

JOURNAL *for the* STUDY *of* RELIGIONS *&* IDEOLOGIES

• No. 7 • spring 2004

Edited by S.C.I.R.I. & SACRI
<http://www.sacri.ro>

ISSN: 1583-0039

EDITOR:
Sandu FRUNZA, B.B.U.

EXECUTIVE EDITORS:
Michael JONES
Temple University
Mihaela FRUNZA
B.B.U.

MEMBERS:
Diana COTRAU, B.B.U.
Codruta CUCEU, B.B.U.
Alina BRANDA, B.B.U.
Nicu GAVRILUTA, U. Al. I. Cuza, Iasi
Ana-Elena ILINCA, B.B.U.
Petru MOLDOVAN, B.B.U.
Adonis VIDU, Emanuel Univ.
Adrian COSTACHE, B.B.U.

MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:
Horatiu CRISAN
Liviu POP (html version)

ADVISORY BOARD

Aurel CODOBAN, B.B.U.
Aziz AL-AZMEH
American University of Beirut
Ioan BIRIS, West Univ., Timisoara
Ioan CHIRILA, B.B.U.
Teodor DIMA, U. Al. I. Cuza, Iasi
Michael FINKENTHAL, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem
Linda FISHER
Central European Univ., Budapest
Mircea FLONTA, U. Bucharest
Ladislau GYEMANT, B.B.U.

Zev HARVEY
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Moshe IDEL
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Adrian-Paul ILIESCU, U. Bucharest
Marius JUCAN, B.B.U.
Ioan-Vasile LEB, B.B.U.
Mircea MICLEA, B.B.U.
Adrian MIROIU, SNSPA, Bucharest
Camil MURESANU, B.B.U.
Toader NICOARA, B.B.U.
Dorothy NOYES

Ohio State University
Liliana POPESCU, CEP
Dan RATIU, B.B.U.
Traian ROTARIU, B.B.U.
SALAT Levente, B.B.U.
Leonard SWIDLER
Temple University
Peter van der VEER
Univ. of Utrecht
Leon VOLOVICI
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
VERESS Carol, B.B.U.

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

PETER VAN DER VEER

**Transnational Religion;
Hindu and Muslim Movements • 4**

LEONARD SWIDLER

**Toward a universal
declaration of a global ethic • 19**

JOHANNES MICHAEL SCHNARRER

**The challenge of the globalization of the world
economy or - is the social and ecological misery in
the so called Third World something of our con-
cern? • 46**

ANTON CARPINSCHI, ANDREI ILAS

**Criza politica si constructia institutionala
democratica.
O analiza comparata a douazeci si opt de
constitutii
Political Crisis and the Democratic Institutional
Construction.
A Compared Analysis of Twenty-eight Constitu-
tions • 54**

EMIL MOISE

**Relatia Stat-Biserica în privinta educatiei
religioase în scolile publice din România
Church-State Relation in the Religious Education
in Romanian Public Schools • 77**

DMITRY A. GOLOVUSHKIN

**On the issue of religious tolerance in modern
Russia: national identity and religion • 101**

MARINA GASKOVA

**The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shap-
ing the Political Culture of Russia • 111**

FUAD B. ALIYEV

**Framing Perceptions of Islam and the 'Islamic
Revival' in the Post-Soviet Countries • 123**

J. C. ACHIKE AGBAKOBA

**Traditional African Political Thought and the Cri-
sis of Governance in Contemporary African Soci-
eties • 137**

BÜLENT ÖZDEMİR

**Political Use of Conversion in the Nineteenth
Century Ottoman Context: Some Cases From
Salonica • 155**

LILIYA SAZONOVA

**The role of interfaith dialogue in the process of
protection and implementation of Human Rights
• 170**

ION CORDONEANU

**O radiografie necesara – Ortodoxie si Globalizare
A Necessary Radiography: Orthodoxy and
Globalisation • 182**

SCIRI CONFERENCES

MARIUS JUCAN

Secularizare/ desecularizare. Un rezumat de etapa

Secularization/ De-secularization • 192

BOOK REVIEWS

VASILE CATALIN BOBB

C. G. Jung, Opere complete. Arhetipurile si inconstientul colectiv

C. G. Jung, Complete Works. Archetypes and Collective Unconsciousness • 204

AUREL BUMBAS-VOROBIOV

**Stefan Iloaie, Nae Ionescu
si ortodoxia romana**

**Stefan Iloaie, Nae Ionescu and the Romanian
Orthodoxy • 206**

RALUCA CIURCANU

**Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives. Modernity and
Its Outcasts • 208**

SANDU FRUNZA

**Ioan Chirila, Fragmentarium exegetic filonian II.
Nomothetica. Repere exegetice la Decalog • 210**

OTILIA HERMAN

**Bryan Wilson, Religia din perspectiva sociologica
Bryan Wilson, Religion. A Sociological Perspective
• 212**

CHRISTIAN SCHUSTER

**Constantin Radulescu-Motru, Scrieri Politice
Constantin Radulescu-Motru, Political Writings •
217**

SANDU FRUNZA

**Leonard Swidler, Dupa absolut. Viitorul dialogic al
reflectiei religioase**

**Leonard Swidler, *After the Absolute. The dialogi-
cal future of religious reflection* • 224**

AUREL CODOBAN

**Gal Laszlo, Societate si Logicitate
Gal Laszlo, Logic and Society • 226**

Transnational Religion; Hindu and Muslim Movements

This paper deals with transnational Hindu and Muslim movements. It rejects the common assertion that migrant communities are conservative in religious and social matters by arguing that 'traditionalism' requires considerable ideological creativity that transforms previous practices and discourses considerably. It suggests instead that religious movements, active among migrants, develop cosmopolitan projects that can be viewed as alternatives to the cosmopolitanism of the European Enlightenment. This raises a number of challenges concerning citizenship, integration and political loyalty for governmentality in the nation-states in which these cosmopolitan projects are carried out. The paper suggests that instead of looking at religious migrants as at best conservative and at worst terrorist one should perhaps pay some attention to the creative moments in human responses to new challenges and new environments.

1. Introduction

Religion is a conceptual category that, like similar categories such as 'culture' and 'ritual' and 'society', organizes understandings of social practices in a novel way from the beginning of the 19th century (Asad 1993, van der Veer 2001). As a modern category it emerges together with nationalism as an ideology in discourses that oppose the 'modern' to the 'traditional'. Theories that emphasize the trans-historical universality of 'religion' and the particular historicity of the nation underestimate the extent to which the nation form is universalised in modern history and determines the location of religion. Societies assume the nation-form in the historical transformation that we refer to as 'modernity' and it is this form that determines what is understood as the religious or the secular. This assertion is

PETER VAN DER VEER

Professor of Comparative Religion, University of Utrecht. His most recent book in English is *Imperial Encounters: Religion, Nation, and Empire*.

KEY WORDS:

nation-state, trans-nationalism, Hindu, Muslim, migrants, identity, orientalist imagination, tradition, globalisation, cosmopolitanism

not a re-phrasing of the secularisation-thesis since there is not much evidence for the disappearance of religion or its marginality in public life in most societies. Rather, it emphasises the importance of the nation-state for the location and nature of religion. Again, theories, such as those of Durkheim or of recent authors like Gellner and Anderson, that argue that religion is replaced by nationalism neglect the continuing importance of nationalized religion in modern identity. (Anderson 1991, Bellah 1973, Gellner 1983). In Western Europe, at least, denominational differences are not completely obliterated in the process of national unification, but they are often hierarchically 'encompassed' (to use Louis Dumont's term) as forms of national identity (Dumont 1980). This encompassment is in many plural societies expressed in well-worn slogans, such as 'unity in diversity'. In the modern nation-state religious difference does not immediately have to lead to questions of loyalty to the nation, although, as we shall see, this continues to be a delicate issue in relation to immigrant minorities that practice religions that seem difficult to assimilate.

Nation and trans-nation belong together in a more intimate way than is often realized. (van der Veer 1995) Processes of globalisation have been intrinsic to processes of state-formation both in colonizing and colonized societies. This is not taken sufficiently into account in theories of globalisation that posit the dissolution of the nation-state today as a consequence of the development of trans-national governance and the global economy. In fact, from the 19th century nations have been formed as a consequence of transfor-

mations in the world-system. The fundamental changes that we see over the past few decades, undeniably, do have important consequences for the political and economic capacities of nation-states, but they do certainly not imply the dissolving of this societal form. It is important to remain aware of the great variation of state formation in the world and the variable effects of global capitalist transformations on the nation-state system. At the same time there can be little doubt that human interaction networks increasingly operate on a global scale (Mann 1999) One of the most important transformations we can point at is that of what is called 'the death of distance', the idea being that communications in the broad sense (including telecommunications and transport) have brought everyone closer to everyone. Migrant communities at the end of the 20th century are thus different from those at the end of the 19th century, because telephone, inter-net, television and airplane bring them not only closer to home, but also to members of the community in other places. Instead of forming singular migrant communities that try to keep in touch with home they become diasporic networks with a multiplicity of nodes. Moreover, there is a global production of the imagination of 'home' in media like television and cinema which affects both migrants and those who stay behind. The cultural distance with the traditions of 'home' can therefore not be conceptualised in the same ways as before. The notion of 'culture' itself has become increasingly problematic since it is hard to localize in discrete communities within bounded territories (van der Veer 1997)

The general observations that I have made here are meant to be introductory to the issues I want to address in this paper. The first issue is that of the relation between nation-states, nationalism and migrant religious communities. The second is that of the so-called religious conservatism of migrant communities. The final is that of alternative cosmopolitanisms. These issues are related in the perspective presented here, but can be disentangled for analytical purposes. My examples concern mainly transnational Muslim and Hindu communities.

2. Nation, Migration and Religion

An important issue often raised in relation to migrant religious communities is that of political loyalty to either the nation-state of immigration or the nation-state of origin. Before the rise of the nation-state in Europe this was an issue that was raised not in relation to migration, but to religious minorities. The European wars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were fought around the question of political loyalty: Can one be loyal to the state when one is not following the religion of the state? As Hobbes and other political thinkers realized, it was the nature of the state that was at issue here. One outcome of the political revolutions in America and France of the late eighteenth century was that political loyalty could rest on citizenship instead of membership in the state church. This development led ultimately, for example in nineteenth-century Britain, to the 'secular' idea of the enfranchisement of

the Roman Catholics and of dissenting minorities. Therefore the definition of citizenship and its connection not only to rights and obligations but also to cultural notions and practices of belonging and community become crucial.¹

One of the central elements in the debate in Europe about the integration of migrant communities, and especially Muslims, in society is the question of political loyalty. Were in the nineteenth century Roman Catholics in Protestant countries like Britain or Holland often accused of being loyal to 'the pope in Rome', Muslims today are either accused of being loyal to Mecca (and receive money from the Saudis) or to their nation-states of origin. In the Netherlands, where around 700.000 Muslims (less than 3 percent of the population) live, a recent report of the Internal Security Agency (BVD) argues that mosques which are supported from 'outside' are forces which work against the integration of Muslims in Dutch society. Suspicions that Muslim migrants have their loyalties elsewhere has, obviously, been strongly reinforced by the terrorist assault on the USA of September 11, 2001. The fact that there are terrorist networks of radical Muslims operating in many Western societies is justifiably seen as a threat to the security of these nation-states. Moreover, the enthusiasm shown by some Muslim youngsters for the actions of Bin Laden has been highly publicised and discussed as an unacceptable provocation to the nation-state and thrown doubts on their loyalty. In the Netherlands the decision of some Moroccan newspaper-sellers in November 2001 to stop distributing a newspaper that had

a Quranic quotation in Arabic on its cover threw further doubt on Muslim participation in what the Dutch themselves perceive to be an open society. In debates about religious points of view Muslim citizens are regularly requested to show their allegiance to Dutch norms and values, and to the laws of the land. Some of this is simply a juridical demand connected to citizenship, but it does single Muslims out. There is discernible moral panic that transcends the language of rights and obligations. The general idea behind this anxiety is expressed by the political philosopher Charles Taylor, who argues that “secularism in some form is necessary for the democratic life of religiously diverse societies”.² Starting with John Stuart Mill liberal thinkers have felt that religion is likely to be a threat to freedom and democracy.³ Muslims in particular have often been portrayed as fanatically pursuing the imposition of Islamic values on non-Muslims. In Western Europe it was the burning of copies of Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* that has done more than anything else to reinforce the image of intolerant Islam and to highlight the conflict between liberal conceptions of citizenship and religious conceptions of collective action in the public sphere.⁴

Besides this general, secularist unease with the role of public religion in the nation-state there is the problem of dual citizenship and the role of religion in transnational linkages. Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands are often still citizens in their nation-states of origin. For both Turkey and Morocco the loyalty of their transnational communities continues to be of crucial economic and political importance. These states

make concerted efforts to control the appointment of religious officials, such as imams, in the migrant communities, because it is religion that ties these migrants to the nation.⁵ Moreover, these states have a vested interest in controlling the education of such officials. One could speak of transnational state policies not only in economic and political matters, but also in religious ones. Migrant communities, therefore, have to negotiate the religious policies of both the nation of immigration and the nation of origin.

Questions of multiple citizenship and religion have gained priority on the European political agenda. Hyphenated identities, which have become of great importance in identity politics in the US, are now also increasingly important in Europe and Asia. To illustrate this development and to demonstrate that transnational religious movements are crucial in it I want to examine the case of India.

India has seen the emergence of a special kind of hyphenated identity: the non-resident Indian (NRI). The Foreign Exchange Regulations Act of 1973 includes in this category: 1. citizens of India living abroad for the purpose of carrying on a business or career, but declaring their intention to stay in India for an indefinite period. 2. Persons of Indian origin holding a passport of another country. One is of Indian origin if one has held an Indian passport, or if either of the parents or grandparents was Indian. The wife of a person of Indian origin is held to be of Indian origin too. Citizenship nor residence are thus the criteria for deciding who belongs to this category, but ‘origin’ is and in that sense it has

much in common with the German genealogical definition according to which migrant communities in Eastern Europe belong to the German nation and have the right to return to Germany. One reason for the Indian state to create this category is to raise foreign exchange, since NRIs are allowed to deposit money in Indian banks with competitive, guaranteed rates of interest. However, I would suggest that the main reason is not economic, but political. It is striking that it is not the lower-class migrant labourers in the Gulf region who are the primary targets of this policy, although they are among the migrants by far the most important economic actors in terms of remittances and other effects on the Indian economy. It is also not the older migrant communities of indentured labourers and their descendants or even the older merchant communities that form the target of this policy. Rather it is the new Hindu middle-class professional and entrepreneurial migrant in especially the USA that forms an important focus for Indian politics. In 1998 the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) proposed further changes, such as the introduction of a PIO card (Person of Indian origin) with a number of benefits attached to it. In 2001 the Indian Government, led by the BJP, announced the appointment of an ambassador at large for NRIs and PIOs in the embassy in Washington. It is ironic that a party that derives so much of its political gains from a campaign which stigmatises the indigenous Muslim community as 'foreign' is so interested in Indians who actually live in foreign lands. Such Indians are primarily perceived as Hindus and Hindu nationalism

mobilizes large groups of Hindu migrants all over the world. "Achievements" like the nuclear explosions of 1998, for example, enhanced enthusiasm under the non-resident Indians (NRIs) in the USA. The announcement of international sanctions against India led to successful fundraising by the Indian government under NRIs in the USA. Transnational investment, global politics and the cultural capital of 'belonging' go hand in hand here.⁶

In his impressive work on the network society Manuel Castells argues that while the legitimizing identities of the state are declining in the information age, resistance identities and project identities (aiming at total societal transformation) are on the rise. In his view, these identities are produced by social movements which react against three fundamental threats: "globalization, which dissolves the autonomy of institutions, organizations and communication systems where people live. Reaction against networking and flexibility, which blur the boundaries of membership and involvement, individualize social relationships of production, and induce the structural instability of work, space, and time. And reaction against the crisis of the patriarchal family, at the roots of the transformation of mechanisms of security building, socialization, sexuality, and therefore of personality systems. When the world becomes too large to be controlled, social actors aim at shrinking it back to their size and reach."⁷ Castells' observations are useful, but, at the same time, things look somewhat different when one examines Indian social movements with a global reach. I want to look at two of

them, one Hindu, the other Muslim, but both originating in India.

The Vishva Hindu Parishad, founded in 1964 by leaders of the militant Hindu nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu guru Swami Chinmayanand, is a Hindu revivalist movement which simultaneously tries to reach out globally to all Hindus in the world and mobilize Hindus in India for anti-Muslim politics.⁸ The most important action of the VHP has been in the period 1984 to 1992 to mobilize Hindus for the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, a mosque allegedly built on a Hindu site. Not only has this action reached its target of destroying the 16th century mosque it also has made the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a political party allied to both VHP and RSS, the largest party in India. The issue of building a temple for the God Rama on the site of the destroyed temple continues to be raised by the VHP especially during major elections.

What concerns us here are the contradictory faces of the VHP. On the one hand, the VHP is clearly a movement that promotes Hindu nationalism with an anti-secular and anti-Muslim slant and as such it is a movement that continues much of the religious nationalist rhetoric and methods of such movements since the late 19th century. It resists westernization and globalization in so far as they are portrayed as 'foreign' threats to the basic Hindu values of the Indian nation. Muslims as a community signify the 'foreign' as 'the enemy within'. Ideologically, they are portrayed as 'converts', having their allegiance outside of India. The VHP argues that

they do not belong to India, but to Pakistan or to Arabia and have thus to be either religiously purified by re-conversion to Hinduism or ethnically cleansed by forced emigration.

On the other hand, the VHP is a movement that is very active globally and one of the prime agents of the globalization of Hinduism. In the USA it is active since 1974, following sizable immigration from India. The anti-Muslim politics which is central to its activities in India, does not make much sense in the USA. Anti-globalization rhetoric which emphasizes restrictions on foreign capital flowing into Indian companies is conspicuously absent from the VHP propaganda in the USA and rightly so, since its supporters there are strongly in favor of the liberalization and globalization of the economy. As NRIs they have also direct personal advantage in the free flow of capital. The focus of the VHP in the USA is, as with many religious movements globally, on the family. The great fear of Indian migrants to the USA is perhaps not so much the threat to the patriarchal nature of the Hindu family, since many of these migrants are well-educated professionals and both men and women are income-earners. Rather, it is the struggle to reproduce Hindu culture in a foreign environment in order to socialize their children into the hybridity of Indian-Americans. The fear is often that the children will lose all touch with the culture of the parents and thus, in some sense, be lost to them. Both Internet-chatgroups and youth camps are organised by the VHP to keep Hinduism alive among young Indians in the USA. As Arvind Rajagopal rightly observes, the

VHP needs different tactics, different objectives in different places in order to be able to recruit members. In India it is a nationalist movement, but in the US it is a global religious movement.⁹ Arjun Appadurai's work on globalization has reminded us consistently how important it is to keep these disjunctures and differences in global flows in view.¹⁰

The VHP has benefited from the great success of the serialization of the religious epic Ramayana between 1987 and 1988 on Doordarshan, Indian national television. It not only became the most popular program ever seen on Indian television but also turned out to be a social and political event of great significance. The estimated daily viewership was 40 to 60 million, while some 80 to 100 million people watched the most popular episodes. Newspaper reports say that Indian life ground to a standstill at the time of the broadcast. Hindus all over the country watched with a religious attitude, having in fact a darshan, a vision of the sacred. on durdarshan, television. Put on twenty-six videocassettes it became available for worldwide sale. The VHP not only benefited from this, but used itself also actively media, such as video-cassettes, for purposes of propaganda. The Hindu nationalist movement uses a combination of media strategies to promote their views both in India and abroad among the NRIs.¹¹

In the context of current essentialist thinking about Islamic politics it is interesting to contrast the VHP, a highly political Hindu religious movement with a Muslim movement, originating in India, which is explicitly a-political. This is the Tablighi Jama'at, a Muslim revivalist

movement founded in Delhi in the 1920s, but globally spread, especially in areas of Indo-Pakistani migration, such as Britain, USA, Canada, France, Belgium, Germany, South Africa and Morocco.¹² This is now the largest transnational Islamic movement, in scale and scope only comparable to Christian Pentecostalism. Marc Gaborieau describes its *modus operandi* succinctly: "the invitation (tabligh) to Islam is not the affair of religious specialists, but the responsibility of all Muslims who must devote their time and money to it; one should not wait for people to come to hear the preaching, but ether preachers should travel to reach the people; preaching is done by self-financing itinerant groups; the mingling of all social classes is obligatory within these groups; the primary objective is to deepen the faith of those who are already Muslims, proselytism toward non-Muslims being marginal; and the promotion of the unity of Muslims being a primary objective, theological as well as political controversies are prohibited inside the movement".¹³ The tablighis, then, resemble some of the Christian evangelical movements which summon their fellow-believers to wake-up and be faithful.

The tablighis are professedly a-political and this is a very deliberate stance. In that sense they do not resist any particular state or political formation. Instead they have a project in the way Manuel Castells defines it, an objective of total transformation of society not by the state but by social actors without political mediation. For the social scientist it makes no sense to call this a-political, since it clearly has political effects. Rather it is

anti-statist and not involved in democratic politics. In that sense it is, obviously, crucial for the tablighis to state that they are neither interested in the state nor in politics. It enables them to work in a great variety of states, both Islamic and non-Islamic, without coming into open conflict with them. The aim of total transformation, however, does conflict in an indirect way with state-policies of assimilation and multiculturalism, since they promote religious enclaves of correct beliefs and behaviour.

It is fascinating to see that this truly global movement which can only be understood in terms of global labour migration is very much opposed to modern media of communication, like television, cassettes and videos, internet, such as are used almost by any other global movement of this kind. This resistance to globalization and to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) is quite exceptional among transnational Islamic movements. In fact, according to a recent argument by Eickelman and Anderson, a transnational Muslim public sphere is being opened up through the use of Information and Communication Technologies.¹⁴ The tablighis do not conform to this trend. The method of communication is oral and the expansion of the movement works through face-to-face encounters and the movement of groups who preach. Despite the first impression of an extremely loosely organised network of groups, there is in fact a clear hierarchy of command, centering on Delhi, but the apex of it is hardly penetrable for outsiders.

Both these movements, the VHP and the Tablighi Jama'at, operate globally but have different strategies, aims and objectives in different locales simultaneously. The VHP, however, continues to emphasize the intermediate, national level, while this level has an ideologically reduced significance for tablighis who stress the transnational unity of Muslims ('umma). They have interesting and contradictory stances towards globalization, but it is clear that their transnational politics have impact on the projects of a number of states to create civil societies.

3. Religious Conservatism in Migrant Communities

It is often asserted and sometimes demonstrated that migrant communities become conservative in religious and social matters. They would do so to retain their identity under the pressures of assimilation. Moreover, since they are often challenged in a multicultural environment to explain their beliefs and practices they tend to become more aware of them. Such awareness can lead to a receptivity towards ideological reifications that take cultural and religious elements out of the daily flow of life and make them into markers of identity in a plural society. This kind of conservatism or reactionary traditionalism has been observed in a number of migrant groups, such as the Dutch Reformed Church migrants in Michigan (USA), Canada and Australia. In debates about Muslims in Western Europe it is often

remarked that they tend to be more religiously conservative than their kin who have stayed in the countries of origin. The observation that migrant groups have to become more aware of their religion and culture due to their constant interpellation by 'established' communities is undoubtedly correct. It is also valid to assume that an ideological apologetics, based on a conscious awareness of one's 'culture' in order to be able to defend one's practices, may follow from this. However, such observations should not be interpreted as the 'freezing' of an otherwise fluid tradition. In fact, 'traditionalism' requires immense ideological work that transforms previous discursive practices substantially. Work on arguments about Islam in high school discussions in Western Europe describes in detail how Muslim students acquire skills to defend their religion and culture, in ways appropriate to the discursive styles in the nation-states of immigration. ¹⁵ More broadly, migrant groups are often required to translate their discursive traditions into the dominant language of the nation of immigration in order to educate the generations born in these new societies. ¹⁶ This act of translation is crucial in the transformation of religious tradition. When Hindus and Muslims in the Netherlands begin to speak about their religious specialists and their religious services by using Protestant Christian vocabulary they are already in a process of transformation, in which pandits and imams provide guidance in spiritual matters and become not-yet secularised social workers.

In a recent contribution Olivier Roy distinguishes several responses to the migrant situation by Mus-

lims. ¹⁷ The first is the so-called 'salafist' that stresses the return to an original and authentic Islam, but in doing so goes against the ethnicization of Islam. Mosques in Europe tend to be 'Moroccan', 'Turkish', 'Algerian', 'Bangladeshi' or otherwise ethnically specific, but this tendency of ethnic division has been rejected as *fitna* in Islamic thought and the salafists or 'new fundamentalists' make use of this to preach a global Islam transcending ethnic and national divisions. The second is a process of individualization in which individual belief instead of social conformism is the basis of Islamic behaviour. To be a 'true' Muslim is more a personal choice and a matter of internal conversion than the result of social pressure. It is here that we can understand the success of such movements as the Tablighi Jama'at since they produce a kind of 'born-again' Muslims. Thirdly, there is the expansion of web-sites where self-appointed experts on Islamic thought and behaviour teach their version. This creates a new sphere of Muslim communication and debate in which the traditional interpreters of the tradition, the 'ulama, play a diminished role. In this debate, however, it is not 'liberal Islam', promoted by such thinkers as the Algerian Muhammad Arkoun, which is prevalent. Rather it is the more literalist or even fundamentalist arguments that are dominant. Again, these developments do not show conservatism, but quite significant transformations that bring 'born-again' Muslims, so to say, in direct conflict with their own fellow-Muslims who try to continue some of their ethnic-religious practices in a new environment.

Crucial is the shaping of the public sphere and the deployment of Islamic arguments in it. An interesting illustration of what may happen in the liberal public sphere is a recent incident in mid-2001 in the Netherlands. An important news-program on Dutch television had an item on violence against homosexuals by Moroccan youth gangs. A Moroccan imam in Rotterdam was invited to comment in that program and asked what he thought of homosexuality. He stated clearly on television that homosexuality was regarded as a terrible aberration in Islam and that it was a disease that would ultimately threaten Dutch society. He indicated in the interview that violence against homosexuals was forbidden and that homosexuals should be regarded with pity and treated, but this part of the interview was not broadcast. Within a few days the media could not stop reporting on the illiberal and unenlightened nature of Islam and members of parliament started arguing that this imam should be brought to justice and possibly extradited. The Dutch Prime Minister made a very strong statement that Muslim immigrants should conform to the norms and values of Dutch society. In the media a demand for state intervention in education of imams was voiced from different sides, forgetting the secular separation of state and church for a moment. The rapid transition from a concern about violence to a concern about religion was striking in the Dutch debate. It is in this context that imams are appointed as spokesmen for their religious community by the Dutch media and public opinion and in which the understanding of Islam in

both Muslim and non-Muslim public spheres has to be articulated.

Imams who state publicly that Islam is against homosexual practice are portrayed as conservative in the liberal public sphere. Moreover, since Morocco is a country which is known in the partly orientalist imagination as a heaven of homosexual and pederast practice for at least a century there is a further notion that what is accepted in Morocco is suddenly not anymore acceptable in the Netherlands because of the growing conservatism of migrant Muslims.¹⁸ This precisely shows the difference in the understanding of 'the public' in Morocco and the Netherlands. In Holland identity movements, such as the Gay movement, have after the sixties made great progress in gaining public recognition of their sexual identity. A recent culmination of that is the civil marriage for homosexuals. In Morocco there may be substantial gay activity, but no public recognition nor debate about it. Gays should be 'in the closet' in Moroccan society (as in fact in most societies) but in Holland this is not possible anymore; positions have to be publicly stated and are immediately connected to religion. Everything becomes a subject of public debate and the invitation to that debate is given under special conditions and can hardly be refused. In the Netherlands the leaders of Muslim communities were summoned by the Minister of Urban Policy to explain their views on homosexuality in a meeting at his department. The nature of the liberal public sphere is such that religious points of view can be primed and framed by the media as more conservative than in the countries of origin and

deeply offensive to liberal sensibilities. In such an atmosphere religious leaders can be made into ethnic spokesmen.

4. Alternative Cosmopolitanisms

Instead of looking at religious migrants as at best conservatives and at worst terrorists one should perhaps pay some attention to the positive and creative moments in human responses to new challenges and new environments. Transnational religious movements are hardly ever seen as instances of cosmopolitanism, since cosmopolitanism is very positively valued in social thought. Secularity is a characteristic of the nineteenth-century trope of cosmopolitanism and it continues to be so in current discussions. Religious allegiances are understood as condemning the believer to parochialism, absolutism and a lack of tolerance.¹⁹ Given the importance attributed to the notion of cosmopolitanism in current discussions of transnationalism and globalization I want to complicate this perspective.²⁰ As I have argued elsewhere, cosmopolitanism as a concept and an ethical ideal is not a view from nowhere.²¹ It has a clear genealogy in the European Enlightenment and in its development into a liberal, progressive ideal in the nineteenth century it connects nationalism with imperialism.²² In my view, it was in nineteenth-century Europe always complemented by a Christian cosmopolitanism of both the Catholic and the Protestant kind. Missionary movements in nineteenth-century Britain,

for example, created a public awareness of a larger world beyond Britain and of an imperial duty towards the rest of the world. Liberal Cosmopolitanism and Evangelical Cosmopolitanism developed side by side in the colonial era. Their commonality was well expressed in the phrase “the white man’s burden” which is still behind global charitable and developmental activism. If openness and a willingness to engage are characteristic of cosmopolitanism one has to recognize a number of different projects of engagement with the world.²³

In the contemporary phase of globalization non-western kinds of cosmopolitan engagements with very different genealogies have come up. There are new perceptions of ‘home and the world’ at play in a number of migrations. The postcolonial cities of today show a massive deprovincialization of the world or, as I would argue, a new cosmopolitanism. Clifford Geertz expresses this with his usual rhetorical flourish: “As the entanglements of everybody with everybody else have grown in recent times to the point where everyone is tripping over everyone’s feet and everyone is everyone’s face, its disruptive power, its capacity to induce doubts in those who think they have things figured out, taped, under control, rapidly increases. We live in a bazar, not a cathedral; a whirl, not a diagram, and this makes it difficult for anyone anymore to be wholly at ease with his or her own ideas, no matter how official, no matter how cherished, no matter how plated with certainty”.²⁴

There are a variety of responses to this situation. One of them is indeed non-interference or even indifference. Ulf Hannerz argues correctly that this attitude

is not cosmopolitanism, since it is the attitude of sticking to one's own. Genuine cosmopolitanism in his view is a willingness to engage with the Other. The question, however, is what are the conditions and terms of engagement in today's global cities. In an essay on the cultural role of world cities Hannerz uses a quotation from V.S. Naipaul as his motto: "Cities like London were to change. They were to cease being more or less national cities; they were to become cities of the world, modern-day Romes, establishing the pattern of what great cities should be, in the eyes of islanders like myself and people even more remote in language and culture. They were to be cities visited for learning and elegant goods and manners and freedom by all the barbarian peoples of the globe, people of forest and desert, Arabs, Africans, Malays".²⁵ This is in fact a nineteenth-century British view in which the cultural engagement is perceived as an attempt to uplift the "great unwashed", now constituted by groups of very different cultural backgrounds. Naipaul is, of course, one of the great believers in a universal civilization, rooted in the Enlightenment, and not at all sympathetic to the persistence of backward cultures, predominantly of what he perceives as an anti-rational religious kind. He is a representative of liberal cosmopolitanism. But is this the only possibility of engagement in the global city?

We see in global cities predominantly a cultural engagement within the context of a politics of immigration.²⁶ These cities are a product of the increased mobility of capital and labour and they are the sites of new notions of citizenship and solidarity, but also violence.

²⁷ Particularly interesting are the new social movements that mobilize outsiders to gain access to housing, property, sanitation, health services, education, childcare, employment, and protection. The established respond to these claims by developing more and more elaborate security measures, creating walled enclaves in the city. Ghettos, ethnic neighborhoods, enclaves are the conditions of engagement in the global city. Gendered and communal identities are newly constructed in the encounter with the Other which is often anonymous and indifferent, but sometimes violent when spatial markings of identity are violated. Nothing is fixed and settled in the urban space: outsiders today are the established of tomorrow and the demands of the globalized network society prevent a reflexive life-planning for most people except a tiny elite.²⁸

Much of the cultural engagement in the global cities in the world is reactive to the enormous dislocations of modern flexible capital and labour. People do try to build enclaves of communal identity and stake their claims to ownership of the city, sometimes violently. Their engagement with the Other is not necessarily pleasant. Nevertheless, I believe that it is in these urban arenas that new sources of the self, in religious, gender, and political terms, develop. For migrants a vision of a better life is one of the most important elements in their migration. That vision is partly economic, but it is also culturally embedded. The urban space of a mega-city is already invested with a lot of dream-work, to use the Freudian terminology. The imagination of possibility, of dynamism, of mobility is fed by cinematic productions

that imbue the real spaces of migrant labour with an aura of virtuality. It is interesting to see how religious visions try to claim these spaces and are confronted with other imaginative claims, both in the own community, and coming from outside. In the case of South Asians, elements of popular culture, such as cricket and Bollywood, have become as global as religious culture. It is this popular culture of media and sports, of 'fun' and leisure, that religious movements have to come to term with in the urban context. The cosmopolitanism claimed in cricket and in some movies has to be confronted by them. Pnina Werbner cites the famous Indian Muslim actor Dilip Kumar at a fund raising in Britain for a cancer hospital in Lahore, set up by the immensely popular cricketer Imran Khan in 1987: "It is an irony, when the world is growing towards not just internationalism but towards universalness, that we are speaking about nationalities, we are talking about ethnic identities: we, the people and some leaders of human society talk about religion, practising irreligiousness... Yes, we've had too much of this religion. There is but one religion that is preached by all the gospels, by all the sacred books, and that is the decency of man towards fellow human beings. And I stand here with that stamp of Indian nationality to support the cause of my brother [Imran Khan] in this exercise in humanism, universal humanism..."²⁹ Werbner, rightly argues that this is not anti-Islamic, but in fact a plea for a certain kind of cosmopolitan religion. Such a plea runs counter to other cosmopolitan projects that are carried by religious movements.

If we thus are looking for a postmodern cosmopolitanism it is the global city we have to examine. I, for one, do not want to be restricted by Jean Baudrillard's description of postmodern culture as immediate and bland, transparent and fast-moving...a blip on the screen, impelled by commercialism, without depth, without place. In fact, locality is produced by global forces and the global city is a very real domain in which cosmopolitanism as a pattern of inclusion and exclusion in the public sphere emerges. Especially, transnational movements which help migrants to cope with the conditions of migration and labour flexibility as well as the vicissitudes of the world economy, such as the Tablighi Jama'at in Islam and the Visva Hindu Parishad in Hinduism, do, to some extent, build religious enclaves, safe havens of the self, but are, at the same time, creatively developing new religious understandings of their predicament, entailing an encounter with the multiplicity of Others and with global conditions on their own terms. Both the Tablighi Jama'at and the VHP have strong connections with Gujarati communities that have longstanding transnational ties with East Africa, Britain, and the USA. For Gujaratis there is a close affinity between trading and business networks and the networking that is central to these religious movements. That kind of affinity is even stronger in the case of sectarian business communities like the Jains or the Daudi Bohras.³⁰ But it is not only that religious movements link up with globalised social configurations, but also that religious worldviews engage global issues in an innovative manner. To mention only one example: if the

development of the financial markets is one of the main elements of globalisation, affecting patterns of migration substantially, it is illuminating to look at the speculation on Islamic financial alternatives in Muslim circles. Islamic interpretations of interest (riba) in the context of discussions of derivatives cut to the heart of global finance and are, as such, engagements with the world from another discursive tradition.³¹ It is impossible to simply call such arguments and the movements that carry them closed, confined and confining, provincial as against cosmopolitan. They are cosmopolitan projects, but emerge from very different histories than that of the European Enlightenment.

Global cities are located everywhere, from Hongkong to Rio de Janeiro, from Mumbai to Los Angeles; they are not anymore the metropolises of colonial empires. The global imageries which are at play in them are just as multi-centred. I met a Pakistani taxi-driver in New York who was saving money to study Islamic science in Teheran and I am regularly travelling in aeroplanes with Hindu grandmothers who are located both in India and the US and connect their grandchildren with a religion that is constantly negotiated in New York and San Francisco. The 19th century Western bourgeois project of cosmopolitanism is not anymore possible in the global cities of today, since the differences are too substantial, the diasporic communications too frequent. And this does not only concern elites. As Pnina Werbner has recently argued about working-class Pakistani cosmopolitans, labour migration forges global pathways, routes along which Islamic and familial

transnational worlds are constituted.³² One does not know what the postmodern, postcolonial cosmopolitanism will look like, but it will be a beast of a different kind, whether we like it or not.

References

- ¹ Bryan S. Turner, ed., *Citizenship and Social Theory*. London: Sage, 1993.
- ² Charles Taylor, 'Modes of Secularism', in Rajeev Bhargava (ed), *Secularism and its critics*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- ³ John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government*. Ed. Geraint Williams. London: J.M. Dent, 1993
- ⁴ Talal Asad, "Multiculturalism and British identity in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair", in *Genealogies*, see footnote 1.
- ⁵ See Rubah Salih, 'Confronting Modernities; Muslim Women in Italy', *ISIM-Newsletter*, March 2001.
- ⁶ Prema Kurien, "Gendered Ethnicity: Creating a Hindu Indian Identity in the United States", *American behavioural Scientist*, 42, 4, 1999, 648-670, idem, "Religion, ethnicity and politics: Hindu and Muslim Indian immigrants in the United States", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24, 2, 2001, 263-293.
- ⁷ Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1997, p.66.
- ⁸ for a general overview, see Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism. Hindus and Muslims in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
- ⁹ Arvind Rajagopal, "Transnational networks and Hindu nationalism", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29, 3, 1997, 49-50
- ¹⁰ see Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- ¹¹ Arvind Rajagopal, *Politics after Television. Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India*. Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 2001. About Indian television viewers in Britain: Marie Gillespie: *Television, Ethnicity, and Cultural Change*. London: Routledge, 1995.

¹² Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed, *Travellers in Faith; Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic movement for Faith Renewal*. Leiden: Brill, 2000.

¹³ Marc Gaborieau, "Transnational Islamic Movements: Tablighi Jama'at in Politics?", ISIM Newsletter, 1999, 3, 21.

¹⁴ Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson (ed) *New Media and the Muslim World*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

¹⁵ Werner Schiffauer, Gerd Baumann, Steven Vertovec and Riva Kastoryano, eds. *Civil Enculturation: Nation-State, School, and Ethnic Difference in Four European Countries*. London: Routledge, in press.

¹⁶ David Pocock, 'Preservation of the Religious Life: Hindu Immigrants in England' *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 10, 1976, 341-365.

¹⁷ Olivier Roy, 'Muslims in Europe: From Ethnic Identity to Religious Recasting', ISIM Newsletter, June 2000.

¹⁸ This similar to the Dutch understanding of the Turkish demand to wear headscarves in schools. Since this is forbidden in Turkish schools this demand is seen by the Dutch as a sign of growing conservatism. There is a serious neglect of the political context of Turkey in which a radical secularist government tries to get rid of public Islam but seems to be losing that battle.

¹⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1973. Idem: *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*. London: Routledge, 1992.

²⁰ See for instance, Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds) *Cosmopolitics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

²¹ Peter van der Veer, "Colonial Cosmopolitanism", in Robin Cohen and Steve Vertovec, eds: *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002

²² Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), *Nation and Religion. Perspectives on Europe and Asia*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999.

²³ See on these issues: George Thomas, 'Social Movements in Rationalistic Contexts: Religions in World Culture' and 'Religion in Global Civil Society', in press.

²⁴ Clifford Geertz, 'Reason, Religion, and Professor Gellner', in *The Limits of Pluralism: neo-absolutism and relativism*. Amsterdam: Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, 1995, 169

²⁵ Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections*. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 127.

²⁶ James Holton and Arjun Appadurai 'Cities and Citizenship', *Public Culture*, 19, 1996. Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its discontents: Essays on the new mobility of people and money*. New York; The New Press, 1998

²⁷ Thomas Blom Hansen, *Wages of Violence*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001


²⁸ See Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1997.

²⁹ Pnina Werbner, "Fun Spaces: On Identity and Social Empowerment among British Pakistanis", *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 1996, vol.13, 4: 70.

³⁰ Jonah Blank, *Mullahs on the Mainframe: Islam and Modernity among the Daudi Bobras*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001; Marcus Banks, *Organizing Jainism in India and England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

³¹ Bill Maurer, "Engineering an Islamic future: Speculations on Islamic financial alternatives". *Anthropology Today*, 17, 1, 2001, 8-11.

³² Pnina Werbner, 'Global Pathways. Working class cosmopolitans and the creation of transnational ethnic worlds', *Social Anthropology* (1999), 7, 1, 17-35.



Leonard Swidler

Toward a universal declaration of a global ethic

LEONARD SWIDLER

Professor at Temple University, Philadelphia, co-president of the Global Dialogue Institute, co-editor of the *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*. Author of the books: *Dialogue for Reunion* (1962), *Women in Judaism* (1976), *Kung in Conflict* (1981), *Yeshua: A Model for Moderns* (1993), *The Study of Religion in an Age of Global Dialogue* (2000), *Dupa absolut. Viitorul dialogic al religiei* (2003). E-mail: dialogue@temple.edu

Humans tend to group themselves in communities with similar understandings of the meaning of life and how to act accordingly. For the most part, in past history such large communities, called cultures or civilizations, have tended on the one hand to live unto themselves, and on the other to dominate and, if possible, absorb the other cultures they encountered. For example, Christendom, Islam, China.

I. The meaning of religion (ideology)

At the heart of each culture is what is traditionally called a Religion, that is: “An explanation of the ultimate meaning of life, and how to live accordingly.” Normally all religions contain the four “C’s”: Creed, Code, Cult, Community-structure, and are based on the notion of the Transcendent.

KEY WORDS:

Global ethics, dialogue, inter-religious dialogue, ideology, declaration of universal ethics

Creed refers to the cognitive aspect of a religion; it is everything that goes into the “explanation” of the ultimate meaning of life.

Code of behavior or ethics includes all the rules and customs of action that somehow follow from one aspect or another of the *Creed*.

Cult means all the ritual activities that relate the follower to one aspect or other of the Transcendent, either directly or indirectly, prayer being an example of the former and certain formal behavior toward representatives of the Transcendent, like priests, of the latter.

Community-structure refers to the relationships among the followers; this can vary widely, from a very egalitarian relationship, as among Quakers, through a “republican” structure like Presbyterians have, to a monarchical one, as with some Hasidic Jews vis-a-vis their “Rebbe.”

The *Transcendent*, as the roots of the word indicate, means “that which goes beyond” the every-day, the ordinary, the surface experience of reality. It can refer to spirits, gods, a Personal God, an Impersonal God, Emptiness, etc.

Especially in modern times there have developed “explanations of the ultimate meaning of life, and how to live accordingly” which are not based on a notion of the Transcendent, e.g., secular humanism, Marxism. Although in every respect these “explanations” function as religions traditionally have in human life, because the idea of the Transcendent, however it is understood, plays such a central role in religion, but not in these “explanations,” for the sake of accuracy it is best to give these “explanations” not based on notion of the Tran-

scendent a separate name; the name often used is: *Ideology*. Much, though not all, of the following will, *mutatis mutandis*, also apply to Ideology even when the term is not used.

II. From the age of monologue to the age of dialogue

1. A Radically New Age

Those scholars who earlier in the twentieth century with a great show of scholarship and historical/sociological analysis predicted the impending demise of Western Civilization were “dead wrong.” After World War I, in 1922, Oswald Spengler wrote his widely acclaimed book, *The Decline of the West*¹. After the beginning of World War II Pitirim A. Sorokin published in 1941 his likewise popular book, *The Crisis of Our Age*². Given the massive, world-wide scale of the unprecedented destruction and horror of the world’s first global war, 1914-18, and the even vastly greater of the second global conflict, 1939-45, the pessimistic predictions of these scholars and the great following they found are not ununderstandable.

In fact, however, those vast world conflagrations were manifestations of the dark side of the unique breakthrough in the history of humankind in the modern development of Christendom-become-Western

Civilization, now becoming Global Civilization. Never before had there been world wars; likewise, never before had there been world political organizations (League of Nations, United Nations). Never before did humanity possess the real possibility of destroying all human life—whether through nuclear or ecological catastrophe. These unique negative realities/potentialities were possible, however, only because of the correspondingly unique accomplishments of Christendom/Western/Global Civilization—the like of which the world has never before seen. On the negative side, from now on it will always be true that humankind could self-destruct. Still, there are solid empirical grounds for reasonable hope that the inherent, infinity-directed life force of humankind will nevertheless prevail over the parallel death force.

The prophets of doom were correct, however, in their understanding that humanity is entering into a radically new age. Earlier in this century the nay-sayers usually spoke of the doom of only Western Civilization (e.g., Spengler, Sorokin), but after the advent of nuclear power and the Cold War, the new generation of pessimists - as said, not without warrant: *corruptio optimae pessima* - warned of *global* disaster. This emerging awareness of global disaster is a clear, albeit negative, sign that something profoundly, radically new is entering onto the stage of human history.

There have, of course, also recently been a number of more positive signs that we humans are entering a radically new age. In the 1960s there was much talk of “The Age of Aquarius,” and there still is today the con-

tinuing fad of “New Age” consciousness. Some may be put off from the idea of an emerging radically new age because they perceive such talk to be simply that of fringe groups. I would argue, however, that the presence of “the crazies” around the edge of any idea or movement, far from being a sign of the invalidity of that idea or movement, is on the contrary a confirmation precisely of its validity, at least in its core concern. I would further argue that if people are involved with a movement which does not eventually develop its “crazies,” its extremists, the movement is not touching the core of humankind’s concerns—they should get out of the movement, they are wasting their time!

Moreover, there have likewise recently been a number of very serious scholarly analyses pointing to the emergence of a radically new age in human history. Two of them will be dealt with in some detail. The first is the concept of the “Paradigm-Shift,” particularly as expounded by Hans Küng³. The second is the notion of the “Second Axial Period,” as articulated by Ewert Cousins⁴. Then, including these two, but setting them in a still larger context, I shall lay out my own analysis, which I see as the movement of humankind out of a multi-millennia long “Age of Monologue” into the newly inbreaking “Age of Dialogue,” indeed, an inbreaking “Age of Global Dialogue.”

Of course there is a great deal of continuity in human life throughout the shift from one major “Paradigm” to another, from one “Period” to another, from one “Age” to another. Nevertheless, even more striking than this continuity is the ensuing break, albeit largely

on a different level than the continuity. This relationship of continuity and break in human history is analogous to the transition of water from solid to fluid to gas with the increase in temperature. With water there is throughout on the chemical level the continuity of H_2O . However, for those who have to deal with the water, it makes a fantastic difference whether the H_2O is ice, water, or steam! In the case of the major changes in humankind, the physical base remains the same, but on the level of consciousness the change is massive. And here too it makes a fantastic difference whether we are dealing with humans whose consciousness is formed within one paradigm or within another, whose consciousness is Pre-Axial, Axial-I or Axial-II, whose consciousness is Monologic or Dialogic.

2. A Major Paradigm-Shift

Thomas Kuhn revolutionized our understanding of the development of scientific thinking with his notion of paradigm shifts. He painstakingly showed that fundamental “paradigms” or “exemplary models” are the large thought frames within which we place and interpret all observed data and that scientific advancement inevitably brings about eventual paradigm shifts - from geocentrism to heliocentrism, for example, or from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics - which are always vigorously resisted at first, as was the thought of Galileo, but finally prevail⁵. This insight, however, is valid not only for the development of thought in the

natural sciences, but also applicable to all major disciplines of human thought, including religious thought. For example, the move from the Semitic thought world of Jesus and his followers into the Hellenistic world of early Christianity and then into the Byzantine and Medieval Western Christian worlds, and further, generated a number of greater and lesser paradigm shifts in European religion and culture over the centuries.

3. The Modern Major Paradigm-shift

Since the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, Christendom-now-become-Western Civilization has been undergoing a major paradigm shift, especially in how we humans understand our process of understanding and what meaning and status we attribute to “truth,” that is, to our statements about reality - in other words, to our epistemology. This new epistemological paradigm is increasingly determining how we perceive, conceive, think about, and subsequently decide and act on things.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the role in religion, in the “ultimate understanding of reality and how to live accordingly,” played by the conceptual paradigm or model one has of reality. The paradigm within which we perceive reality not only profoundly affects our theoretical understanding of reality, but also has immense practical consequences. For example, in Western medicine the body is usually conceived of as a highly nuanced, living machine, and therefore if one

part wears out, the obvious thing to do is to replace the worn part - hence, organ transplants originated in Western, but not in Oriental, medicine.

However, in Oriental, Chinese, medicine, the body is conceived of as a finely balanced harmony: “pressure” exerted on one part of the body is assumed to have an opposite effect in some other part of the body - hence, acupuncture originated in Oriental, but not in Western, medicine⁶. Our conceptual paradigms have concrete consequences.

Furthermore, obviously some particular paradigms or models for perceiving reality will fit the data better than others, and they will then be preferred - e.g., the shift from the geocentric to the heliocentric model in astronomy. But sometimes differing models will *each* in their own ways “fit” the data more or less adequately, as in the example of Western and Oriental medicines. The differing models are then viewed as complementary. Clearly it would be foolish to limit one’s perception of reality to only one of the complementary paradigms.

Let me turn now to the post-Enlightenment epistemological Paradigm-Shift. Whereas the Western notion of truth was largely absolute, static, and monologic or exclusive up to the past century, it has since become deabsolutized, dynamic and dialogic - in a word, it has become “relational.”⁷ This “new” view of truth came about in at least six different, but closely related, ways. In brief they are:

1. Historicism: Truth is deabsolutized by the perception that reality is always described in terms of the circumstances of the time in which it is expressed.

2. Intentionality: Seeking the truth with the intention of acting accordingly deabsolutizes the statement.

3. Sociology of knowledge: Truth is deabsolutized in terms of geography, culture, and social standing.

4. Limits of language: Truth as the meaning of something and especially as talk about the transcendent is deabsolutized by the nature of human language.

5. Hermeneutics: All truth, all knowledge, is seen as interpreted truth, knowledge, and hence is deabsolutized by the observer who is always also interpreter.

6. Dialogue: The knower engages reality in a dialogue in a language the knower provides, thereby deabsolutizing all statements about reality.⁸

In sum, our understanding of truth and reality has been undergoing a radical shift. This new paradigm which is being born understands all statements about reality, especially about the meaning of things, to be historical, intentional, perspectival, partial, interpretive and dialogic. What is common to all these qualities is the notion of *relationality*, that is, that all expressions or understandings of reality are in some fundamental way related to the speaker or knower. It is while bearing this paradigm shift in mind that we proceed with our analysis.

0. Before the nineteenth century in Europe truth, that is, *a statement about reality*, was conceived in quite an absolute, static, exclusivistic either-or manner. If something was true at one time, it was always true; not only

empirical facts but also the meaning of things or the oughtness that was said to flow from them were thought of in this way. At bottom, the notion of truth was based exclusively on the Aristotelian principle of contradiction: a thing could not be true and not true in the same way at the same time. Truth was defined by way of exclusion; A was A because it could be shown not to be not-A. Truth was thus understood to be absolute, static, exclusivistically either-or. This is a *classicist* or *absolutist* view of truth.

1. Historicism: In the nineteenth century many scholars came to perceive all statements about the truth of the meaning of something as partially the products of their historical circumstances. Those concrete circumstances helped determine the fact that the statement under study was even called forth, that it was couched in particular intellectual categories (for example, abstract Platonic, or concrete legal, language), particular literary forms (for example, mythic or metaphysical language), and particular psychological settings (such as a polemic response to a specific attack). These scholars argued that only if the truth statements were placed in their historical situation, their historical *Sitz im Leben*, could they be properly understood. The understanding of the text could be found only in context. To express that same original meaning in a later *Sitz im Leben* one would require a proportionately different statement. Thus, all statements about the meaning of things were now seen to be deabsolutized in terms of time.

This is a *historical* view of truth. Clearly at its heart is a notion of *relationality*: any statement about the truth of the meaning of something has to be understood in relationship to its historical context.

2. Intentionality: Later thinkers like Max Scheler added a corollary to this historicizing of knowledge; it concerned not the past but the future. Such scholars also saw truth as having an element of intentionality at its base, as being oriented ultimately toward action, praxis. They argued that we perceive certain things as questions to be answered and set goals to pursue specific knowledge because we wish to do something about those matters; we intend to live according to the truth and meaning that we hope to discern in the answers to the questions we pose, in the knowledge we decide to seek. The truth of the meaning of things was thus seen as deabsolutized by the action-oriented intentionality of the thinker-speaker.

This is an *intentional* or *praxis* view of truth, and it too is basically *relational*: a statement has to be understood in relationship to the action-oriented intention of the speaker.

3. The sociology of knowledge: Just as statements of truth about the meaning of things were seen by some thinkers to be historically deabsolutized in time, so too, starting in this century with scholars like Karl Mannheim, such statements began to be seen as deabsolutized by such things as the culture, class and gender of the thinker-speaker, regardless of time. All re-

ality was said to be perceived from the perspective of the perceiver=s own world view. Any statement of the truth of the meaning of something was seen to be perspectival, “standpoint-bound,” *standortgebunden*, as Karl Mannheim put it, and thus deabsolutized.

This is a *perspectival* view of truth and is likewise *relational*: all statements are fundamentally related to the standpoint of the speaker.

4. The limitations of language: Following Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, many thinkers have come to see that any statement about the truth of things can be at most only a partial description of the reality it is trying to describe. Although reality can be seen from an almost limitless number of perspectives, human language can express things from only one perspective at one. If this is now seen to be true of what we call “scientific truths,” it is so much the more true of statements about the truth of the meaning of things. The very fact of dealing with the truth of the “meaning” of something indicates that the knower is essentially involved and hence reflects the perspectival character of all such statements.

A statement may be true, of course - it may accurately describe the extra-mental reality it refers to - but it will always be cast in particular categories, language, concerns, etc., of a particular “standpoint,” and in that sense will be limited, deabsolutized.

This also is a *perspectival* view of truth, and therefore also *relational*.

This limited and limiting, as well as liberating, quality of language is especially clear in talk of the transcendent. The transcendent is by definition that which goes beyond our experience. Any statements about the transcendent must thus be deabsolutized and limited far beyond the perspectival character seen in ordinary statements.

5. Hermeneutics: Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur recently led the way in developing the science of hermeneutics, which, by arguing that all knowledge of a text is at the same time an *interpretation* of the text, further deabsolutizes claims about the “true” meaning of the text. But this basic insight goes beyond knowledge of texts and applies to all knowledge. In all knowledge *I* come to know something; the object comes into me in a certain way, namely, through the lens that *I* use to perceive it. As St. Thomas Aquinas stated,: “Things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower - *cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis*.”⁹

This is an *interpretive* view of truth. It is clear that *relationality* pervades this hermeneutical, interpretative, view of truth.

6. Dialogue: A further development of this basic insight is that *I* learn not by being merely passively open or receptive to, but by being in dialogue with, extra-mental reality. *I* not only “hear” or receive reality, but *I* also - and, *I* think, first of all - “speak” to reality. *I* ask it questions, *I* stimulate it to speak back to me, to answer

my questions. In the process I give reality the specific categories and language in which to respond to me. The “answers” that I receive back from reality will always be in the language, the thought categories, of the questions I put to it. It can “speak” to me, can really communicate with my mind, only in a language and categories that I understand.

When the speaking, the responding, grows less and less understandable to me, if the answers I receive are sometimes confused and unsatisfying, then I probably need to learn to speak a more appropriate language when I put questions to reality. If, for example, I ask the question, “How far is yellow?” of course I will receive a non-sense answer. Or if I ask questions about living things in mechanical categories, I will receive confusing and unsatisfying answers.

This is a *dialogic* view of truth, whose very name reflects its *relationality*.

With this new and irreversible understanding of the meaning of truth, the critical thinker has undergone a radical Copernican turn. Just as the vigorously resisted shift in astronomy from geocentrism to heliocentrism revolutionized that science, the paradigm shift in the understanding of truth statements has revolutionized all the humanities, including theology-ideology. The macro-paradigm with which critical thinkers operate today is characterized by historical, social, linguistic, hermeneutical, praxis and dialogic – *relational* – consciousness. This paradigm shift is far advanced among thinkers and doers; but as in the case of Copernicus,

and even more dramatically of Galileo, there are still many resisters in positions of great institutional power.

With the deabsolutized view of the truth of the meaning of things we come face to face with the specter of relativism, the opposite pole of absolutism. Unlike *relationality*, a neutral term which merely denotes the quality of being in relationship, *relativism*, like so many “isms,” is a basically negative term. If it can no longer be claimed that any statement of the truth of the meaning of things is absolute, totally objective, because the claim does not square with our experience of reality, it is equally impossible to claim that every statement of the truth of the meaning of things is completely relative, totally subjective, for that also does not square with our experience of reality, and of course would logically lead to an atomizing isolation which would stop all discourse, all statements to others.

Our perception, and hence description, of reality is like our view of an object in the center of a circle of viewers. My view and description of the object, or reality, will be true, but it will not include what someone on the other side of the circle perceives and describes, which will also be true. So, neither of our perceptions and descriptions of reality is total, complete – “absolute” in that sense – or “objective” in the sense of not in any way being dependent on a “subject” or viewer. At the same time, however, it is also obvious that there is an “objective,” doubtless “true” aspect to each perception and description, even though each is relational to the perceiver-“subject.”

But if we can no longer hold to an absolutist view of the truth of the meaning of things, we must take certain steps so as not to be logically forced into the silence of total relativism. First, besides striving to be as accurate and fair as possible in gathering and assessing information and submitting it to the critiques of our peers and other thinkers and scholars, we need also to dredge out, state clearly, and analyze our own pre-suppositions - a constant, ongoing task. Even in this of course we will be operating from a particular “standpoint.”

Therefore, we need, secondly, to complement our constantly critiqued statements with statements from different “stand-points.” That is, we need to engage in dialogue with those who have differing cultural, philosophical, social, religious viewpoints so as to strive toward an ever fuller perception of the truth of the meaning of things. If we do not engage in such dialogue we will not only be trapped within the perspective of our own “standpoint,” but will now also be aware of our lack. We will no longer with integrity be able to remain deliberately turned in on ourselves. Our search for the truth of the meaning of things makes it a necessity for us as human beings to engage in dialogue. Knowingly to refuse dialogue today could be an act of fundamental human irresponsibility - in Judeo-Christian terms, a sin.

4. The Second Axial Period¹⁰

It was the German philosopher Karl Jaspers who almost a half-century ago in his book *The Origin and Goal*

*of History*¹¹ pointed to the “axial” quality of the transformation of consciousness that occurred in the ancient world. He called the period from 800-200 B.C.E. the “Axial Period” because “it gave birth to everything which, since then, man has been able to be.” It is here in this period “that we meet with the most deepcut dividing line in history. Man, as we know him today, came into being. For short, we may style this the ‘Axial Period.’”¹² Although the leaders who effected this change were philosophers and religious teachers, the change was so radical that it affected all aspects of culture, for it transformed consciousness itself. It was within the horizons of this form of consciousness that the great civilizations of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe developed. Although within these horizons many developments occurred through the subsequent centuries, the horizons themselves did not change. It was this form of consciousness which spread to other regions through migration and explorations, thus becoming the dominant, though not exclusive, form of consciousness in the world. To this day, whether we have been born and raised in the culture of China, India, Europe, or the Americas, we bear the structure of consciousness that was shaped in this Axial Period.

What is this structure of consciousness and how does it differ from pre-Axial consciousness? Prior to the Axial Period the dominant form of consciousness was cosmic, collective, tribal, mythic, and ritualistic. This is the characteristic form of consciousness of primal peoples. It is true that between these traditional cultures and the Axial Period there emerged great empires

in Egypt, China, and Mesopotamia, but they did not yet produce the full consciousness of the Axial Period.

The consciousness of the tribal cultures was intimately related to the cosmos and to the fertility cycles of nature. Thus there was established a rich and creative harmony between primal peoples and the world of nature, a harmony which was explored, expressed, and celebrated in myth and ritual. Just as they felt themselves part of nature, so they experienced themselves as part of the tribe. It was precisely the web of interrelationships within the tribe that sustained them psychologically, energizing all aspects of their lives. To be separated from the tribe threatened them with death, not only physical but psychological as well. However, their relation to the collectivity often did not extend beyond their own tribe, for they often looked upon other tribes as hostile. Yet within their tribe they felt organically related to their group as a whole, to the life cycles of birth and death and to nature and the cosmos.

The Axial Period ushered in a radically new form of consciousness. Whereas primal consciousness was tribal, Axial consciousness was individual. “Know thyself” became the watchword of Greece; the Upanishads identified the *atman*, the transcendent center of the self; Gautama charted the way of individual enlightenment; Confucius laid out the individual’s ethical path; the Jewish prophets awakened individual moral responsibility for powerless persons. This sense of individual identity, as distinct from the tribe and from nature, is the most characteristic mark of Axial consciousness.

From this flow other characteristics: consciousness which is self-reflective, analytic, and which can be applied to nature in the form of scientific theories, to society in the form of social critique, to knowledge in the form of philosophy, to religion in the form of mapping an individual spiritual journey. This self-reflective, analytic, critical consciousness stood in sharp contrast to primal mythic and ritualistic consciousness. When self-reflective *logos* emerged in the Axial Period, it tended to oppose the traditional *mythos*. Of course, mythic and ritualistic forms of consciousness survive in the post-Axial Period even to this day, but they are often submerged, surfacing chiefly in dreams, literature, and art.

Following the lead of Ewert Cousins, if we shift our gaze from the first millennium B.C.E. to the eve of the twenty-first century, we can discern another transformation of consciousness, which is so profound and far-reaching that he calls it the “Second Axial Period.”¹³ Like the first, it is happening simultaneously around the earth, and like the first it will shape the horizon of consciousness for future centuries. Not surprisingly, too, it will have great significance for world religions, which were constituted in the First Axial Period. However, the new form of consciousness is different from that of the First Axial Period. Then it was individual consciousness, now it is global consciousness.

This global consciousness which is generated on a “horizontal” level through the world-wide meeting of cultures and religions, is only one of the global characteristics of the Second Axial Period. The consciousness of this period is global in another sense, namely, in re-

discovering its roots in the earth. At the very moment when the various cultures and religions are meeting each other and creating a new global community, our life on the planet is being threatened. The very tools which we have used to bring about this convergence - industrialization and technology - are undercutting the biological support system that sustains life on our planet. The future of consciousness, even life on the earth, is shrouded in a cloud of uncertainty.

Cousins is not suggesting a romantic attempt to live in the past, rather that the evolution of consciousness proceeds by way of recapitulation. Having developed self-reflective, analytic, critical consciousness in the First Axial Period, we must now, while retaining these values, reappropriate and integrate into that consciousness the collective and cosmic dimensions of the pre-Axial consciousness. We must recapture the unity of tribal consciousness by seeing humanity as a single tribe.

Further, we must see this single tribe related organically to the total cosmos. This means that the consciousness of the twenty-first century will be global from two perspectives: (1) from a horizontal perspective, cultures and religions must meet each other on the surface of the globe, entering into creative encounters that will produce a complexified collective consciousness; (2) from a vertical perspective, they must plunge their roots deep into the earth in order to provide a stable and secure base for future development. This new global consciousness must be organically ecological, supported by structures that will insure justice and peace. The voices of the oppressed must be heard and

heeded: the poor, women, racial and ethnic minorities. These groups, along with the earth itself, can be looked upon as the prophets and teachers of the Second Axial Period. This emerging twofold global consciousness is not only a creative possibility to enhance the twenty-first century; it is an absolute necessity if we are to survive.

5. Globalization

Since the 16th-century European “Age of Discovery” the earth has tended more and more to become, as Wendell Wilkie put it in 1940, “One World.” This increasingly happened in the form of “Christendom” dominating and colonizing the rest of the world. In the 19th century, however, “Christendom” became less and less “Christian” and more and more the “secular West,” shaped by a secular ideology, or ideologies, alternative to Christianity. Still, the religious and ideological cultures of the West, even as they struggled with each other, dealt with other cultures and their religions in the customary manner of ignoring them or attempting to dominate, and even absorb, them - though it became increasingly obvious that the latter was not likely to happen.

As the 20th century drew to a close, however, all of those ways of relating become increasingly impossible to sustain. For example: What happened in other cultures quickly led young men and women of the West to die on the volcanic ash of Iwo Jima or the desert sands

of Kuwait. But more than that, the “West” could no longer escape what was done in the “First World,” such as the production of acid rain, in the “Second World,” such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident, or in the “Third World,” such as the mass destruction of the Amazon rain forest, “the world = lungs.”

At the same time the world has been slowly, painfully emerging from the millennia-long Age of Monologue into the Age of Dialogue. As noted above, until beginning a century or so ago, each religion, and then ideology - each culture - tended to be very certain that it alone had the complete “explanation of the ultimate meaning of life, and how to live accordingly.” Then through the series of revolutions in understanding, which began in the West but ultimately spread more and more throughout the whole world, the limitedness of all statements about the meaning of things began to dawn on isolated thinkers, and then increasingly on the middle and even grass-roots levels of humankind: The epistemological revolutions of historicism, pragmatism, sociology of knowledge, language analysis, hermeneutics, and finally dialogue.

Now that it is more and more understood that the Muslim, Christian, secularist, Buddhist, etc. perception of the meaning of things is necessarily limited, the Muslim, Christian, secularist, etc. increasingly feels not only no longer driven to replace, or at least dominate, all other religions, ideologies, cultures, but even drawn to enter into dialogue with them, so as to expand, deepen, enrich each of their necessarily limited perceptions of

the meaning of things. Thus, often with squinting, blurry eyes, humankind is emerging from the relative darkness of the “Age of Monologue” into the dawning “Age of Dialogue”—dialogue understood as a conversation with someone who differs from us *primarily* so *we* can learn, because of course since we now growingly realize that our understanding of the meaning of reality is necessarily limited, we might learn more about reality’s meaning through someone else’s perception of it.

6. The Age of Global Dialogue

Ewert Cousins has basically affirmed everything Hans Küng has described as the newly emerging contemporary paradigm-shift, but Cousins sees the present shift as much more profound than simply another in a series of major paradigm-shifts of human history. He sees the current transformation as a shift of the magnitude of the First Axial Period which will similarly reshape human consciousness. I too want to basically affirm what Küng sees as the emerging contemporary Major Paradigm-Shift, as well as with Cousins that this shift is so profound as to match in magnitude the transformation of human consciousness of the Axial Period, so that it should be referred to as a Second Axial Period.

More than that, however, I am persuaded that what humankind is entering into now is not just the latest in a long series of major paradigm-shifts, as Hans Küng has

so carefully and clearly analyzed. I am also persuaded that it is even more than the massive move into the consciousness transforming Second Axial Period, as Ewert Cousins has so thoroughly demonstrated. Beyond these two radical shifts, though of course including both of them, humankind is emerging out of the 'from-the beginning-till-now' millennia-long 'Age of Monologue' into the newly dawning "Age of Dialogue."

The turn toward dialogue is, in my judgment, *the most fundamental, the most radical and utterly transformative* of the key elements of the newly emerging paradigm, which Hans Küng has so penetratingly outlined, and which Ewert Cousins also perceptively discerns as one of the central constituents of the Second Axial Age. However, that shift from monologue to dialogue constitutes such a radical reversal in human consciousness, is so utterly new in the history of humankind *from the beginning*, that it must be designated as literally *Arevolutionary*,@ that is, it turns everything absolutely around. In brief: Dialogue is *a whole new way of thinking* in human history.

To sum up and reiterate: In the latter part of the twentieth century humankind is undergoing a Macro-Paradigm-Shift (Hans Küng). More than that, at this time humankind is moving into a transformative shift in consciousness of the magnitude of the Axial Period (800-200 B.C.E.) so that we must speak of the emerging of the Second Axial Period (Ewert Cousins). Even more profound, however, now at the edge of the Third Millennium humankind is slipping out of the shadowy Age

of Monologue, where it has been since its beginning, into the dawn of the Age of Dialogue (Leonard Swidler). Into this new Age of Dialogue Küng=s Macro Paradigm Shift and Cousins = Second Axial Period are sublated (*aufgehoben*, in Hegel=s terminology), that is, taken up and transformed. Moreover, as Ewert Cousins has already detailed, humankind=s consciousness is becoming increasingly global. Hence, our dialogue partners necessarily must also be increasingly global. In this new Age of Dialogue dialogue on a global basis is now not only a possibility, it is a necessity. As I noted in the title of a recent book - humankind is faced with ultimately with two choices: Dialogue or Death!¹⁴

III. Need for a global ethic

When the fact of the epistemological revolutions leading to the growing necessity of interreligious, interideological, intercultural dialogue is coupled with the fact of all humankind=s interdependency - such that any significant part of humanity could precipitate the whole of the globe into a social, economic, nuclear, environmental or other catastrophe - there arises the pressing need to focus the energy of these dialogues on not only how humans perceive and understand the world and its meaning, but also on how they should act in relationship to themselves, to other persons, and to nature, within the context of reality=s undergirding, pervasive, overarching source, energy and goal, however

understood. In brief, humankind increasingly desperately needs to engage in a dialogue on the development of, not a Buddhist ethic, a Christian ethic, a Marxist ethic, etc., but of a global ethic - and I believe a key instrument in that direction will be the shaping of a *Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic*.

I say ethic in the singular rather than ethics in the plural, because what is needed is not a full blown global ethics in great detail - indeed, such would not even be possible - but a global consensus on the fundamental attitude toward good and evil and the basic and middle principles to put it into action. Clearly also, this ethic must be global. It will not be sufficient to have a common ethic for Westerners or Africans or Asians, etc. The destruction, for example, of the ozone layer or the loosing of a destructive gene mutation by any one group will be disastrous for all.

I say also that this *Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic* must be arrived at by consensus through dialogue. Attempts at the imposition of a unitary ethics by various kinds of force have been had aplenty, and they have inevitably fallen miserably short of globality. The most recent failures can be seen in the widespread collapse of communism, and in an inverse way in the resounding rejection of secularism by resurgent Islamism.

That the need for a global ethic is most urgent is becoming increasingly apparent to all; humankind no longer has the luxury of letting such an ethic slowly and haphazardly grow by itself, as it willy nilly will gradually happen. It is vital that there be a conscious focusing of

energy on such a development. Immediate action is necessary:

1) Every scholarly institution, whether related to a religion or ideology or not, needs to press its experts of the widest variety of disciplines to use their creativity among themselves and in conjunction with scholars from other institutions, both religiously related and not, in formulating a Global Ethic.

2) Every major religion and ethical group needs to commission its expert scholars to focus their research and reflection on articulating a Global Ethic from the perspective of their religion or ethical group - in dialogue with all other religions and ethical groups.

3) Collaborative "Working Groups," of scholars in the field of ethics which are very deliberately interreligious, interideological need to be formed specifically to tackle this momentous task, and those which already exist need to focus their energies on it.

4) Beyond that there needs to be a major permanent Global Ethic Research Center, which will have some of the best experts from the world=s major religions and ethical groups in residence, perhaps for years at a stretch, pursuing precisely this topic in its multiple ramifications.

When the *Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic* is finally drafted - after multiple consultation, revision and eventual acceptance by the full range of religious and ethical institutions - it will then serve as a minimal ethical standard for humankind to live up to, much as the United Nation=s 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Through the former, the moral force of the

world=s religious and ethical institutions can be brought to bear especially on those issues which are not very susceptible to the legal and political force of the latter. Such an undertaking by the Religions and Ideologies of the world would be different from, but complementary to, the work of the United Nations.

After the initial period, which doubtless would last several years, the “Global Ethic Research Center” could serve as an authoritative religious and ideological scholarly locus to which always-new specific problems of a global ethic could be submitted for evaluation, analysis and response. The weightiness of the responses would be “substantive,” not “formal.” That is, its solutions would carry weight because of their inherent persuasiveness coming from their intellectual and spiritual insight and wisdom.

IV. Principles of a universal declaration of a global ethic

Let me first offer some suggestions of the general notions that I believe ought to shape a UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF GLOBAL ETHIC, and then offer a tentative draft constructed in their light:

1. The Declaration should use language and images that are acceptable to all major religions and ethical groups; hence, its language ought to be “humanity-based,” rather than from authoritative religious books; it should be from “below,” not from “above.”

2. Therefore, it should be anthropo-centric, indeed more, it must be anthropo-cosmo-centric, for we can not be fully human except within the context of the whole of reality.

3. The affirmations should be dynamic in form in the sense that they will be susceptible to being sublated (aufgehoben), that is, they might properly be reinterpreted by being taken up into a larger framework.

4. The Declaration needs to set inviolable minimums, but also open-ended maximums to be striven for; but maximums may not be required, for it might violate the freedom-minimums of some persons.

5. It could well start with - though not limit itself to - elements of the so-called “Golden Rule”: Treat others as we would be treated.

Excursus: the “Golden Rule”

A glimpse of just how pervasive the “Golden Rule” is, albeit in various forms and expressions, in the world=s religions and ideologies, great and small, can be garnered from this partial listing:

a) Perhaps the oldest recorded version - which is cast in a positive form - stems from Zoroaster (628-551 B.C.E.): “That which is good for all and any one, for whomsoever - that is good for me...what I hold good for self, I should for all. Only Law Universal is true Law” (*Gathas*, 43.1).

b) Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.), when asked “Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for

all one's life?" said: "Do not to others what you do not want done to yourself" (*Analects*, 12.2 & 15.23).

Confucius also stated in a variant version: "What I do not wish others to do to me, that also I wish not to do to them" (*Analects*, 5.11).

c) The founder of Jainism was Vardhamana, known as Mahavira (AGreat Hero - 540-468 B.C.E.); the various scriptures of Jainism, however, derived from a later period: "A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself would be treated" (*Sutrakri-tanga* 1.11.33). "One who you think should be hit is none else but you.... Therefore, neither does he cause violence to others nor does he make others do so" (*Acarangasutra* 5.101-2).

d) The founder of Buddhism was Siddhartha Gautama, known as the Buddha "Enlightened One" - 563-483 B.C.E.); the various scriptures of Buddhism also derived from a later period: "Comparing oneself to others in such terms as 'Just as I am so are they, just as they are so am I,' he should neither kill nor cause others to kill" (*Sutta Nipata* 705). "Here am I fond of my life, not wanting to die, fond of pleasure and averse from pain. Suppose someone should rob me of my life.... If I in turn should rob of his life one fond of his life.... How could I inflict that upon another?" (*Samyutta Nikaya* v.353).

e) The Hindu epic poem, the 3rd-century B.C.E. Mahabharata, states that its "Golden Rule," which is expressed in both positive and negative form, is the summary of all Hindu teaching, "the whole Dharma": "Vyasa says: Do not to others what you do not wish

done to yourself; and wish for others too what you desire and long for for yourself - this is the whole of Dharma; heed it well" (*Mahabharata*, Anusasana Parva 113.8).

f) In the biblical book of Leviticus (composed in the fifth century B.C.E., though some of its material may be more ancient) the Hebrew version of the "Golden Rule" is stated positively: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. 19: 18).

g) The deuterocanonical biblical Tobit was written around the year 200 B.C.E. and contains a negative version - as most are - of the "Golden Rule": "Never do to anyone else anything that you would not want someone to do to you" (Tobit 4:15).

h) The major founder of Rabbinic Judaism, Hillel, who lived about a generation before Jesus, though he may also have been his teacher, taught that the "Golden Rule" - his version being both positive and negative - was the heart of the Torah; "all the rest was commentary": "Do not do to others what you would not have done to yourself" (*Btalmud*, Shabbath 31a).

i) Following in this Jewish tradition, Jesus stated the "Golden Rule" in a positive form, saying that it summed up the whole Torah and prophets: "Do for others just what you want them to do for you" (Luke 6:31); "Do for others what you want them to do for you: this is the meaning of the Law of Moses [*Torah*] and of the teachings of the prophets" (Matthew 7:12).

j) In the seventh century of the Common Era Mohammed is said to have claimed that the "Golden Rule" is the "noblest Religion": "Noblest Religion is

this - that you should like for others what you like for yourself; and what you feel painful for yourself, hold that as painful for all others too.” Again: “No man is a true believer unless he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself.”¹⁵

k) The “Golden Rule” is likewise found in some non-literate religions: “One going to take a pointed stick to pinch a baby bird should first try it on himself to feel how it hurts”¹⁶

l) The eighteenth-century Western philosopher Immanuel Kant provided a “rational” version of the “Golden Rule” in his famous “Categorical Imperative,” or ‘Law of Universal Fairness’: “Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature.... Treat humanity in every case as an end, never as a means only.”¹⁷

m) The late nineteenth-century founder of Baha’ism, Baha’ullah, wrote: “He should not wish for others that which he doth not wish for himself, nor promise that which he doth not fulfill.”¹⁸

n) In 1915 a new version of Buddhism, Won Buddhism, was founded in Korea by the Great Master Sotaesan. In the teachings he left behind are found variants of the “Golden Rule”: “Be right yourself before you correct others. Instruct yourself first before you teach others. Do favors for others before you seek favors from them.” “Ordinary people may appear smart in doing things only for themselves, but they are really suffering a loss. Buddhas and *Bodhisattvas* may appear to be stupid in doing things only for others, but eventually they benefit themselves.”¹⁹

It is clear that the core of the world’s major Religions, the “Golden Rule,” “does not attempt the futile and impossible task of abolishing and annihilating the authentic ego. On the contrary, it tends to make concern for the authentic ego the *measure* of altruism. ‘Do not foster the *ego* more than the *alter*; care for the *alter* as much as for the *ego*.’ To abolish egoism is to abolish altruism also; and *vice versa*.”²⁰

Authentic egoism and authentic altruism then are not in conflict with each other; the former necessarily moves to the latter, even possibly “giving one’s life for one’s friend.” This, however, is the last and highest stage of human development. It is the stage of the (w)holy person, the saint, the arahat, the bodhisattva, the sage. Such a stage cannot be the *foundation* of human society; it must be the *goal* of it. The foundation of human society must be first authentic self-love, which includes moving outward to loving others.

Not recognizing this foundation of authentic self-love is the fundamental flaw of those idealistic systems, such as communism, that try to build a society on the *foundation* of altruism. A human and humanizing society should *lead* toward (w)holiness, toward altruism, but it cannot be built on the assumption that its citizens are (w)holy and altruistic to start with. Such an altruism must grow out of an ever developing authentic self-love; it cannot be assumed, and surely it cannot be forced (as has been tried for decades - with disastrous dehumanizing results).

6. *As humans ineluctably seek ever more knowledge, truth, so too they seek to draw what they perceive as the good to themselves (that is, they love). Usually this self is expanded to include the family, and then friends. It needs to continue its natural expansion to the community, nation, world and cosmos, and the source and goal of all reality.*

7. *But this human love necessarily must start with self-love, for one can love one's "neighbor" only AS one loves oneself; but since one becomes human only by inter-human mutuality, loving others fulfills one's own humanity, and hence is also the greatest act of authentic self-love.*

8. *Another aspect of the "Golden Rule" is that humans are always to be treated as ends, never as mere means, i.e., as subjects, never as mere objects.*

9. *Yet another implication of the "Golden Rule" is that those who cannot protect themselves ought to be protected by those who can.*

10. *A further ring of the expanding circles of the "Golden Rule" is that non-human beings are also to be revered and treated with respect because of their being.*

11. It is important that not only basic but also middle ethical principles be spelled out in this Declaration. Although most of the middle ethical principles that need to be articulated in this Declaration are already embedded in juridical form in the United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is vital that the religions and ethical traditions expressly state and approve them. Then the world, including both adherents and outsiders of the various religions and ethical traditions, will know what ethical standards all are committing themselves to.

12. *If a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic is to be meaningful and effective, however, its framers must resist the temptation to pack too many details and special interests into it. It can function best as a kind of "constitutional" set of basic and middle ethical principles from which more detailed applications can be constantly be drawn.*

V. A plan of action

Such general suggestions need to be discussed, confirmed, rejected, modified, supplemented. Beyond that, it is vital that all the disciplines contribute what from their perspectives ought to be included in the Declaration, how that should be formulated, what is to be avoided - and this is beginning to happen. The year 1993 was the 100th anniversary of the 1893 World Parliament of Religions which took place in Chicago and marked the beginning of what became world-wide inter-religious dialogue. As a consequence, a number of international conferences took place and in the center of them was the launching and developing of a *Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic*.

The first was held in New Delhi, India in February, 1993; the second in August of the same year in Bangalore, India and the third that year in September in Chicago. For that huge (over 6,000 participants) September 1993 Chicago "Parliament of the World's Religions" Professor Hans Küng drafted a document entitled

“Declaration Toward a Global Ethic,” which the Parliament adopted.²¹

Beyond that, the text given below, after having been commissioned by the January 1992 meeting in Atlanta, Georgia of the “International Scholars’ Annual Trialogue-ISAT@ (Jewish-Christian-Muslim), was drafted by Professor Leonard Swidler and submitted to and analyzed at the January, 1993 meeting of ISAT in Graz, Austria; it was focused on during the spring 1993 semester graduate seminar Leonard Swidler held at Temple University entitled: “Global Ethics-Human Rights-World Religions”; it was also a major focus of the “First International Conference on Universalism” in August, 1993, in Warsaw; a Consultation of the American Academy of Religion in November, 1993, in Washington D.C. was devoted to the topic; the sixth “International Scholars’ Annual Trialogue” in January, 1994, concentrated for a second year on the Universal Declaration; in May, 1994, it was the subject of a conference sponsored by the “International Association of Asian Philosophy and Religion - IAAPR@ in Seoul, Korea; the “World Conference on Religion and Peace – WCRP” in part focused on it in its fall, 1994 World Assembly in Rome/Riva del Garda, Italy; and on June 20-21, 1995, it was the subject of a conference in San Francisco in honor of the “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the United Nations,” entitled: “Celebrating the Spirit: Towards a Global Ethic.”

In March, 1997, the Philosophy and Ethics Division of UNESCO held in Paris the first meeting of its newly established committee to work toward a “Universal

Ethic.” Its second meeting was held December, 1997 in Naples in conjunction with the *Istituto Italiano degli Studii Filosofici*. Both the above two Drafts (as well as the one described next) were submitted to this UNESCO committee.

More recently Professor Küng drafted a third text (also contained in this volume), this time within the context of the *InterAction Council*, entitled “A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities.” The *InterAction Council* is a committee made up of former heads of states, chaired by retired Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany. All three of these texts have been subjected to numerous consultations and comments by scholars and thinkers from multiple philosophical, religious and other backgrounds.

It is vital that we study this matter seriously, but we also need to act. We must not dally, for the changes in the world are mounting not only in arithmetic but in geometric fashion. We must hurry with our global ethical guiding light to “get ahead of the curve,” lest Samuel Huntington’s grim prediction of the “Clash of Civilizations” and worse, comes true. On the other hand, a document merely handed down from above will lack the “ownership” of those who it is to influence and guide.

In this matter we can learn from the methodology employed by the Earth Charter Project headquartered in Costa Rica and chaired by Professor Steven Rockefeller. They did indeed initially “prime the pump” with textual input from leading scholars and thinkers, but have then put their bread out on the water of a vast network of

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), religious, secular, political and semi-political organizations and individuals, urging them to bring insights and formulations up from below, which the headquarters is then synthesizing.

To summarize: It is imperative that various religious and ethical communities, ethnic groups and geographical regions work on discussing and drafting their own versions of a “Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic,” that is, *what they consider their own basic ethical principles, which they at the same time believe people of all other religious and ethical traditions could also affirm*. The three already existing drafts should certainly be made use of in this process. But all communities and regions need to make their own contributions to the final Declaration, and in the process of wrestling with the issue and forging the wording, they will make the concern for a global ethic their own, and will thus better be able to mediate it to their “constituents” and enhance the likelihood of the Declaration in fact being adhered to in practice.

What needs to be stressed is that such a project cannot be carried out only by the scholars and leaders of the world=s religious and ethical communities, though obviously the vigorous participation of these elements is vital. The ideas and sensitivities must also come from the grassroots.

Moreover, it is also at the grassroots, as well at the levels of scholars and leaders, that, first, consciousnesses must be raised on the desperate need for the conscious development of a Global Ethic, and then once drafted and accepted, the conviction of its

validity must be gained. The most carefully thought out and sensitively crafted Declaration will be of no use if those who are to adhere to it do not believe in it. A Global Ethic must work on all three levels: scholars, leaders, grassroots. Otherwise it will not work at all. Hence, I urge:

! first, all religious, ethical, ethnic and geographical communities and organizations (either alone or in concert with others, but always in a dialogic spirit) - and most especially the myriad NGOs of the world - need to move seriously but quickly to the drawing up of their own Draft of a “Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic”;

! second, these groups need to strategize on how to maneuver their Drafts to gain the greatest influence in all the theaters each operates in: the UN, other NGOs, scholarly groups, religious groups, the vast world of the internet, myriads of grass-roots organizations - in short, wherever aroused imaginations will lead;

! third, each group should send their Draft of a “Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic” to the *Center for Global Ethics* (Professor Leonard Swidler, *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122; FAX: 215-204-4569; E-mail: dialogue@vm.temple.edu), which will serve first as a collection and distribution center, and when the time is appropriate, a facilitator in the process of synthesizing a

final Draft and devising in as democratic manner as possible a process of world-wide adoption.

In sum, having studied, listened and thought, I challenge us all to take up this vital task and act!

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF A GLOBAL ETHIC

I. RATIONALE

We women and men from various ethical and religious traditions commit ourselves to the following Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic. We speak here not of *ethics* in the plural, which implies rather great detail, but of *ethic* in the singular, i.e., the fundamental attitude toward good and evil, and the basic and middle principles needed to put it into action.

We make this commitment not despite our differences but arising out of our distinct perspectives, recognizing nevertheless in our diverse ethical and religious traditions common convictions that lead us to speak out *against* all forms of inhumanity and *for* humaneness in our treatment of ourselves, one another and the world around us. We find in each of our traditions:

- a) grounds in support of universal human rights,
- b) a call to work for justice and peace, and
- c) concern for conservation of the earth.

We confirm and applaud the positive human values that are, at times painfully slowly, but nevertheless increasingly, being accepted and advocated in our world: freedom, equality, democracy, recognition of interdependence, commitment to justice and human rights. We also believe that conditions in our world encourage, indeed require, us to look beyond what divides us and to speak as one on matters that are crucial for the survival of and respect for the earth. Therefore we advocate movement toward a global order that reflects the best values found in our myriad traditions.

We are convinced that a just global order can be built only upon a global ethic which clearly states universally-recognized norms and principles, and that such an ethic presumes a readiness and intention on the part of people to act justly - that is, a movement of the heart. Secondly, a global ethic requires a thoughtful presentation of principles that are held up to open investigation and critique - a movement of the head.

Each of our traditions holds commitments beyond what is expressed here, but we find that within our ethical and religious traditions the world community is in the process of discovering elements of a fundamental minimal consensus on ethics which is convincing to all women and men of good will, religious and nonreligious alike, and which will provide us with a moral framework within which we can relate to ourselves, each other and the world in a just and respectful manner.

In order to build a humanity-wide consensus we find it is essential to develop and use a language that is

humanity-based, though each religious and ethical tradition also has its own language for what is expressed in this Declaration.

Furthermore, none of our traditions, ethical or religious, is satisfied with minimums, vital as they are; rather, because humans are endlessly self-transcending, our traditions also provide maximums to be striven for. Consequently, this Declaration does the same. The maximums, however, clearly are ideals to be striven for, and therefore cannot be required, lest the essential freedoms and rights of some thereby be violated.

II. PRESUPPOSITIONS

As a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic, which we believe must undergird any affirmation of human rights and respect for the earth, this document affirms and supports the rights and corresponding responsibilities enumerated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. In conjunction with that first United Nations Declaration we believe there are five general presuppositions which are indispensable for a global ethic:

a) Every human possesses inalienable and inviolable dignity; individuals, states, and other social entities are obliged to respect and protect the dignity of each person.

b) No person or social entity exists beyond the scope of morality; everyone - individuals and social organizations - is obliged to do good and avoid evil.

c) Humans are endowed with reason and conscience - the great challenge of being human is to act conscientiously; communities, states and other social organizations are obliged to protect and foster these capabilities.

d) Communities, states and other social organizations which contribute to the good of humans and the world have a right to exist and flourish; this right should be respected by all.

e) Humans are a part of nature, not apart from nature; ethical concerns extend beyond humanity to the rest of the earth, and indeed the cosmos. In brief: this Declaration, in reflection of reality, is not just anthropocentric, but cosmo-anthropo-centric.

III. A FUNDAMENTAL RULE

We propose the Golden Rule, which for thousands of years has been affirmed in many religious and ethical traditions, as a fundamental principle upon which to base a global ethic: "What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others," or in positive terms, "What you wish done to yourself, do to others." This rule should be valid not only for one's own family, friends, community and nation, but also for all other individuals, families, communities, nations, the entire world, the cosmos.

IV. BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. Because freedom is of the essence of being human, every person is free to exercise and develop every capacity, so long as it does not infringe on the rights of other persons or express a lack of due respect for things living or non-living. In addition, human freedom should be exercised in such a way as to enhance both the freedom of all humans and due respect for all things, living and non-living.

2. Because of their inherent equal dignity, all humans should always be treated as ends, never as mere means. In addition, all humans in every encounter with others should strive to enhance to the fullest the intrinsic dignity of all involved.

3. Although humans have greater intrinsic value than non-humans, all such things, living and non-living, do possess intrinsic value simply because of their existence and, as such, are to be treated with due respect. In addition, all humans in every encounter with non-humans, living and non-living, should strive to respect them to the fullest of their intrinsic value.

4. As humans necessarily seek ever more truth, so too they seek to unite themselves, that is, their “selves,” with what they perceive as the good: in brief, they love. Usually this “self” is expanded/transcended to include their own family and friends, seeking the good for them. In addition, as with the Golden Rule, this loving/loved “self” needs to continue its natural expansion/

transcendence to embrace the community, nation, world, and cosmos.

5. Thus true human love is authentic self-love and other-love co-relatively linked in such a way that ultimately it is drawn to become all-inclusive. This expansive and inclusive nature of love should be recognized as an active principle in personal and global interaction.

6. Those who hold responsibility for others are obliged to help those for whom they hold responsibility. In addition, the Golden Rule implies: If we were in serious difficulty wherein we could not help ourselves, we would want those who could help us to do so, even if they held no responsibility for us; therefore we should help others in serious difficulty who cannot help themselves, even though we hold no responsibility for them.

7. Because all humans are equally entitled to hold their religion or belief - i.e., their explanation of the ultimate meaning of life and how to live accordingly - as true, every human's religion or belief should be granted its due freedom and respect.

8. In addition, dialogue - i.e., conversation whose *primary* aim is to learn from the other - is a necessary means whereby women and men learn to respect the other, ceaselessly to expand and deepen their own explanation of the meaning of life, and to develop an ever broadening consensus whereby men and women can live together on this globe in an authentically human manner.

V. MIDDLE PRINCIPLES

The following “Middle Ethical Principles” are in fact those which underlie the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, formally approved by almost every nation in the world.

1. Legal Rights/Responsibilities:

Because all humans have an inherent equal dignity, all should be treated equally before the law and provided with its equal protection.

At the same time, all individuals and communities should follow all just laws, obeying not only the letter but most especially the spirit.

2. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Conscience and Religion or Belief:

Because humans are thinking, and therefore essentially free-deciding beings, all have the right to freedom of thought, speech, conscience and religion or belief.

At the same time, all humans should exercise their rights of freedom of thought, speech, conscience and religion or belief in ways that will respect themselves and all others and strive to produce maximum benefit, broadly understood, for both themselves and their fellow humans.

3. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Speech and Information:

Because humans are thinking beings with the ability to perceive reality and express it, all individuals and communities have both the right and the responsibility, as far as possible, to learn the truth and express it honestly.

At the same time everyone should avoid cover-ups, distortions, manipulations of others and inappropriate intrusions into personal privacy; this freedom and responsibility is especially true of the mass media, artists, scientists, politicians and religious leaders.

4. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Participation in All Decision-making Affecting Oneself or Those for Whom One is Responsible:

Because humans are free-deciding beings, all adults have the right to a voice, direct or indirect, in all decisions that affect them, including a meaningful participation in choosing their leaders and holding them accountable, as well as the right of equal access to all leadership positions for which their talents qualify them.

At the same time, all humans should strive to exercise their right, and obligation, to participate in self-governance as to produce maximum benefit, widely understood, for both themselves and their fellow humans.

5. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning the Relationship between Women and Men:

Because women and men are inherently equal and all men and women have an equal right to the full development of all their talents as well as the freedom to marry, with equal rights for all women and men in living out or dissolving marriage.

At the same time, all men and women should act toward each other outside of and within marriage in ways that will respect the intrinsic dignity, equality, freedom and responsibilities of themselves and others.

6. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Property:

Because humans are free, bodily and social in nature, all individual humans and communities have the right to own property of various sorts.

At the same time, society should be so organized that property will be dealt with respectfully, striving to produce maximum benefit not only for the owners but also for their fellow humans, as well as for the world at large.

7. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Work and Leisure:

Because to lead an authentic human life all humans should normally have both meaningful work and recreative leisure, individuals and communities should strive to organize society so as to provide these two dimensions of an authentic human life both for themselves and all the members of their communities.

At the same time, all individuals have an obligation to work appropriately for their recompense, and, with all communities, to strive for ever more creative work and re-creative leisure for themselves, their communities, and other individuals and communities.

8. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Children and Education:

Children are first of all not responsible for their coming into existence or for their socialization and education; their parents are. Where for whatever reason they fail, the wider community, relatives and civil community, have an obligation to provide the most humane care possible, physical, mental, moral/spiritual and social, for children.

Because humans can become authentically human only through education in the broad sense, and today increasingly can flourish only with extensive education

in the formal sense, all individuals and communities should strive to provide an education for all children and adult women and men which is directed to the full development of the human person, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the promotion of understanding, dialogue and friendship among all humans - regardless of racial, ethnic, religious, belief, sexual or other differences - and respect for the earth.

At the same time, all individuals and communities have the obligation to contribute appropriately to providing the means necessary for this education for themselves and their communities, and beyond that to strive to provide the same for all humans.

9. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning Peace:

Because peace as both the absence of violence and the presence of justice for all humans is the necessary condition for the complete development of the full humanity of all humans, individually and communally, all individuals and communities should strive constantly to further the growth of peace on all levels, personal, interpersonal, local, regional, national and international, granting that

- a) the necessary basis of peace is justice for all concerned;
- b) violence is to be vigorously avoided, being resorted to only when its absence would cause a greater evil;
- c) when peace is ruptured, all efforts should be bent to its rapid restoration - on the necessary basis of justice for all.

At the same time, it should be recognized that peace, like liberty, is a positive value which should be

constantly cultivated, and therefore all individuals and communities should make the necessary prior efforts not only to avoid its break-down but also to strengthen its steady development and growth.

10. Rights/Responsibilities Concerning the Preservation of the Environment:

Because things, living and non-living, have an intrinsic value simply because of their existence, and also because humans cannot develop fully as humans, or even survive, if the environment is severely damaged, all individuals and communities should respect the ecosphere within which we all live, move and have our being, and act so that

a) nothing, living or non-living, will be destroyed in its natural form except when used for some greater good, as, for example, the use of plants/animals for food;

b) if at all possible, only replaceable material will be destroyed in its natural form.

At the same time, all individuals and communities should constantly be vigilant to protect our fragile universe, particularly from the exploding human population and increasing technological possibilities which threaten it in an ever expanding fashion.

Notes:

¹ Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (Munich: Beck, 1922-23), 2 vols.

² Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age* (New York: Dutton, 1941).

³ See among others, Hans Küng, *Theologie im Aufbruch* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987), esp. pp. 153 ff.

⁴ See especially Ewert Cousins, *AJudaism-Christianity-Islam: Facing Modernity Together*, *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 30:3-4 (Summer-Fall, 1993), pp. 417-425.

⁵ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1970).

⁶ I am grateful for this exemplary comparison to Henry Rosemont, who I met when he was the Fulbright Professor of Philosophy at Fudan University, Shanghai, 1982-84.

⁷ Already two millennia and more ago some Hindu and Buddhist thinkers held a nonabsolutistic epistemology, but that fact had no significant impact on the West; because of the relative cultural eclipse of those civilizations in the modern period and the dominance of the Western scientific worldview, these ancient nonabsolutistic epistemologies have until now played no significant role in the emerging global society-though in the context of dialogue, they should in the future.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century Eastern thought has become increasingly better known in the West, and proportionately influential. This knowledge and influence appears to be increasing geometrically in recent decades. It is even beginning to move into the hardest of our so-called hard sciences, nuclear physics, as evidenced by the popular book of the theoretical physicist Fritjof Capra, *The Tao of Physics* (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 2nd ed., 1983).

⁸ For a full discussion of these epistemological issues and related matters, see my *After the Absolute: The Dialogical Future of Religious Reflection*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990

⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, Q. 1, a. 2.

¹⁰ I am in this section especially indebted to Ewert Cousins = essay *AJudaism-Christianity-Islam: Facing Modernity Together*, *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 30:3-4 (Summer-Fall, 1993), pp. 417-425.

¹¹ Karl Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (Zurich: Artemis, 1949), pp. 19-43.

¹² Ibid., p. 19; trans. Michael Bullock, *The Origin and Goal of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 1. For the

ongoing academic discussion of Jaspers = position on the Axial Period, see *Wisdom, Revelation, and Doubt: Perspectives on the First Millennium B.C.*, *Daedalus* (Spring, 1975); and *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989).

13 For a more comprehensive treatment of Cousins = concept of the Second Axial Period, see his book *Christ of the 21st Century* (Rockport, MA: Element, 1992).

14 Leonard Swidler et alii, *Death or Dialogue* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990).

15 Hadith: Muslim, chapter on iman, 71-2; Ibn Madja, Introduction, 9; Al-Darimi, chapter on riqaq; Hambal 3, 1976. The first quotation is cited in Bhagavan Das, *The Essential Unity of All Religions* (1934), p. 298.

16 A Yoruba Proverb (Nigeria), cited in Andrew Wilson, ed., *World Scripture* (New York: Paragon House, 1991), p. 114

17 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, A 54; and *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Ethics*, BA 66f.

18 *Gleanings from the Writings of Baba=u=llah*, trans. by Shoghi Effendi (Wilmette, IL: Baha=i Publishing Trust, 2d ed., 1976).

19 *The Scripture of Won Buddhism* (Iri, Korea: Won Kwang Publishing Co., rev. ed. 1988), pp. 309f.

20 Bhagavan Das, *The Essential Unity of All Religions* (1934), p. 303.

21 Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds., *A Global Ethic* (New York: Continuum, 1993).

The challenge of the globalization of the world economy or - is the social and ecological misery in the so called Third World something of our concern?

**JOHANNES MICHAEL
SCHNARRER**

Prof., Ph.D., Ph.D., visiting-professor of the University of Cluj, Romania, professor at the University of Karlsburg, and at the University of Vienna. Author of the books: *Arbeit und Wertewandel im postmodernen Deutschland: Eine historisch, ethisch-systematische Studie zum Berufs- und Arbeitsethos* (1996), *The common good in our changing world* (1997), *Allianz für den Sonntag* (1998).

In a speech at the Independence Hall in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) held on 4th of July when he was awarded with the „Peace Medal“, President Vaclav Havel has exemplified the meaning of the postmodern age as follows: a Bedouin, sitting on a camel, wearing jeans under his traditional clothes, drinking Coke and listening to a walkman with a Coca-Cola ad stuck onto the camel. True indeed. Closed cultures are breaking up and become westernized, and along with this development many ecological and social problems have occurred. From the standpoint of the given example, we could ask, where did the Bedouin get all this? Where can he recycle his empty tins? Let us discuss these social and ecological difficulties.

Our postmodern age is characterized by changes of values and viewpoints, kinds of labour, flexibility and mobility, mix of cultures, ethnic conflicts and new alliances. Something is going towards an end (like the planned market economy of communism), other new things are coming into existence by the painful process of trial and error.

1. Concern of ecological aspects

The term “ecology” is defined as the scientific study of the interactions that determine the territorial distribution and abundance of organisms.¹ It was first used sci-

KEY WORDS:

globalization, economy, ecosphere, subsidiarity, justice, value

entifically in 1866 by the German biologist ERNST HÄCKEL in a study of plant ecology and is etymologically derived from the Greek “oikos” or “household”. Each living species is assigned its own proper place in nature; its own specific type of food, geographical range, and population, within a harmonious pattern of interdependence between the different species.

Modern ecology is centrally concerned with the cycling of nutrients through ecosystems, and with patterns of energy flow and interchange. The economic metaphor by which the “functions” of different groups of organisms within an ecosystem are classified- ‘producers’ (mainly green plants), consumers (herbivores= animal that feeds on plants, and their predators= plundering or exploiting others) and decomposers (mainly micro-organisms)-carries a clear resonance of the earlier notion of an ‘economy of nature’. The concept of “ecosphere” means that the planet is considered as an immensely complex global system of ecosystems. The shift from metaphorical to direct, literal application of ecological concepts to human social life was established only in the 1960s, following the globalization of the ecological perspective in the form of the concept of the “ecosphere”. If we take out one factor of the natural circle of the environment, we are going to lose our ecological balance. The catastrophe of Tschernobyl in 1986 showed that it is not only a matter concerning the Ukraine or Russia but also other parts in the world as well. Similarly, pollution in the Third World should consider our thinking, too.

2. The problem of globalization

This is the process whereby the population of the world is increasingly bounded into a single society. Globalization as term came only into wide use in the 1980s. The changes it refers to are highly charged politically, and the concept is controversial because it suggests that the creation of a world society is no longer the project of a hegemonic nation-state but the undirected outcome of social interaction on a global scale. The term has established itself in fields as diverse as economics, geography, marketing and sociology, which suggests that its use is more than a matter of passing fashion. Culture and market combined in the 1970s in the activities of multinational corporations seeking to maximize the worldwide sales of products through global advertising. Globalization is attacked by those who see it as a new form of homogenization of culture, an extension of the mass culture which ironed out the variety of nineteenth-century local European cultures. The sense of a common fate for humanity is enhanced by recognition of global environmental issues, and political activism increasingly crosses national boundaries with the worldwide mobilization of social movements.

3. Guidelines for international business activity

Economic factors exert a profound and lasting influence on the life of all human beings. They can en-

courage, alter or question basic human values. This applies in particular to the effects of the international business activities of companies in areas where different cultures meet. Therefore, the responsibility of business goes beyond immediate entrepreneurial concerns and extends to primary human and social values. The first and most important principle is that of responsibility. It is much better for countries in the Third World to get fair trade conditions with partners from the northern hemisphere than getting gifts. One goal of the richer countries should be the clearly oriented help which induces new little initiatives or small enterprises in the particular country of the Third World.

Business activities are governed by the respective national legislation. Companies should co-operate in fighting corruption and they should also observe the principle of non-interference in the political affairs of a host country, because their very economic presence has effects on man and society. Therefore, co-operations with national authorities and local economy should be conducted in the spirit of fairness and good faith. In fulfilling their responsibilities, especially in economically underdeveloped countries, companies should orient their activities towards a development beneficial to all people concerned. Companies should inform the public about their activities and the economic and social consequences in a way consistent with their social importance. Dominating market positions should not be misused to the detriment of the economy of the host country or of its development. Decisions concerning

important changes within companies must be made after careful evaluation of the social consequences.

4. Solidarity and subsidiarity

The basic notion of solidarity comprises interrelated connection and duty. It has its foundation in the human dignity of each individual and the social tendency of being with others, and also the need of other people. Solidarity is an ontic and ethical principle. And in the global sense we can say that we are responsible for one another. The individual is only thinkable as a dialogical being and therefore in need of solidarity. This idea is particularly important in the postmodern age and in the context of the philosophical thinking of existentialism which often fails to see it. Yet, MARTIN BUBER writes, "Man becomes an I through a You." A lack of solidarity (=egoism) destroys a community and is inhuman in itself. Individuals grow in encounter with others, in interrelated service and dialogue with sisters and brothers. Solidarity is a responsible and loving acceptance by a person based on the fact of human interdependence on the global scale today, based on the fact that one's own life and the lives of the countless others whom one never comes to know personally are intertwined for good and for ill.

The principle of subsidiarity requires that the state leaves to individuals and intermediate bodies what they are able to achieve by their own capabilities and inter-

venes only to the extent where they are unable to secure important needs of the citizens (cf. CA 48).

Solidarity is expressed by the love of the other. In a very concise way love of neighbour has been defined as ‘willing the good of another’. Willing the good of another means first of all to accept and appreciate the good endowments a neighbour possesses as natural gifts or as acquired facilities. It also means wishing him the good which he ought to possess and to develop or perhaps regain. But merely wishing good to another is not enough where one is in a condition to actually help him. One must also commit oneself to the active protection of the good endowments of the other and work for the restoration or promotion of what is lacking in goodness according to one’s possibilities. Integrating these various aspects, love of neighbour could be defined as the sincere esteem for one’s neighbour’s gifts of body and soul and their active protection and furtherance in accordance with his calling by God. The neighbours to be loved include all men, relatives and outsiders, nationals and foreigners, friends and enemies, individuals and groups, the families, communities and nations.

Love of self, rightly understood (and not in the egoistic sense), calls for the realization of the same objectives as love of neighbour and is motivated by the same motives. God wills his likeness in us as much as he wills it in our neighbour. Again, love of self has to realize the same objectives as those pointed out in love of neighbour: acceptance of oneself and promotion of one’s divinely willed growth in accordance with one’s

calling within the all-comprising scope of God’s eternal design. Love must be interior, i.e. sincerely affirm and accept another person’s value and good endowments and talents without envy and curtailment. It must be active by an effective concern for the welfare of other. The political thrust of love orients the ethos towards social horizons. Another, most indispensable quality of love appears to be humble, reverent respect for the person or community who is loved and helped.

5. Justice in the world

Evaluations of the basic and political institutions, particularly with respect to the consequent distributions of benefits and burdens, are standardly expressed in terms of justice and injustice. Justice is often held to be the priority social value which overrides all other normative considerations. In its most general sense the concept of justice requires that each individual have what is due to him or her. Within this formula we may distinguish formal and material justice. Formal justice requires distribution which are in accordance with existing or agreed criteria or rules. It is often identified with legal or individual justice. Material (or substantive) justice concerns the identification of the appropriate distributive criteria (such as rights, need or choice) that constitute competing conceptions of justice.

John Rawls argues in his *“Theory of Justice”* (1971) that the principles for determining the basic institutions of a society which would be chosen in a procedurally

fair situation, and which are endorsed by our firmest reflective intuitions as what is just, are (A) each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (cf.p.250); and (B) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that are both [a] to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and [b] attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (cf.p.83).

The justice question is linked to the human rights. Realities of political life often do not correspond with the pledges made by the declarations of human rights and not seldom stand in glaring contrast to them. Nevertheless the recognition of a common moral authority is in itself a reason for hope. The Church considers it as her prophetic mission to defend justice and right in the social, national and international domain and to denounce injustice where the basic rights of man and his salvation require it. The Church, especially today, is judged by her own practice. The Church's prophetic defence of human rights can only be credible if she herself is perceived by others to be just and merciful. Her service to human rights thus pledges her to a constant examination of conscience and a continuous purification and renewal of her own life, her own laws, institutions and conduct. The service that the Church can perform for the realization of human rights consists not merely in verbal appeals, however important they may be, but also in setting an example herself by doing right. Least of all by the Church must the thirst for justice and the yearning for humanity in our world be disappointed.

6. The concept of values

We live in a time of competition of interests and values (i.g. helping my own national economy and/or supporting Third World countries), and in changing value systems around the world. Therefore, let us look to the values, its means and its different understandings.

The term values may refer to interests, pleasures, likes, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, attractions and many other modalities of selective orientations. Values are found in the large and diverse universe of selective behavior. The limits of value may be conceived very broadly or quite narrowly, but the limits should never be arbitrarily set, and their location ought to be justified in any particular case. Values regulate 'impulsive satisfaction' in accord with the whole array of hierarchical enduring goals of personality, the requirements of both personality and sociocultural system for order, the need for respecting the interests of others and the group as a whole in social living. Values serve as criteria for selection in action, and they become criteria for judgement, preference and choice.

In ordinary speech the term "value" is used in two senses: in one meaning, we refer to the specific evaluation of any object. Here we are told how an object is rated or otherwise appraised, but not what standards are used to make the judgements. The second meaning of value refers to the criteria, or standards in terms of which evaluations are made. Value-as-criterion is usually the more important usage for purposes of social scientific analysis. It is often difficult in specific instances to

distinguish between values and such related concepts as beliefs, needs, or motives, reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn in general terms. Needs derive from deficiency or disruption. Desires are wishes or appetitions directed toward certain objects and states. Values are not motives. A given value may have a strength that is relatively independent of any particular motive. Some values are freedom, equality, honesty, humanitarianism, authority. Most of them are questioned today, because the standards and evaluations are not clear enough.

There is a main problem: many norms are multivalued, relating simultaneously, for example, to hedonic criteria, considerations of efficiency, and values of social integration. Values enter into each of the four great systems human action: organism, personality, society and culture. Both philosophical analysis and social science often fall into serious error by paying attention to a single kind of value while ignoring or underestimating others.

I gave this philosophical consideration, because the awareness of differences in other cultures is a presupposition for dealing with people from different continents. On the one hand, we are changing not only our behavior (in the Second World), but our value system as well. So that it seems helpful to me thinking about roots and backgrounds of values. On the other hand, dealing with other cultures means knowing the system of the brother or sister. Contextual analysis is a necessary corrective in comparisons. Health, security, wealth, enjoyment, faith in the supernatural, knowledge, and other values that figure prominently in the value systems of many cultures are similar in name only. In different cultures,

knowledge refers to such diverse contents as revealed religious doctrine, traditional formulas, and modern science. Context is needed also to locate value judgements that do not contain explicit value terms, the counterparts in other languages of the English “That simply is not done!” Verbal explanation as well as context is needed to understand nonlinguistic signs of evaluation, including sanctions. Not every spanking is a punishment. Not every smile is a sign of joy: it may only express incomprehension. Since no value system is a perfect fit to life conditions, each contains socially acceptable alternatives to formally established principles. These secondary rules and norms permit individuals to come to terms with reality without running afoul of society. Cross-cultural perspective is perhaps the most promising single factor for refining and enriching our comprehension of cultural value systems.

7. Democracy as precondition for a stable society

The term “democracy” is difficult to define, not only because it is vague, like so many political terms, but more importantly, because what one person would regard as a typical example or paradigm case another would deny was a democracy at all. However, there is still this much agreement: democracy consists in ‘government by the people’ or ‘popular self-government’.

Obviously, the conditions of face-to-face democracy, with direct participation, cannot be fulfilled within

the political structure of modern states, both because of the size of their populations and because of the specialized knowledge needed to govern them. The idea of making decisions raises the difficulty of how many different individual decisions can be combined into one collective decision. A decision by the whole people amounts to something more than a decision by the majority and must involve compromise and consensus. Near universality of approval is a salient feature of democracy today. The other key feature is that modern democracies are indirect or representative rather than direct.

The dominant form of democracy today is liberal democracy. The term 'liberal' applied to governmental systems usually implies a concern with protecting individual freedoms by limiting the power of the government (which is until today one of the biggest problems in the Second and Third World, where governments are still too powerful and often enough, they don't have political oppositions).

Another feature of democracy is equality. There is a connection between the ideas of democracy and equality because, apart from anything else, the idea of the whole people making a decision involves the notion - summed up in the slogan 'one man, one vote' - of each individual having an equal say. On the other hand, the notion of liberal democracy is usually associated with important ideas about further kinds of political structures and processes that are necessary for limiting governmental power and providing electoral choice. Prominent amongst these is the concept of a multiparty

system and the associated idea of parties whose function is to oppose the government. These can be seen as components in the overall idea of pluralism. This centres on the concept of a plurality of political/interest groups, as well as parties, as being important both for providing sources of power alternative to and limiting that of the government, and for creating choice for the electorate. The one-party systems of the former communist world and of many Third World countries are no alternative to the liberal and democratic system of the western world. Another difficulty is the undemocratic tribalism in many countries all over the world, but particularly in the southern hemisphere.

Somebody could ask, why do I say something about democracy in this connection: I think it is necessary speaking about it, because only with democracy starts the change in a bad economic and ecological situation (cf. South Africa). Therefore it is very important to consider it in that way and to look at the foundations or the philosophical background of political stability.

8. Conclusion

The Third World is still far away for the most of our fellow citizens in the northern hemisphere. But it is our duty as human beings and Christians to consider the misery of other parts in the world, in the decades coming more than we did in the past. One presupposition is the change in our narrow European and profit-oriented attitude. The other has to be towards a responsibility of global thinking taking into account not only the difficult

situation of our home countries but particular countries of the poorer world as well.

If it is not possible to help solving the even bigger problems of social and ecological distress in the Third World, we will suffer more because the distance between the “different worlds” is getting smaller. Christians have to influence the world in the positive sense because all people are equal in front of God, and we are responsible for one another.

Notes:

¹ This speech has been given by: The Conference of the Christian Democratic Academy for Central and Eastern Europe about “Democracy and Market Economy” Budapest, April 25th, 1995. And at the International Ecumenical World-Meeting in Minsk/Belarus, October 1st to 3rd, 1996. The whole text in German is published in the online-journal under the title „Das Phänomen Globalisierung und seine Auswirkungen auf unser Leben.“ http://www.aurora-magazin.at/gesellschaft/global_schnarrer.htm

Criza politica si constructia institutionala democratica. O analiza comparata a douazeci si opt de constitutii

ANTON CARPINSCHI

Prof., Ph.D., "Al. I. Cuza"
University, Iasi, Romania.
Author of the books:
*Contemporary Political
Doctrines. A Typological
Synthesis* (1991);
*Orientari ideologice
actuale. Tendinte si
semnificatii*, (1991);
*Doctrine politice
contemporane. Tipologii,
dinamica, perspective*
(1992); *Deschidere si sens
în gândirea politica*,
(1995); *Stiinta politicului.*
Tratat, vol. I (1998).

ANDREI ILAS

Assist. Lect., "Al. I. Cuza"
University, Iasi, Romania.
E-mail:
andan_i@yahoo.com

This article examines the *political crisis* that has appeared in the constitutions of 28 democratic states. The units of analysis have been chosen using the criterion of a modern and formal constitution. Using the systemic paradigm, the article proposes an institutionalist approach. After explaining the role of the main institutions, the article focuses itself on identifying the mechanisms of crisis as they are provided by constitutions (i.e. the vote of no-confidence, the motion of censure, the vacancy etc.). We have observed that the correlation between the institutional arrangement and the number of crisis mechanisms is not very strong one. The article concludes that in order to explain the reaction of a political system towards a crisis situation it is not sufficient to draw on the constitution, an understanding of the political tradition and of the recent political experiences being absolutely necessary.

1. Criza politica în constructia constitutională democratică

Oricare ar fi tipul de inferenta, descriptiv sau cauzal, ales pentru o cercetare a socialului, prima sarcina a cercetatorului rezida în conturarea unui cadru teoretic. Acesta nu trebuie sa se reduca la simple trimiteri spre una sau mai multe teorii. Alegatia se justifica, pe de o parte, prin fragmentarea si nuantarea teoriilor din stiintele sociale si, pe de alta parte, prin gradul de complexitate ridicat al acestora. În acest context, apreciem ca o *abordare sistematica a crizei politice* raspunde determinantelor precizate si poate oferi o explicatie comprehensiva cu valente integratoare. Lansata la mijlocul secolului al XX-lea si, beneficiind de un larg potential de modelare, paradigma sistematica a cunoscut

KEY WORDS:

comparative politics, constitutionalism, institutionalism, political crisis, mechanisms of crisis, democratic theory, index of institutional potentiality, theory of crisis

rafinari continue prin aportul diverselor zone ale cunoasterii. Dezvoltata în ultimele doua decenii în directia modelarii organizarilor complexe, a jocului ordine-dezordine, a turbulentei în relatiile politice, paradigma sistematica poate oferi cadrul analitic pentru o teorie a crizei politice.

Democratia se arata a fi un regim politic failibil întrucît, în epoca moderna, un mare numar de state lansate la un anume moment dat pe orbita democratica s-au dovedit incapabile sa-si mentina altitudinea. Republica de la Weimar, România interbelica, diferitele state sud-americeane sunt cîteva dintre numeroasele exemple. Alte state, întîmpinînd diverse obstacole, s-au vazut nevoite sa-si modifice, definitiv sau temporar, tipul de democratie practicat. Cea de a patra republica franceza ce adoptase o democratie cu un pronuntat caracter parlamentar este înlocuita, în 1958, de un sistem prezidential. Sistemul politic britanic a fost modificat temporar în perioada critica a celui de-al doilea razboi mondial prin crearea unui cabinet bazat pe coalitia dintre cele doua mari partide. Toate acestea justifica miza prezentului demers: o radiografie a modului în care democratiile actuale înțeleg sa raspunda, printr-o anume constructie constitutionala, eventualelor amenintari la adresa stabilitatii si durabilitatii lor.

Însa, pentru a înțeleg forma pe care o iau constitutiile statelor democratice este necesar, mai întîi, a face cîteva precizari privind substanta regimului politic democrat.

Ca obiect de studiu, democratia admite aplicarea unei multitudini de paradigme la toate nivelurile:

ontologic, metodologic si epistemologic. Adeseori, în interiorul aceleasi paradigme, exista un numar ridicat de variante la dispozitia cercetatorului. Optiunea pentru una sau alta dintre aceste tine de unghiul de abordare si de problema specifica aflata în atentie. Avînd în vedere scopul propus, pare potrivit a contura democratia prin identificarea tensiunilor ce se regasesc atît în fundamentarea structuro-functiionala - *tensiuni statice*, cît si în dinamica starilor - *tensiuni dinamice*.

Astfel, pe lînga functia de coordonare, sistemului politic democratic îndeplineste, tot ca functie principala, si pe aceea de reprezentare a intereselor tuturor. Cele doua functii intra în opozitia clasica dintr putere si reprezentare. Din aceasta dialectica se nasc cele doua modele ale democratiei asa cum le-a identificat Arend Lijphart: modelul majoritarist (de tip Westminster) si modelul consensualist. În timp ce modelul majoritarist pune accent pe concentrarea puterii prin reprezentarea celor mai multi dintre cetatenii unei democratii, în modelul consensualist accentul cade pe ridicarea gradului de reprezentare prin împartirea puterii. Tensiunea “concentrare a puterii *versus* cresterea gradului de reprezentare” este, însa, prezenta în ambele modele chiar daca în forme diferite.

Din perspectiva structurii, sa observam, mai întîi, ca democratia poate fi caracterizata prin neîncrederea publica în capacitatea sistemului politic de a-si stapîni excesele. Spre deosebire, în monarhiile absolutiste si statele totalitare încrederea în actiunile sistemului politic este maxima nefiind justificate supravegherea si controlul. De aceea, în structura intima a democratiilor

trebuie sa regasim modalitati interne si externe de ponderare si delimitare actionala. Astfel, analiza pîrghiilor si contraponderilor (*checks and balances*) existente între diversele institutii politice reprezinta un loc comun în conturarea oricarei democratii. Pe de alta parte, sistemele sociale coordonate de politic (E.g. sistemul societatii civile, sistemul mass-media, sistemul economic etc.) exercita, la rîndul lor, un control continuu asupra acestuia. Toate acestea implica o ridicare a complexitatii sistemului politic democrat.

Însa, cu cît un sistem este mai complex cu atît creste probabilitatea ca, în fata imprevizibilului, sa se dovedeasca incapabil de un raspuns suficient de rapid. În situatii similare, sistemele de un nivel de complexitate mai scazut au avantajul de a produce un raspuns - chiar daca acesta nu este unul pe deplin adecvat - si sa-si asigure, astfel, supravietuirea. De aici, deducem ca sistemele democratice baleiaza între o tendinta naturala de crestere a complexitatii si necesitatea asigurarii unor raspunsuri prompte. Aceasta tensiune complexitate *versus* celeritate este, la rîndul sau, definitorie pentru structura democratica.

Tensiunile dinamicii starilor pot fi relevate prin analiza relatiilor dintre *gradul de deschidere*, *nivelul fluxului informational-energetic*, si *mobilitatea partilor componente* (actori politici).

Democraziile sunt adesea caracterizate drept societati deschise. Din perspectiva sistemica, comparativ cu alte tipuri de regimuri politice, democratia prezinta un grad de deschidere mult mai ridicat deoarece, postulînd politica drept bun public, permite tuturor

participarea. În particular, sistemul politic poate fi “accesat” de orice cetatean fie direct prin implicarea ca actor politic, fie indirect prin intermediul informarii, discursului ori discutiilor desfasurate în varii spatii publice.

Pe de alta parte, societatile contemporane, prezinta nivele ale fluxului informational-energetic mult mai ridicate decît în orice epoca anterioara datorita dezvoltarilor tehnice si tehnologice din secolul al XX-lea. Pentru cazul democratiilor, datorita deschiderii naturale a acestora, cantitatea de informatie si energie recunoscuta si procesata tinde sa devina enorma. Conchidem ca, în democratii, relatia dintre deschidere si flux informational-energetic este una tensionata întrucît deschiderea cu un grad a sistemului poate provoca o crestere exponentiala a nivelului fluxului informational-energetic.

Orice crestere a nivelului fluxului informational-energetic pune în scena mobilitatea partilor componente, respectiv capacitatea de adaptarea continua si rapida la noi realitati societale. Cu toate acestea, deseori actorii si institutiile politice dau dovada de o mobilitate scazuta, din diverse motive (E.g. teama de a pierde electoratul, nerecunoasterea necesitatii de a modifica, inertia, atasamentul fata de o ideologie etc.). Consideram ca o alta tensiune sta în relatia dintre fluxul informational-energetic si mobilitatea partilor întrucît actorii politici nu se arata întotdeauna dispusi sa opereze schimbari.

De asemenea, poate fi usor sesizata tensiunea dintre mobilitatea actorilor politici si deschiderea sistemului. Lipsa de mobilitate ce conduce la refuzarea unei

necesare deschideri sau operarea unei deschiderii pe care sistemul nu o poate gestiona sunt exemplele ce pun în evidența prezenta acestei tensiuni.

Conchidem că tensiunile statice și dinamice, identificate mai sus atât la nivelul proiectării cât și al evoluției unui sistem politic democrat, ar trebui să se regasească în orice secvență a unei democrații, inclusiv, în constituție. Astfel, atât instituțiile constituționale democratice cât și raporturile dintre ele sunt modelate de aceste tensiuni, după cum tot ele conduc la apariția crizelor. În consecință, a analiza criza politică în construcția constituțională democratică înseamnă, pe de o parte, a cerceta instituțiile constituționale și atribuțiile acestora din perspectiva tensiunilor creatoare și, pe de altă parte, a reliefa modalitățile de detensionare – mecanisme ale depășirii crizei. Într-un sistem politic putem regăsi, deopotrivă, *mecanisme informale* și *mecanisme formale* de depășire a crizei. Prin mecanisme informale înțelegem acele procese de detensionare ce apar ca urmare a voinței actorilor politici. Menționăm că unele procese se bucură de repetabilitate și stabilitate în timp, iar altele sunt unice – expresie a unor situații excepționale ce necesită rezolvări neuzuale. Prin mecanisme formale de depășire a crizei – pe care le vom numi în continuare *mecanisme ale crizei* – înțelegem acele procese de detensionare ce sunt înscrise într-un act normativ. Prezenta cercetare se concentrează numai asupra mecanismelor formale incluse în constituțiile statelor. Scopul nostru este de a releva cât de sensibile sunt constituțiile față de diversele crize politice și de a cerceta dacă este o corelație între tipul de aranjament in-

stituțional și numărul de mecanisme ale crizei. Pentru aceasta este necesar, mai întâi, să precizăm care sunt instituțiile supuse studiului și care sunt mecanismele crizei prezente în constituții.

La baza construcției constituționale democratice a fost așezat, încă din secolul al XVIII-lea, principiul separației puterilor în stat. În baza acestuia, exercitarea puterii este împartită între mai multe instituții în așa fel încât “puterea să fie înfrînăta de putere”. Aceasta segregare a făcut ca o instituție – Parlamentul – să dețină ca obiect al activității adoptarea legilor, o altă – Guvernul – să fie însărcinată să le pună în aplicare, în timp ce o a treia – Instanța judecătorească – să poată sancționa nerespectarea legilor. Este necesar să adăugăm imediat că între Parlament și Guvern, pe de o parte, și instanța de judecată, pe de altă parte, există diferențe profunde. Despre acest lucru ne atenționează Montesquieu care scrie că într-un fel puterea judecătorească nu este o putere. Și aceasta pentru că Parlamentul și Guvernul sunt instituții eminamente politice, în timp ce o instanță judecătorească e o instituție a-politică. Cele două instituții politice își concentrează acționalitatea asupra prezentului și al viitorului, în vreme ce o instanță re-actionează cu privire la evenimente deja desfășurate. Parlamentul și Guvernul se bucură de un grad de libertate decizională ridicată pe care instanța, ținută de lege sau de precedent judiciar, nu o are.

Prin urmare, a fost firesc că evoluția democrațiilor moderne să graviteze în jurul raporturilor Parlament-Guvern. Înainte de a explicita dezvoltarea acestor

raporturi se impun cîteva precizări privitoare la nașterea democrației moderne. Drumul care a condus la conceptualizarea și implementarea acestei formule de regim politic a fost unul sinuos. Astfel, unul dintre cei mai importanți filosofi ai Antichității, Aristotel, considera că democrația nu este decît o “pervertire” a bunei guvernări. În *Politica*, Stagiritul oferă o analiză succintă și precisă a democrației așa cum era înțeleasă în perioada antică. Din această descriere, reținem alături de David Held, condițiile pe care trebuie să le îndeplinească un stat pentru a adopta acest regim politic: orăș-stat mic cu terenuri agricole în vecinătate; economie bazată pe munca sclavilor, care asigură timp liber pentru cetățeni; serviciul casnic, adică munca femeilor, care dă posibilitatea bărbaților să se ocupe de îndatoririle publice; cetățenie restrînsă la un număr relativ mic de persoane. În ciuda idealului generos al egalității politice, democrația clasică a fost considerată, vreme îndelungată, potrivită doar pentru statele mici, statele-cetate. Însă, diminuarea rolului monarhului și augmentarea celui jucat de starile generale au impus, treptat, conturarea modelului democrației reprezentative. Acest tip preia principiul deplinei egalități politice, dar îl face posibil prin intermediul mandatarii - cetățenii participă la guvernare prin intermediul reprezentanților.

Astfel, instituția centrală și fără de care nu e posibilă democrația modernă este Parlamentul. Acestea pot fi unicamerale și bicamerale. În principiu, statele unitare ar trebui să detină Parlamente unicamerale, în timp ce statele federale ar trebui să practice bicameralismul. Există însă și excepții datorate unor diverși factori. De

exemplu, în Parlamentul bicameral al Marii Britanii Camera Lorzilor, menținută datorită tradiției, joacă un rol minor. De altfel, Parlamentul Marii Britanii este considerat un “unicameralism bicameral”.

Dacă Parlamentul este piatra de boltă a construcției democratice, atunci Guvernul - instituția abilitată să pună în executare legile - poate fi înțeles ca un instrument de lucru, “mîna lungă” a acestuia. Prezenta unei instituții precum Guvernul, organ colegial construit pe principiul răspunderii solidare și de dimensiuni mult mai reduse decît Parlamentul, pare firească din perspectiva asigurării unității și rapidității de acțiune în implementarea legilor. Poziția sa este clar precizată: în timp ce Parlamentul ales, direct sau indirect, de cetățenii cu drept de vot, se bucură de legitimitate deplină, Guvernul, învestit de Parlament, rămîne un simplu executant.

Cu acest model pare să fi început aventura modernă a democrației. De aceea, în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea și prima jumătate a secolului al XX-lea, Parlamentele au uzat de legitimitatea lor sporită și au creat o presiune puternică asupra guvernelor. Este perioada lungilor dezbateri parlamentare bazate pe o revigorare a retoricii antice. Excesul de parlamentarism a dus la o instabilitate ridicată și o viață scurtă a Guvernelor, complexitatea sistemelor crescînd în dauna capacității lor de a răspunde prompt la provocările mediului social.

Pentru a contracara fenomenul, în Constituțiile statelor democratice din perioada interbelică și, mai ales, după al doilea război mondial, au apărut mecanisme

care au *rationalizat parlamentarismul* în scopul de a crește puterea decizională a Guvernului. Însă, această soluție putea conduce și la efecte nedorite întrucât Guvernul era situat într-o poziție favorabilă abuzului de putere. Pentru a înlătura noul neajuns, forța Guvernului a fost treptat redusă, pe de o parte prin *desprinderea* unor institutii, pe de alta parte, prin *crearea* unor institutii menite să-i controleze activitatea.

Între institutiile desprinse din Guvern pot fi menționate: Reprezentantul statului (în anumite state), Banca Centrală (Natională), Administrația locală, iar ca institutii menite să sancționeze activitatea Guvernului: Avocatul Poporului și Curtea Constituțională (Curtea Supremă). Vom analiza aceste institutii preponderent din perspectiva rolului jucat în reamenajarea sistemelor politice democratice de după 1945, reliefând aspectele legate de “minarea” forței Executivului.

Institutia care ridică cele mai importante dificultăți în argumentarea teoretică este cea a Reprezentantului statului. Și aceasta deoarece rolul său – de reprezentare a statului în relațiile cu alte state – este mai ușor de justificat prin referiri la tradiție și istorie decât la teoria democratică.

Pentru conturarea unei tipologii a acestei institutii, putem porni de la două modele diametral opuse: unul de inspirație britanică și un altul de inspirație nord-americană. Urmare a unui lung proces de democratizare, în Marea Britanie monarhul a ajuns să joace un rol eminamente simbolic fiindu-i distribuit un rol minor în sistemul politic. El se bucură de o legitimitate scăzută întrucât ocupă funcția respectivă pe criterii ereditare și

nu este investit cu atribuții executive. Modelul poate fi regăsit în statele din Commonwealth precum și în unele state europene. Asimilăm acestui model și sistemul democratic în care, în loc de monarh există un președinte care este ales de Parlament și care nu deține atribuții executive importante. Acest tip de regim este denumit, în mod curent, regim parlamentar.

La polul opus se situează modelul american în care funcția de reprezentare a statului și cea de prim-ministru sunt deținute de președinte. Acesta se bucură de o legitimitate deplină deoarece este ales prin votul întregului popor. Acest model a fost exportat în unele țări sud-americane: Columbia, Venezuela și Costa Rica. Acest tip de regim este regimul prezidențial.

Între cele două modele poate fi identificat un model hibrid în care președintele are unele atribuții executive și, mai important, o legitimitate ridicată datorată alegerii sale de către întregul popor. În acest model, președintele poate fi văzut ca o contrapondere la Guvern mai ales în situația în care nu are aceeași orientare politică cu cea a majorității. Deși, *de jure*, președintele în acest model – regimul semi-prezidențial – are atribuții de guvernare – el propulsează în calitate de *sui generis* membru al Cabinetului, în situația anvizată, el iese *de facto* din Guvern prin neparticipare la decizia politică și devine un filtru al activității guvernamentale. În Franța, spre exemplu, această situație se numește *coabitare* și s-a întâmplat de câteva ori.

Banca Centrală (Natională) a devenit independentă ca o consecință a globalizării relațiilor economice, pe de o parte, și pe de altă parte, a integrării statelor în

organizatii financiare supra-statale. De exemplu, Bancile Nationale ale statelor din Uniunea Europeana fac parte din Sistemul European al Bancilor Centrale ce are ca principal obiectiv “meninerea stabilitatii preturilor”. Realizarea obiectivului poate stopa anumite actiuni inflationiste cu substrat politic ale Guvernului cum ar fi acelea din anii electorali. Rolul important jucat de Banca Nationala îl determina pe Arend Lijphart sa o includa ca variabila a cercetarii efectuate la sfîrsitul anilor '90 (desi nu o inclusesese în analiza, avînd acelasi subiect, de la mijlocul anilor '80) constatînd ca: “A oferi bancilor centrale independenta este înca o modalitate de împartire a puterii si se încadreaza în setul de caracteristici ale puterii împartite [...]”.

Tot în subordinea Guvernului s-au aflat si organele administratiei locale. Tensiunea dintre necesitatea de a rezolva cît mai repede o problema aparuta si drumul anevoios al actelor a favorizat aparitia himerei birocratice. De aici s-a ajuns la solutia descentralizarii serviciilor publice, desprinderii de autoritatea centrala, apropierii de contribuabil si apropierii cetateanului. Reprezentînd interesele comunitarilor, administratia locala a devenit o structura de incomodare a initiativelor Guvernului. Autonomizarea serviciilor publice este un alt pas de desprindere fata de administratia public centrala a unor institutii, desi acestea ramîn, în continuare, controlate de reprezentanti teritoriali – prefectii - ai acestuia.

Institutia Avocatului Poporului (*Ombudsman*) are atributii în exercitarea unui control asupra actelor de guvernamînt. A aparut în Suedia la începutul secolului al

XIX-lea, dar face cariera abia dupa al doilea razboi mondial cînd o suma de state adopta, pe rînd, aceasta institutie. Ombudsmanul trebuie sa apere spiritul legilor si sa protejeze drepturile si libertatile individului. Patronat de Parlament, Avocatul Poporului are drept scop urmarirea actelor Puterii privitoare la promovarea si protejarea drepturilor individului si, prin aceasta, limiteaza libertatea de actiune a Guvernului.

Curtea Constitutionala a aparut întîia data în Austria si Cehoslovacia în 1920, dar principiul pe care se bazeaza - controlul constitutionalitatii legilor a fost conturat într-o celebra decizie a Curtii Supreme Americane din 1803. În cauza *Marbury vs. Madison*, Curtea Suprema a Statelor Unite ale Americii a statuat ca “fara îndoiala, cei care au elaborat Constitutii scrise le-au conceput ca reprezentînd legea fundamentala si suprema a natiunii si, în consecinta, principiul oricarei guvernari de acest fel trebuie sa fie ca o lege a Parlamentului contrara Constitutiei este nula”. Astfel s-a nascut modelul american de control al constitutionalitatii legilor realizat de instantele judecatoresti. Exercitarea controlului de catre o instanta oarecare prezinta doua inconveniente majore: riscul unui “guvernamînt al judecatorilor” si posibilitatea aparitiei unei practici neunitare în aplicarea legilor. Pentru eliminarea neajunsurilor a aparut “modelul european” ce presupune crearea unui organ special si specializat de “justitie constitutionala”. Existenta unei constitutii limiteaza la spiritul si litera ei activitatea Parlamentului, dar nu întotdeauna Legislativul gaseste calea optimizarii raportului constitutie/ lege/ necesitate. Curtea

Constitutionala sau Curtea Suprema amendeaza aceasta eroare prin declararea ca neconstitutionala a unei legi ori a unui segment de lege.

Dintre aceste institutii numai unele sunt, prin modul în care iau nastere si prin atributiile pe care la au, institutii politice. Astfel, Parlamentul, Guvernul, Reprezentantul statului pot fi considerate institutii politice pline. Curtea Constitutionala (Curtea Suprema), Avocatul Poporului, Banca Centrala nu sunt institutii politice. Administratia locala are, prin modul în care ia se constituie, o dubla natura - politica si birocratica, dar atributiile sale cele mai importante nu sunt guvernate de principii si interese politice.

O cercetare completa privind criza politica ar trebui sa ia în considerare toate aceste parti ale sistemului politic prezente în majoritatea democratiile contemporane. Din cauza ca ar necesita un volum de munca mult mai ridicat care ar fi posibila numai în urma unei colaborari internationale, am decis sa ne concentram cercetarea asupra institutiilor ce constituie nucleul tare al democratiilor moderne si care, de altfel, produc sau sunt implicate în majoritatea crizelor politice. Aceste institutii sunt Parlamentul, Guvernul, Reprezentantul statului si Curtea Constitutionala (Curtea Suprema). De altfel, Avocatul Poporului, Banca Centrala si Administratia locala sunt, cel mai adesea, implicate în crize ale *output*-ului politic - politicile publice.

Cele patru institutii identificate pot fi implicate în crize fie pentru ca reprezentantii lor nu mai doresc ori nu mai pot sa-si continue activitatea, fie pentru ca apar diferende în privinta adoptarii unei pozitii comune fata

de anumite legi, programe politice, probleme economice, sociale etc. Constitutiile nu releva întotdeauna motivele aparitiei unei crize, dar stabilesc *mecanisme* care sa raspunda acestor situatii. De aceea, apropierea de criza politica institutionalizata constitutional nu poate fi facuta decât studiind mecanismele de raspuns si arătând cauzele ce o pot provoca. Asupra acestor mecanisme ne vom concentra, în continuare, atentia.

Vacanta unei functii importante precum cea de reprezentant al statului ori de prim-ministru poate fi provocata de demisia sau imposibilitatea de exercitarea a atributiilor. Demisia poate reprezenta un mecanism de iesire dintr-o criza politica (E.g Demisia lui Richard Nixon fortata, în 1974, de afacerea Watergate). Imposibilitatea de exercitare a atributiilor poate fi invocata pentru a acoperi un motiv determinat de o criza politica.

Presedintele sau Primul-ministru pot fi *pusi sub acuzare* (*impeachment*) de catre Parlament pentru comiterea unor infractiuni grave. Acest mecanism încearca sa raspunda unei crize provocate de actiunile contrare intereselor nationale comise de persoane îndeplinind astfel de functii.

În majoritatea statelor democratice, parlamentarii se bucura de imunitate în sensul în care nu pot fi urmariti penal decât în urma autorizarii prealabile venite din partea Camerei respective. Procedura de *ridicare a imunitatii* poate fi interpretata ca mecanism de iesire dintr-o criza politica atunci când apar speculatii privind posibila implicare a unui om politic într-o infractiune de

o anume gravitate. O astfel de situație poate apărea deopotrivă cu privire la un om politic aparținând unui partid de guvernământ cât și cu privire la un reprezentant al opoziției.

Comisiile de ancheta reprezintă un mijloc de control al activității altor instituții, în special a Executivului. Ele apar, de multe ori, în urma unei crize politice. *Sesiunile extraordinare* pot fi convocate pentru ca a apărut un eveniment neașteptat pe parcursul vacanței parlamentare, eveniment care poate să fie și o criză politică (E.g. neînțelegeri între reprezentanții coaliției aflate la guvernare).

În cazul Parlamentelor bicamerale este posibil ca în procesul de adoptare a unei legi să apară un *dezacord privind textul unei legi*. În această situație, Constituțiile prevăd o procedură, care include adesea o comisie mixtă, prin care este depășită criza și se ajunge la o variantă acceptată de ambele Camere sau votată, de obicei cu o majoritate calificată, de Camera inferioară.

Pierderea încrederii concretizată într-o motiune de cenzură sau un vot de neîncredere reprezintă mecanisme care răspund unei crize politice generate de o deteriorare a raporturilor dintre Parlament și Guvern. Motiunea de cenzură este supusă unor condiții și restricții. Astfel, aceasta trebuie să fie semnată de un număr destul de ridicat de deputați și senatori. Mai mult, senatorii și deputații ce au inițiat o motiune de cenzură nu mai pot face acest lucru în respectiva sesiune parlamentară. Unele state (E.g. Germania, Spania) prevăd *motiuni de cenzură constructive*: odată cu motiunea

de cenzură este propus sau chiar trebuie desemnat viitorul prim-ministru.

Angajarea răspunderii Guvernului cu privire la un program, declarație politică sau lege permite acestuia să verifice în ce măsură se mai bucură de răspunderea Parlamentului. Dacă actul propus nu a fost votat, Guvernul va fi demis. Acest mecanism permite consolidarea relațiilor dintre Guvern și Parlament atunci când a apărut o situație critică.

Invocarea stării de *urgenta legislativă* de către Guvern constituie o cale de a grăbi Parlamentul să voteze o lege. Dar poate fi folosită și ca un mijloc de a forța Parlamentul să voteze o lege în forma pe care o dorește Executivul.

În cazul în care coaliția aflată la guvernare își pierde unitatea și o altă coaliție nu poate fi formată, ieșirea din criză o reprezintă *dizolvarea* Parlamentului și organizarea de alegeri anticipate. De menționat, că dizolvarea poate reprezenta o manevră politică prin care cei aflați la putere încearcă să evite erodarea provocată de perioada prea lungă de guvernare.

Sesizarea Curții (Curtea Constituțională sau Curtea Supremă) de către Guvern, de un grup de parlamentari sau de Președinte survine atunci când se consideră că o lege este neconstituțională. Practica arată că în spatele acestei sesizări ce urmarește, aparent, un bine public se ascunde frecvent o criză. Cei ce sesizează Curtea sunt parlamentari ai opoziției sau Președintele – dacă are o coloratură politică diferită de cea a coaliției sau partidului aflat la guvernare.

Delegarea legislativa extraordinara acopera situatia de vid legislativ în care Guvernul considera ca se afla într-o situatie speciala si poate promova un act cu valoare de lege. Lasînd la o parte n posibilitatea ca acest fapt sa se întîmple ca urmare a unui vid real putem sa luam în consideratie posibilitatea ca Guvernul sa încerce sa oblige Parlamentul: în momentul în care un act cu valoare de lege a intrat în vigoare si a produs efecte pentru o perioada de timp, modificarea sa în mod substantial poate provoca mai mult rau.

Trimiterea legii în Parlament spre reexaminare de catre Presedinte reprezinta un alt mecanism de depasire a unei crize politice. În acest caz este vorba de o diferenta privind modul în care ar trebui sa arate o lege între Parlament si Presedinte.

Mentionam ca “înghetarea”, în diferite trepte, a sistemului politic determinata de starea de urgenta, starea exceptionala si starea de asediu nu poate fi considerata un mecanism de raspuns la o criza politica. Prelungirea mandatului Guvernului si a Parlamentului, actiunile exceptionale ale Guvernului, activarea “celulei de criza” (precum Consiliul de Stat sau Consiliul Superior de Aparare a Tarii) sunt raspunsuri firesti ale unui sistem confruntat cu un flux informational-energetic ridicat. Pe acest fond pot aparea mai usor crize politice deoarece sistemul devine mai instabil si opozantii puterii încearca sa profite. Într-o astfel de ipoteza devin incidente mecanismele pe care le-am descris anterior.

Ne propunem, in continuare, “testarea” conceptului de criza politica, prin analiza comparata a celor 28 de constitutii avute in vedere. Ce ne vor spune, oare,

constitutiile: eficienta si stabilitatea unui sistem constitutiv se ating prin structuri simple sau prin structuri complexe, cu ajutorul mecanismelor formale sau al celor informale?

2. “Harta” crizei în constitutiile a douazeci si opt de state

Pentru a realiza cercetarea comparativa a reglementarilor crizei politice în constitutiile unor state democratice, sunt necesare cîteva precizari privind metodologia folosita. Plecînd de la cercetarile lui Arend Lijphart asupra *modelelor democratiei* si de la cei 20 de ani de practica democratica neîntreputa recunoscuti drept criteriu pentru selectia unitatilor de observatie, noi ne-am fixat asupra 28 de constitutii. În cercetarea de fata prin constitutie înțelegem sensul formal (organic) al acesteia, si anume, de lege ce cuprinde “ansamblul regulilor, indiferent de obiectul lor, adoptate în forme procedurale specifice, distincte, exclusive”.

În analiza prezenta nu au putut fi incluse toate cele 36 de tari studiate de Lijphart, din diferite motive. Unele state nu au o constitutie în sens formal. Precizam, însa, ca aceste state au o constitutie în sens material, adica o suma de prevederi scrise sau cutumiare ce se regasesc în diverse legi. Întrucît, de multe ori, cunoasterea exacta a continutului acestor constitutii ridica dificultati chiar si specialistilor din tarile respective, am considerat ca, pentru acuratetea cercetarii este necesar sa excludem aceste state din analiza. În situatia mentionata se afla:

Regatul Unit, Israel si Noua Zeelanda. Constitutiile altor state sunt foarte vechi si, desi au fost amendate sau modificate, nu se armonizeaza cu teoria separatiei suveranitatii si a colaborarii puterilor. Este cazul Statelor Unite ale Americii (1787), al Norvegiei (1814) si al Canadei (1867), ale caror constructii institutionale au ramas neschimbate. Spre exemplu, în ceea ce priveste constitutia americana, unele amendamente ulterioare au avut drept obiect institutiile, dar schimbarile produse nu au fost de substanta. Cu mult mai semnificative sunt modificarile produse la nivelul practicilor politice, astfel încât textul Constitutiei SUA ne poate spune foarte putin despre ceea ce se petrece în sistemul insitutional al acestui stat.

În ciuda eforturilor depuse, constitutiile unor state, Papua Noua Guinee si Botswana, nu au putut fi gasite.

În urma acestor precizari, unitatile de observatie sunt constituite din urmatoarele state: Austria, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Danemarca, Elvetia, Finlanda, Franta, Germania, Grecia, India, Irlanda, Islanda, Italia, Jamaica, Japonia, Luxemburg, Malta, Mauritius, Olanda, Portugalia, Spania, Suedia, Trinidad-Tobago, Venezuela.

Pentru consultarea constitutiilor acestor state am accesat sursele oficiale ale guvernelor sau ale Parlamentelor. De asemenea, am consultat surse ale unor universitati prestigioase care au construit baze de date ce includ constitutii si traduceri ale acestora.

O problema cu care se confrunta o cercetare comparativa, din orice domeniu, este aceea a limbii si a limbajului. În acest caz, aducerea la numitorul comun s-

a realizat prin intermediul limbii engleze datorita mai multor motive. Frecventa de utilizare si raportare la limba engleza atât în dreptul international public cât si în relatiile internationale fac din aceasta o *lingua franca*. De asemenea, o serie de state studiate au drept limba oficiala engleza, iar cele mai multe surse oficiale cuprindeau o varianta si în aceasta limba.

În ceea ce priveste limbajul, cercetarea s-a bucurat de un grad destul de ridicat de formalizare de la nivelul institutiilor juridice din dreptul constitutional al statelor democratice.

În consecinta, construirea unor *travelling concepts* a fost mai usoara. Operatiunea are în vedere realizarea unei definiri echilibrate a unui concept care sa ia în considerare atât precizia logica cât si aplicabilitatea sa la spatii politice atât de diferite. Conceptele construite teoretic, în prima parte, au rezistat testului, dovedindu-se destul de flexibile în raport cu fiecare constitutie cercetata.

Pasul urmator în analiza a constat în identificarea institutiilor din fiecare constitutie. În urma acestei operatii am constatat ca unele state au aceleasi institutii, însa, pozitia constitutională a acestora este sensibil diferita. Aceasta ne-a sugerat ca simpla identificare a institutiilor este insuficienta si ca este necesar a construi o analiza care sa releve capacitatea de actiune si interactiune a acestora. Pentru aceasta am apelat la descrierea si acordarea de valori numerice institutiilor cercetate în functie de doua dimensiuni: *dimensiunea legitimitatii* si *dimensiunea atributiilor*. Cele doua dimensiuni operationalizeaza conceptul denumit de noi, *potentialitate*

institutionala. Prin potentialitate institutionala, înțelegem capacitatea actionala a unei institutii. Am considerat ca dimensiunea legitimitatii este cea care prevaleaza într-un sistem politic construit pe principiul forte al reprezentativitatii. O institutie puternic legitimata poate actiona politic dincolo de limita atributiilor recunoscute, întrucât poate pretinde ca actioneaza în numele poporului. Spre exemplu, experienta comuna ne arata ca un presedinte puternic legitimat prin votul întregului popor are tendinta de a juca un rol mult mai important decât un presedinte ales de Parlament chiar daca acesta din urma ar avea atributii mai importante. În functie de cele doua dimensiuni, am construit urmatorul tabel:

Tabelul 1

	Atributii		
		reduse	importante
Legitimitate	redușă	1	2
	puternică	3	4

În continuare, pe baza acestui tabel, vom evalua cele cinci institutii pe care le-am ales pentru analiza comparata: Camera inferioara, Camera superioara, Executivul, Reprezentantul statului, Curtea care realizeaza controlul de constitutionalitate. Parlamentelor unicamerale si Camerelor inferioare le-a fost acordata valoarea 4 întrucât au atributia majora de adoptare a legilor si sunt deplin legitimize în urma votului direct. În cazul Parlamentelor bicamerale, Camerele superioare au fost considerate cu legitimitate puternica în cazul alegerii prin vot direct. Atributiile Camerei superioare au fost considerate importante în functie de rolul jucat în

procesul adoptarii legilor, în speta de posibilitatea acesteia de a se opune vointei Camerei inferioare.

Am apreciat ca Executivul au atributii importante, dar, nefiind alese prin vot direct, detin o legitimitate redua. Exceptie fac regimurile prezidentiale unde legitimitatea este puternica deoarece Presedintele este ales prin vot direct. În Columbia, Venezuela si Costa Rica functia de reprezentant al statului si de prim ministru sunt îndeplinite de Presedinte. În cazul acestor state, am considerat ca exista o singura institutie – Guvernul – ce îndeplineste prin liderul sau si functia de reprezentare a statului. În consecinta, Executivului i-a fost acordata valoarea 4. Franta constituie o exceptie la exceptie întrucât, desi presedintele este ales direct si conduce politica externa, nu îndeplineste si calitatea de prim-ministru.

Reprezentantii statului au legitimitate puternica daca sunt alesi direct. În cazul în care sunt alesi de Parlament sau ocupa functia pe criterii ereditare, legitimitatea lor este scazuta. Majoritatea reprezentantilor statului au atributii reduse.

Membrii Curtilor ce realizeaza control de constitutionalitate sunt numiti si nu alesi, fie ca e vorba de Curti Constitutionale, fie ca e vorba de Curti Supreme. Am considerat ca un organism special constituit va tinde sa fie mai activ decât unul care îndeplineste aceasta atributie alaturi de cea obisnuita de jurisdictie. În consecinta, Curtilor Constitutionale le-a fost atribuita valoarea 2, în timp ce Curtilor Supreme valoarea 1.

În urma acestei operatiuni, fiecare institutie a obtinut o valoare. Însumarea valorilor, utilizarea mediei

aritmetice simple sau a celei ponderate nu ne conduc la rezultate concludente. De aceea, este necesar sa folosim o formula de calcul care sa scoata în evidenta *diferentele semnificative* dintre constructiile institutionale democratice. Dupa cum am precizat la începutul acestei sectiuni, proiectarea cercetarii noastre este centrata pe relevarea diferentelor dintre democratii. Aceasta ne sugereaza ca formula de calcul a indicelui constructiei institutionale trebuie astfel conceput, încât sa ajute la evidentierea specificitatii fiecarui stat. O formula matematica menita sa scoata în evidenta diferentele este media patratica ponderata.

$$\overline{x_p} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^k x_i^2 n_i}{\sum_{i=1}^k n_i}}$$

Pentru a utiliza aceasta formula, trebuie sa atribuim coeficienti valorii fiecarei institutii. În consecinta, luând în considerare ordinea logico-istorica a aparitiei lor, vom acorda Camerei inferioare coeficientul 1, Camerei superioare coeficientul 2, Guvernului coeficientul 3 Reprezentantului statului coeficientul 4, Curtii coeficientul 5. Pe baza acestor valori, utilizând media patratica ponderata, am realizat un *indice al potentialitatii institutionale (I)*:

$$I = \sqrt{\frac{a^2 + 2b^2 + 3c^2 + 4d^2 + 5e^2}{1+2+3+4+5}}$$

unde a este valoarea conferita Camerei inferioare, b este valoarea conferita Camerei superioare, c este valoarea conferita Guvernului, d valoarea conferita Reprezentantului statului, e este valoarea conferita Curtii cu atributii de control al constitutionalitatii. Precizam ca, pentru cercetarea noastra, a are, întotdeauna, valoarea 4, c are, cu exceptia regimurilor prezidentiale, valoarea 2, b si d pot lua valori în multimea $\{0,1,2,3,4\}$, în timp ce e poate lua valori în multimea $\{0,1,2\}$. Într-o prima acceptiune, *indicele potentialitatii institutionale poate fi definit ca, media patratica ponderata a potentialelor institutiilor statului*.

Dupa consultarea constitutiei fiecarui stat, acordarea de valori fiecarei institutii în conformitate cu Tabelul 1 si calcularea indicelui constructiei institutionale, a fost construit urmatorul tabel:

Tabelul 2 (vezi pagina urmatoare)

Precizam ca în Tabelul 2, în coloana statelor, a fost înscris, alaturat, anul în care a fost adoptata constitutia la care facem referire. În coloanele institutiilor a fost trecuta valoarea asignata acestora conform Tabelului 1, între paranteze fiind consemnate articolele pe care ne-am sprijinit în apreciere. Absenta institutiilor a fost notata cu x. Ultima coloana cuprinde valoarea indicelui potentialitatii institutionale (I) obtinut conform formulei (2).

Privind Tabelul 2 se pot face câteva observatii. Asa cum era de asteptat, avînd în vedere formula matematica utilizata, regimurile semi-prezidentiale si cele prezidentiale care au mai multe institutii cu valori mari, obtin scoruri mai ridicate decît cele parlamentare. Regimurile parlamentare se regasesc în intervalul de la

	Cam era Inferioară	Cam era Superioară	G uvern	Reprezentantul statului	Tip de control constituțional	I
State						
A ustralia-1900	4 (art.24-40)	4 (art.7-23)	2 (art.61-70)	1 (art.2-4)	1 (art.71-80)	2,14
A ustria-1929	4 (art.24-32)	1 (art.32-37)	2 (art.69-78)	3 (art.60-68)	2 (art.137-148)	2,39
Baham as-1973	4 (art.46-51)	1 (art.39-45)	2 (art.71-92)	1 (art.32-37)	1 (art.93-97)	1,61
Barbados-1966	4 (art.41-47)	1 (art.36-40)	2 (art.64-79)	1 (art.28-34)	1 (art.80-82)	1,61
Belgia-1970	4 (art.61-66)	1 (art.67-73)	2 (art.96-114)	1 (art.85-95)	2 (art.142)	1,89
Colum bia-1991	4 (art.176-178)	3 (art.171-175)	4 (art.188-201)	x	2 (art.239-245)	3,04
Costa Rica-1949	4 (art.105-129)	x	4 (art.130-151)	x	1 (art.152-167)	2,76
Danem arca-1953	4 (art.28-58)	x	2) (art.13)	1 (art.5-27)	1 (art.59-65)	1,68
Elveția-1998	4 (art.149)	2 (art.150)	2 (art.174-187)	x	x	2,44
Finlanda-1999	4 (art.24-53)	x	2 (art.60-69)	3 (art.24-53)	x	2,82
Franța-1958	4 (art.24-33)	1 (art.24-33)	2 (art.20-23)	4 (art.5-19)	2 (art.56-63)	2,75
Gem ania-1949	4 (art.38-48)	1 (art.50-53)	2 (art.62-69)	1 (art.54-61)	2 (art.93-94)	1,89
Grecia-1975	4 (art.30-50)	x	2 (art.81-86)	1 (art.30-50)	1 (art.100)	1,68
India-1950	4 (art.81)	2 (art.80)	2 (art.77-78)	1 (art.52-62)	1 (art.124-147)	1,73
Irlanda-1937	4 (art.15-17)	1 (art.18-20)	2 (art.28)	3 (art.12-14)	1 (art.34)	2,17
Islanda-1944	4 (art.31-58)	x	2 (art.13-30)	3 (art.3-13)	1 (art.59-61)	2,30
Italia-1947	4 (art.56)	1 (art.57)	2 (art.92-100)	1 (art.83-91)	2 (art.134-139)	1,89
Jam aica-1962	4 (art.34-67)	1 (art.34-67)	2 (art.68-96)	1 (art.27-33)	1 (art.97-102)	1,61
Japonia-1946	4 (art.41-64)	3 (art.41-64)	2 (art.65-75)	1 (art.1-8)	1 (art.79-91)	1,91
Luxem burg-1868	4 (art.50-75)	x	2 (art.76-83bis)	1 (art.33-45)	2 (art.95ter)	2,00
M alta-1964	4 (art.51-57)	x	2 (art.78-94)	1 (art.48-50)	2 (art.95)	2,00
M auritius-1968	4 (art.31-57)	x	2 (art.58-68)	1 (art.28)	1 (art.76-84)	1,68
O landa-1983	4 (art.54)	2 (art.55)	2 (art.42-49)	1 (art.24-41)	x	2,00
Portugalia-1976	4 (art.150-184)	x	2 (art.185-204)	3 (art.123-143)	2 (art.223-226)	2,54
Spania-1978	4 (art.66-80)	1 (art.66-80)	2 (art.97-107)	1 (art.56-65)	2 (art.159-165)	1,89
Suedia-1978	4 (cap.3)	x	2 (cap.6)	1 (cap.5)	1 (cap.11)	1,68
Trinidad-Tobago-1962	4 (art.39-73)	2 (art.39-73)	2 (art.75-88)	1 (art.22-27)	1 (art.99-111)	1,73
Venezuela-1999	4 (art.186-224)	x	4 (art.225-237)	x	1 (art.262-266)	2,76

prezidentiale se regasesc în intervalul de la 2,17 la 3,04.

Întrucât indicele potentialitatii institutionale este unul nou-creat, va trebui sa stabilim ce anume determina cresterea si descresterea valorilor sale. Observam ca valoarea minima (1,61) este obtinuta de state - Bahamas, Barbados si Jamaica – în care toate cele cinci institutii au valori minime. Daca privim în tabel doar statele ce au cinci institutii, observam ca indicele acestora creste odata cu cresterea valorii acordate institutiilor. Astfel, Belgia, Germania, Italia si Spania obtin 1,89 deoarece sunt diferite de cele trei tari ce obtin indicele cel mai mic, prin prezenta Curtii Constitutionale în locul Curtii Supreme. Între statele cu cinci institutii cea mai mare valoare o obtine, în mod firesc, Franta care are atât un presedinte puternic cât si un organ specializat de control al constitutionalitatii legilor. Conchidem ca *indicele potentialitatii institutionale creste, ceteris paribus, odata cu cresterea atributiilor si legitimitatii institutiilor*. Consideram ca aceasta concluzie este fireasca, indicele nefacînd altceva decît sa “aseze” regimurile politice pe axa regim parlamentar - regim prezidential într-o ordine crescatoare.

În continuare, vom urmări în tabel ce se întîmpla cu indicele atunci cînd numarul de institutii scade. Pentru aceasta, vom porni tot de la statele ce obtin valoarea minima - Bahamas, Barbados si Jamaica – si le vom compara cu statele ce au o structura ce difera doar prin absenta unei institutii. Astfel de state sunt Danemarca, Grecia, Mauritius si Suedia. Structura lor difera doar prin absenta Camerei Superioare. Observam ca scorul obtinut – 1,68 – este mai mare decît cel al statelor de

referinta (Bahamas, Barbados si Jamaica). Asemănător, Luxemburg difera de Germania si Italia prin absenta Camerei superioare. Desi are un număr mai mic de institutii, Luxemburg obtine un indice mai ridicat (2 fata de 1,89). Aceeasi situatie o întîlnim si în cazul a doua regimuri semi-prezidentiale. Finlanda si Portugalia au structuri asemănătoare. Diferenta este data de faptul ca Portugalia are o Curte Constitutionala, în timp ce Finlanda nu are. Statul ce are doar trei institutii – Finlanda – obtine un scor mai ridicat 2,82, decît statul ce are patru institutii – Portugalia – care obtine doar 2,54.

Putem concluziona ca *indicele potentialitatii institutionale poate sa creasca si în cazul scaderii numarului de institutii*. Daca prima concluzie privind cresterea indicelui potentialitatii institutionale a aparut ca fireasca, cea de a doua necesita unele clarificari. Partile unui sistem tind sa devina mai importante atunci cînd sunt mai putine. Implicit, scaderea numarului de institutii conduce la o redistributie a rolurilor si, astfel, la o crestere a potentialitatii actionale a fiecareia.

Un indice mai mare indica o propensiune mai ridicata a institutiilor spre actional si, de aici, aparitia unui număr mai mare de divergente între institutii. În consecinta, ne asteptam ca o crestere a acestui indice sa fie însoțita de un număr mai ridicat de mecanisme ale crizei. De aceea, pasul ulterior al cercetării a constat în identificarea mecanismelor de criza din fiecare constitutie. Numarul total al acestora este înscris în penultima coloana a Tabelului 3. Pentru a obtine valori comparabile am împartit numarul total de mecanisme la

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Total	index
State																				
AUL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	53	57	-	-	2	0.4
AUS	-	-	68	-	-	140a 11	1421 itb	-	-	53	28a12	57	74	140a1 1	42	29a11	-	-	10	2.0
BAH	-	-	-	-	74a1 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	74a11	-	61a11	66a12	-	-	4	0.8
BAR	-	-	-	-	66	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	61a12	-	-	3	0.6
BEL	94	-	-	-	96a1 2	-	103a 11	-	-	56	44a14	59	-	-	78a15	46	-	54	9	1.8
COL	-	-	-	166	173	167	175	-	x	-	138	-	135pc t7	-	-	-	150pc t10	-	8	2.0
CR	-	-	-	125	-	128	151	-	-	-	118	110	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1.6
DEN	9	-	60a1 2	-	-	-	16	-	-	51	-	57	15a12	-	-	-	-	-	6	1.5
SW I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	165	153a1 4	151a12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.0
FIN	-	-	-	-	64	-	101	44a1 2	-	35a11	26	30a13	43a12	-	-	-	-	-	7	2.3
FR	7a14	61a1 4	68	10	8	61a1 2	68-1 1,4	49a1 1,4	-	-	29	26a12	49a12	61a12	45	12	-	41,45	16	3.2
GER	57	-	61	-	-	93a1 2	-	-	81	44	-	46a14	67	93a12	77	63a14	-	-	10	2.0
GR	32a11	-	49a1 2	35lit d	-	-	86	-	-	68a12	32a15	61a12	84a12	-	-	32a14	44	-	10	2.5
IND	62	-	61lit b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	108	85a12 litb	123	143	6	1.2
IRE	-	26a1 1pct 1	12a1 10pc t1	26a1 5	13a1 2pct 3	-	-	-	24a1 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	13a12 pct1	-	-	6	1.2
ICE	7	-	-	26	-	-	14	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	24	28	-	6	1.5
ITA	86a12	-	90	74a1 1	-	-	-	-	-	82a12	62a12	68a11	77a12	-	-	x	x	-	9	1.8
JAM	-	-	-	-	71	-	-	-	-	-	64a14	-	64a15	-	-	64a11	-	-	4	0.8
JAP	-	-	-	-	70	-	-	-	-	62	53	-	69	-	59	54a11	-	67	7	1.4
LUX	-	-	-	-	-	-	82	-	-	64	72	69	-	-	-	74	-	-	5	1.2
MAL	-	-	76	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	81	-	-	55	-	-	3	0.7
MAU	88	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57a11	-	-	57a11	-	-	4	1.0
NED	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	-	-	-	-	-	64	-	-	3	0.7
POR	126a1 1	-	133	139a 11	198	-	199	196	173	181a1 1	136pct c	160a1 2	197	-	-	136pc te	-	137pc tc	13	3.2
SPA	57	-	-	-	101	162a 11	102	-	-	76a11	73a12	71a12	113	162a1 1	90	115a1 1	86	74a12 99a1 5	13	2.6
SW E	cap.5a rt.4	-	-	-	cap. 7art. 7	-	-	-	-	-	-	cap.4a rt.8a1 1	cap.6a rt.5	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.0
TRI	27	-	36	-	77	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68a11	-	-	4	0.8
VEN	-	-	-	214	233	214	233	-	-	222	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2.0

numarul efectiv de institutii. Indicele astfel obtinut – *indicele mecanismelor* – a fost înscris în ultima coloana a Tabelului 3.

Tabelul 3 (vezi pagina precedenta)

Legenda:

- 1 - vacanta functiei de Reprezentant al statului
- 2 - sesizarea Curtii la initiativa Reprezentantului statului cu privire la neconstitutionalitatea unei legi
- 3 - punerea sub acuzare a Reprezentantului statului
- 4 - trimiterea legii spre reexaminare
- 5 - vacanta functiei de Prim-Ministru
- 6 - sesizarea Curtii de catre Guvern cu privire la neconstitutionalitatea unei legi
- 7 - punerea sub acuzare a Primului-ministru
- 8 - angajarea raspunderii
- 9 - urgenta legislativa
- 10 - comisii de ancheta
- 11 - sesiuni extraordinare
- 12 - ridicarea imunitatii parlamentarilor cu acordul Camerei
- 13 - pierderea încrederii
- 14 - sesizarea Curtii de catre parlamentari cu privire la neconstitutionalitatea unei legi
- 15 - dezacord între Camere pe un text de lege
- 16 - dizolvarea Parlamentului
- 17 - delegare legislativa extraordinara
- 18 - altele

Cercetînd Tabelul 3 se pot face cîteva observatii. Sunt putine statele care sa aiba un numar mare de mecanisme ale crizei: Franta -16, decît Spania -13, Portugalia -13. Multe state (12) au sub 6 mecanisme ale crizei înscrise în Constitutie. Dintre acestea, majoritatea

o reprezinta statele ce se înscriu în modelul majoritarist de inspiratie britanica. Tot aici se înscriu si statele (Costa Rica, Venezuela, si, într-o masura mai mica, Columbia) ce au fost influentate de modelul american.

Ne-am astepta ca tarile ce se înscriu în modelul consensualist, bazat pe cooperare si multipartidism, sa favorizeze introducerea unui numar mai mare de mecanisme. Aceasta afirmatie nu este valabila întrucît suficient de multe state (Elvetia, Olanda, Danemarca, Islanda, Luxemburg) ce se înscriu în modelul consensualist nu o confirma.. Aceasta ne sugereaza ca exista doua modalitati prin care sistemul politic înțelege sa preîntîmpine criza: una ce se bazeaza pe capacitatea de negociere si compromis a actorilor politici – mecanisme informale si o a doua ce construiesc un solid esafodaj constitutional de mecanisme ale crizei – mecanisme formale.

Privind indicele mecanismelor observam ca unele state cu regim parlamentar (Spania, Grecia) obtin indici mai ridicati decît state cu regim prezidential (Costa Rica, Columbia, Venezuela).

Daca în cazul indicelui potentialitatii institutionale am putut remarca o serie de regularitati, în cazul indicelui mecanismelor observam ca acestea lipsesc. Aceasta ne sugereaza ca între cei doi indici nu exista o corelatie ridicata asa cum se poate observa din Figura 1:

Figura 1. “Harta” crizei în constitutiile a 28 de state (vezi pagina urmatoare)


Coeficientul de corelare este de 0,50 care este semnificativ din punct de vedere statistic la nivelul de 1 procent. Figura 1 prezinta o dispersie importanta, ceea

ce arata ca si alti factori determina puternic numarul de mecanisme.

Dintre cazurile deviante – Finlanda, Franta, Grecia, Portugalia, Spania – cele mai multe sunt state ce au avut nefaste experiente democratice sau totalitare dupa al doilea razboi mondial. Aceasta sugereaza ca un element important în introducerea mecanismelor crizei în constitutii îl reprezinta si istoria recenta a spatiului politic respectiv. De cealalta parte a liniei de regresie, regasim ca si cazuri deviante Australia a carei pozitie poate fi explicata prin vechimea constitutiei (1900) si Elvetia care, desi a adoptat o noua constitutie recent (1998), pastreaza, la nivel institutional, traditia de secol XIX.

Modelul predominant este cel al statelor cu regim parlamentar si cu numar redus de mecanisme ale crizei. Aceasta situatie se datoreaza, pe de o parte, vechilor democratiilor europene care se bazeaza pe stabilitatea sistemului politic si pe capacitatea acestuia de a gestiona si rezolva, informal, crizele. Pe de alta parte, fostele colonii ce au preluat modelul britanic si care au constitutii, în buna masura, asemanatoare au ramas fidele traditiei mostenite.

Conchidem ca aceasta “harta” arata, odata în plus, ca o Constitutie este o imagine a experientei si traditiei politice din statul respectiv si ca nu se poate vorbi de un model valabil oriunde si oricând.



3. Spre o teorie a crizei ca metoda de cunoastere si dezvoltare societala

Secolul al XX-lea poate fi considerat unul exemplar din perspectiva numarului mare de crize si al efectelor globale produse de acestea în toate domeniile. Iata numai câteva exemple dintr-o lunga lista: Criza economica din 1929-1933, Criza Berlinului din 1948-1949, Criza Ciprului din anii '50-'60, Criza Suezului din 1956, Criza rachetelor cubaneze din 1962, Criza dolarului de la începutul anilor '70, Criza petrolului din 1973, Criza ostatecilor din Iran si Liban din anii '80, Criza determinata de crashul bursier din 1987, Criza Golfului din 1991, Criza economiilor asiatice din anii '90 etc.

Termenul de “criza” este, în mod curent, asociat nu doar unor evenimente cu durata determinata în timp, ci si unor fenomene trenante: criza petrolului, criza termica, criza claselor sociale, criza mediului etc.

De asemenea, o serie de termeni frecvent utilizati de mijloacele de comunicare în masa induc, într-o masura sau alta, ideea de criza: antagonism, clivaj, conflict, coruptie, deficit, deficienta, diferenta, greva, minoritate, nationalism, opozitie, recesiune, tranzitie, segmentare, segregare, stres.

Ce semnificatie ar trebui sa acordam acestei abundente? Se poate concluziona ca *suntem în criza* sau ca *traim într-o lume a crizei*? Daca pornim pe filiera etimologica aflam, folosind dictionarul Larousse, ca în

greaca veche *krisis* însemna *decizie*. Astfel, putem schita o paradigma în care accentul cade pe momentul alegerii, al gasirii si aplicarii unei solutii pentru problema aparuta. Însa, având în vedere experienta secolului recent încheiat, criza nu este doar o metoda de raspuns la tensiunile aparute, ci si *o metoda de cunoastere si dezvoltare societala*. Astfel, dupa fiecare criza majora sistemele nationale sau internationale s-au modificat, fie recunoscând prezenta unor noi entitati în spatiile societale proprii, fie înțelegând necesitatea unor modificari esentiale. Practic, dupa fiecare criza, mediul societal s-a îmbogătit si niciodata nu a mai putut fi adus în situatia anterioara. Acest lucru diferentiaza fenomenul de criza din secolul XX fata de cel din alte perioade istorice. Crizele pot fi identificate în orice epoca istorica si, atunci ca si astazi, impuneau luarea unei decizii. Însa, obiectivul final era acela de reîntoarce la momentul initial, de restabilire a *status quo* -ului.

Evident, ne întrebam de unde provine deosebirea. Un posibil raspuns ia în considerare lipsa unui model general-acceptat, lipsa datorata celeritatii progresului social. Trecerea de la societatile rigide, de tip victorian, la cele deschise, tolerante la diferenta, însoțite de destructurarea claselor sociale traditionale au facut imposibile stabilitatea si continuitatea.

Istoria Statului si a teoriilor despre acesta, în secolul al XX-lea, reflecta aceasta lipsa a modelului. Poate si de aceea statul totalitar în diversele sale forme, de la cel facist pîna la cel comunist, a putut parea multor intelectuali de marca drept o solutie rezonabila. Abia caderea comunismului din ultimul deceniu al veacului

produce ruperea definitiva a valului si triumful statului democratic.

Cu atît mai mult devine necesara studierea statelor cu vechime neîntrerupta în practica democratica din perspectiva modului în care au înteles sa reglementeze constitutional mecanisme de raspuns la criza.

Nu de putine ori se spune despre Constitutie, într-o abordare institutionalista, ca ocupa locul cel mai important în ansamblul legislativ si ca stabileste regimul politic al unei tari. Însa, dintr-o perspectiva neo-institutionalista, o constitutie reprezinta doar unul dintre elementele importante ce contribuie la conturarea ordinii juridice si a sistemului societal. Adeseori, intervin fenomene ce fac ca prevederile constitutionale sa fie futille. Astfel, Pierre Pactet observa ca procedurile destinate evitarii instabilitatii guvernamentale s-au dovedit a fi destinate esecului. În constitutiile diverselor state, dupa primul razboi mondial si, mai ales, dupa cel de al doilea au fost introduse institutii precum motiunea de cenzura si votul de încredere menite sa limiteze libertatea de actiune a Parlamentului. Aceste proceduri s-au aratat inutile, spune P.Pactet, fie pentru ca echilibrul a fost asigurat de sistemul de partide, fie pentru ca, în ciuda prevederilor constitutionale, stabilitatea guvernamentala a fost erodata de fragmentarea multipartidica.

Aceste remarci merita, însa, nuanate. Este adevarat ca în Germania, spre exemplu, stabilitatea sistemului de partide a jucat un rol important si ca motiunea de

cenzura constructiva prevazuta de articolul 67 nu a fost folosita decît în anul 1982. În acelasi timp, nu vom sti niciodata ce s-ar fi întîmplat daca în legea fundamentala a Germaniei nu ar fi fost prezent acel articol. Afirmatia are substanta daca luam în considerare atitudinea unui actor politic care constient de prevederile din Constitutie si de cerintele statului de drept îsi va construi strategia în consecinta.

Observatia este importanta întrucît releva raportul dintre reglementarile constitutionale si sistemul politic. Este vorba de o dubla determinare, o dialectica în care sistemul politic se construiesc în functie de constitutie, dupa cum constitutia ia forma pe care i-o da sistemul politic. Acestea fiind luate în considerare, se poate spune ca în constitutii regasim, în buna masura, o forma de canonizare a politicului asa cum a fost sarjata de sistemul politic respectiv. Consecinta este una importanta si a fost, nu odata, iterata: nu exista constitutii care sa fie bune în mod abstract, ci doar constitutii adecvate realitatilor societale. Ceea ce putem adauga în urma acestui studiu este ca adecvarea priveste atît configuratia institutionala cît si mecanismele de criza.

Din perspectiva sistemica, se poate spune ca întelegera modului în care se pregateste sistemul fata de o potentiala criza echivaleaza cu întelegera sistemului însusi.

- Carpinschi, Anton si Cristian Bocancea, *Stiinta politicului. Tratat*, Editura Universitatii "Al.I.Cuza", Iasi, 1998
- Carpinschi, Anton, "Paradigma complexitatii si sistemul actiunii concrete" în volumul colectiv *Mentalitati si institutii*, coordonat de Adrian Paul Iliescu, Editura Ars Docendi, Bucuresti 2002
- King, Gary, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, *Fundamentele cercetarii sociale*, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2000
- Lijphart, Arend, *Democratii. Modele de guvernare majoritara si consensuala în douazeci si una de tari*, Editura Sigma, Chisinau, 1999
- Lijphart, Arend, *Democratia în societatile plurale*, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2002
- Lijphart, Arend, *Modele ale democratiei. Forme de guvernare si functionare în treizeci siase de tari*, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2000
- Lijphart, Arend, *Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method*, în "The American Political Science Review"
- Pennings, Paul, Hans Keman si Jan Kleinnijenhuis, *Doing Research in Political Science*, SAGE Publications, 1999
- Sartori, Giovanni, "Comparing, Miscomparing and the Comparative Method", în *Comparing Nations. Concepts, Strategies, Substance* editat de Mattei Dogan si Ali Kazancigil, Blackwell, 1994
- Vile, M.J.C., *Constitutionalism and the separation of powers*, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1998

Situri accesate

- <http://confinder.richmond.edu/>
<http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/forcons.html>
<http://www.findlaw.com/01topics/06constitutional/03forconst/>
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/usconst.htm>
<http://tcnbp.tripod.com/indexi.htm>

- 1 Gary King, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, *Fundamentele cercetarii sociale*, Editura Polirom Iasi, 2000, pp.21-23.
- 2 Prin tensiune înțelegem divergenta vectoriala a doua sau mai multe fenomene
- 3 Sistemele totalitare nu îndeplinesc decât aceasta functie
- 4 Arend Lijphart, *Modele ale democratiei*, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2000
- 5 Într-o democratie de tip Westminster se vor cauta metode de ridicare a gradului de reprezentativitate, în timp ce într-una de tip consensualist se vor cauta metode de concentrare a puterii
- 6 Anton Carpinschi, "Paradigma complexitatii si sistemul actiunii concrete" studiu publicat în volumul colectiv *Mentalitati si institutii*, coordonat de Adrian Paul Iliescu, Editura Ars Docendi, Bucuresti 2002, pp.319-338
- 7 Drept exemplu, poate fi data implementarea *Legii accesului liber la informatii- 544/2001*. Aceasta lege aduce o deschidere suplimentara a sistemului. Desi fireasca într-o democratie, aplicarea legii întâmpina dificultati întrucât sistemul politic nu reuseste sa raspunda nivelului informational-energetic extrem de ridicat. În particular, reprezentantii Parlamentului României au afirmat ca nu au posibilitatea de a da raspuns tuturor cererilor înaintate de ziaristi datorita numarului covârșitor al acestora.
- 8 Generalul Charles de Gaulle s-a aratat incapabil sa opereze o deschidere a sistemului în sensul cerut de miscarile muncitoresti si studentesti din mai 1968
- 9 Aparitia unei crize este posibila doar daca este depasita limita superioara a tensiunii
- 10 Charles de Montesquieu, *Spiritul Legilor*, vol. I, Editura Stiintifica, Bucuresti, 1964, p.195
- 11 *idem*, p.198
- 12 Nuantare: instantele sunt independente (nu raspund în fata unei alte institutii), dar nu sunt libere fiind supuse ordinii juridice ce le învesteste; institutiile politice au libertate

decizionala, dar nu se bucura de independenta (raspund în fata altor institutii si a alegatorilor)

13 Aristotel, *Politica*, Editura Antet, 1999, pp.218-219

14 David Held, *Modele ale democratiei*, Editura Univers, p.47

15 Poate purta diverse alte denumiri: Adunare Nasionala, Congres, Dieta

16 Pentru rigoare, sa precizam ca Prima Camera, cea care asigura reprezentativitatea populara, este denumita Camera inferioara, în timp ce a doua Camera, cea care include reprezentantii statelor federate, este denumita Camera superioara

17 Aceasta institutie poate purta diverse denumiri: Guvern, Executiv, Consiliu de Ministri. Cel ce o conduce se numeste, de obicei, prim-ministru, dar se poate numi si presedinte (Spania) ori cancelar (Germania, Austria)

18 Exista si în aceasta privinta exceptii (cel putin la nivel formal) – cf. Constitutiei SUA Executivul este reprezentat de Presedinte

19 Drept exemplu poate fi invocata atitudinea Frantei din perioada de început al celui de al doilea razboi mondial

20 Asupra rationalizarii parlamentarismului vom reveni în momentul discutarii mecanismelor

21 Folosim aceasta formula si nu pe aceea uzuala în limbajul diplomatic de Sef al statului întrucât aceste functii au, cel mai adesea, atributii de conducere limitate

22 De exemplu, nimic nu opreste ca reprezentarea statului sa fie atributie a Primului-Ministru, unui membru al Parlamentului etc.

23 Mai mult, conform Constitutiei SUA , Executivul este uni-personal fiind alcatuit din Presedinte. În fapt, presedintii SUA se bucura astazi de un aparat complex si numeros format din ministri (secretari de stat) si consilieri.

24 Între 1986-1988 are loc prima coabitare între un presedinte de stînga –François Mitterand si un prim-ministru de dreapta Jacques Chirac. Între 1993-1995 se petrece a doua coabitare presedinte–François Mitterand si primul-ministru gaullist Édouard Balladur, în timp ce a treia coabitare, 1997-

2001, a avut ca presedinte pe Jacques Chirac si ca prim-ministru pe socialistul Lionel Jospin.

25 Art. 2 al “Protocolului privind Statutul Sistemului European al Bancilor Centrale si al Bancii Centrale Europene” în *Documente de baza ale Comunitatii si Uniunii Europene*, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 1999, p.191

26 Lijphart, Arend, *Democratii. Modele de guvernare majoritara si consensuala în douazeci si una de tari*, Editura Sigma, Chisinau, 1999

27 Lijphart, Arend, *Modele ale democratiei. Forme de guvernare si functionare în treizeci si sase de tari*, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2000, p.217

28 Apare în Finlanda în 1919, în Norvegia în 1952, în Danemarca în 1954, R.F.Germania în 1957, în Marea Britanie în 1967, în Irlanda de Nord 1969, în Franta în 1973, în Italia în 1974, în Portugalia în 1975, în Austria în 1977, în Spania în 1981.

29 Ovidiu Tinca, *Constitutii si alte texte de drept public*, Editura Imprimeriei de Vest, Oradea, 1997, p.702

30 M.J.C. Vile, *Constitutionalism and the separation of powers*, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1998; p.85

31 Este adevarat ca atât judecatorii de la Curtea Constitutionala, cât si Avocatul Poporului ori guvernatorul Bancii Centrale sunt numiti, în realitate, pe criterii politice. Însa, în cele mai multe state, criteriile formale sunt bazate pe îndeplinirea unor conditii de merit si vechime în activitate.

32 Vezi “Carta europeana a autonomiei locale” adoptata de Consiliul Europei la Strasbourg, 15 octombrie 1985

33 Unele institutii nu apar în Constitutii si ar fi necesara consultarea minutioasa a unor legi interne.

34 Acestea pot fi mai putine daca ne aflam, de exemplu, în situatia unui regim prezidential sau mai multe daca este vorba de un Parlament bicameral

35 Este ceea ce i s-a întâmplat lui William Jefferson Clinton, al 42-lea presedinte al Statelor Unite ale Americii, care a fost pus sub acuzare de Camera Reprezentantilor, pentru “*perjury and obstruction of justice*” (marturie mincinoasa si obstructionare a justitiei) în decembrie 1998 în legatura cu depozitia sa din cadrul

unui proces civil. Senatul Statelor Unite l-a achitat, însa, în februarie 1999. Acesta a fost al doilea presedinte supus procedurii de impeachment, dupa Andrew Johnson.

36 Arend Lijphart, *Modele ale democratiei. Forme de guvernare si functionare în treizeci si sase de tari*, Polirom, Iasi, 2000. Precizam ca aceasta cercetare a fost initial publicata în anul 1999.

37 Ion Deleanu, *Drept constitutional si institutii politice*, vol. II, Editura Fundatiei Chemarea, Iasi, 1996, p.59

38 Desi actul din 1982 a adus modificari importante constitutiei canadiene, aceasta nu se înscrie în limitele teoriei pe care se funamenteaza aceasta cercetare

39 E.g. Amendamentul XII privitor la procedura de alegere a Presedintelui, Amendamentul XXII privitor la limitarea numarului de mandate, Amendamentul XXV privitor la decesul sau demisia Presedintelui

40 <http://confinder.richmond.edu/>; <http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/forcons.html>; <http://www.findlaw.com/01topics/06constitutional/03forconst/>; <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/usconst.htm>
<http://tcnbp.tripod.com/indexi.htm>

41 Pentru problema “conceptelor calatoare” vezi Mattei Dogan si Dominique Pelassy, *Cum sa comparam natiunile*, Editura Alternative, Bucuresti, 1993, pp.28-35

42 Aceasta asumptie este una destul de buna daca luam în considerare rezultatele obtinute de Arend Lijphart cu privire la intensitatea controlului constitutional vezi Arend Lijphart, *op .cit.* p.210, Tabelul 12.2

43 Nu exista Curti Constitutionale sau Curti Supreme alese prin vot direct, deci acestea nu pot lua valorile legitimitatii puternice, adica 3 sau 4.

44 E.g. S-a spus, adesea, ca dupa 11 septembrie 2001 lumea nu mai arata la fel.

45 apud. Jean-Claude Masclet si Jean-Paul Valette, *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques*, Ed. Dalloz, 1997, p.125

46 Guvernul Partidului Social Democrat condus H.Schmidt a fost abandonat de Partidul liberal care s-a asociat cu Partidul Democrat Crestin pentru a forma un guvern sub conducerea lui H.Kohl

Relatia Stat-Biserica în privinta educatiei religioase în scolile publice din România

In this paper I will deal with the question of the religious education in the public schools in Romania, from the point of view of the relationship between Church and State. My quantitative and qualitative analysis of the bills concerning religious education, the way in which law has been applied and some of the consequences of this application wants to circumscribe the meaning of some concepts such as *religious liberty* and *the new religious forms*. The basic consequence of this I hope will be the redefining of the notion of public space and of the role played by religion with its characteristic aspects: the relationship between state and religious organizations. This will clearly show the essential bond between two main aspects of religious liberty: the formal aspect - legal and institutional - and the informal aspect – an aspect connected to the personal and social attitudes regarding the new forms of religious behaviour.

Moto:

„Nu biserica se transforma în stat, va rog sa luati bine aminte. Spre asta nazuia Roma în visurile sale! Cea de a treia ispita a diavolului! Dimpotriva, statul se transforma în biserica, se ridica pâna la ea pentru a pastori asupra întregului pamânt ceea ce este ... suprema menire a credintei pravoslavnice (ortodoxe, n.m., E.M.) pe lumea asta. Si luceafarul acesta se va aprinde în Rasarit”.¹

„Ne confruntam cu întrebarea privind rolul religiei în viata publica a „democratiilor care se nasc”, si necesitatea vitala ca organizatiile religioase sa devina parte a emergentei societati civile în loc sa caute aliante politice nesanatoase cu statul”.²

EMIL MOISE

Ph.D. candidate, SNSPA,
Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: emimfil@k.ro

KEY WORDS:

legislation, gender discrimination, Romania, religious education, public schools

Viziunea personajului citat în prima parte din moto-ul acestei lucrări implica nu o coexistență a Bisericii Pravoslavnice (Ortodoxe) cu Statul ci, mai mult, o respingere a acestui *rau* prin reconstrucția Statului pe principii creștine.

În această lucrare voi analiza relația *Bisericii* cu statul în privința educației religioase în școlile publice din România. Analiza cantitativă și calitativă – a legislației vizând educația religioasă, a modului în care legislația a fost aplicată și a unora dintre consecințele acestora – urmărește probleme care circumscriu termeni precum libertatea religioasă, noile fenomene religioase³, și care conduc la o redefinire a spațiului public și a rolului religiei, cu aspectele caracteristice: relația dintre stat și organizațiile religioase.

Se vor evidenția astfel întrepătrunderea și interrelacionarea celor două aspecte principale ale libertății religioase: aspectul formal, instituțional, legal și aspectul informal, conectat cu atitudinile personale și sociale față de noile forme și manifestări religioase.

Cea mai exploatată terminologie în încercarea de a defini situația religioasă contemporană depinde de noțiuni precum sincretism, secularism, eclecticism și pluralism.

Ipoteza de lucru care stă la baza acestui studiu este aceea conform căreia România este (sau ar trebui să fie) un stat secular, ipoteza justificată și de art. 29, alin. 5 din Constituția României: *culte religioase sunt autonome față de stat*. Am ales ca definiție a secularizării – „procesul societal în care un sistem religios transcendent este redus la

un subsistem al societății printre alte subsisteme și ale cărui sustineri au o audiență scăzută”⁴.

În principal, lucrarea este structurată în două părți: o analiză normativă a legislației privind educația religioasă în România și un studiu de caz.

I. Legislația privind educația religioasă. Analiză normativă

În România, relația religiei cu educația (școlară) a fost reglementată prin Legea 84 din 24 iulie 1995⁵ – Legea învățământului – modificată și republicată în 1999⁶:

Art. 9

(1) Planurile-cadru ale învățământului primar, gimnazial, liceal și profesional includ Religia ca disciplină școlară, parte a trunchiului comun. Elevul, cu acordul părinților sau al tutorelui legal instituit, alege pentru studiu religia și confesiunea.

(2) La solicitarea scrisă a părinților sau a tutorelui legal instituit, elevul poate să nu frecventeze orele de religie. În acest caz situația școlară se încheie fără această disciplină. În mod similar se procedează și pentru elevul caruia, din motive obiective, nu i s-au asigurat condițiile pentru frecventarea orelor la această disciplină.

În varianta inițială, din 1995, în art. 9, alin. (1), teza a doua, *Religia* era reglementată ca disciplină *obligatorie* pentru învățământul primar, *optională* pentru

învatamântul gimnazial si *facultativa* pentru învățamântul liceal si profesional⁷.

În data de 25 iunie 1995, 57 de deputati au sesizat Curtea Constitutionala asupra neconstitutionalitatii prevederilor art. 9 alin (1), teza a doua, sustinând, în esenta, ca prin instituirea obligativitatii studiului religiei în ciclul primar se aduce atingere prevederilor constitutionale ale art. 1, alin. (3), teza privind „libera dezvoltare a personalitatii umane”, ale art. 26 alin. (2) care prevad ca „persoana fizica are dreptul sa dispuna de ea însasi”, ale art. 29 alin. (1), (2) si (6) privind libertatea constiintei si ale art. 45 alin. (5) privind obligatia autoritatilor publice de a contribui „la asigurarea conditiilor pentru participarea libera a tinerilor la viata politica, sociala, economica, culturala si sportiva a tarii”.

În temeiul art. 19 din Legea nr. 47/1992⁸ *privind organizarea si functionarea Curtii Constitutionale*, Curtea Constitutionala a solicitat si analizat punctele de vedere ale presedintilor celor doua Camere ale Parlamentului si Guvernului. În baza art. 5 din aceeași lege si a art. 11 alin. 2 din *Regulamentul de organizare si functionare a Curtii Constitutionale*⁹ aceasta a solicitat si analizat informatiile Ministerului Învatamântului, iar prin *Decizia 72 privind constitutionalitatea unor prevederi ale Legii învățamântului*¹⁰, a stabilit ca prevederile art. 9 alin. (1) din *Legea învățamântului* sunt constitutionale (sub aspectul analizat), întrucât art. 9 alin. (1), teza finala, din *Legea învățamântului*, „permite o interpretare conforma prevederilor constitutionale”: *Elevul, cu acordul parintelui*

sau tutorelui legal instituit, alege pentru studiu religia si confesiunea.

În interpretarea (putin fortata) a Curtii Constitutionale, desi mentionata în textul legii ca atare, *Religia* nu trebuia înțeleasa ca disciplina obligatorie, obligativitatea constând numai în introducerea acestei discipline în planurile de învățamânt.

Pe de o parte, interpretarea Curtii Constitutionale ofera o varianta de îmbinare a legii învățamântului cu legislatia internationala si nationala într-un cadru legislativ coerent, eliminând astfel interpretarile conform carora disciplina *Religie* este obligatorie; pe de alta parte însa, terminologia folosita de legiuitor – în cazul discutat, al Legii învățamântului, este una care poate (usor) contribui la interpretari abuzive în privinta libertatii de alegere a frecventarii orelor de *Religie* (referinta este, în special la clasele din învățamântul primar) – „e greu de presupus ca fiecare director va fi dotat cu o copie a deciziei Curtii pentru a o aplica întocmai, si ca va reusi acest lucru”¹¹. Analiza mea va viza argumentul folosit de Curtea Constitutionala pentru a demonstra ca obligativitatea din textul legii nu se refera la obligativitatea studierii *Religiei*.

Astfel, în opinia Curtii Constitutionale, dreptul de a alege (*religia si confesiunea*) „semnifica si posibilitatea de a nu avea nici o optiune religioasa”¹².

Analizând prin analogie, consider ca argumentul folosit de Curtea Constitutionala este unul falacios, întrucât daca coroborarea tezei conform careia *învatamântul religios este obligatoriu* (premisa 1 – art. 9, alin 1, teza a doua) cu teza conform careia *elevul, cu acordul*

parintelui..., alege pentru studiu religia ..., (premisa 2 – ibid., teza finala), semnifica posibilitatea de a nu avea nici o optiune religioasa, (concluzia C – concluzia Curtii Constitutionale) atunci coroborarea tezei conform careia învățământul primar și gimnazial este obligatoriu (premisa 1' – art. 6 și art. 15, alin 10) cu teza conform careia. parintele ..., are dreptul de a alege forma de învățământ și felul educației copilului (premisa 2' – art. 178, alin 1¹³) va semnifica posibilitatea de a nu alege nici o forma de învățământ sau educație (concluzia C'), argument pe care, cred, nici macar Curtea Constituțională nu ar fi fost de acord să-l considere valid¹⁴.

În decembrie 1996, Sinodul Bisericii Ortodoxe Române și Adunarea Națională Bisericească au înaintat Senatului propunerea legislativă cetățenească, susținută prin semnăturile a 1.049.853 de „credincioși”, privind modificarea art. 9 alin. (1) din Legea învățământului nr. 84/1995.

Potrivit propunerii legislative, acest alineat urma să primească următoarea redactare:

“Planurile învățământului primar, gimnazial, liceal și profesional includ religia ca disciplină școlară de bază¹⁵. Participarea la orele de religie se va face în funcție de apartenența religioasă și confesională.”

Propunerea nu a fost adoptată în varianta solicitată întrucât, cu referire nemijlocită la obiectul inițiativei legislative, prin adresa nr. 9.304/ 1997, Ministerul Învățământului a precizat, următoarele:

“1. În Legea învățământului nu există noțiunea de „disciplină de bază”. Art. 127 alin. (2) prevede ca

planurile de învățământ cuprind discipline obligatorii, optionale și facultative.

2. Introducerea religiei ca disciplină obligatorie nu va avea consecințe negative asupra elevilor care nu aparțin unei credințe și confesiuni dintre cele recunoscute, potrivit legii. Există posibilitatea ca aceștia - foarte puțini - să primească spre rezolvare, în școală, individual sau în grup diverse sarcini didactice¹⁶. “

Din nou, susținerea privind disciplina *Religie* (punctul 2 al anexei) este cel puțin confuză: pe de o parte legiuitorul a stabilit ca *elevii* „care nu aparțin unei credințe sau confesiuni dintre cele recunoscute oficial sunt foarte puțini (!)”¹⁷; pe de altă parte din text reiese că dacă un elev aparține uneia dintre „credințele sau confesiunile recunoscute oficial” este obligat (prin lege) să frecventeze orele disciplinei *Religie*¹⁸ (ca și cum prin lege o persoană poate fi obligată să participe la slujbele religioase din biserică).

În varianta modificată și republicată a *Legii învățământului*, din 1999, caracterul disciplinei *Religie* este, din nou, unul ambiguu, aceasta figurând ca obligatorie (*parte a trunchiului comun*, art. 9, alin 1) dar cu statut de opțională (*elevul poate să nu frecventeze orele de religie*, art. 9, alin 2).¹⁹ Nici statutul de disciplină *opțională*, pentru *Religie*, nu este însă suficient clarificat întrucât opțiunea de a nu frecventa această disciplină nu este condiționată de alegerea altei discipline din pachetul de discipline optionale din planul de învățământ, existând posibilitatea – conform art. 9, alin. 2 – încheierii situației școlare fără această disciplină, ceea ce îi confera și caracterul de disciplină *facultativă*.

Este evident, în urma analizei sub aceste trei planuri, că *Religia* are caracter de disciplina facultativa. Mentionarea, în textul legii, a celorlalte doua variante nu face decât sa îngreuneze optiunile în privinta alegerii acestei discipline, mai exact în privinta *renuntarii* la frecventarea orelor acestei discipline.

Ambiguitatea legislativa este continuata si în unele acte normative cu caracter de lege, prin care se atenteaza la mecanismul de asigurare a libertatii religioase. Astfel, Ordinul nr. 3670/17.04.2001²⁰ cu privire la aplicarea Planurilor-cadru de învățământ pentru liceu în anul școlar 2001-2002, în contradicție cu Legea învățământului (art. 9), anuleaza caracterul de disciplina facultativa pentru disciplina *Religie*:

“(...) Luând în considerare faptul ca învățământul din România trebuie sa contribuie la formarea la elevi a unei personalitati active, motivate si creative, capabile de optiune si de decizie, Ministrul Educatiei si Cercetarii dispune:

(...) Art.5. Conform art. 9 din Legea învățământului, „planurile-cadru ale învățământului primar, gimnazial, liceal si profesional includ Religia ca disciplina școlara, parte a trunchiului comun. Elevul, cu acordul parintilor sau al tutorelui legal instituit, alege pentru studiu religia si confesiunea. La solicitarea scrisa a parintilor sau a tutorelui legal instituit, elevul poate sa nu frecventeze ora de religie.” În aceasta ultima situatie, elevul își va alege, în locul disciplinei Religie, o disciplina optionala.”

În unele dintre anexele *Ordinului Ministrului Educatiei* se prevede²¹, printr-o nota sub un tabel ca „elevii care nu studiaza *Religia* își vor completa, în mod obligatoriu,

schema orara cu un optional ales în urma procesului de consultare”.

Desi invoca, în preambulul *Ordinului*, „formarea unei personalitati capabile de optiune si decizie”, Ministrul Educatiei si Cercetarii, printr-o nota în subsolul unui tabel, care contrazice chiar Legea învățământului, restrictioneaza libertatea religioasa: daca un/ o elev/ eleva (*la solicitarea scrisa a parintilor...*) va dori sa nu mai frecventeze orele disciplinei *Religie* (sa presupunem ca si-a schimbat religia) la mijlocul semestrului al II-lea, nu va putea sa-si mai aleaga un optional, ceea ce va determina continuarea disciplinei *Religie*, împotriva dorintei (si a vointei) legitime a elevului/ elevei.

O situatie ilegala de ascensiune (cel puțin în privinta puterii) Bisericii, cu sprijinul institutiilor publice, este evidentiata si în scoaterea la concurs, în fiecare an²², a posturilor titularizabile pentru disciplina *Religie*. Pentru a putea fi oferita spre titularizare, în conditiile legii, o catedra trebuie sa prezinte garantia viabilitatii pentru o perioada de cel puțin 4 ani. Mai mult decât atât, nu pot fi oferite spre concurs catedrele pentru discipline optionale.

Pe de o parte, asa cum prevede legea, disciplina *Religie* are caracter de disciplina facultativa deci nu poate fi titularizabila (decât ilegala); pe de alta parte, existând garantia libertatii religioase, asigurata de reglementarile internationale²³ si de Constitutia României, nu poate fi asigurata viabilitatea unei catedre pentru disciplina *Religie* – oricând o persoana își poate schimba religia sau poate renunta la ea, a gândi si a legifera altfel însemnând o diminuare (considerabila) a acestei libertati.

În alin 3 al art. 9 din Legea 84/1995, republicată în 1999, se prevede ca, la cererea cultelor recunoscute oficial de stat, organizarea învățământului teologic specific pregătirii personalului de cult și activității social-misionare, în subordinea *Ministerului Educației Naționale*, se face „proporțional cu ponderea numerică a fiecărui cult în configurația religioasă a țării, potrivit recensământului oficial reactualizat”.

Această restricție²⁴ nu este corect justificată întrucât, pe de o parte, în cadrul recensământului, la întrebarea privind religia „răspunsul nu este obligatoriu. Cel care este întrebat poate să declare religia de care aparține, poate să declare că este ateu sau poate să spună că este o problemă personală – și atunci se va considera nedeclarat. Adică, spre deosebire de celelalte întrebări, are dreptul de a nu răspunde la această întrebare”²⁵.

Însă nici această situație nu este reglementată destul de clar întrucât, prin art 21, alin (1), lit b), și alin (2), din Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 680/2001, *privind organizarea și desfășurarea recensământului populației și al locuințelor din România în anul 2002*²⁶, se stabilește că *refuzul de a furniza personalului de recensământ informațiile prevăzute în formularele de înregistrare sau furnizarea de date eronate sunt considerate contravenții pentru care se aplică o amendă între 2 000 000 lei și 10 000 000 lei*.

De asemenea, pe coperta I a formularului pentru recensământ, 2002, este trecută mențiunea „Cetățenii au obligația de a furniza recenzorului informații complete și corecte”, iar la capitolul IV: *Date privind persoanele înregistrate în gospodărie*, la pct. 17. Religia, există doar două

rubrici (*Ortodoxă și Alta religie*) fără a fi specificată și posibilitatea neapartenenței la una dintre religii.

În interviurile realizate cu recenzori, aceștia mi-au spus că au existat persoane care nu știau ce să răspundă la întrebarea privind religia sau persoane care dădeau răspunsuri de tipul „treceți ce este toată lumea”, sau „treceți ce au zis și ceilalți”²⁷.

Mai mult, deși 84% din populația României se declară că aparținând confesiunii creștin-ortodoxe, sondajul Gallup din septembrie 2003, „Intoleranță, discriminare și autoritarism în opinia publică”, comandat de Institutul de Politici Publice arată că (doar) 49,8% dintre respondenți/ respondente cred în viața de după moarte, iar 42,3% consideră că este mai important să fii om bun decât să crezi în Dumnezeu, ceea ce contravine principiilor de bază ale creștinismului²⁸.

Pe de altă parte, *Conferința Generală a Organizației Națiunilor Unite pentru educație, știință și cultură*, a adoptat la Paris, la 14 decembrie 1964 *Convenția privind lupta împotriva discriminării în domeniul învățământului*, care, la art. 3, lit d, susține următoarele:

“În scopul de a elimina sau preveni orice discriminare în sensul prezentei Convenții, Statele Participante își iau angajamentul să nu admită, în cazul unui ajutor eventual, dat sub orice formă, de către autoritățile publice instituțiilor de învățământ, nici o preferință sau restricție bazate exclusiv pe faptul că elevii aparțin unui grup determinat”.

România a devenit parte la această convenție prin *Decretul 149 din 2 aprilie 1964 pentru ratificarea Convenției*

*privind lupta împotriva discriminării în domeniul învățământului*²⁹.

Restrictia impusa prin art. 9, alin (3), teza întâi a fost reglementata din august 1999 prin adoptarea *Legii 151 din 30 iulie 1999*³⁰ privind aprobarea *Ordonantei de urgenta a Guvernului nr. 36/1997 pentru modificarea si completarea Legii învățământului nr. 84/ 1995*:

“Culte recunoscute oficial de stat pot solicita Ministerului Educatiei Nationale organizarea unui învățământ teologic specific pregatirii personalului de cult si activitatii social-misionare a cultelor, numai pentru absolventii învățământului gimnazial sau liceal, dupa caz, proportional cu ponderea numerica a fiecarui cult in configuratia religioasa a tarii, potrivit recensământului oficial reactualizat”.

II. Studiu de caz

Voi continua lucrarea cu un studiu de caz, o analiza a modului în care s-au facut demersurile introducerii educatiei *moral-religioase* în învățământul *de stat*³¹, câteva dintre etapele parcurse si unele dintre consecinte. Alaturi de instrumentele mentionate în introducerea lucrării – analiza cantitativa si cea calitativa – am folosit interviuri cu elevi/ eleve, parinti ai acestora, profesori/ profesoare, inspectori scolari. Materialele – procese verbale, dari de seama, informari, adrese, cereri – au fost preluate din arhivele Episcopiei Buzaului si ale Seminarului Teologic Liceal din Buzau.

II.1 Predarea altor discipline, în afara religiei, de catre absolventi ai institutiilor de învățământ teologic, în scolile de stat

Absolventii seminarelor teologice, ai seminarelor monahale si ai institutelor teologice au fost angajati pentru predarea si a altor discipline în afara disciplinei *Religie*.

În 22.02.1991, Ministerul Învățământului si Stiintei si Secretariatul de Stat Pentru Culte au emis o *Nota* comuna cu numerele 32443, respectiv 1448 (vezi anexa), privind posibilitatea utilizarii absolventilor de seminarii si ai institutelor teologice de grad universitar ca învățatori, respectiv ca profesori cu studii superioare, pentru predarea unor discipline în scolile de stat începând cu trimestrul al II-lea al anului de învățământ 1990-1991.

În 26.02.1991, prin adresa nr. 1693, Cancelaria Sfântului Sinod din cadrul Patriarhiei Române solicita Episcopiei Buzaului selectionarea, de urgenta, a preotilor care, conform *Notei* Ministerului Învățământului si Stiintei si Secretariatului de Stat pentru Culte, corespund pentru a preda în scolile de stat, cu precadere din mediul rural, disciplinele: muzica, limba româna, limba latina, limbi moderne.

Recomandarile eparhiilor urmau a fi trimise inspectoratelor scolare teritoriale care „aveau nevoie” de cadre didactice.

În urma solicitarii Episcopiei Buzaului³², protopopiatele din judetele Buzau si Vrancea, au întocmit tabele cu numele preotilor care corespund (atât

ca pregătire cât și ca metodologie) pentru a putea predă în școlile de stat, „cu precădere în mediul rural”, disciplinele prevăzute în nota comună:

- Protoeria Buzău³³: 71 preoți – 17 cu seminar teologic (notați, în continuare, cu ST), 54 licențiați în teologie (notați, în continuare, cu LT);
 - Protoeria Pârlamele³⁴: 14 preoți – 14 LT;
 - Protopopiatul Râmnicu Sărat³⁵: 12 preoți – 12 LT;
 - Protoeria Panciu³⁶: 44 preoți – 35 LT, 1 ST;
 - Protopopiatul Focșani: 44 preoți – 40 LT, 4 ST;
- Ulterior, listele au fost trimise Inspectoratelor Școlare Județene Buzău și Vrancea.

II.2 Predarea religiei în școlile de stat: “Scapa cine poate!”

Deși în instituțiile de învățământ teologic s-a oferit oportunitatea pregătirii în scopul predării *Religiei* (existând clase cu această specializare în institutele teologice, seminarele teologice și seminarele monahale), din paragraful final al *Notei* reiese prioritatea care a fost acordată preoților în predarea acestei discipline³⁷. De asemenea, deși predarea acestei discipline are loc în școli ale Ministerului Educației – școli publice, prioritatea în decizii, în privința încadrării suplینitorilor, o detin Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte și „conducătorul unității centrale de cult” (aceste aspecte constituind unele dintre sursele *neînțelegerilor* în privința alegerii cadrului didactic, în unele școli; vezi infra, pp. 27-28).

În adresa *Cancelăriei Sfântului Sinod al B.O.R.*, nr. 5331/ 14.06.1990, către *Episcopia Buzăului*, se aduce la cunoștință că *Sfântul Sinod* în ședința sa de lucru din 08.06.1990 a luat în examinare referatul *Cancelăriei Sfântului Sinod* privind organizarea cursurilor de metodologie și didactică pentru preoții care vor predă religia în școlile din învățământul de stat în anul școlar 1990-1991.

În urma concluziilor la care s-a ajuns, *Sfântul Sinod* a hotărât (printre altele):

- la aceste cursuri vor participa câte un preot din fiecare protopopiat, rânduit de *Chiriah*, dintre preoții cu pregătire și vocație didactică, consilieri culturali de la centrele eparhiale și profesori de la seminariile teologice care predau *Omiletica* și *Catehetica*;

- organizarea cursurilor de metodologie și didactică va avea loc la Institutul Teologic Universitar din București în perioada 16-27 iulie 1990, într-o singură serie;

- în cursul lunii august, a.c., eparhiile, la rândul lor, vor organiza, pe protopopiate sau grupe de preoți, seminarizarea acestor prelegeri folosind în acest scop pe preoții, consilierii și profesorii de seminar care au participat la cursurile de metodologie și didactică la Institutul Teologic Universitar din București.

Din cuprinsul Eparhiei Buzăului au participat la cursurile de metodologie și didactică, organizate de Institutul Teologic Universitar București, 8 preoți³⁸.

În *Protocolul* încheiat între Ministerul Educației și Științei³⁹ și Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte⁴⁰, la 11.09.1990, privind introducerea educației moral-

religioase în învățământul de stat, la pct. 3, se prevede ca „educatia moral-religioasa accentueaza asupra elementelor de etica si istorie culturala. (...) Elaborarea programelor de învățământ si predarea se vor face în spirit irenic, tinând seama de principiile vietii comune într-un stat modern”, iar la pct. 2 se mentioneaza ca educatia moral-religioasa este obiect de învățământ si „are statut de disciplina optionala si facultativa”. Este interesant de remarcat ca nici una dintre prevederile cheie ale acestui *Protocol* initial nu au fost respectate⁴¹: educatia „moral-religioasa” nu s-a concentrat pe elemente de etica si istorie culturala, programele de învățământ si predarea nu au respectat (si nu respecta) spiritul irenic, iar despre „principiile vietii comune într-un stat modern”... se pare ca tendinta este de a le combate si nu de a le promova.

În urma sesizarii celor 57 de deputati asupra neconstitutionalitatii prevederilor art. 9 din Legea învățământului, în punctul de vedere al presedintelui Camerei Deputatilor se considera ca textele în discutie sunt constitutionale. În acest sens, se arata, în esenta, urmatoarele:

“Studiul religiei, în conformitate cu optiunea elevului si acordul parintelui sau tutorelui legal, în masura în care obiectul materiei si modalitatea de predare se integreaza procesului normal de învățământ si se axeaza pe prezentarea unor elemente de cultura religioasa generale, abordate într-o maniera neutra (sic!), nu poate fi considerat, ca si în cazul altor discipline, o modalitate de constrângere a subiectilor în aderarea la o anumita religie⁴²”.

Afirmatiile presedintelui Camerei Deputatilor sunt false întrucât, în contextul educational dat, studiul religiei, în scolile de stat din România, nu se axeaza pe prezentarea unor elemente de cultura religioasa generala, iar prevederile punctului 3 din *Protocol* au fost încalcate de B.O.R., respectiv prin nerespectarea caracterului irenic al disciplinei *educatie moral-religioasa* chiar din programa analitica⁴³. Astfel, pentru fiecare clasa, de la clasa I pâna la clasa a XII-a, *programa* începe cu *Semnul Sfintei Cruci* (semn specific Bisericii Ortodoxe si care, în cadrul altor confesiuni crestine este neacceptat). În *Abecedarul micutului crestin*, Bucuresti: Editura Didactica si Pedagogica, 1992, aparut cu aprobarea Comisiei Patriarhale Române pentru Învățământ si cu avizul Ministerului Educatiei Nationale nr. 32530/ 17.06.1990, se prezinta explicit, cu detalii în imagini, cum se face semnul crucii, caracteristic confesiunii ortodoxe.

Din interviuri cu eleve/ elevi de diferite clase⁴⁴, a reiesit ca la toate orele de religie li se solicita sa faca acest *semn*, cu fata orientata catre o icoana – aparținând tot confesiunii ortodoxe si care ramâne în clasa tot timpul, nu numai la orele de religie – care este prezenta în toate salile de clasa (icoanele ortodoxe nu lipsesc nici de pe peretii cancelariilor sau ai birourilor persoanelor din conducere, fiind însotite, nu de putine ori, si de *Calendarul crestin-ortodox*); acceptarea, de catre conducerea scolilor publice, a icoanelor pe peretii claselor si ai cancelariilor este o încălcare a libertatii religioase si o promovare a intolerantei, sanctionate prin *Conventia privind lupta împotriva discriminarii în domeniul învățământului*, la care România este parte.

În una dintre scolile din Buzau⁴⁵, la clasele primare, în anul școlar 2001-2002, profesoara de religie le spunea elevelor/ elevilor ca „daca nu vin la scoala cu cruciulita la gât o sa apara *diavolul* si vor pati numai lucruri rele”. La una din clasele I, mama unei eleve mi-a spus ca aceasta se trezea plângând noaptea, întrucât, la ea în clasa, pentru a fi mai convingatoare, profesoara le-a desenat *diavolul* pe tabla. În discuțiile purtate, printr-o elocventa pentru care ar fi invidiat-o si cei patru evanghelisti, profesoara respectiva mi-a spus ca atât timp cât *Fecioara Maria* – care vegheaza la buna desfasurare a activitatii ei -, nu i-a atras atentia, înseamna ca nu a gresit⁴⁶.

Un exemplu similar s-a întâmplat si la alta scoala⁴⁷ unde mama unei eleve a trebuit sa mearga cu aceasta la psiholog în urma unei povesti predată la ora de religie (probleme similare având si alti copii, ceea ce i-a determinat pe parinti sa solicite schimbarea profesorului respectiv).

Tot la aceeasi scoala, la clasele primare, în cadrul orei de religie, profesorul le-a spus elevelor/ elevilor ca „pe umarul drept aveti un înger, iar pe umarul stâng un drac, prin urmare aveti grija cum va închinati: daca începeti cu partea stânga, va închinati dracului”. Tot la clasele primare li s-a spus elevelor/ elevilor: „daca intrati într-o biserică adventista da tractorul peste voi” (în imediata vecinătate a școlii respective se afla un asezământ al confesiunii adventiste de ziua a șaptea).

Într-un liceu din Buzau⁴⁸, la orele de religie, profesorul le-a spus elevelor/ elevilor, în anul școlar 2001-2002, ca unele dintre confesiunile care nu sunt

ortodoxe (dar care sunt printre confesiunile acceptate, legal, în România) sunt secte⁴⁹. Este interesant de observat ca dintre confesiunile acceptate în România s-a referit numai la cele care au reprezentanti/ reprezentante în Buzau.

Bisericele care nu apartin confesiunii ortodoxe, sunt prezentate ca fiind un pericol pentru cei/ cele care intra în ele. De asemenea, unele dintre confesiunile respective sunt prezentate ca *denigratoare* ale confesiunii ortodoxe; (din caietul de religie al unui elev de clasa a IX-a⁵⁰): „(...) adventistii denigreaza Biserica Ortodoxa, (...) pentru ei biserica este stapânita de diavol iar singurul adapost de acesta este casa lor”; sau: „Martorii lui Iehova este una dintre cele mai periculoase secte (...) este una dintre formele de fanaticism religios”.

La una dintre scolile din Buzau⁵¹, în clasa a V-a (an școlar 2003-2004), profesoara de *Religie* le-a spus copiilor ca Dumnezeu îi iubeste numai pe ortodocsi. Din colectivul clasei fac parte si doua eleve care nu apartin confesiunii ortodoxe si care participa la ora de *Religie*: una aparținând confesiunii evanghelice iar alta aparținând confesiunii iudaice. Desi una dintre colege a protestat chiar în timpul orei: „doamna profesoara, eu cred ca Dumnezeu ne iubeste pe toti – nu numai pe ortodocsi, ci si pe colegele noastre”⁵², reactia negativa nu a întârziat sa apara, unii/ unele colege/ colege îndepartându-le, în pauza, pe cele doua fete spunând ca sunt „spurcate”. Problema s-a discutat în sedinta pe clasa, mama uneia dintre cele doua eleve solicitându-i dirigintei sa discute cu profesoara de *Religie* pentru a-si modifica discursul, cel puțin în cadrul școlii.

La mai multe scoli si licee din (judetul) Buzau⁵³, profesorul de religie (preot) le solicita elevelor/ elevilor, la ora de religie, sa prezinte aspecte din slujba tinuta la una dintre bisericile ortodoxe în duminica precedenta zilei în care are loc lectia. De asemenea, unele dintre eleve⁵⁴ mi-au spus ca li se solicita ca la ora de *Religie* sa nu stea cu *capul descoperit*. La acelasi liceu, la deschiderea anului scolar, directorul a propus ca toate zilele de scoala sa înceapa si sa se încheie cu o rugaciune.

Obligarea elevelor si a elevilor de a merge la biserica este întâlnita frecvent în scolile din mediul rural: în Grup Scolar Industrial (G.S.I.) Berca, în scoala din Plescoi⁵⁵, în scoala din Sageata, în scoala din Cândesti (anul scolar 2003-2004). Daca nu merg la biserica saptamânal, elevelor/ elevilor li se scad puncte la notarea din cadrul orei de *Religie*. Asemenea situatii sunt întâlnite si în alte judete⁵⁶. În comuna Sageata, pentru astfel de „abateri” copiilor li se dau note sub nota de promovare a clasei, iar în Cândesti copiii sunt obligati sa cumpere si trei lumânari. La scoala din Joseni, profesorul (preot) de religie a pedepsit un elev⁵⁷ în clasa a IV-a tinându-l în picioare toata ora (în prezenta celorlalti copii) pentru ca, în preajma sarbatorilor de Paste a vizionat un fim difuzat în localitate de membrii unei confesiuni protestante⁵⁸. Astfel de comportamente sunt considerate infractiuni si sunt pedepsite ca atare de legislatia din România. Astfel, Codul Penal sanctioneaza cu închisoare de la o luna la 6 luni sau cu amenda „fapta de a obliga o persoana, prin constrângere, sa participe la serviciile religioase ale vreunui cult, sau sa îndeplineasca un act religios legat de exercitarea unui cult”⁵⁹.

În G.S.I. Berca, unul dintre profesorii de *Religie* (preot) obliga copiii ca, în scoala, sa i se adreseze cu apelativul *Prea Cucernice Parinte*. De asemenea, pentru acelasi profesor (preot) formula de salut trebuie sa fie, obligatoriu, *Saru' mâna*.

În procesul verbal al *Conferintei preotesti*, Protoeria Buzau, încheiat în data de 28.08.1990⁶⁰ se mentioneaza ca „acest subiect (al educatiei moral-religioase, *n.m.*, E.M.) ne da mult de gândit si ne întrebam daca noi putem acoperi atâtea ore de religie, daca putem fi în acelasi timp si preoti si profesori”.

Prin adresa nr. 3407/ 12.09.1990 Episcopia Buzaului informeaza *Cancelaria Sfântului Sinod* ca, în cadrul întrunirilor organizate pe protopopiate, la cea de a treia parte, care a constatat în discutii pe marginea temelor prezentate, s-au facut sugestii si propuneri, printre care:

- reintroducerea religiei în scolile de stat „e o problema care trebuie sa mobilizeze nu numai pe preoti ci si pe parintii copiilor, care parinti sa solicite acest lucru”;
- oficierea, în cadrul fiecărei institutii scolare, la începerea noului an scolar, a slujbei de *Sfestaniei* si a *Te-Deumului* (specific ortodoxe, *n.m.*, E.M.);
- înfiintarea la Bucuresti, în cadrul Patriarhiei a unui „post national de radio prin intermediul caruia sa se expuna învataturile Bisericii noastre, sa se faca o informare exacta si la timp asupra tuturor evenimentelor cu caracter bisericesc”;

În primele zile ale anului 1991, Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte a emis un *Apel-Invitatie*⁶¹ la dezbateri în

cadrul unei sesiuni stiintifice cu tema „O bresa între trecut si viitor; impactul religiei crestine în societatea româneasca contemporana”. La sectiunea a II-a, *Religie si Educatie*, problematica de discutat era: *Criza moralei. Criza educatiei... Introducerea educatiei moral-religioase în scolile învatamântului de stat*⁶².

Pentru „organizarea de întâlniri si dezbateri, activitati metodice si lectii deschise în vederea unei bune desfasurari a orelor de educatie moral-religioasa” au fost emise *Circulara Sfântului Sinod nr. 641/ 1991 si Comunicatul Ministerului Învatamântului si Stiintei si Secretariatului de Stat pentru Culte, din 01.02.1991*

La propunerea *Comisiei învatamântului* pentru pregatirea personalului bisericesc, *Sfântul Sinod* a aprobat⁶³ ca în cadrul *primei* întruniri preotesti, din luna iunie 1991, sa se trateze subiectul „Educatia moral-religioasa a tineretului”.

În adresa nr. 1519/ 08.05.1991, emisa de Episcopia Buzaului catre *Cancelaria Sfântului Sinod*, se mentioneaza organizarea unor întruniri si dezbateri, în cadrul Eparhiei Buzaului, de comun acord cu cele doua inspectorate scolare judetene, Buzau si Vrancea. Au avut loc discutii cu privire la modul cum se desfasoara ora de educatie moral-religioasa în învatamântul de stat, greutatile întâmpinate în acest sens si propuneri pentru viitor. Printre „greutati”, este mentionat si faptul ca orele de religie au fost programate la începutul sau sfârșitul orelor, problema fiind nu lipsa de interes a elevilor/ elevelor pentru aceasta disciplina (întrucât în procesele verbale, ale reprezentantilor B.O.R., este mentionat „un interes larg” al acestora pentru *Religie*) ci

faptul ca nu se respecta *Protocolul* încheiat între Ministerul Învatamântului si Stiintei si Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte, în care este precizat ca ora de religie sa fie „inclusa în orar”⁶⁴.

Printre propuneri:

- organizarea de întruniri cu preotii în probleme de metodologie si didactica;
- interventia în vederea schimbarii denumirii disciplinei *educatie moral-religioasa*;

În adresa se precizeaza ca reprezentantii celor doua inspectorate scolare judetene s-au angajat sa rezolve „favorabil” problemele sesizate (care revin unitatilor respective).

De asemenea, se mentioneaza ca în cadrul Inspectoratului Scolar Judetean, la data de 30.04.1991, toti directorii de scoli au fost îndrumati sa „include aceasta disciplina în orar, sa aiba rubrica în catalog si sa fie notata, iar lectiile predate sa fie mentionate în condica”.

În privinta „interesului larg” acordat de eleve/ elevi disciplinei *Religie*, diriginta unuia dintre liceele din Buzau⁶⁵ a solicitat acestora (clasa a XI-a), dupa începerea anului scolar 2002-2003, sa scrie pe o foaie de hârtie optionalele pe care le-ar fi ales daca li s-ar fi dat aceasta posibilitate (*de regula* optionalele sunt deja *alese* – dar nu de eleve/ elevi sau parintii acestora – atunci când începe scoala). Fiecare trebuia sa aleaga trei optionale. Nici un/o elev/a nu a ales *Religia*. Consider ca acest aspect este foarte important si cred ca ar trebui sa se insiste pe alegerea propriu-zisa a optionalelor de catre eleve/ elevi, dupa ce aceste optionale sunt afisate la un

avizier însoțite de o descriere a lor. De asemenea, un aspect la fel de important este și faptul că nici un/ o elev/ eleva nu știa că *Religia* este disciplină opțională.

În interviurile realizate cu eleve/ elevi de clasele a IX-a, a X-a, a XI-a și a XII-a⁶⁶, doar în două clase (din 19 analizate) procentul celor care au ales ca disciplină opțională *Religia* a fost 30%, în rest situându-se sub 20%, în unele clase existând o singură preferință pentru această disciplină, iar în altele chiar nici una. 90% dintre elevele/ elevii interviuați/ interviuați nu șiau că *Religia* este disciplină opțională și chiar facultativă (poate să nu fie aleasă fără a se face o altă în loc)⁶⁷. Dintr-un total de 366 eleve/ elevi, doar 51 au ales ca disciplină opțională *Religia* (le-au fost indicate 9 discipline, din care trebuia să își aleagă, fără precizarea numelui elevei/ elevului, 3 opționale), reușind astfel, un procent de 13,93% (din totalul elevelor/ elevilor în clasele respective, au fost absente/ absenți în timpul interviurilor 29 eleve/ elevi).

Nici cadrele didactice, în majoritate, nu știu că disciplina *Religie* are caracter facultativ, ceea ce afectează informarea elevelor/ elevilor și a părinților acestora (nici o/ un diriginte/ diriginte, din școlile analizate nu a anunțat copiii sau părinții de posibilitatea nefrecventării orelor de *Religie*). De altfel, reglementarea acestei discipline reflectă o duplicitate care, macar în *Legea învățământului* ar fi trebuit evitată: *Religia* apare ca obligatorie în oferta, iar cei/ cele care doresc să nu frecventeze orele respective trebuie să solicite, în scris, acest lucru⁶⁸. Varianta corectă ar fi trebuit să prevadă solicitarea celor care doresc să

frecventeze orele de *Religie* și nu a celor care doresc să nu frecventeze aceste ore.

În școala unde predau⁶⁹, după ce am anunțat, la toate clasele unde am ore, că frecvența acestei discipline nu este obligatorie, aproximativ 30 de elevi/ eleve și-au anunțat intenția de a nu mai participa. Este ușor de imaginat de ce intențiile lor nu s-au regăsit în practică. Doi dintre elevi (în vârstă de peste 18 ani) au anunțat însă renunțarea la această disciplină. Ambii au fost însă *determinați*, de majoritatea cadrelor didactice care le predau, să reia frecventarea orelor de *Religie*. Ceea ce s-a și întâmplat, după nici trei săptămâni⁷⁰. Din discuții cu elevi/ eleve de la diverse școli a reușit teama acestora de a alege să nu frecventeze ora de religie; cu alte cuvinte, varianta aleasă de legiuitor poate fi încadrată în formula „Scapa cine poate!” în locul celei corecte „Beneficiază cine dorește!”.

În procesul verbal încheiat în data de 18.06.1991⁷¹ la conferința preotească din cadrul Protoieriei Buzău, cu tema „Educația moral-religioasă a tineretului și a întregului popor” se menționează că „educația rece, școlastică, trebuie evitată sau, cel puțin, trecută pe locul doi... Sfânta Scriptură trebuie să aibă primul rol în educație: a ajunge asemenea lui Dumnezeu, iată tinta de atins”.

Nu lipsesc exprimările sexiste (și, evident, discriminatorii): „Educația având la bază omul ca chip al lui Dumnezeu va trimite în lume bărbați capabili să cugete și să lucreze cu putere, care să fie stăpânii și nu robii înșelămintelor, bărbați cu idei largi, cu idei clare și având curajul convingerilor lor”. Un asemenea exemplu

de sexism în limbaj îl putem întâlni și în practica predării acestei discipline – la una din scolile din Buzau⁷² la clasele a doua, profesoara de religie le-a explicat elevilor și elevilor, la lecția „Iubirea și purtarea de grija a lui Dumnezeu fata de lume” ca *Dumnezeu se poartă cu noi ca un tata cu fiii lui*⁷³.

Se recunoaște totodată că desi este creată posibilitatea predării religiei în școli, „o problema care se ridică acum este pregătirea noastră din punct de vedere pedagogic pentru aceasta deosebită lucrare cu tineretul tău”.

În referatul conferinței din 20.06.1991⁷⁴, parohia Unguriu, se dau ca exemple de educație pasajul din *Vechiul Testament* în care femeia este citată printre proprietățile barbatului, alături de boul, asinul și alte dobitoace ale acestuia și pasajul în care este promovată metoda răzbnării – „ochi pentru ochi, dinte pentru dinte...” – sugerându-se că „influențele educative” ale *profetilor* asupra poporului evreu ar putea fi transpuse în „adeverate manuale de educație”:

“Sa nu doresti femeia aproapelui tau, nici ogorul lui, nici sluga lui, nici slujnica lui, nici boul lui, nici asinul lui și nici unul dintre dobitoacele lui (...)! ”

Iar de va fi și alta vătămare atunci să platească suflet pentru suflet, ochi pentru ochi, dinte pentru dinte, mână pentru mână, picior pentru picior.”⁷⁵

Se menționează că *Vechiul Testament* este o carte (sic!) puternic educativă.

Este, cred, interesant de menționat că exemple care reflectă acest tip de educație, prin pedeapsa, se regăsesc și în manualele religioase ale confesiunii ortodoxe. În

abecedarul ortodox (vezi supra), un baiat, care este prezent și în imagini și în text, fiindu-i specificat și numele (Vasilica), este pedepsit de Dumnezeu pentru că a vrut să strice cuibul unei rândunici. Pedeapsa ilustrează o metodă educativă care nu este tocmai în acord cu normele Ministerului Educației și Cercetării și nici, macar, în acord cu învățătura creștină, aceea a dragostei și a recompensei: scara, pe care baiatul s-a „catarat” încercând să strice cuibul rândunicii, a alunecat, „Vasilica a căzut și toată vara a zăcut bolnav în spital”. În imagine Vasilica este prezentat căzut la pământ, cu scara peste abdomen, peste membrele inferioare și peste unul din membrele superioare (în lecția Fiti buni cu vițuitoarele, pp. 36-37); în această prezentare se poate identifica o ierarhie de putere, tendința putând fi considerată că fiind aceea de a dezvolta un caracter răzbnător; subsumându-se temei sugerată în titlu, conținutul lecției putea fi unul în care să se explice copiilor cum ar putea fi buni cu vițuitoarele (oferind acestora hrană, construindu-le un adapost, sau protejându-le împotriva pericolelor s.a.m.d.) și nu unul în care să poată fi identificat un conflict între copii și animale, conflict soluționat de Dumnezeu în favoarea animalelor⁷⁶.

Tot o ierarhie de putere care poate ilustra metoda educației prin pedeapsa este identificată în una dintre imaginile lecției Sfântul Nicolae, prietenul copiilor, pp. 14-15, (manualul confesiunii ortodoxe) în care, unuia dintre copii (baiatul) Sfântul Nicolae i-a adus în dar câteva nuiele; în text se menționează explicit că „Sfântul Nicolae împarte daruri copiilor cuminti și credincioși” (p. 15). În Pravila Bisericească, se menționează că

pentru copii „în anumite împrejurari, o bataie chibzuita si parinteasca le este de mult folos”⁷⁷, dându-se urmatorul citat din Biblie (Proverbe 13, 24): Cine-si cruta nuiaua, își uraste copilul, iar cine-l iubeste, îl pedepseste.

În procesul verbal încheiat în data de 20.06.1991⁷⁸ la conferinta preoteasca cu tema „Educatia moral-religioasa a tineretului” în cadrul Protoieriei Panciu, preotul din Rotilesti considera ca „nu s-a procedat bine prin înfiintarea multor facultati de teologie în care patrund tineri nepregatiti si cu vicii, care vor face greutate bisericii. De ce ierarhii Bisericii noastre si reprezentantii preotimii din Parlament nu iau pozitie fata de strainii care vin în tara la noi si fac propaganda religioasa pe stadioane? De ce nu ne aparam mai cu curaj religia noastra ortodoxa stramoseasca?”⁷⁹

Din acelasi proces verbal, consider ca sunt interesante unele dintre precizarile protopopului care si-a centrat discursul pe „marea misiune a predarii religiei în scoli”:

“Criza morala în care se zbate astazi poporul nostru este în buna masura urmare propagandei ateiste. Consideram ca iesirea din aceasta criza nu va fi posibila fara ca tânara generatie sa cunoasca adevarurile crestine si sa se deprinda cu practicarea valorilor morale crestine. Alaturi de Biserica, scoala își poate aduce un mare aport în acest sens daca va reveni la predarea religiei. În interesul viitorului moral al copiilor nostri, al neamului nostru, va trebui sa apelam la parintii copiilor si împreuna sa solicitam reintroducerea religiei. Generatiile noastre nu stiu ce vor pentru ca nu stiu ce cred. (...)

Educatia laica se adreseaza intelectului iar educatia religioasa se adreseaza inimii. Religia nu trebuie sa fie un compendiu de definitii, ea trebuie sa fie traire. E nevoie sa se dea educatiei religioase rolul ei primordial. De educatia religioasa au nevoie copiii dar si adultii. E nevoie de o catehizare a tuturor fiilor Bisericii noastre”.

În opinia reprezentantilor Bisericii Ortodoxe Române singura sursa morala, necesara pentru „viitorul moral al copiilor nostri si al neamului nostru” este religioasa – crestin-ortodoxa.

La încheierea lucrarilor conferintei, protopopul anunta ca la începerea anului scolar se poate oficia, de comun acord cu conducerea scolii, *Sfestania* si *Te-Deum* si, de asemenea, se poate pune în clase câte o icoana.

II.3 Unele dintre rezultatele introducerii educatiei religioase în scolile de stat

În data de 10.10.1990, la *Cancelaria Sfântului Sinod*, este înregistrata, la nr. 10809, o reclamatie a unora dintre *credinciosii* din parohia Canesti, care, împreuna cu preotul din parohie sunt nemultumiti din cauza „acutelor greutati întâmpinate în privinta reintroducerii religiei în scoala din cauza conducerii scolii, reprezentata prin doamna directoare Iordan Florica, ce face parte din vechea nomenclatura comunista, fosta secretar adjunct la primaria comunei noastre si instalata în mod abuziv ca director al scolii dupa revolutia din decembrie 1989”.

Astfel, pentru a discredita persoanele care nu erau de acord cu initiativa de a se preda religia în

învatamântul de stat, se foloseau sintagme care faceau referire la regimul comunist anterior anului 1989⁸⁰. Însa *mecanismele* folosite de cei nemulțumiti erau tot unele caracteristice sistemului comunist întrucât în cerere se solicita intervenția la *forurile superioare*:

„Smeriti apelam la Prea Fericirea Voastră a ne ajuta, intervenind la Guvernul României, ca în școala din satul nostru sa se reintroducă religia cum a fost până în anul 1948, fiind un drept ce ni se cuvine. Aceasta masura va contribui la educarea sanatoasă a noii generații de copii și tineret, în spiritul moralei creștine și cinstei, adevărului, dreptății, al tuturor virtuților, mostenite de la strămoșii spre binele Patriei noastre, spre slava Sfintei Biserici și bunăstarea întregului popor român”.⁸¹

Încă o dată se observa cum „educarea sanatoasă a copiilor și tineretului, binele patriei și bunăstarea întregului popor român” erau considerate nemijlocit dependente de morală creștină (se înțelege, ortodoxă).

De asemenea, este interesant de observat că se considera element de critică apartenența la *vechea nomenclatură comunistă* iar scrisoarea îi era adresată patriarhului Teoctist caruia, după decembrie 1989, nu de puține ori, i s-au adus critici similare⁸².

Prin adresa înregistrată la Episcopia Buzăului, la nr. 4346/ 11.10.1990, preotul din parohia Cănești oferea mai multe explicații: directorul școlii nu a permis oficierea *Te Deumului*, aplicarea în școală a unei icoane și predarea religiei. Mai mult, respectivă directoră „a avut același comportament ca și în regimul trecut când a fost secretara adjunctă și a persecutat poporul”.

Deși nu a avut acordul conducerii școlii, slujba a fost oficiată, la 1 octombrie 1990, iar icoana a fost prinsă în peretele din holul școlii, însă „în scurt timp a dispărut”.

Evenimentele s-au soldat cu diverse petiții, întocmite de „credincioși”, adresate patriarhului României, primului-ministru, președintelui României, în care se solicita reintroducerea religiei în școli, iar în alte petiții retragerea din funcție a directorului.

În discuțiile purtate de preot cu un reprezentant al Inspectoratului Școlar acesta (din urmă) îi da dreptate directorului, spre indignarea preotului care încheie *informarea* atenționând că „starea de nemulțumire se mentine în parohia din Cănești”.

Solicitându-i-se explicații, preotul comunei a declarat⁸³ că, între timp, la „presiunea credincioșilor”, directorul „a fost nevoită să primească reintroducerea religiei în școală de la data de 29.10.1990”.

Dintre problemele evidențiate la conferința lunară⁸⁴ a preoților din Protoeria Buzău, conferința la care a participat și un reprezentant al Inspectoratului Școlar Județean Buzău:

- neasigurarea de către conducerea anumitor școli a timpului și spațiului necesare desfășurării orelor de educație moral-religioasă;
- interpretarea deformată, în majoritatea școlilor, a cuvintelor din *Protocol* „facultativ” și „optional”.

Reprezentantul Inspectoratului Școlar a promis tot sprijinul „luând act de situațiile negative ce s-au ivit la nivelul unor școli și a asigurat de intervenția sa în punerea la punct și intrarea pe un fagăș normal”.

Printre problemele evidentiuate la întâlnirea dintre reprezentantii Protopopiatului Râmnicu Sarat si reprezentanta Inspectoratului Scolar Judetean Buzau, la sediul Protopopiatului:

- majoritatea preotilor a raportat ca ora de educatie moral-religioasa nu este trecuta în catalog si este fixata ori prea dimineata (ex. Posta Câlnau), ori la ora când copiii trebuie sa mearga acasa;

- la scolile nr. 1 si 2 nu se pun la dispozitie clase din lipsa de spatii, în aceste scoli învatându-se în trei schimburi;

- „având în vedere ca aceasta ora este optionala si facultativa acest lucru facându-se cunoscut elevilor chiar de diriginta lor, frecventa nu este satisfacatoare” (din interviurile realizate în diverse scoli si licee din Buzau, reiese ca 90% dintre elevele/ elevii intervievate/ intervievati nu stiu ca ora de religie este facultativa, putând fi încheiata situatia scolara fara a se alege o alta disciplina în loc⁸⁵);

- învatamântul moral-religios se desfasoara mai usor la tara, acolo nefiind problema spatiului si nici a claselor paralele.

Inspectoarea a luat nota de cele semnalate de preoti si s-a angajat ca va lua legatura cu directorii de la toate scolile pentru „a se da concursul preotilor de a putea sa si desfasoare activitatea în bune conditii”.

Probleme similare au fost sesizate si în alte unitati de învatamânt. În *Darea de seama asupra desfasurarii procesului de învatamânt moral-religios în scolile din cadrul Protopopiatului Buzau*⁸⁶ se preciza ca:

- „cu toata prezenta preotilor în scoli, în unele din acestea ei au fost primiti cu oarecare retinere si chiar cu ostilitate; la insistente de 2-3 saptamâni orele de educatie moral-religioasa au demarat, în unele scoli mai usor, în altele mai greu”;

- „problema cea mai grea este ca în orarul scolilor nu a fost prevazuta ora de educatie moral-religioasa”;

- „realitatea din teren este la aceasta data urmatoarea: în mediul rural toti preotii au intrat în scoli si-si desfasoara activitatea didactica fara probleme deosebite; problema mai dificila este în scolile din municipiul Buzau – aici actiunea a demarat mult prea greu atât din motive obiective cât si subiective”;

- „la majoritatea scolilor din oras se învata în trei schimburi; daca ora de educatie moral-religioasa era prinsa în orar situatia ar fi fost mult mai usurata, dar la nici una din scoli nu s-a întâmplat acest lucru; daca Inspectoratul Scolar s-ar fi implicat mai mult, sarcina preotilor ar fi fost usurata”.

Exista, de asemenea, numeroase *informari* si *rapoarte* privind modul în care s-a deschis anul scolar – *informari* facute de parohii sau protopopiate în care sunt descrise slujbele oficiate cu ocazia deschiderii anului scolar.

Prin adresa nr. 4121/ 02.11.1995 protopopul Protoieriei Focsani anunta episcopului din Buzau ca la Scoala Generala din Tâmboiesti, Vrancea, Inspectoratul Scolar Vrancea a repartizat pentru orele de religie o profesoara „calcând planificarea pe care Centrul Eparhial Buzau o înaintase în 07.09.1995” (desi în cererea preotului din Parohia Tâmboiesti se mentioneaza ca profesoara respectiva este calificata prin

absolvirea Institutului Teologic din București). O sesizare asemanatoare este facuta si de preotul din parohia Floresti⁸⁷, Vrancea, în care se precizeaza ca preotul respectiv nu predă religia în școala deoarece inspectorul de specialitate „a numit o tânără care are un curs de pregătire de o luna de zile”; o asemenea situație este sesizata si în parohia Câmpineanca.

Pe spatele adresei 4485/ 23.11.1995 la care este anexat raportul unui preot din Ruginești care „a fost îndepărtat din școala, orele de religie fiind repartizate unui tânăr”, este scrisa propunerea de a se face „o nouă intervenție la domnul Prefect al județului Vrancea pentru reglementarea situației”.

Astfel de situații mai sunt întâlnite si în prezent: în școala din parohia Fundeni – Zarnesti, la angajarea cadrului didactic pentru predarea *Religiei*, în anul școlar 2002-2003, prioritate a avut preotul din comuna, desi pentru post a candidat si o absolventa a unui seminar monahal si care în baza rezultatelor școlare foarte bune a obtinut avizul conducătorului unității centrale de cult (în exemplul nostru, Episcopia Buzăului). Din interviul cu inspectorul școlar de specialitate a reiesit ca ar fi fost de preferat ca postul respectiv sa fie ocupat de absolventa seminarului monahal, dar prevederile legale, în astfel de situații, dau prioritate preoților motivându-se cu „prioritatea studiilor superioare”. Consider ca aceasta „prioritate” nu este bine întemeiata întrucât scopul studiilor superioare ale unui preot este catehizarea si nu profesoratul, pe când, în exemplul prezentat, scopul studiilor monahale a fost acela al predării *Religiei*.

III. Concluzii

Pe baza analizei întreprinse se poate evidenta ceea ce statul considera a fi continutul libertății religioase, dezvaluind nu numai ceea ce este libertatea religioasă în sine, ci si atitudinea statului în privința drepturilor ființei umane.

Urmărind legislația din România, cât si situațiile prezentate în studiul de caz, putem concluziona ca educația religioasă, departe de a promova toleranța, inoculează comportamente de respingere, alianțele politice între *Biserica* si stat neputând fi descrise – în rezonanță cu pasajul citat în moto –, decât ca nesănătoase.

Este relevantă, cred, opinia lui Olivier Gillet:

“Pot fi înțelese astfel, în contextul „renasterii creștine”, tendințele „fundamentaliste” pe care le-am putea defini drept voința unei părți a Bisericii de a restaura „credința” ortodoxă ca unic punct de referință în noua societate pe cale de a fi edificată. Credința ortodoxă ar fi singurul element motor, unificator si mobilizator, si ar determina soarta Bisericii, a statului si a națiunii, unite într-un mesianism în afara căruia nu ar exista mântuire”.⁸⁸

Analizând atât reglementările legislative cât si situația *de facto* putem spune, urmând-o pe Ina Merdjanova, ca în perioada postcomunistă tendința celor care elaborează prevederile constituționale în privința libertății religioase este de a interpreta notiunea de „religie” în termeni creștini si, mai mult, în termenii

bisericii crestine traditionale. Aceasta tendinta „este alimentata de o lipsa comuna a culturii religioase, ca sa nu spun o ignoranta în chestiuni religioase, de înteles dupa 45 de ani de îndoctrinare ateista, dar greu de justificat la nivelul politicii de stat”⁸⁹.

Unii autori considera ca prapastia dintre tendinta generala din continutul constitutiilor, pe de o parte, si particularitatile religioase, pe de alta parte, sugereaza importanta chestiunilor religioase pentru elitele guvernamentale care incearca sa-si însuseasca religia pentru legitimitate politica⁹⁰. Riscul de a adânci aceasta prapastie devine si mai mare atunci când pentru aceasta legitimitate este folosita – în sensul peiorativ al termenului – educatia. Cu atât mai mult consider ca masurile legislative corective trebuie adoptate cât mai urgent, orice întârziere implicând pierderi de nerecuperat.

Bibliografie

Andreescu, Gabriel „Investitia în religie nu e o investitie în civilizatie”, *Ziua*, Bucuresti, nr. 2937, an X, 13 februarie 2004.

Andreescu, Gabriel „Cele doua Românii: Parcul Carol si Biserica Ortodoxa Româna”, *Ziua*, Bucuresti, nr. 2972, an X, 25 martie 2004.

Andreescu, Gabriel „Logica «mântuirii neamului» e anacronica”, *Observator Cultural*, Bucuresti, nr 213, 23. 03 – 29.03.2004.

Buzea, Gianina „Recensământul 2002”, Interviu cu Aurel Camara, presedintele *Institutului National de Statistica*, 22, Bucuresti, nr. 13, an XIII (629), 26 mar.- 1 apr. 2002.

Dostoievski, F. M. *Fratii Karamazov*, Bucuresti: Cartea Româneasca, 1986.

Jigau, Mihaela coord. *Învatamântul rural din România, conditii, probleme si strategii de dezvoltare*, Bucuresti, Ministerul Educatiei si Cercetarii: MarLink, 2002.

Olivier Gillet *Religie si nationalism. Ideologia Bisericii Ortodoxe Române sub regimul comunist*, Bucuresti: Compania, 2001.

Kamaras, Istvan „New Religious Phenomena and the Catholic Church in the Postcommunist Countries”, versiune preliminara, publicata în reader-ul cursului *Religion, Globalisation, and the State*, Central European University, Budapesta, 2003.

Merdjanova, Ina „Religious Liberty, New Religious Movements and Traditional Christian Churches in Eastern Europe”, *Religion, State & Society*, vol. 29, No. 4, 2001.

Sachelarie, Nicodim *Pravila Bisericeasca*, Buzau: Editura Sfintei Episcopii a Buzaului, 1999.

Weber, Renate „Legea învățământului: între contestare si supra-apreciere”, *Revista Româna de Drepturile Omului*, Bucuresti, nr. 9, aprilie-iunie, 1995.

*** *Abecedarul micutului crestin*, Bucuresti: Editura Didactica si Pedagogica, 1992

*** *Biblia sau Sfânta Scriptura*. Bucuresti: Institutul Biblic si de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 1988.

*** *Programa analitica pentru predarea religiei în scoala* (aparuta cu aprobarea *Sfântului Sinod* al B.O.R.). Bucuresti: Editura Institutului Biblic si de Misiune al B.O.R., 1990.

* Cercetarea care sta la baza acestei lucrari face parte din proiectul Harta actorilor si problemelor aderarii la Uniunea Europeana, proiect derulat de Fundatia pentru o Societate Deschisa. Textele studiilor si anexele acestora pot fi accesate pe pagina de internet a Fundatiei, la adresa www.osf.ro. Rezumatele tiparite ale studiilor sunt disponibile, atât în limba româna cât si în limba engleza, la dresa Fundatiei, str. Caderea Bastiliei nr. 33, Bucuresti.

1 Parintele Paisie, personaj din F. M. Dostoievski, *Fratii Karamazov*, Bucuresti: Cartea Româneasca, 1986, pp. 20-21.

2 Ina Merdjanova, „Religious Liberty, New Religious Movements and Traditional Christian Churches in Eastern Europe”, *Religion, State & Society*, vol. 29, No. 4, 2001, p.272.

3 Urmându-l pe Istvan Kamaras, în locul notiunilor „secta” sau „cult”, care, de regula, sunt folosite în sens peiorativ, si în locul notiunii „noile miscari religioase”, care se refera la un cerc restrâns, am preferat termenul „noile fenomene religioase”; vezi Istvan Kamaras, „New Religious Phenomena and the Catholic Church in the Postcommunist Countries”, versiune preliminară, publicata în reader-ul cursului *Religion, Globalisation, and the State*, Central European University, Budapesta, 2003.

4 Karel Dobbelaere, „Secularization theories and sociological paradigms: convergences and divergences”, *Social Compass*, vol. 31, no. 2-3, 1984, p. 200, apud Ina Merdjanova, op. cit., p. 279.

5 Publicata în Monitorul Oficial nr. 167 din 31 iulie 1995 si republicata în M. Of. nr. 1 din 5 ianuarie 1996.

6 Publicata în M. Of. nr. 606 din 10 decembrie 1999.

7 O analiza critica a acestei variante initiale, din perspectiva drepturilor fiintei umane, este realizata de Renate Weber în articolul „Legea învățământului: între contestare si supra-apreciere”, publicat în *Revista Româna de Drepturile Omului*, nr. 9, pp. 16-27; aspectele analizate de autoare vizeaza libertatea de

conștiinta, în legatura cu obligativitatea studiului religiei si accesul la educatie al persoanelor aparținând minoritatilor nationale.

8 Publicata în M. Of. nr. 101 din 22 mai 1992.

9 Publicat în M. Of. nr. 190 din 7 august 1992.

10 Publicata în M. Of. nr. 167 din 31 iulie 1995.

11 Renate Weber, op. cit. p. 20.

12 Ceea ce ar însemna ca art. 9, alin (1) nu este coerent întrucât în teza a doua se stabileste ca religia (în ciclul primar) este obligatorie, iar în teza finala se ofera posibilitatea interpretarii conform careia religia este facultativa. Desigur, exista si varianta de interpretare, data de Curtea Constitutionala în preambulul Deciziei 72/1995, în care se precizeaza ca „prin coroborarea tezei a doua cu cea finala din structura art. 9 alin. (1) rezulta ca « obligativitatea » priveste includerea religiei ca disciplina în planurile de învățământ, religia si confesiunea rămânând sa fie alese sau nu”; însa, pe de o parte, aceasta precizare putea fi facuta explicit în textul legii, iar pe de alta parte, introducerea religiei ca disciplina obligatorie în planurile de învățământ, fara precizarea explicita în textul legii, poate fi interpretata ca obligativitatea studierii acesteia.

13 Toate articolele citate în aceasta (ultima) sustinere a mea sunt preluate din Legea învățământului, nr. 84 publicata în 1995.

14 Cu alte cuvinte, sustinând un argument similar celui folosit de Curtea Constitutionala, am ajunge la concluzia ca le este permis parintilor sa nu aleaga nici o forma de învățământ sau educatie pentru copiii lor, în conditiile în care sistemul legislativ din România obliga la un învățământ general obligatoriu (pâna în clasa a X-a).

15 Aceasta pretentie de acordare a unui statut privilegiat disciplinei *Religie*, evident exagerata, a B.O.R., confirma intentia de transformare a statului în biserica („suprema menire a credintei ortodoxe”), asa cum sustine parintele Paisie, personajul citat în moto-ul acestei lucrari; pentru o analiza a ascensiunii Bisericii (în privinta bogatiei si a puterii) vezi si Gabriel Andreescu, „Investitia în religie nu e o investitie în civilizatie”,

Zina, Bucuresti, nr. 2937, an X, 13 februarie 2004, p. 4, „Cele doua Românii: Parcul Carol si Biserica Ortodoxa Româna”, *Zina*, Bucuresti, nr. 2972, an X, 25 martie 2004, p. 4.

16 Se observa caracterul (pronuntat) ambiguu si totodata special pe care, conform acestei precizari, îl capata statutul disciplinei *Religie*, despre care nu se poate spune ce este ci, mai degraba ce nu este: disciplina obligatorie nu este, pentru ca se poate renunta la frecventarea orelor acesteia, disciplina optionala nu este pentru ca nu este prevazuta posibilitatea poate fi înlocuita cu o alta, disciplina facultativa nu este pentru ca nu exista posibilitatea ca elevilor/elevelor care nu opteaza pentru studierea acestei discipline („foarte putini”!!!) sa li se încheie situatia scolara fara aceasta disciplina, urmând a rezolva „diverse sarcini didactice”.

17 Cel puțin doua sunt problemele generate de o astfel de sustinere: nu legiuitorul stabileste numarul persoanelor care apartin uneia sau alteia dintre confesiunile religioase, iar daca, de dragul argumentului, am accepta ca numarul acestor persoane este, într-adevar mic, a preciza acest aspect în textul unei legi constituie un atentat la mecanismul libertatii religioase, limitând libertatea persoanelor de a-si schimba convingerile religioase.

18 Situatie paradoxala în care, de mai multe drepturi beneficiaza persoanele care nu apartin unor confesiuni recunoscute oficial.

19 Aceasta situatie se reflecta si în practica: În cataloagele scolare, în dreptul disciplinelor optionale se afla trecuta mentiunea „C. d. s. – Curriculum la decizia scolii”, mentiune care nu se afla si în dreptul disciplinei *Religie*; de asemenea, *Religia* este trecuta direct în planul disciplinelor de studiu al elevilor/elevelor, fara acordul acestora sau al parintilor acestora, si nu figureaza în oferta disciplinelor optionale.

20 Ordin valabil încă în anul scolar 2003-2004.

21 La specializarile: Stiinte sociale, Matematica-informatica, Stiinte ale naturii, Turism si alimentatie publica, Administrativ, Posta, Economic, Industrie alimentara, Protectia mediului, Chimie alimentara, Agricol agromontan si veterinar, Silvic si

prelucrarea lemnului, Telecomunicatii, electronica, automatizari si electrotehnica, Mecanic, Lucrari-publice, constructii, Textile si pielarie s.a..

22 Posturile sunt scoase la concurs de Inspectoratele Scolare Judetene dar sunt afisate si pe adresa de site a Ministerului Educatiei si Cercetarii, prin urmare existând si acordul acestui minister.

23 Amintesc numai prevederile corespunzatoare ale Pactului International cu privire la Drepturile Civile si Politice, Conventia Europeana a Drepturilor Fiiintei Umane (art. 9) si Declaratia privind Eliminarea Tuturor Formelor de Intoleranta si Discriminare pe baza de Religie sau Credinta.

24 În varianta initiala a legii învatamântului, publicata în 1995 si republicata în 1996, nu exista aceasta restrictie. Astfel, în art. 9 alin (2) se preciza despre cultele recunoscute oficial de catre stat ca *pot solicita Ministerului Învatamântului organizarea unui învatamânt specific, corespunzator necesitatilor de pregatire a personalului de cult*, iar în Ordonanta de Urgenta 36 din 10 iulie 1997 pentru modificarea si completarea Legii invatamantului nr. 84/1995, publicata în M. Of. nr.152 din 14 iulie 1997, se preciza ca *pot solicita Ministerului Învatamântului organizarea unui învatamânt specific, corespunzator necesitatilor de pregatire a personalului de cult, precum si înfiintarea si functionarea unor structuri de învatamânt laic, în sistemul national de învatamânt, sub coordonarea si controlul Ministerului Învatamântului*.

25 Gianina Buzea, „Recensamântul 2002”, Interviu cu Aurel Camara, presedintele *Institutului National de Statistica*, 22, Bucuresti, nr.13, an XIII (629), 26 mar.-1 apr. 2002, p. 6; citatul îi apartine lui Aurel Camara; acelasi gen de probleme au generat si întrebările privind etnia si intimitatea personala; este, cred, interesant de observat ca interviul în care se mentioneaza acest drept de a nu raspunde la anumite întrebări apare în penultima zi de desfasurare a recensamântului – perioada în care s-a desfasurat recensamântul a fost 18 – 27 martie 2002.

26 Publicata în M. Of. nr 439, din 06.08.2001.

27 Întrucât ne-am angajat în asigurarea deplinei confidentialitati a informatiilor obtinute în baza interviurilor,

persoanele intervievate vor fi identificate astfel: S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 si S6. Informatiile mi-au fost furnizate de subiectii S1, S2, S3.

28 Vezi si Gabriel Andreescu, „Cele doua Românii: Parcul Carol si Biserica Ortodoxa Româna”, *Ziua*, Bucuresti, nr. 2972, an X, 25 martie 2004, p. 4.

29 Publicat in Buletin Oficial nr. 5 din 20 aprilie 1964.

30 Publicata în M. Of. nr. 370 din 3 august 1999.

31 Sintagma „învatamânt de stat” este cea folosita de legiuitorul român în textul Legii învățământului, susținând astfel relatia de putere între învățământul centralizat si initiativa locala sau învățământul alternativ; vezi si Renate Weber, op. cit. p. 16.

32 Prin adresa nr. 629 din 27.02.1991

33 Adresa nr. 876.

34 Adresa nr. 52/22.03.1991.

35 Adresa nr. 114/26.03.1991

36 Adresa nr.1168/29.03.1991.

37 Preferinta pentru preoti, în predarea disciplinei *Religie* a ramas valabila pâna astazi, desi, pe de o parte, exista specializari, cu absolventi/ absolvente, în acest sens (pe profil pedagogic) în seminarele monahale si în institutele teologice, iar pe de alta parte pregatirea preotilor are o alta menire, de multe ori acestia fiind incompatibili (ca timp) – din cauza obligatiilor pastorale –, cu predarea la catedra.

38 Adresa nr2647/ 06.07.1990.

39 Înregistrat la nr.150052.

40 Înregistrat la nr. 7758.

41 Aceasta sustinere anticipeaza, de fapt, una dintre concluziile prezentei lucrari; premisele care conduc la aceasta concluzie se regasesc în cuprinsul studiului.

42 Decizia 72 din 18 iulie 1995 privind constitutionalitatea unor prevederi ale Legii învățământului, publicata în Monitorul Oficial nr. 167 din 31 iulie 1995.

43 *Programa analitica pentru predarea religiei în scoala* (aparuta cu aprobarea *Sfântului Sinod* al B.O.R.), Bucuresti: Editura Institutului Biblic si de Misiune al B.O.R., 1990.

44 Scoala generala nr. 1, Scoala generala nr. 15, Liceu Pedagogic, Grup Scolar Costin Nenitescu, Grup Scolar Industrial Contactoare, Grup Scolar Servicii si Meserii, Colegiul Agricol Constantin Angelescu, Liceul de Arta, Liceul B.P. Hasdeu (toate din Buzau), Scoala generala Plescoi, Scoala generala Sageata, Grup Scolar Industrial Berca.

45 Liceul de Arta.

46 Am prezentat aceasta problema patologica inspectorului de specialitate (preot), care a avertizat profesoara în cauza.

47 Scoala generala nr. 1.

48 Grup Scolar Industrial Contactoare.

49 Concept caruia (în cadrul orei respective, de religie) i s-a dat o definitie peiorativa: „grupare de credinciosi ce s-au rupt de Biserica pe baza unor învățaturi înțelese gresit”.

50 Grup Scolar Industrial Contactoare.

51 Liceul de Arta.

52 S5.

53 Scoala generala Sageata, Scoala Generala Plescoi, Scoala Generala Cândesti, Grup Scolar Costin Nenitescu, G.S.I. Berca.

54 G.S.I.Costin Nenitescu.

55 În anul scolar 2003-2004, am atras atentia asupra acestor aspecte în sedintele *Consiliului Profesorat*; motivatia unui preot-profesor, erijat în avocatul colegului sau (care obliga prezenta copiilor la Biserica), a fost una în directia considerarii bisericii ca laborator (sic!) pentru ora de *Religie*; pentru a contura tabloul, dar departe de a-l completa, as dori sa mai mentionez ca aceluiasi preot i s-a permis, tot în *Consiliul Profesorat*, sa-si exprime dubiile (si obsesiile) în privinta orientarii mele sexuale (!) si sa chestioneze ne/ apartenenta mea la confesiunea crestin-ortodoxa (!).

56 vezi Mihaela Jigau, coordonatoare, *Învatamântul rural din România, conditii, probleme si strategii de dezvoltare*, Bucuresti, Ministerul Educatiei si Cercetarii: MarLink, 2002, p.114.

57 Subiectul S5; marturiile lui au fost confirmate de colegii/ colegele de clasa.

58 Pentru ca nu de putine ori am întâlnit exemple similare, voi mentiona doar unul dintre articolele de lege care sunt

încalcate prin astfel de comportamente: „Nimeni nu poate fi supus torturii nici pedepselor sau tratamentelor inumane ori degradante” – art. 3 din Convenția Europeană a Drepturilor Ființei Umane.

59 art. 318 Cod Penal, publicat în Monitorul Oficial nr. 65 din 16 aprilie 1997.

60 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzău la nr. 3808/ 10.09.1990.

61 Înregistrat la nr. 11304/ 03.01.1991.

62 Initiatorul și coordonatorul lucrărilor sesiunii era prof. dr. Meroiu Grigore, insp. Gn. Secretariatul de Stat pt. Culte; apelul era semnat de Gheorghe Vladutescu.

63 Adresa este înregistrată la Patriarhia Română la nr. 138/ 06.02.1991 și la Episcopia Buzăului la nr. 521/ 14.02.1991.

64 Consider că aceasta este o falsă problemă, întrucât includerea „în orar” înseamnă de la prima până la ultima oră. Mergând pe rationamentul reprezentanților B.O.R., dacă pentru fiecare disciplină s-ar solicita în mod similar includerea, în această variantă, „în orar”, concluzia ar fi una imposibil de aplicat: școlile nu ar mai avea prima și ultima oră.

65 Grup Școlar Industrial Contactoare.

66 Interviuurile au fost realizate la Grup Școlar Contactoare Buzău și Grup Școlar Servicii și Meserii Buzău, în anul școlar 2002-2003.

67 Din acest punct de vedere, situația a rămas neschimbată: elevi și eleve cu care am discutat, de la cel puțin 8 școli și licee din Buzău, încă nu știu că *Religia* are statut de disciplină facultativă și mi-au spus că nimeni nu le-a transmis informații în acest sens; de altfel, din nou surprinzător, nici cadrele didactice nu cunosc acest lucru și nu putine au fost exemplele în care nici persoanele din conducerea școlilor nu cunosteau statutul (ce-i drept ambiguu) al acestei discipline.

68 Este evident un proces care îngreunează mecanismul prin care se asigură libertatea de conștiință.

69 An școlar 2003-2004.

70 Adus în discuție, mai mult tangential, în *Consiliul Profesoral*, subiectul a fost evitat, sau a fost susținut în termeni

care vizau mai mult imaginația preotului/ profesorului de religie decât prevederile legale; deși eram buni prieteni (ne scriam mesaje periodice), unul dintre elevi mi-a transmis că ar fi mai bine să întrerupem legăturile (din cauza presiunilor la care este supus), ceea ce s-a și întâmplat; de asemenea, situația se reflecta și în notele mai mici și dezinteresul lui pentru disciplină pe care o predau, elevul încercând să mă evite, cerându-și scuze, deși i-am aratat aceeași deschidere pentru prietenie.

71 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzăului cu nr. 2544/01.07.1991.

72 Liceul de Artă.

73 Textul este preluat din caietul unei eleve de clasă a doua (S6), care nu a putut înțelege prea bine cum stau lucrurile cu iubirea *Domnului*: pe de o parte pentru că ea este *fiica* și nu *fiu*, iar pe de altă parte nu vedea cum profesoara (că femeie) putea înțelege, și totodată transmite, iubirea unui tata pentru *fiu* lui – profesoara neputând fi nici tata nici *fiu*.

74 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzăului cu nr. 2408/ 21.06.1991.

75 Pasajele sunt din *Vechiul Testament, Iesirea*, 20, 17, respectiv, 20, 23-24, *Biblia sau Sfânta Scriptură*, București: Institutul Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 1988.

76 În discuțiile pe care le-am avut cu inspectorul-preot din Inspectoratul Școlar Județean Buzău, acesta mi-a spus că respectivul manual fusese retras din *circulație* dar că mai era folosit ca auxiliar. După ce a fost retras, în urma discuției avute, din școlile buzoiene, a apărut din nou, după două luni. Manualul a fost reeditat în 2002, cu același conținut.

77 Nicodim Sachelarie, *Pravila 136*, în *Pravila Bisericească*, (Buzău: Editura Sfintei Episcopii a Buzăului, 1999), p.30.

78 Înregistrat la Episcopia Buzăului cu nr. 2837/ 03.07.1991.

79 Este des întâlnită această tendință de transmitere a opiniei conform căreia există o relație de identitate între apartenența religioasă (creștin-ortodoxă) și apartenența națională (română); vezi, de exemplu (dar nu singurul) numirea principalei

ctitorii ortodoxe *Catedrala Mântuirii Neamului* (ma simt cel puțin dator să menționez articolul lui Gabriel Andreescu, „Logica << mântuirii neamului >> e anacronică”, *Observator Cultural*, București, nr 213, 23.03 – 29.03.2004, pp 4-6). Consecințele transmiterii acestei opinii în educație sunt dezastruoase: am întâlnit nu puține situații în care elevii sau eleve mi-au spus că cine nu este ortodox nu are ce căuta în „această școală”, sau (un exemplu extrem, dar nu neapărat rar) situații în care elevi sau eleve au afirmat că dacă ar avea o putere ar omorî toate persoanele care nu aparțin confesiunii ortodoxe (în exemplul oferit, elevul și eleva care au susținut asemenea afirmații erau în clasa a IX-a, după 8 ani de frecventare a disciplinei *Religie*); sunt și cadre didactice, nu neapărat de *Religie* care susțin, violent, această opinie: când am solicitat retragerea icoanelor de pe peretii (publici) ai școlii, pe motiv că erau și copii ai altor confesiuni în școală, un profesor mi-a răspuns: „dacă nu le convine, să plece în țara lor, de unde au venit”.

80 În documentele din arhiva *Episcopiei*, astfel de sintagme sunt frecvent întâlnite atunci când o persoană (în special) publică, nu răspundea favorabil cererii de introducere a religiei în școli.

81 Din aceeași scrisoare.

82 Vezi în acest sens, Olivier Gillet (2001), *Religie și nationalism. Ideologia Bisericii Ortodoxe Române sub regimul comunist*, (București: Compania), p. 13, 30 ș.a., dar nu numai.

83 Declarația a fost înregistrată la Episcopia Buzăului la nr. 510/ 13.02.1991.

84 Înregistrată la Episcopia Buzău cu nr. 1593/01.05.1991.

85 vezi supra, nota nr. 28.

86 Înregistrată la Episcopia Buzău cu nr. 244/ 25.01.1991.

87 Înregistrată la nr. 4301/ 15.11.1995, Episcopia Buzăului.

88 Olivier Gillet (2001), *Religie și nationalism. Ideologia Bisericii Ortodoxe Române sub regimul comunist*, București: Compania, p. 275.

89 Ina Merdjanova, op. cit., p. 274.

90 John Markoff and Daniel Regan, „Religion, the state and politics: legitimacy in the world's constitutions”, în Thomas Robbins and Roland Robertson (eds.), *Church-State Relations: Tensions and Transitions* (Transactions Books, New Brunswick, 1987), pp. 161-82, apud Ina Merdjanova, op. cit. p. 278.

On the issue of religious tolerance in modern Russia: national identity and religion

DMITRY A. GOLOVUSHKIN

Senior lecturer, Ph.D.,
Chair of Religious Studies,
Dept. of Social Sciences,
A. I. Herzen State Pedagogical University,
St. Petersburg, Russia
E-mail: golovushkinda@mail.ru

The sources of religious tolerance but also of religious nationalism in post-soviet Russia can be found basically in the group identification of nationality and religion. In crisis situations, the historical religion of the Russian society - Orthodoxy - becomes the criterion for identifying the national identity. However, despite the fact that the majority of Russians in our times consider themselves Orthodox, many of them are not believers. The observable effect of the "external belief" results in the fact that the religion tends to become a matter of personal choice and an individual value. It assumes a nationalistic function and to become an ideology. As a result, the political elite considers religion as a means of achieving different non-religious purposes. The Russian Orthodox Church, the official church, is compelled to take this fact into consideration and even support it. This is why religious intolerance and religious nationalism in modern Russia are often directed towards religion.

One of the best ways of ensuring the successful operation of democratic procedures in any society is to strengthen social peace by means of assimilating civic solidarity into the culture and by encouraging dialogue. This is an especially urgent task for post-communist countries, which have chosen the path of democratic development. Thus, the major task for the churches is that of strengthening fundamental moral values, forming relations of solidarity and consensus in society. However, sociological surveys of the last ten years¹ show that religious conflicts and religious fundamentalism, however dangerous these tendencies might be, increasingly determine the atmosphere in modern Russian society.

One can name a variety of reasons for the increase of religious intolerance. However, before examining

KEY WORDS:

Religious intolerance, Post - Soviet Russia, religious nationalism, national identity, freedom of conscience, Anti-Cult Movement, multi-confessional society, state-church relations, religious fundamentalism

them, it is necessary to define clearly the limits of religious tolerance, because without knowing these, one cannot defend the victim, nor identify the aggressor. J. Schpies, leader of the largest German Christian Organization of Students and Academics, says: "It makes sense to speak about religious tolerance in terms of morality and not in terms of pure knowledge". Religious tolerance always ends wherever one teaching has an ambition to monopolize the Truth and the right to expend it. But the Truth should never be imposed by force, and frequent violations of this principle (including use of religious freedom and tolerance as instruments of domestic or foreign policy) lead to a false understanding of the very nature of religious tolerance². In this case, the state should be religiously intolerant towards the falsely understood tolerance. Positive discrimination is the basis for religious policy in most European cultures. Such 'discrimination' does not threaten basic freedoms, which should always be protected by law, regardless of what the contents of the religious doctrines are (apart from those religious doctrines, which endanger the public order or the democratic values, and therefore should be banned). Thanks to such a policy, religious tolerance in industrially developed Western countries is based on solid national and supranational values, which ensures the protection of both old traditional churches and new important religious movements, while at the same time guaranteeing basic religious freedom for every individual. Interaction between these two levels makes it possible to reconcile interests of the church and the state as well as ensuring better understanding of the na-

ture of a multi-confessional society. However, in modern Russia the limits of religious tolerance and the objective criteria of positive discrimination are blurred and sometimes non-existent. This sad fact is evidence of the low level of political culture and cultural pluralism in Russia, and it is one of a whole series of factors that cause the prevalence of religious intolerance in the Russian society.

According to public opinion polls conducted by the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (RCSPo) in 1999-2002, the Gorbachev-era 'perestroika', the 'false democracy' and 'imperialism' have been usually named as the main reasons for giving birth to post-Soviet xenophobia. Such sentiments really exist in the society, but they are only partly to blame. Religious intolerance in Russia has deeper social, cultural, political and ethnic roots.

First of all, the theoretical base for religious intolerance is present in every religious teaching. All religions are rooted in special experience, in an encounter with the Sacred, and presuppose the existence of supernatural goals and realities. That is why, in historical perspective, religions by no means encourage tolerance. For example, in Christianity, universalism gave way to the national tradition. In the West this culminated in the emergence of alternative states (secular kingdoms) and alternative (Protestant) churches. As for the East, where the concordance of church and state became a special form of their union, the Christian State retained its global ambitions. However, under the double pressure from the Western and Islamic worlds, these ambitions

mutated into the feeling of exclusiveness and isolation in the hostile environment. Later, according to Prof. D. Obolensky, “after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and of the ‘Commonwealth of Orthodox states’, local Orthodox churches became increasingly isolated in their national shells and with more readiness demonstrated their supremacy over others”³. This attitude resulted in Russia regarding itself, for many centuries (until the monarchy was overthrown), as the only country possessing the true – that is, Orthodox – faith.

Second, religious intolerance may also be formed in a person’s consciousness and become part of his/her worldview as a result of the need to re-evaluate the remote and recent past, as well as the present. Economic hardships, the drop in social status of whole strata of society, the feeling of bitterness for the fall of Russia’s prestige as compared to the USSR, and, finally, the fear of globalization and the dictatorship of consumerism, — all this develops in Russians an ‘inferiority complex’ and makes people look for those who can be held responsible for what has happened to the country, to the society and to every single person. As a result, even the people who were initially indifferent to religion have started to identify themselves with certain confessions. The historical confession – Orthodoxy – becomes a criterion of national identity, of ‘being Russian’. The Russian Orthodox Church is consequently regarded as the keeper of the cultural tradition, and membership in it as an integral feature of national character. In other words, we see a pronounced tendency for strengthened connection between the national and the religious self-iden-

tification. This results in religion ceasing to be a value in itself and acquiring a nationalistic function.

Third, an important reason for the increased religious intolerance is the growing gap between the secularity of the modern society and the traditional spiritual values. The research project “Religion and Values after the Fall of Communism”, which was carried out in 1991-1999, found that despite the fact that 82% of Russians considered themselves Orthodox, only 4 % were ‘real’ practicing believers⁴. Therefore, non-Orthodox religions also inevitably address the same, extremely narrow social stratum. This also means that if, for instance, the number of practicing Baptists (and all Baptists are such) grew by just 1%, this would be tantamount to the loss of 20% of potential or actual parishioners for the Russian Orthodox Church. For the society in general, these figures are insignificant, but they are a serious precedent in the struggle for believers, and thereby may lead to the rise of intolerance and aggressiveness.

Fourth, an important source of religious intolerance in modern Russia is the system of relations between the state and the church, which increasingly reminds one of the model used before the Revolution, when Orthodox faith was the official state religion. (Religious freedom in Russia has been on the retreat since 1994, when district and federal authorities, acting in the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church, began to more openly ignore the constitutional clauses which guaranteed religious freedom in accordance with the legislation of 1990 and the Constitution of 1993). Religious climate in modern Russia has been influenced by attempts of sev-

eral political groups to make use of the authority of different churches and of the absolute trust that the public put in them. This use of religion for political and ideological purposes lead to the emergence of an image of non-Orthodox denominations as “an enemy” and contributed to the increase in religious intolerance.

Thus, religious intolerance in Russia exists at four interrelated levels – religious, social-political, governmental and routine everyday level.

What can be said about the position of the Russian Orthodox Church? According to Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Slutsk, it has always been too preoccupied with self-reflection and constant efforts to understand and realize its own unique character. Here finding the differences became predominant and Orthodox self-understanding was formed along the principal “whoever is not with us, is against us.” Thus, for instance, *the Guidelines for the Russian Orthodox Church’s Attitude to Non-Orthodoxy*, worked out in 2000 by the Theological Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church, lay emphasis on the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church does not equate itself to the Christian world in its entirety and rejects the notion that any Christian unity may exist beyond confessional barriers. This document states that the Orthodox Church differentiates between various non-Orthodox denominations and would not cooperate with non-traditional churches on Russian territory, or inside the CIS and the Baltic States. In other words, the Russian Orthodox Church has rejected the idea of “Christian universalism” with its various “branches”, which has created a potential basis for Orthodox funda-

mentalism. This is, however, not to say that all Orthodox believers are aggressively adherent to this understanding of piety: there are a lot of believers who support liberal reforms. Still, the right radical wing of the Russian Orthodox membership numbers quite a few clergymen as well as believers.

The latter find their aim in the fight against all non-Orthodox denominations, thereto using the concept formulated by the anti-liberal ideologist Metropolitan Iohann of St. Petersburg and Ladoga (Snytychev) and the theory of “canonical territory”. According to this theory, the territory of Russia belongs to the Moscow Patriarchate, and other denominations, especially the Catholics, have no right to preach here. If this preaching does take place, then it is regarded not as such, but as “common proselytism on a foreign territory” and it can and should be fought against. To implement these policies, all right-wing Orthodox organizations, the Moscow Patriarchate included, are trying to gain support from various political parties, social structures, federal and regional authorities. These activities culminated in the Anti-Cults Movement, which was established at the beginning of the 1990s and united all those who were actively opposing any display of non-Orthodox thinking.

It is an interesting fact that the Anti-Cults Movement in Russia took its final shape partly owing to the influence of such West European anti-cults groups as, for instance, the Dialog Center based in Aarhus (Denmark) and Berlin (Germany), as well as the American Family Fund. Unfortunately, Russian anti-cultists were

very selective in using the debates held in the West on the issue of the New Religious Movement and its influence on modern society. Most surveys were held on the basis of deliberately arranged fragmented theories and concepts, many of them already seriously discredited in scientific and legal circles. Some of the key works and documents have not even been mentioned, while others were presented in such distorted manner that their major ideas proved to be either omitted or discarded. Thus, for example, A. Dvorkin, head of the Information-Consultation Center of St. Irenaeus of Lyons, completely disapproves of the NRM, over-generalizing about its nature and putting into the category of “totalitarian sects”⁵ a number of groups, radically different in character, ranging from Baptists and Mormons to Herbalife International. Among those who hold the same opinion are members of the Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Heterodoxy, St. Petersburg Commission for Protection of the Family and Individuals, Moscow Committee for Salvation of Young People, an anti-cults center “Civil Security” in Yaroslavl as well as numerous anti-sectarian missionary centers created with the help of the Moscow Patriarchate. These organizations have enlisted the support of some psychiatrists and psychologists who have adopted and later provided scientific “justification” for the originally vague concepts of “mind control” and “brainwashing”, which sometimes leads them to unjustified conclusions. Thus, for example, you can come across the opinion that “new religious movements and structures threaten the

interests of the state, to the point of using their followers as spies and perpetrators of terrorist acts”⁶.

Analyzing the role of the religious factor for the political agenda and activities of various political movements, we can also see the role it plays and how its character varies from party to party. The most intolerant attitude towards non-Orthodox denominations and new religious movements is characteristic of national-patriotic political parties: the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the Congress of Russian Communities, the Russian National Union, the Social-Patriotic Association *Derzhava*. Thus, for example, V. Zhirinovskiy, leader of the LDPR, formulated a geopolitical concept that the current crisis in Russia has two underlying reasons. First, political power in Russia has been seized by anti-national and anti-Russian forces that imposed upon the Russian society an alien pro-Western ideology of the “free market” and “human rights”. Second, Orthodox spiritual values have been replaced by consumerism. V. Zhirinovskiy claims that the Orthodox faith in the course of its millennial presence on Russian territory has succeeded in developing concepts that are best for the Russian national character and traditions. That is why the LDPR looks upon Orthodoxy as a major source of Russian national thinking. Similar concepts of the “Holy Orthodox Russia” predominate in the ideological makeup of the Social-Patriotic Association *Derzhava*, which proclaims as its key objective the restoration of the former “natural” borders of the Russian state, that is, the borders of the USSR. *Derzhava* hopes that that Orthodoxy will enjoy absolute government

support in this new Russian State, while non-Orthodox confessions, such as Islam or Buddhism, would be supported only “on the territories densely populated by their members”.

Russian national-patriotic movement also has its supporters of fundamentalism. Among the movements that see themselves as fundamentalists one will find the Russian National Unity, the Russian National Council and the National Republican Party of Russia. “Their final objective is to develop a ‘Russian civilization’ based predominantly on Orthodox thinking.”⁷ . Thus, for example, the Resolution of the December Convention of the National Patriotic Front *Memory* (1994) contains a direct request for the legislature that would establish rightful, legal pre-eminence of the Russian Orthodox Church over non-orthodox denominations. The political agenda of the People’s National Party, apart from proclaiming the Orthodox faith as the established religion, claims that non-Russians and members of non-orthodox churches should have no right to be citizens of Russia. Russian state officials should be ethnically Russian and should profess Orthodoxy, while religious freedom can only be permitted as far as this or that teaching does not contradict moral doctrines inherent to the Russian Orthodox faith.

No less conservative in their attitude to religious tolerance are various Marxist groups and parties such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Russian Communist Laborist Party (RCLP), the Union of Communists, the ‘Working Russia’ Party and others.

However, religious intolerance is most dangerous at the government level. One should bear in mind that the decisive step towards recognition of the fight for religious freedom in the modern world was taken not by religious, social or political organizations but by constitutions, legislative assemblies and courts. The very concept of human religious rights is inseparably connected with the democratic values and the culture of pluralism. Unfortunately, the current situation with the right to religious freedom and its protection by the government in Russia is a serious cause for concern. In his analysis of the current situation, A. Pchelintsev, director of the Institute of Law and Religion, states that “the Russian society has abandoned its former liberal attitude in the sphere of relationship between the state and religion that was characteristic of the beginning of the 1990s, and now moves towards a neo-conservative view of the issue”⁸ .

The *Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations* adopted by the State Duma in 1997 is evidence that the state has no intention to make protection of human rights proclaimed in the Constitution its top priority. The text of the preamble of the Law contains the recognition of the special role of one denomination – namely, Orthodoxy – in the history of Russia, as well as a list of confessions “respected” by the state. This violates the constitutional principle of equal protection of all religious associations by the law (Article 14, RF Constitution). According to Article 2 of the *UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief*, the expression “intolerance and

discrimination” means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief. Article 10 of the RSFSR *Law on Religious Freedom*, of October 25, 1990, used to contain this conceptually important provision stipulating that “the state will maintain neutrality as regards the issue of freedom of conscience and religious beliefs”. However, this provision was not only excluded from the new legislation, but the concept itself was radically transformed. In fact, the new law is practically giving Orthodoxy the status of the state religion. The Russian Orthodox Church, rather than playing the role of an institutionalized religion, is proclaimed to be the basis for the restoration of Russian national identity, which in itself is the restoration of imperial ideology.

As a result, ever since the adoption of *the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations*, opposition to the “expansionism of foreign missionaries”, threatening the “spiritual renaissance of Russia” has become an integral part of religious policies of the Russian state. According to the prominent English specialist in religious studies P. Jenkins, the fear of sects has often been a deliberately created phobia. Such phobias have a considerable unifying force, since they create an image of a “common enemy”, which enables the general public to join forces against the common threat and reinstate once again the universally accepted standards and beliefs.⁹ Thus, the *Doctrine of Informational Security of the Russian Federation*, adopted September 9, 2000, clearly states that “one of the major directions for ensuring informational security in the sphere of spiritual life, should be

the opposition to the influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.” However, the document fails to give a clear definition what should be considered “religious fundamentalism” or a “totalitarian sect”.

What one clearly finds lacking in the document are any serious studies of a possible classification of new religious movements and structures and definition of their negative or positive influence on society. Similar terminological vagueness and groundless xenophobia is manifest in the majority of documents issued by the authorities in charge of registering new religious associations, as well as in local legislation on missionary activities. Thus one gets an impression that the laws are aimed at creating new myths and new “enemy images”, rather than at stabilizing the religious situation in Russia.

It is worth mentioning that all efforts to legitimize the state anti-sectarian policy in Russia are often explained by appealing to the situation in the West. While it is true that Europe has no uniform legislation on religious issues, it is also a fact that they have adopted the European Convention on Human Rights, and some governments have already faced a lot of criticism for the unsatisfactory situation of religious freedom in their countries, having to alter their legislation accordingly. Now religious legislation in Europe is evolving towards promoting personal rights and freedoms of citizens in all, including the religious, spheres, and only Russia is walking backwards.

The analysis given above shows that heterodoxy in Russia is primarily seen as a threat to national values and state interests. For that reason, religious intolerance,

as a rule, is aimed at a religion that is considered false by the established religious community, that is seen as threatening the foundations of the society, since its teachings threaten the political authority and policies of the government and finally, a religion that is equated with an alien political and social-economic system. Since the borders between the Islamic, the Buddhist and the Christian worlds are not transparent for mutual “expansion”, the main lines of confrontation will be the following:

a) opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church to Catholic and Protestant “pretensions” to the “Russian canonical territory”;

b) joint fight of the Orthodox Church and the state against foreign and new local religious movements that are automatically declared “totalitarian sects”;

c) opposition of the established Orthodox Church to any expansion of alternative Orthodox churches - the Foreign, the Catacomb and the Renovated - and their influence, as well as opposition to the Russian Protestants, whose activity deprives the Russian Orthodox Church of its “monopoly” for Russian religious life;

d) opposition of the Moscow Patriarchate to the “secession of local national churches” in the “new foreign countries”, that is, in Ukraine, Estonia and other countries, which deprives Moscow of its own Eastern Rome.

Defeat in any of these tasks threatens to bring up radical changes in the established position of the unsuccessful party. This worries both the church authorities and some political leaders, since the official position of

the Orthodox Church in Russia is connected with the political situation in the country (history shows that totalitarian regimes are no exception to this rule) and, moreover, it serves as basis for “national identity”. Reorganization in this sphere will require changes not only in the religious tradition, but also in the character of political power and the sentiment of the public. However, if these changes do not take place, resulting religious intolerance might lead to deplorable consequences, the first signs of which are already manifest in modern Russian society.

Firstly, there exists a danger of a definite turn towards the anti-liberal Russian “special way”, i.e. a totalitarian imperial regime using nationalist-clerical ideology.

Secondly, there are social and economic consequences. In the atmosphere of pre-dominance of “religious nationalism”, social order and consensus in the Russian society will be broken. This will lead to the failure of modernization programs and will be an obstacle on the way out of the crisis the country is now trying to overcome.

Thirdly, if Russia does not have religious freedom, it will face a lot of problems on the international arena. This might damage Russia’s international relations and result in isolation instead of the desired equality.

Fourthly, religious nationalism is dangerous not only for the society, but for the Russian Orthodox Church as well. The latter is rapidly assuming the character of a conservative social institution, defending the old traditional order and becoming a political instrument in the hands of the reactionaries.

It is clear that such tendencies are highly dangerous. However, one cannot yet say that in modern Russia “religious orthodox” nationalism has already firmly established itself, along with its classical, parity, economic and defensive varieties. Besides the above mentioned factors that encourage its development, there is a number of factors that oppose and resists its dissemination.

The first and most important factor is the process of social modernization in the Russian society, which broadens the worldview of the people. Religion in its traditional forms is losing its role as a predominant vertical line of the world conceptualization and we witness the rise of new sub-cultures that no longer coincide with national borders but are determined by personal choice and interests. According to the independent journalist Ye. Ikhlov, “the Russian society that has moved far enough from the traditional lifestyle and got used, in the past couple of dozen years, to the increasingly predominant climate of spiritual and intellectual pluralism, can no longer be satisfied with the leadership of a structure that is socially passive”¹⁰. As a result, despite the fact that 82 % of Russians today regard themselves as Orthodox, overwhelming majority of the population is against building the state system along ethnic-confessional lines. Besides, it is highly doubtful that the Russian State today will agree to share its power with anyone, let alone the Orthodox Church. All political processes active in our society since 1991, in fact, lack any religious constituents. And, finally, we can clearly see the changes in the very sentiment of Orthodox believers and the appearance of so-called “new or-

thodox believers” with their active social attitude, pragmatism, ecumenism, dissatisfaction with their current spiritual counseling, personal spiritual experience and adherence to the values of democracy.

It might seem a paradox but religious intolerance in modern Russia is to a great extent based on the national “inferiority complex” and the wish to prove to the world that Russia will survive on account of its “spiritual wealth”. However, no one today understands what this wealth is and how it can be used in contemporary life, and spiritual tradition is no more than a symbol. In the final analysis, misgivings about non-Orthodox denominations’ influence in Russia have no solid ideological base, nor legal authority behind them, and their actualization remains fragmentary and inconsistent.

In conclusion, the real “return to one’s roots”, the discovery of one’s national identity based on religious tradition cannot in itself be the source of conflict. On the contrary, it facilitates the dialogue between cultures and promotes religious tolerance. It’s a known fact that people with a strong feeling of national and religious identity tend to be tolerant towards the “others” and their “strange ways”. In other words, tolerance does not mean rejection of one’s views and beliefs but rather their further development and amplification.

Notes:

1 See Papers in Sociological Research (1990 - 1992; 1996). Institute of Sociological Research, Russian Academy of Science. Moscow, 1996. 74 p.; Papers in Sociological Research (1995; 1997) Russian Independent Institute of Social and National

Problems. Moscow, 1997. 183 p.; Papers in Sociological Research (1994 - 1995) Russian Academy of Science. Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography. Moscow, 1997. 85 p.; Papers of Sociological Research (1993 - 1997) Moscow State University; Center for Social Studies. Moscow, 1997. 151 p.; State, Religion, Law: Sociological Analysis // Religion and Law. 2001. N 1. pp. 26 - 29.

2 The case in point is the so-called “tactical tolerance”, which is mostly used by totalitarian political systems with the purpose of promoting their own ideology. – *author's remark*.

3 *Qtd. in* Pospelovskiy D. V. The Russian Orthodox Church in the 20th Century. Moscow, 1995. p.18.

4 *See* Old Church, New Believers: Religion in Public Perceptions in Post-Soviet Russia. St. Petersburg, Moscow, 2000. pp. 7 - 15.

5 Dvorkin A. Introduction into Sect Studies. Nizhni Novgorod, 1998. p. 24.

6 Kondratiev F. K. Medical and Social Consequences of Destructive Activity of Totalitarian Sects: an Analytical Survey. State Research Center of Social and Legal Psychiatry of V.P. Serbskiy. Moscow, 1998. p. 4.

7 *See* Ovsienko F. G., Trofimchuk N. A. Confessional Factor in Russian Political Process: Place and Essence // Religion and Culture. M., 2000. p. 81 – 82.

8 Pchelintsev A., Ragozina L. State, Religion, Law: Sociological Analysis // Religion and Law. 2001. N 1. p. 29.

9 Jenkins P. Pedophiles and Priests: Anatomy of a Contemporary Crisis. Oxford, 1996. p. 158.

10 Ikhlov Ye. V. Difficulties for Inter-Confessional Dialogue in Russia // Nationalism and Religion. Moscow, 2000. p. 149.



Marina Gaskova

The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping the Political Culture of Russia

Besides other changes that have taken place in the Russian Federation in our times, the process of constitution of an ideology, which is accompanied by different competing value-systems, is one of the crucial tendencies. This process also occurs in the area of the development and construction of religious institutions and religious consciousness. Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church has had a dominant position among the other religious institutions in the country. Unfortunately, it has not and does not serve the role of promoting a democratic change, but is rather an “echo” of the authoritarian and totalitarian past of the Russian history. In my paper I will analyze different factors that contribute to these characteristics of the Orthodox Church, and their influence on the political culture of Russia.

In spite of the fact that, officially, a course towards democratization has been adopted in Russia since Perestroika, there are some tendencies, rooted deeply in the consciousness of the Russian people, which are contradictory to the idea of democracy. The Russian Orthodox Church is one of the oldest institutions in Russian society. In my paper I will argue that the Russian Orthodox Church is the body, which simultaneously reflects and shapes the reactionary, extremely conservative “interpretation of reality” of Russia. Paradoxically enough, even though the Church was persecuted during the communist regime, some members of the priesthood, who have become politically active today, associate themselves with the communist ideas. To some extent, the Church is an “echo” of the totalitarian past of the country.

MARINA GASKOVA

Institute of Economics
and Industrial Engineering,
Russian Academy of
Sciences, Department of
Social Problems,
Novosibirsk, Russia
E-mail:
mgaskova@yahoo.com

KEY WORDS:

Russia, Orthodox Church, political culture, traditionalism, postmodern society, church ideology, cultural representations

Thus, some of the questions I would like to answer in the paper are: Which factors of the Russian culture work for and against the formation of legitimacy of the Church in the society? Can we say that the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church serves as the “root paradigm”, or as the ideology that can potentially “win” against the competing ones (for example, liberalism)? Is the claim of the Russian Orthodox Church to become the “civil religion” (Bellah), the symbol of national unity, a realizable one? Will the Church be able to fill in the spiritual void existing in Russia; Will it be able to become the moral symbol of authority of the nation?

In my opinion, there are several aspects that have contributed to the formation of the Church as it is today: 1) the essence of the doctrine itself (extremely traditionalist); 2) the history of the relationship between state and Church in the Russian history. There has always been a symbiosis between Church and state in Russia, and over the time this has resulted in mutual protection. Russian Church does not have a history of independent development, of struggle for human rights, for liberty or freedom, as it is the case with the Roman Catholic Church in Poland; 3) the situation of great instability and change in Russia (“unsettled lives”, using the term of Swidler), which led to a greater need for spiritual security, support, and determination among people. The economic instability and the standards of living are also important factors that have contributed to the formation of a certain type of religiosity. Inglehart’s ideas concerning the values of traditional and postmodern societies are very useful here.

My paper will be organized according to these aspects: 1) Firstly, using the works of Swidler, Aronoff, Inglehart, Berdiaev, and others I will discuss the basis and the forms of religious ideology in the political culture of Russia; 2) Secondly, I will touch upon the political activity of the Church and its ideological premises. 3) Thirdly, I will take a look at the history of the development of the relationship between Church and state; 4) In the end I will deal with the legal aspect of religion, because, as we can see by comparing two Russian Federal laws adopted after the transformation period, in the laws towards religions we can find a discriminatory basis, other than Russian Orthodox. This, undoubtedly, is a step back on the road (imposed by Gorbachev) for democratic changes in the field of law making and politics.

In this paper I will use mainly the assumptions of the semiological approach proposed by Kubik (forthcoming). This approach focuses on the dynamic interplay of attitudes, discourses, and institutional settings where power is actualized. (Kubik forthcoming, p.13). Consequently, it allows the researcher to combine different dimensions, such as the psycho-social one (which focuses mainly on attitudes), the semiotic dimension (focusing on the study of symbols); and the socio-political or the dimension of power (which concentrates primarily on the study of institutions and power). It is also necessary to point out the dynamic character of the cultural representations and the evolving character of their meanings in contrast to the understanding of culture as a static phenomenon. Religion is potentially one of the

most powerful system of symbols, able to reshape the political culture, and this is why, I think, it is best to approach it from the four angles mentioned above.

1. The social, cultural, and ideological premises for the formation of the ideology of the Church. Some characteristics of the Church today

The period of social transformations that started in the 80s and 90s in the countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has completely shaken the foundations of the settled lives in every aspect – economically, ecologically, politically, etc. In the field of culture, the established rules and customs began to be questioned. The old ideological schemas, propagated by the communist regime ceased to have an influence on people, and, consequently, a new political discourse had to be found by political entrepreneurs to explain the reality. A great spiritual need and a search for meaning is characteristic for such periods. Aspirations for a new and brighter future have been expressed in the democratic reformation and the dethroning of the cult of the totalitarian regime introduced by Gorbachev during Perestroika. Unfortunately, the shadows of the past, and the ideological form that political culture takes today *are not new* in the history of Russia. They were selected from the existing “tool kit”, the repertoire of possibilities (Swidler) that Russian culture had, and that is why there are different types of “democracy” in the former Soviet

countries. The historical past is differently molded with the choices of the present.

As Swidler wrote, in unsettled societies, ideologies have a stronger control over people’s actions than in the “settled lives”. If in a stable social order culture is taken for granted, and religion often plays the role of tradition, changing societies are much more sensitive to culture. Doctrine, symbol, and ritual shape action directly. Undoubtedly, the religious revival in Russia is of great importance not only for the spiritual life of the individual (I agree with the thesis of M. Eliade, C.G. Jung and others according to which “religious thinking” is an essential part of human consciousness that can take different forms), but also for the formation of a political and legal culture. The ideology of the Russian Orthodox Church has looked back upon the tradition of conservative nationalism, and its representatives have understood and cooperated with the ideas of the “new” communists. Using Swidler’s terminology, fewer resources were needed to be spent for this already trodden path of history. “Culture in this sense is more like a style or set of skills and habits than a set of preferences and wants” (Swidler, p.275). To some extent, one can say that the development of the Church was frozen during the seventy years of repressions, and now the Church is being rebuilt, copying its own image from the pre-revolutionary times from the beginning of the twentieth century. This was the strongest tool to choose from in shaping the religious ideology of our times.

However, there are some researchers who affirm that the historical reality has very little or nothing in

common with the construction of an ideology (Petro forthcoming). Additionally, “there is no cultural or historical disposition toward any particular type of policy” (Ibid, p.52). What really matters, in Petro’s opinion, is the preference of elites, who take the decisions on what kind of symbols to evoke in a given political situation. Pursuing certain political interests, elites (re)construct a certain myth from the history of a country. If the public accepts a given myth, it helps to achieve the legitimacy of the regime, and serves as a strong cohesive factor, forming (national) identity. This means that the role played by the Orthodox religion today in the political culture of Russia was and is determined by the purpose orientated actions of the political leaders.

Petro’s position on the role of elites could be contradicted from the standpoints of some other scholars who say that elites are rather subconscious recipients than conscious manipulators of culture. These researchers consider that the explanations are to be found taking into consideration the uniqueness of the history and culture of every country (Petro pp.47-48).

From the comparative perspective of the macro-historical approach, one can speak of different types of societies only in terms of their economic and cultural development and, consequently, in terms of different systems of values and religious through which this are characterized. I fully agree with the distinction made by Inglehart between people’s values in the traditional and modern societies. The sense of great insecurity, instability, and low economic standards of living determine people to look for absolute standards, security, a

greater power, and a rigid set of (religious) uniting norms. The Russian Orthodox Church satisfies these needs perfectly. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that, according to Inglehart, people, especially in the former countries of the Soviet Union, did not start feeling happier, more satisfied with life after the beginning of the transformation period. As a result, one cannot speak about the legitimacy of the democratic regime, which was established in Russia (Inglehart 1999). This factor rather forms the basis for authoritarianism, and in the religious sphere – for a dominant traditional religion. It pushes people towards criticizing the existing regime, and thinking that the earlier (for example, communist) times were better. If we can speak of the emergence of new social and religious movements, which express the set of “post-materialist” values (tolerance, belonging, self-expression, participatory role in society) in the Western countries, in Russia the situation is different. I think that pluralism and acceptance of different religious forms is a matter of things to come in the case of Russia. Unfortunately, one can say that, to a certain degree, the legitimacy of monotheistic religion goes along well with the support for the strong authoritarian secular power in Russia today. These are two facets of the same type of political culture. Undoubtedly, Western countries have the longest tradition of monotheistic religion; but the modern post-industrial regimes of these countries are also characterized by the existence of new social movements, including new religions, some of which even non-Christian (Inglehart 1999, Balagushkin 1999).

Besides the cultural and socio-political factors that formed the basis for the legitimation of the Russian Orthodox Church, it is worth mentioning that there has been an ongoing debate about the “nature” of the Russian culture. Can Russia be considered a part of Europe, Asia, or is it an independent “Eurasian” country? These discussions can be traced back to the Slavophiles and Westernizers which have become very important today due to the global geopolitical changes taking place all over the world, the shifting of the borders and the reshaping of the cultural identities of the people. The answers to such questions like: “who are we and where do we go?” are not provided by the cultural “tool kit” anymore. These questions are rather posed than answered. Russians do not perceive themselves as Soviet citizens; they need to identify themselves in different terms and being engaged in different relations with the rest of the world. Today the Church is claiming to become a symbol of a Russian nation. Some of its features, its ideology, is similar to that one of the neo-Slavophiles. The Church claims to play a unique messianic role for Russia, being extremely hostile to everything that comes from the West, including the ideas of liberalism and democracy, tolerance to other religions, cosmopolitanism, Enlightenment, etc.

The fundamentalist wing of the Church perceives perestroika, started by Gorbachev, negatively, as the event that pushes the Russian nation away from God. The representatives of the Church, using terminology from the Middle Ages, defines Europe and America as

being possessed by evil forces, as the countries that will inevitably burn in hell soon (Shenfield 2001).

There are some strong anti-Semitic tendencies that can be noticed in the activity of the Church. Books and pamphlets which describe the dangers of the satanic secret movement are being published. On 9th of March 2000, the Holy Synod of the Russian Church issued a declaration, in which the Ministry of Taxes and Duties was accused of using satanic symbols in some tax documents (Shenfield 2001, p. 63). Additionally, a revival of the medieval belief that Jews commit ritual murders, using Christian children has also been noted. Some believe that the Jews, who perceived it as a ritual slaughter, killed the tsar’s family in 1918. Many members of the Church believe that there is the Judaeo-Masonic plot against Russia. Adherence to the tradition and the strong secular power (preferably in the face of a monarch) are the main points of Church’s ideology today. I think that *one of the most characteristic* features of the Church is its resistance to change, to accept modernization in any form. Its rituals and attitudes toward world have remained unchanged for centuries. Some authors have shown that the ideas of neo-Slavophilism are closely connected with the communist ideology today. (Kubik “Cultural Legacies of State Socialism...”). It was noted also that the members of the Russian Orthodox Church associate themselves with communism and neo-Slavophilism (Balagushkin, Shenfield). Some of them even cooperate with fascist organizations such as Russian National Unity. On the other hand, communists themselves are very eager to be associated with Russian

Orthodoxy. For example, the leading figure of the Russian Communist Workers Party, Viktor Tyulkin, has been characterized as an “orthodox internationalist communist” (Shenfield 2001, p. 60). Undoubtedly, it is nevertheless an overstatement to put the political activity of the Church on the same level with fascist organizations or analyze it within the framework of fascism as, for example, S. Sheffield¹ and Steeves did (Steeves, 1994).

The image of the Russian Orthodox Church would be misleading if the liberal aspects of its ideology were to be let aside. Politically this liberal wing stands for Christian democracy and a separation of the Church and the state. There are some Christians believers who have preserved their faith during the religious repressions of the Soviet regime; at the same time they remained open and welcoming to democratic changes. The appreciation of one’s nation can be combined with appreciation of other, different cultures. Likhachev, for example, noted that it is necessary to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism. The first means love for one’s nation and for one’s neighbour, and its roots can be found in Orthodoxy and in the Russian national character. It is important to note that the liberal wing of the Orthodox believers identifies its forefathers with the ideologist-philosophers of the Silver Age. I think that these thinkers (such as Florensky, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Frank and others) have contributed greatly to the spiritual heritage of Russians. Several generations have found inspiration and answers to the question about the meaning of life in their books. These writers considered

Russian Orthodoxy to be the essence of the Russian soul, but at the same time they often criticized both some aspects of the regime and the weaknesses of the Russian character. For example, N. Berdyaev wrote that Orthodoxy was embedded in the spirit of the Russian soul. He noted that *religion and nationality were understood as a symbiosis* by the Russians. “Narod” (common people) always loved its tsar and saw nobility as the cause of its problems. The tsar was at the same time a secular and a spiritual authority. Berdyaev discussed the “feminine” nature of the Russian nation, its passivity, its *collectivistic* character, the lack of determination and discipline. Irrationality and contradictions are also qualities that were pointed out by him. Berdyaev thought that even Marxism and nihilism were easily accepted by the Russians in accordance with the Russian nature.² He also noted that Church’s nationalism is a characteristically Russian phenomenon. In my opinion, many of these ideas are very relevant today (a century after Berdyaev’s works have been published), when we talk about Church and its influence on the development of culture and politics in Russia. For example, if one can underline the importance of Protestantism in the formation of the ethics and the culture of the American society (started by Weber’s works), this is not the case with the Russian religious tradition. The crucial features of religious, and later economic ethics of Western societies are lacking: individualism, rationality, and the idea of the division between the secular and the spiritual powers. This becomes clear if we take a look at the history of Russian Church.

Many writings of the philosophers of the Silver Age are deeply democratic by nature; they value human dignity and the uniqueness of the human being. The writers of the Silver Age saw themselves as philosophers, independent from the Church. Unfortunately, this line of thinking did not develop into the mainstream of the Russian religious thought due to the fact that the Bolsheviks destroyed the Church's activity, including the most positive beginnings. Some consider this fact as one of the main reasons why today's Church is reactionary, conservative, and hostile to the idea of the freedom of (religious) thought. The murder of A. Mien, who, in my opinion, was one of the most outstanding religious liberal thinkers of our days, is the best illustration of this fact. Even though one cannot say that ideologically all the members of the Church are affiliated to fundamentalist extremism, the majority of the clergymen could be characterized as conservative and politically loyal to the government today. (Shenfield 2001).

I will focus on this matter in the next part of my paper.

2. The Relationship between Church and State in the Russian History

Historically, the Church has always been associated with the secular power. The Church has no tradition of independent functioning, but only a history of loyalty and glorification of the rulers. On the one hand, one can say that during the times of troubles, wars, and for-

eign invasions throughout twelve centuries it served as a strong moral authority, giving spiritual strength to the nation in order to fight the enemies. On the other hand, its constant dependency and support of the authorities brought about strong reactionary and anti-liberal tendencies in this institution. There were times in Russian history when its status was inferior to that of the state (during Ivan the Terrible, for example), and times when the Patriarch was basically ruling the country (Patriarch Nikon, in 1662, claimed that the Church is superior to the secular power). There was also a tragic period in Church's history when it was almost completely destroyed (during communist regime), and only once revived by Stalin to use it as a source for motivating people in the struggle with fascist Germany.

Nevertheless, one cannot find in the history of the Church the idea of the separation of powers (as it could be found in Protestantism and Catholicism, often bringing deep Church reforms, which influenced society as a whole). There was no Enlightenment or modernization of the Russian Orthodox Church. Rather, one of its main characteristic features is the dogmatic adherence to *Tradition*. The forms in which tradition is understood by the members of the Church are: the Bible, the Seven Ecumenical Councils, the Later Councils, the Fathers, the Liturgy, the Canon Law, and the Icons. Nothing has changed in the Church of today, and the spirit of antiquity is consciously preserved in its liturgy, which is still being held in the ancient Russian language with a very impersonal character, in the ancient form of baptizing,

etc. The Church is extremely loyal to the past, often including the past of the secular powers.

The already-mentioned claim is sustained by the fact that some of the Russian rulers were canonized (Prince Vladimir, Tsar Ivan I, etc.). If the main mythologemas of the Poles, for example, are connected with the names of Saint Stanislaw and Saint Wojciech, who were associated with the resistance to the royal power, in Russia, in contrast, the abbot of Volokolamsk Monastery, a person devoted to absolutism, was canonized. He was characterized by religious formalism and ritualism, glorification of the power of the prince, and desire to defend the Church's wealth. The conflict between Church and state, connected with his name, was symbolical. In the 15th century a monk, Nil Sorskii, and his followers ("nestiazhateli") have started to defend the idea that the Church and the monasteries (which owned one third of the land at that time) should have no property. At first they gained the support of the prince, but in the end status quo of the Church and the state was preserved, and Joseph, the abbot of Volokolamsk Monastery, was canonized.

The relationship between Church and state at the beginning of the 21st century follows its typical path in Russia. If in the case of Poland, Catholicism served as the main catalyst of democratic change from the communist regime, in Russia the Church withdrew itself back to conservative nationalism. The visit of John Paul II in 1979 transformed Poland. It influenced public discourse, individual attitudes, and the rules of interaction of people. It evoked great psychological response,

which served as one of the factors in forming the legitimacy of the new political regime (Kubik 1994). In Russia, during the period of Perestroika, lots of actions were taken by Gorbachev in order to find a basis for a democratic regime. The freedom of speech and religious practices, stipulated in the law were only one of the many reforms of that time. Thousands of churches of different denominations (Russian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Armenian Apostolic, etc.), as well as seminaries were opened, and the publishing activity of the churches expanded, during the Gorbachev's time. These are all former demands, expressed by religious activists, satisfied at that time. Additionally, it was the time when new religious movements appeared, some of them coming from abroad, and some being formed from the roots of different Russian national traditions and beliefs. Most important, this has led to the change of status of religion. If previously, due to repressions, it was stigmatizing to speak about faith, after Perestroika officials found it increasingly useful to show their belonging to the church. The attitudes of people changed as well.

However, the religious situation changed again when Boris Yeltsin was alleged President. Slowly, mainly due to Church's activity, the religious situation in Russia has shifted towards intolerance for all other religions. Undoubtedly, this has had a certain effect on the formation of a political and legal culture. The democratic orientation that started with Gorbachev has failed to produce the long-term effect that was expected. This was also reflected on the Federal and local laws on reli-

gions (at the end of the 80's the Orthodox clergy were being elected as deputies in the Russian parliament).

On 1st October 1990, a law concerning religion ("On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organizations" for the USSR) was adopted by Gorbachev. At the end of October, another law concerning the "Freedom of Worship" in Russian Federation was signed (Witte 2000). Both of them prohibited religious discrimination. The foundations of religious liberty, freedom of religious expression were stipulated in these documents. Additionally, they stated the separation of state and religion. These two institutions were expected not to interfere with each other in any way. The Russian Constitution from 1993 confirmed these provisions. However, since then the Russian Orthodox Church has started an active campaign against all other religious practices, because, first of all, they were bringing about the context for a contest for souls, so to speak. Western Churches also represented the ideology of individualism and liberty, which is inherently alien to this Church. Finally, the Russian Orthodox Church claimed that the foreign religious denominations posed a threat to society by breaking up families, using brainwashing techniques, etc. It should be mentioned that the Church accused *all* other religious denominations of this, without making any distinctions. The idea, being supported by Patriarch Aleksii II, was to ban all of them. The Church has published numerous proclamations against the activities of the other religious denominations; the Moscow Patriarchate requested restraint for several times, and even a one-generation moratorium on foreign mis-

sion activities in Russia. In 1993 the Moscow Patriarchate joined various nationalist groups in order to make a pressure on the Russian Parliament to amend the Federal Law from 1990 (Witte 2000). As a result, in 1997 a new Federal Law was adopted by President Yeltsin, after long discussions and protests (Western representatives, including the Presidents Clinton and Carter together with 160 senators and representatives in the U.S. Congress, several Western European heads of state and Council of Europe, Pope John Paul II). The new law discriminates against all religious denominations other than the Russian Orthodox Church. They are all subject to several restrictions (the right to juridical personality, to hold a collective property, to access to the state's material benefits to religion, and many other were revoked). The Orthodox Church is protected by the state and granted all kinds of support according to the new law. More than one third of Russia's eighty-nine provincial governments also adopted laws limiting the rights of foreign religious organizations (Witte 2000, p.10). One can come to a conclusion that these changes, made in the Federal and local laws of Russia, are a step back on the road to constructing the civil society, protecting the human rights, and guaranteeing legal equality for all religious denominations. But, certainly, the Church does not have the potential to be the spiritual force that stimulates people for civil activity towards democratic reformation.

But it still has the potential for becoming the "civil religion" (Bellah) of Russia. There is no doubt that this institution has a highly moral authority, in comparison

with the situation before Perestroika. First of all, it is noticeable that people, holding power positions show their respect, interest, and participation in religious practices of the Russian Orthodox Church. The mass-media always pays attention to the visits and meetings of Putin with the Patriarch; images of Putin's attendance to church ceremonies are often present even on the first-covers of the magazines. Gorbachev and Eltsin have worked for themselves the same public-image. Hierarchs attend official state ceremonies, and Orthodox priests serve as chaplains in the armed forces and bless submarines, armaments, and boundary posts, etc. The departments of Orthodox theology are opened in state universities; Orthodox sermons are often covered on TV, etc. Thus, one can say that, at an official level, the centuries-long symbiotic relationships between Church and State are restored. At the level of public opinion, according to the statistical research, one can clearly see a growing interest in religion in Russia. In a poll conducted in early 2000 by the Russian Independent Public Opinion Research Center, 57 percent of the respondents said that they trusted the Russian Orthodox Church; 32 percent said that they mistrusted it. According to the survey, *the Church is trusted more than the central and local governments, the Duma, the police and the judiciary system, the media, and the banks*; only the Federal Security Service and the army had better ratings (Shenfield 2000, p.60). However, according to other surveys (ISSP-91; Vorontsova 1997, etc.) it cannot be said that a great majority of people go to church regularly (only about one percent of the population). Also, there is a growing in-

terest in non-traditional religion in Russia now. There was noted lately a shift away from Orthodoxy in people's religious preferences, especially a shift away from the Church as institution, and an orientation toward "Christianity in general" and a vague "New Age spirituality" (Filatov and Furman 1992).

Most important, one could notice a considerable drawback of both theoretical and empirical research of the authors presented in this essay, mainly their *lack of attention* to age and occupational factors. My assumption is that *the same category* of people, circumscribed from the standpoint of these factors, are communists and active followers of the Russian Orthodox Church. Many of the former communists still adhere to this ideology, which combines nationalism and anti-liberalism, today. They also want to be associated with the (reactionary ultranationalist) part of Russian Orthodoxy. These are the kind of people who are not satisfied with their life due to their low standards of living (they have low salaries and unfulfilling jobs or are retired). They have lived most of their lives in the totalitarian regime, and were formed in the conditions of state control and indoctrination. According to one research undertaken by S. Kliger and Paul H. De Vries in the nineties, almost half of the population between 57 and 76 years old are still devoted communists. Such devotion is strong also among the uneducated. 45.8% of people with elementary school education are dedicated communists. Additionally, 53.1% of all the followers of communism are presently unemployed (Ramet 1993, p. 199-200). Unfortunately, I did not find the data on these factors for the

conservative fraction of Orthodox ideology, but my assumption is that extreme Orthodoxy appeals to such a category of people and finds response in it.

So, if one takes a look at the problem of the formation of legitimacy of Church today, it becomes clear that, even though the potential of this institution is considerably strong due to the already-discussed factors, it is nevertheless limited. Such a (extreme ultranationalist) form of religiosity does not appeal to other categories of people (educated, young, financially successful). They share views that are more similar to the values of the Western societies with post-materialistic ethics. Thus, my second main assumption is that *democratic changes will come not from the purely ideological traditional institutions (such as Russian Orthodox Church), but from the flexible or globally integrated economic structures of society (for example, private business owners, employees of the international companies, etc.)*. Unfortunately, they do not represent a notable part of the Russian population today.

Conclusion

One can say that there are objective circumstances that predetermine the ideological form of the Russian Orthodox Church today. Due to the historical and socio-cultural reasons, as well as to the economic situation in Russia, the Church has strong authoritarian and nationalistic tendencies today. Using Swidler's terms, it could be said that the Church did not have the liberal

ideology as a choice in its "tool kit". Church's activity is simultaneously a model "of" and "for" (Geertz) the political and legal culture in Russia, which is to a certain degree non- and anti-democratic in our times. However, it is important to note that one cannot generalize the conclusion at the level of society viewed as a whole. The already-mentioned aspects are only a part of the whole picture. There are other tendencies, which are worth mentioning. The new generation does not have the cultural experience of communism, and it has started to constitute different patterns of social and political behavior. It is much more open than the previous ones. Additionally, factors such as the globalization process and the economic growth in Russia should be mentioned. They form a different type of system of values.

Every theory assumes some agreed-upon limitations of its representation. However, there is a part of truth that is always reflected. What could be said with a greater sense of certainty in the case of functioning of the Church in Russia and its relation to culture and politics is that at a given moment the democratic tradition in this country was very weak. It is contradicted by a much larger part of totalitarian consciousness (better said, the unconscious part of the human psyche) – this fact can be observed in the activity of the Church.

Bibliography:

Balagushkin E. *Netradicionnyie religii v sovremennoi Rossii* Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999.

Berdyaev N. *Istoki I smisl russkogo kommunizma. Rysskaia religioznaia ideja I ruskoje gosydarstvo*. <http://www.philosophy.ru/library/berd/comm.html>

Filatov S.B., and Furman, D.E. 1992. "Religia I politika v massovom soznanii". *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no.7, pp.3-12.

Inglehart, Ronald "Globalization and Postmodern Values," *The Washington Quarterly* 1999, 23(1). <http://www.twq.com/winter00/231Intlehart.pdf>

John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux (ed.) *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia*. New York, 2000.

Kubik, Jan *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland*. University Park: The Penn State University Press, 1994.

Kubik J. "Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History-making and Cultural-political Entrepreneurship in Postcommunist Poland and Russia" In *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule* edited by Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Likhachev, D. *Zametki o Russkom*, 2nd edn. Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1984.

Petro N. "Symbols at Work" forthcoming.

Ramet P. (ed.) *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*. Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Shenfield D. Stephen *Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements*. Armonk, New York, 2001.

Steeves, Paul D. 1994. "Russian Orthodox Fascism After Glasnost". Paper presented to the Conference on Faith and History, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, October 8.

Swidler, Ann "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies", *American Sociological Review*, 1986, 51 (April).

Vorontsova, L.M.; Filatov, S.B.; and Furman, D.E. 1997. "Religion in the Contemporary Mass Consciousness". *Russian Social Science Review*, January-February, pp. 18-39.

Ware Timothy *The Orthodox Church*. Penguin Books, 1967.

Notes:

1 Shenfield identifies similar features between these two ideologies: cooperation of the Church with some fascist organizations; rejection of Enlightenment, democracy, and belief in Jewish conspiracy; public burning of the books that are considered anti-religious (including the ones, written by liberal Orthodox theologians). (Shenfield 2001, p. 69).

2 Berdyaev wrote that, for example, Russian Marxism has accepted a messianic, mythological form of Marxism rather than its scientific, evolutionary part. Nihilism, paradoxically as it might seem, has also grown on the soil of the Russian Orthodoxy: it is based on denial of the world as it is, seeing it as corrupt and sinful. (Berdyaev *Istoki I smisl russkogo kommunizma. Rysskaia religioznaia ideja I ruskoje gosydarstvo*. <http://www.philosophy.ru/library/berd/comm.html>).



Fuad B. Aliyev

Framing Perceptions of Islam and the 'Islamic Revival' in the Post-Soviet Countries

This paper discusses the main directions and trends in framing the perceptions of Islam in the post-Soviet countries engaged in the process of so-called "Islamic Revival". It focuses on the Northern Caucasus region of Russia, Azerbaijan and the countries from Central Asia - a geographical area governed by the tension between the local Muslim traditions and the imported Islamism. It argues that Islamic revival in post-Soviet countries is associated either with the revival of local pre-modern traditions and thus with the localization of post-socialist Muslim space, or with the spreading of Islamism, which is absolutely alien for local Muslim traditions and it is introduced from abroad.

FUAD B. ALIYEV

Researcher, PhD Candidate, Center of Economic Reforms under the Ministry of Economic Development, Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan
E-mail: f.aliyev@cer.az

Introduction

The Post-Communist transition has been accompanied not only by political, social, and economic changes, but also cultural ones. After collapse of 70 years of official atheism and the Communist value system, religion started to revive and play an important role in different spheres of social life, politics, and economics. A bright example of such revival is the mainly Muslim populated ex-Soviet republics. Building of new and modernization of old mosques, an increasing number of Islamic study centers, schools and universities, thousands of pilgrims going to Mecca for Hajj every year as well as falling profits of alcohol producing facilities can be more or less observed in all of these republics. Islam to some ex-

KEY WORDS:

Islam, Post-Soviet Countries, Islamic revival, Central Asia, Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, radical islamists

tent could manage to fill the void left after the collapse of Communism.

The processes of religious revival have played a tremendous role in the lives of the people of the former Soviet Union. Islam does not separate secular life from the spiritual. This is the reason for its active involvement and influence on the course of political events in the Northern Caucasus. The concepts “Islamic” and “National” are closely intertwined in Muslim perception. During the years of Soviet atheism, people continued to follow Islamic customs and rites, understanding them as national and not religious.

This paper will focus on the Northern Caucasus region in Russia, Azerbaijan, and the countries of Central Asia, since to some extent they became the battlefield of the tensions between local Muslim traditions and imported Islamism. I will try to answer the following question: What are the main directions and trends in framing the perceptions of Islam in the post-Soviet countries.

It can be argued that Islamic revival in post-Soviet countries has been associated either with the revival of local pre-modern traditions and thus with the localization of post-socialist Muslim space, or with the spread of Islamism, which is absolutely alien to local Muslim traditions and introduced from abroad. This situation has resulted in certain tensions between these forms of Islam. In the northern Caucasus and Republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan these tensions have even turned into military conflicts. Very often such conflicts are considered to be between Islam and secu-

larism, whereas “the real dispute lies within Islam” (Cornell and Spector 2002: 195).

Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asia during the Soviet Era

During the Soviet rule and the time of militant atheism there were still official “independent” Muslim religious administrations: the Muslim Religious (Spiritual) Board for the European USSR and Siberia (centered in Ufa, Bashkir ASSR); the Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent, Uzbekistan); the Muslim Religious Board for the North Caucasus (in Buinaksk; later in Makhachkala, Daghestan); and the Muslim Religious Board for Transcaucasia (Baku, Azerbaijan). The strongest position and hidden leadership were granted to the Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, situated in Tashkent and mainly headed by Uzbek nationals. Existence of the same institutional structures for the various local Islamic traditions can be evaluated as a process of homogenization. These Boards did not oppose the Soviet rule, and even tried to find similarities between Communist ideology and Qur’anic values, such as equality of nations and sexes, freedom of religion, security of honorable work, ownership of land by those who till it, and others that were put in practice after October Revolution (Saroyan 1997).

As our focus is the regions of the Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, it will be benefi-

cial to see what the position and specific features of Islam was in each of the above-mentioned regions.

Central Asia

First of all I must mention that, traditionally, Uzbeks and Tajiks have been more religious than Kazakhs, Turkmens and even some Kyrgyzs (Hiro 1994, Rashid 1994). The main reason is that the latter have had a nomadic life-style while the former were settled. During the Soviet era (up to Gorbachev's reforms) the main role in framing of the perception of Islam in this region was played by the Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, situated in Tashkent. This religious body had more rights and advantages than other boards. It issued the only official Muslim journal, "Muslims of the Soviet East," and was responsible for other literature and publications about Islam. In fact, there emerged and developed a Muslim administrative elite, which tried to promote its own authority and undermine any alternative authority.

Perestroika and changing sociopolitical and economic circumstances brought to life the reconstruction of Islam, not only in terms of theological debates between isolated Muslim elites but also reinterpretations of Muslim identity in Central Asia.

Fragmentation and regionalization replaced homogenization. Saroyan highlights fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines within the Muslim community in the USSR as one of the most important institutional

changes in Muslim religious organizations (Saroyan 1997). In 1990 an assembly of Muslim clerics in Alma-Ata declared the establishment of a Muslim Board for Kazakhstan. Central Asian boards based in Tashkent did not recognize the legitimacy of this new board.

The establishment of a new medresa also allowed for the development of differentiation and further divided Muslims by nationality in Central Asia. For example, the inauguration of new training centers for the clergy in the various republics meant that Turkmen Muslims studied in Turkmen medresa and Tajiks studied in Tajik medresa. Moreover, the Tajik medresa, along with religious subjects, also provided instruction in Tajik history and culture, which clearly meant stress on national issues. Thus, without the bonds of a common institutional experience and educational process, Muslim clerics increasingly had contact only with members of their own nationality and preached a more localized form of Islam.

The rapidly changing political environment also created conditions for new forms of Muslim religious association. In the past, the Muslim religious boards could rely in part on the coercive power of Moscow to prevent the emergence of independent Muslim religious centers. In the perestroika era, however, liberalization allowed for the emergence of several new Muslim religious movements. The Muslim Religious Boards not only confronted a new set of religious and political challenges, they also increasingly faced a challenge from below - from Muslim religious movements that operated independently from the boards (Saroyan 1997). The

first strong challengers in Central Asia were the Turkestan Islamic party centered in Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley and the Islamic Renaissance Party in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Muslims in the Ferghana town of Namangan near the Kyrgyzstan border began their movement with the takeover of a mosque that had been used as a storage facility for wine. After making renovations to the building, the Namangan Muslims chose an imam and mosque council and opened the mosque for regular worship. In this way, the mosque became the first in the postwar Soviet Union to operate outside the jurisdiction of a Muslim Religious Board. In the ensuing months, local activists began the construction of a medresa alongside the mosque. Most significant about the Ferghana Valley movement and other independent religious movements that emerged in the late perestroika era was the nature of their challenge. Their target was not the secular Soviet state, but self-serving and corrupt Muslim boards.

The collapse of the USSR and the gain of independence intensified "Islamic revival"; especially in the southern part of Central Asia, namely Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Ferghana valley region of Kyrgyzstan. Islam has deeper roots there than in the western republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Radical Islamist movements opposed any official religious elite or authoritarian regimes in these countries. Authoritarian governments in turn tried to suppress the radical Islamist element.

Northern Caucasus

The multiethnic community of the Northern Caucasus has traditionally been poly-confessional. Here, along with the autochthonous pagan beliefs, in various historical periods Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have been widespread. Since the XVII-XIX centuries Sunni Islam has become the indisputably dominant religion in the region. In the first half of the XIX century Islam was a flag for a national movement for the independence of the mountain people of the Northern Caucasus, which strengthened the position Islam in the minds of those who previously were very often Islamicised only on the surface (excluding the inhabitants of Southern and Central Daghestan). Exceptions include the Ossetians, a people of Indo-European language who were and are predominantly of the Orthodox Church, and the Tats in the northern part of the Caucasus, who for a long time were referred to as "the mountain Jews," because Judaism was the dominant faith among them.

In Soviet times the Muslim Religious Board for the North Caucasus was the main official religious center of this linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous region. There have traditionally existed two versions of Sunni Islam (Khanafit and Shafit), a number of Sufi orders, and various small Shiite communities (mostly in Southern Daghestan). Historically the primary expression of religiosity in the region has been Sufism (Bobrovnikov 2001). Unlike orthodox ideology the "mosque tendency" is relatively weak in Sufism. Originating from

the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya Sufi lineages, the widespread network of Sufi orders links the North Caucasus's disparate ethnic, linguistic, clan, and village communities. Sufism is especially important in the region since most mosques in the area were destroyed during the deportation of Chechens and Ingushes in World War II (Saroyan 1997). Thus, the North Caucasus religious board most clearly fits the description of official Muslim elite isolated from the people. It already had a challenger in framing a perception of Islam among population: the Sufi movements.

Thus the religious board's definition of Islamic identity and practice is orthodox and exclusionary. The North Caucasus board emphasizes mosque worship and the religious authority and primacy of the official cleric. Pilgrimages to local shrines (*mazar*), traditional meeting places of Sufis, are discouraged, and the believing population is encouraged to participate in religious rituals performed by official clerics in the state-registered mosques. The North Caucasus clergy has issued a fetwa prohibiting women from leading religious associations. This can be understood as a measure aimed against the numerous Sufi orders that are led by women and whose membership is entirely female (Ibid). It can be argued the North Caucasus administration adopted the dogmatic variant of Islamic identity articulated by the Tashkent Muslim establishment in response to the cultural particularities and Sufi opposition.

However, here the weakening of the Soviet Union has had results like in Central Asia: fragmentation of the official board. Changes in the North Caucasus were

even more striking and confusing. A conference of religious leaders from the region declared the dissolution of the North Caucasus board. In its place they proposed the formation of "religious centers" for each of the ethnic autonomous regions in the area. Like in the case of Central Asia, Makhachkala refused to recognize the decision to dissolve the North Caucasus board, but could not stop this process.

There was also a third power, which had been in a shadow for a long time - "Caucasus Wahhabis." Their roots go back to the 1970s, when proselytizing Muslim groups appeared in many Daghestan and Chechen villages of Terek-Sulak lowlands (Bobrovnikov 2001). They had secret meetings in houses of local radical Muslim scholars taking classes of Arabic and Qur'an. In fact, such unlicensed schools carried out missionary work among the village youth. The most famous teachers have been Bagaudinn Kebedov and Ahmad-qadi Akhtaey (who died in 1998).

According to Bobrovnikov, the movement of North Caucasus Wahhabis appeared as a reaction to anti-Islamic socialist reforms. They were more popular in the lowland regions of Daghestan and Chechnya, where collectivization and "cultural revolution" were successfully implemented from 1930-1970s.

Azerbaijan

According to Motika, 4% to 6% of the population of Azerbaijan may be called "active" believers, which

means that they obey the various Islamic behavior regulations; 87% to 92% consider themselves as Muslims but comply with only a (quite often small) part of the religious regulations. Only about 3% call themselves atheists (Motika 2001).

In contrast to the North Caucasus administration, the Transcaucasus Muslim elite have operated under different conditions. Aside from its jurisdiction over Muslims in Armenia (before they were massacred and deported) and Georgia (where in any case most Muslims are ethnic Azerbaijanis), the Baku religious board is staffed by Azerbaijanis and serves an Azerbaijani community. The administration can be characterized as an Azerbaijani national institution. In Azerbaijan the overlapping of religious and national customs and identities is more common and likely since “Muslim” is coterminous with “Azerbaijani.” (Hadjy-zadeh 1997, Safizadeh 1998, Shaffer 2000, Motika 2001). Another important factor is that the Baku administration is also heir to a religious administration established during the Tsarist period and thus may have some historical legitimacy for the population. Probably even more important, however, is that Azerbaijan’s Muslim community is predominantly Shiite. In contrast to Sunni Islam, formal religious hierarchy is not foreign to the historical development of Shiite Islam. Thus the operation of official institutions regulating religious life can be seen as part of Azerbaijan’s Shiite heritage (Saroyan 1997).

Since in this sense it enjoys a greater degree of legitimacy in popular eyes, it can more easily accommodate particular popular traditions by appropriating them as

its own legitimate religious traditions. For example, while visitations to saints’ tombs or other holy sites have been criticized as heretical by the Tashkent and North Caucasus establishments, the Baku Muslim elite has encouraged such visitations by organizing pilgrimages under its auspices to holy sites in Azerbaijan (Ibid.). Thus it can be argued that the intensity of Islamic reconstruction is much less pronounced in the Azerbaijani administration. The Baku elite’s appropriation of popular Azerbaijani traditions serves its quest to consolidate its socio-religious authority and legitimacy.

In fact, the Baku board is the only one that succeeded in surviving and developing after the Gorbachev reforms and the collapse of the USSR. It is also the situation where there was the least observed activity of transnational Islamic movements, and perception of Islam was mainly framed by “specific circumstances of the republic” (Motika 2001).

During the post-Soviet transition, however, the Muslim Religious Board for Transcaucasus was not the only actor in Islamic revival. I think one can highlight the following “competitors”:

- Popular and recognized Shiite religious leaders, opposing the official center, e.g. Haji Ilqar Ibrahimoglu - Imam of Djuma Mosque, Azerbaijani representative of the International Religious Liberty Association and human rights defender. He does not obey the board, criticizes it and the government. At the moment, Haji Ilqar is under 5 year suspended sentence of deprivation of liberty and his issue is under the rapt of many human

rights defenders, international organizations and some Western Governments.

- Self-declared mullahs and religious leaders opposing Shiism and thus the board. I can mention by name Hamet Suleymanov, who is considered to be Wahhabi. They have their own mosques where followers gather together.

- The Pro-Iranian Islam party, officially registered in 1992. In 1996 leaders of the party were arrested under the accusation of spying for Iran and sending young people to IRI for military training. The Party has up to 70,000 members, but is not supported by the board and intellectuals.

- The following can be defined as actors as well: muslim intellectuals who might be seen as reformists and modernizers of Islam. This would include persons like Haji Ilqar.

As we can see, Islam in the Soviet republics was under control of local official religious boards (to a lesser extent in Northern Caucasus), which in turn were controlled by the state. One of the most important features was the fact that Islam became a part of national identity, which resulted in strengthening traditional Islam in all of the republics. However, lack of religious knowledge among the population and a high level of ignorance as well as corruption among clergy created fertile ground for the emergence and strengthening of new religious movements and sects, and these not only of Islamist persuasion.

Radical Islamists: Who Are They?

The notion of “Islamic Fundamentalism” has become so strongly entrenched in the Western mind, thanks to the efforts of mass media, that it might seem difficult to imagine that fundamentalism can be something different. The concept itself appeared at the beginning of the 20th century in conjunction with the movement of conservative Protestants directed against rationalism and modernism. Similar movements do exist in Judaism and in some non-monotheistic religions, such as Hinduism, where there are calls for the resurrection of what had never historically existed - a pure, unalloyed Hinduism (Chanishev 1974). However, it should be mentioned that Islamic fundamentalism has made itself visible on the largest scale and seems to be the most highly organized form of fundamentalism. The reasons for this are hidden in the peculiarities of Islam, which is not only a religion, but also a “modus vivendi,” and this fact very easily transforms it into one of the factors in the political game playing out on many levels (Yarlykapov 1999).

I already mentioned that after the collapse of Soviet Union there was a heyday of radical Islamic movements. For a better understanding of this problem we should, first of all, define who are the Wahhabis, if there are any.

Radical Islamist movements demand a return to the original Islam of the days of the Prophet and His first successors. The basis for Islam should be only the Qu’ran and Sunnah of the Prophet; the majority of

what was achieved through Muslim thought involving other resources and implicit in the life of the Muslim community (including beliefs as well as everyday practices) is declared to be prohibited innovation and is rejected. It is worth mentioning that such movements are not a product of the XX century, as it might appear to an unsophisticated contemporary observer. This idea has a long history and even a particular symbol in Islam: those supporting “fundamentalist” ideas are named Salafits (as-salafiya). In Sunni Islam such ideas found expression in one of the four renderings of Khanbalist Mazkhab (which was originally formed as a religious-political movement in the IX century, and only later was transformed into a dogmatic legal school at the beginning of the XI century). Later, in the XVIII century, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab elaborated his own teachings based on the Khanbalist ideology and tried to implement them.

The followers of the movement call themselves ‘Muslims’ or ‘brothers’ (ikhwan) and consider their congregations the only communities of the faithful (jamaat). They are also known as salafs or salafits, making reference to the first followers of Prophet Mohammed, whose way of life they claim to imitate. They prefer to call themselves “true Muslims” or “monotheists” who have returned to the purity of the original Islam. The movement was named ‘Wahhabi’ by its opponents.

The Wahhabis, accusing traditional Islam of departing from the original teachings in their innovations (bida) reject many customs and rites entrenched in the minds of people as Islamic. Thus it is forbidden to read

the Qur’an over a grave or in the house of the deceased, to read “Yasin” sura on funerals, to use beads, etc. Not acknowledging the special virtues of the Prophet, the Wahhabis are against the celebration of the Mawlid, the birthday of Muhammad. A special target for attacks is Sufism, cults of the saints, and Ziyarat (pilgrimage) to holy places, which is closely linked to Sufism and Shiism. These practices are sharply condemned as polytheism (shirk).

It should also be mentioned that even in spite of a quite radical agenda, different movements differ on their repertoire of contention, which ranges from peaceful religious propaganda to the above-mentioned acts of militant extremism and terrorism. A good example of such a difference is two movements in Central Asia: the “peaceful” Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

A very important fact is that the radical ideas have been disseminated mainly in those areas where the economic and social situation is unstable: Chechnya and the foothills of Daghestan, and poor and war-torn regions of the Central Asian republics (Yarlykapov 1999, Rashid 1994, Hiro 1994, Cornell and Spector 2002). The main target group is the youth. The young people have not yet become integrated into the life of the community. They have not yet fully perceived the traditional culture, or even protest against some of its components. In the course of teaching, great attention is given to learning the Arabic language, and to studying the Qu’ran and Khadises in the original language. In this way they are being trained for forthcoming discussions.

It is no secret that Wahhabis receive significant financial support from abroad. People of Daghestan have even christened Wahhabism as “Dollar Islam” (Yarlykapov 1999).

The Struggle for Islam in the Post-Soviet Republics

Post-Communist transition in Muslim regions is noticeable for the activation of different religious groups and movements (which are not only Islamic). Thousands of missionaries and preachers from abroad with briefcases full of dollars together with local “fighters for faith” started to actively challenge existing perceptions and traditions of a religion as well as a common lifestyle.

The main target of their criticism was, first, local clergy, and then local governments. The clergy has been criticized and accused of ignorance, corruption, betrayal of religion for indulgences from the side of oppressive and corrupt governments, as well as cooperation with the atheist Soviet power and KGB. The latter was said about all the Muslim religious boards and their administrations. For example, a head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus since 1980, Sheikh ul Islam Allahshukur Pashazade, is said to be a KGB colonel, though he rejects these accusations.

It would be wrong to say that only Wahhabi movements have been active. Local traditional Muslims as well as Sufi orders did their best to resist imported Is-

lam. The most obvious and tragic manifestation of such a clash has been military conflict in Northern Caucasus and Central Asia.

In Northern Caucasus Wahhabism started to spread in the 1970s, but its regional activization started in 1991 in Daghestan and Chechnya (Bobrovnikov 2001). By the mid-1990s Wahhabi congregations, though small in size, emerged in Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. First, they concentrated only on missionary work, by imparting Qur’anic education and literature based on Islamic practices such as Bagauddin Kebedov’s book *Namaz* (Prayer). The center of the movement was located in the Daghestani town of Kizliyyurt, famous for its largest Wahhabi madrasa al-Hikma. Connections were established with foreign missionary Islamic foundations, which began to sponsor their activities (Bobrovnikov 2001).

Radicalization started in the mid-1990s. From 1994-1998, a number of armed conflicts occurred between Wahhabi and traditionalists in the towns and villages of Daghestan and Chechnya. Since the mid-1990s, the Wahhabis have been subjected to systematic repression by the local official Muslim clergy. Gradually, outbreaks of fighting within village and town communities were reproduced at the level of the republic and subsequently expanded to the regional level. This was also the period when the first Russian-Chechen war started, and region became militarized as a result.

In December 1997, Bagauddin Kebedov had to leave Kizilyurt for Urus-Martan in Chechnya. This exile and some other factors resulted in a rapid politicization

and radicalization of the movement in terms of its form and programs. "Islamic Jamaat", established by Bagauddin Kebedov in 1998, announced a holy war (al-jihad al-asgar). This war was to be waged against the "unbelieving secular government" of Daghestan and for the establishment of an "Islamic caliphate in the Caucasus". With the support of Chechen field commanders, the Wahhabi leaders organized "Islamic peace-making troops". An interesting fact is that militant ideas and practices are shared by both Wahhabis and their religious and secular opponents.

In Central Asia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to lesser extent Kyrgyzstan also turned into arenas of the clash between traditionalists and radicals for control of minds and power. It is worth mentioning that these countries have weaker economic performances than Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. We can observe some negative association between economic performance and spread of religious fundamentalism.

Shortly after independence, Tajikistan became involved in a civil war that pitted the former Communist elite against an opposition force containing strong Islamist groups. This conflict led political regimes in four other regional countries to outlaw many opposition parties and religious movements, halting the development of political opposition (Rashid 1994, Cornell and Spector 2002).

It should also be mentioned that different Islamist movements (e.g. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Ahle-Sunnah, and others) act not only within the territory of one state, but in the whole re-

gion. This is the most underdeveloped part of the region, and did not have strong Sufi tradition. The "hottest" place of spread of militant groups is the Ferghana Valley and the surrounding regions where three republics border with each other. The Wahhabi movement in the Ferghana Valley is the most determined and organized of all the radical movements (Rashid 1994). They condemn Sufi tradition, Shiites, secular governments, and official "Islam".

As I already mentioned, militant Islamist movements discredited themselves in the eyes of the public. They now have challengers in the form of organizations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT). This is a secretive transnational network of different movements working on the local level in the Middle East and Central Asia. Having the same goals as do militants, it has a completely different repertoire: it tries to achieve its objectives by propagating its tenets through leaflets and fliers rather than the use of force (Botobekov 2001, Babadzhanov 2001). The lack of secular opposition (where the most active opposition is in exile or in jail) contributed to the fast rise of HuT (Cornell and Spector 2002).

The Uzbek government of Karimov is considered to be the most anti-Islamic government in Central Asia. However, while suppressing radical movements, the Uzbek government has maintained very good relations with the global network of the most prominent Sufi order - Naqshbandiya (Cornell and Spector 2002).

Turkmenistan's Islamic revival was relatively weak. The Government was able to control a process of fram-

ing and foreign influence was minimal. Kazakhstan is the least Islamicized country in the region. Kazakhstanis have also undergone large-scale “Russification” and have the largest Russian population. They also experienced a revival of religion, but it was not as strong as in other countries and local clergy could satisfy it easily. As Rashid mentions in his book “many of the faithful who come to pray every Friday at local mosques belong to non Kazakh minorities, who see Islam as an effective means to distance themselves from both the Kazakhs and the Russians and as means to assert their ethnic identity with their national homeland” (Rashid 1994: 133). I would also like to mention that Kazakhs and Turkmen have traditionally been nomads, which might be negatively correlated with the role of religion in their lives.

Azerbaijan includes different elements of the “Islamic Revival” in other regions of the Post-Soviet space. Radical Wahhabi movements came later and could not achieve such progress as they had in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. Financed by Iran groups also try to challenge existing status quo. But unlike other republics nobody openly and extremely opposed the idea of a secular state. At the same time, Islamic movements were not as weak and unpopular as in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In the first chapter I mentioned the main actors in the framing of the perception of Islam in Azerbaijan. But what are the main trends in this process?

The prestige and influence of Azerbaijan’s official religious “establishment,” the Spiritual Board of Mus-

lims of the Caucasus, which has been headed since the 1980’s by Sheikh ul Islam Allakhshukur Pashazade, is reportedly rapidly evaporating, while that of some other members of the unofficial Muslim clergy is on the rise. Those developments suggest that Islam is becoming a rallying point for the dispossessed, impoverished, and unemployed, and even simply for those Azerbaijanis who reject many aspects of Western culture. As co-chairman of the Social-Democratic party of Azerbaijan, Zardusht Alizade, argued in his interview with the Turan information agency: “The politicization of Islam has helped drive the secular opposition into a corner. A holy place is never empty, and the population has reached out for the mosques...The politicization of Islam was the reaction of the lower classes to the introduction of such attributes of Western mass culture as beauty contests, the cult of eroticism, the legalization of sexual minorities, and the provocative consumption of the upper classes. The ethical puritanism of the conservative sectors of the population manifested itself in the form of devotion to the Islamic behests of their forebears.” Unsolved problems in Karabakh, the approximately one million refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as thousands of veterans of war and families of martyrs, also create a fertile ground for such trends.

As Motika argues, the intellectuals might have a considerable influence in framing the future outlook of Islam in Azerbaijan since most of Azerbaijanis consider Islam a part of their identity (despite of lack of knowledge of their own religion). All actors (except some

radical Wahhabis and small extremist Shiite groups) try to minimize the differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam and find ways to unite the different sects and movements within Islam (Motika 2001).

The state has established a certain committee headed by one of the so-called Islamic intellectuals and modernists, Rafiq Aliyev. That committee is currently completing the process, which it began last fall, of re-registering all religious communities in Azerbaijan. All missionaries and preachers from abroad will be registered and tested by experts of the committee. It also is going to check the financial base of all existing religious organizations.

Azerbaijan's opposition parties are well aware that the burgeoning popularity of Islam could both destabilize the domestic political situation and undercut the degree of support they currently enjoy. Some parties, e.g. the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, have amended their programs to give greater emphasis to the role of Islam in Azerbaijani society.

I would also like to mention the regional diversity of Islamic ideas in Azerbaijan. Baku and the surrounding regions are more pro-Shiite, though Wahhabis are getting more support in Baku and Sumgait. Wahhabis are strong in the northern parts of Azerbaijan, where different Sunni Daghestani minorities reside compactly. Regions bordering Iran are influenced by ideas and support of the Iranian Shiite model of Islam.

Conclusion

After examination of the processes that have taken place in the regions of our interest, some conclusions can be drawn. The first conclusion is that it is still too early to make any clear-cut conclusions, as the process of "Islamic Revival" and the Post-Communist transition itself are still ongoing.

However it is obvious that the main conflict is within Islam. Different movements and groups struggle to influence the framing of the perception of Islam. In some countries this conflict turned into open military clashes. However, there is a trend toward demilitarization and change in the (sometimes contentious) strategies of these movements towards more peaceful methods.

The long tradition of secularism as well as other Soviet legacies also played a role in framing the perceptions of Islam. On the one hand, it framed a kind of "national" Islam in these countries; on the other hand, it creates the fertile ground for framers to influence unemployed and poor youth. In this respect, corrupt and discredited local clergy from the Soviet period also contribute to the disillusionment of the public and the turn towards puritan Islamists.

For most of the Muslims of the post-Soviet nations, Islam serves as a component of their ethnic and regional identity, but is not their primary collective identity (Hadjy-zadeh 1997, Safizadeh 1998, Shaffer 2000, Suleymanov 2001). Solidarity on an Islamic basis with Muslims abroad is minimal, although it has begun to

emerge among movements, especially in the North Caucasus and Central Asia. Most members of the region hold in high regard their local cultures, and they are not particularly susceptible to intensified identification with the broader Muslim world.

Islamist movements are supported from abroad. Rich Muslim countries try to create and support through different charity and religious organizations a kind of “advocacy network” in order to develop their type of Islam and to have strong influence in the Post-Soviet countries. It is clear that radical ideas are spread more successfully in the regions that are worst in their economic performance.

One could roughly say that the above-mentioned processes in the post-Soviet countries are just another illustration of the centuries-old conflict between Wahhabism, Sufism, and traditional Islam; and one will be right, in a way. However, this view of the problem is too simplified. In fact the processes going on are more sophisticated and not just religion is involved. Economic and political interests, socio-cultural and political factors, geopolitics, and others influences contribute to the complication of this issue.

In writing this paper I could not conduct a precise examination of all the possible and relevant factors. Deeper study of such issues as interconnection between poverty, unemployment and radicalism, whether Islamism is more developed in urban or in rural areas, among which strata of society, connection between secular authoritarianism and Islamism, regionalism (trib-

alism) and Islamism, and many others, would be very useful and helpful for better understanding the process of “Islamic Revival” in the post-Soviet countries.

Bibliography

Babadzhanov, Bakhtiyar (2001) „On the Activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan” in *Islam in the Post-Soviet Newly Independent States; The View from Within*, eds. Alexei Malashenko and Martha Brill Olcott, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, July 2001.

Bobrovnikov, Vladimir (2001) “Post-Socialist Forms of Islam. Caucasian Wahhabis”, Regional Issues electronic magazine.

Bobrovnikov, Vladimir (1999) “Muslim Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Caucasus: The Daghestani Case” *Caucasian Regional Studies*, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1999.

Botobekov, Uran (2001) “Spreading the Ideas of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir in South Kyrgyzstan”, in *Islam in the Post-Soviet Newly Independent States; The View from Within*, eds. Alexei Malashenko and Martha Brill Olcott, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, July 2001.

Chanishev A.N. (1974) “Fundamentalism”// *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsyklopedia* (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia) vol. 15, Moscow.

Cornell, Svante - Spector, Regine (2001) “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists” *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:1, Winter 2002.

Hadjiy-zadeh, Hikmet (1997) “Azerbaijan: In Search Of A National Idea” Center for Economic and Political Research Monitoring Group.

Hiro, Dilip (1994) “Between Marx and Muhammad. The Changing Face of Central Asia” Harper Collins Publishers.

Motika, Raul (2001) "Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan" Archives de sciences sociales des religions (web-site) http://www.ehess.fr/centres/ceifr/assr/Sommaire_115.htm accessed in March 2002.

Muslim Peoples. A World Ethnographic Survey; 2 volumes. Edited by Richard Weekes. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut 1984.

Rashid, Ahmed (1994) "The Resurgence of Central Asia. Islam or Nationalism?" Zed Books: London & New Jersey.

Safizadeh, Fereidoun (1998) "On Dilemmas of Identity in the Post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan" Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 3, no. 1, 1998.

Saroyan, Mark (1997) "Minorities, Mullahs, and Modernity: Reshaping Community in the Former Soviet Union" University of California, Berkeley Institute.

Shaffer, Brenda (2000) "It's not about ancient hatreds, it's about current policies: Islam and Stability in the Caucasus", Caucasian Regional Studies Vol. 5, No. 1 & 2, 2000.

Suleymanov, Elin (2001) "Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis and the Search for Identity", web-site of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, accessed in February 2002.

Yarlikapov, Ahmet (1999) "Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Caucasus: Towards a Formulation of the Problem" Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1999.

Traditional African Political Thought and the Crisis of Governance in Contemporary African Societies

J. C. ACHIKE AGBAKOBA

Senior Lecturer, Ph.D.,
Dept. of Philosophy,
Nigeria University.
Author of the books:
The theories of mind: a
case for interactionism
(2001); Philosophical
issues in development
(2003)
E-mail:
jocagbakoba@yahoo.co.nz

The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between the normative outlook and political philosophy of traditional societies on the one hand, and the crises of governance and leadership in contemporary African Societies, particularly sub-Saharan states, on the other. Although there are quite some differences in the quality of leadership and governance among sub-Saharan African states because of the different political and economic circumstances, this part of the globe taken as a whole remains underdeveloped in terms of having the will to institute and maintain stable polities with responsive, responsible and efficient governance.

1. Introduction

Most of the time, the colonial and neocolonial experiences of African societies as well as other international pressures are adduced as explanations of this problem - all of which amount to an externalist approach to this problem; an approach that explains the problem, virtually, in terms of the impact of external factors on African societies. This paper while not denying the importance of external factors altogether, tries to show that certain internal factors, particularly, the nature of the nodal organizing principles in traditional societies and the attitudes, motivations and moods which sustain them as well as the worldviews, normative outlook and political philosophy from which they all derive, play an

KEY WORDS:

African political thought, colonization, globalization, communal power, authority

important, perhaps a more important role, in determining the current state of governance and stability in the continent.

The aims of this paper and the method by which I seek to accomplish them represent a third alternative conceptualization of purpose and methods of African Philosophy (the general research programme of African philosophy). This alternative, very well discussed by Segun Oladipo in his *Idea of African Philosophy* finds both the traditionalism and relativism of the ethno-philosophical school and the ahistorical universalism of the universalistic school not only unsound, but also inadequate and irrelevant in contributing to solving the problems of the day¹. The traditionalist school coming from the angle of patriotism and nationalism wants to procure and secure an unimpeachable African identity. The main problematic it addresses is the claim by some notable foreign scholars in the past, especially from the West (which could be said to be, to a large degree, the general belief of many foreigners - Westerners and non-Westerners) that Africans have no history, no philosophy, no culture, etc; and by extension no humanity or human identity. The objective of African Philosophy, in this regard, is to extract authentic African philosophy, which has been buried by the colonial experience and cultural imperialism (and the African identity that goes with it); to secure an equal position for this philosophy and identity amongst the philosophies and identities of the peoples of the world; and to preserve this philosophy and identity in this respected status².

These are interesting objectives; and at least one of the things traditionalists have accomplished so far is acquainting the world with traditional African thought and philosophy. But this approach is not geared towards solving the life threatening problems of Africans. In the first place, it does not address a problem formulated by Africans, but one formulated by foreigners and one which when solved will satisfy the intellectual curiosity of the foreigner; provide him/her with alternative thought patterns from which he/she could personally draw in developing theories to understand and solve local, regional and global problems; and possibly make him/her amenable to understanding foreign cultures. The argument that, by procuring and securing a respectable identity based on historical achievement, Africans will have the psychological prop they need to tackle the problems of development - political, economic local, etc development - is not sound. To mention just a few problems with this argument: pride in the accomplishment of ones ancestors and building ones identity around such accomplishments does not necessarily (in any way) lead to the order and rational creative (generative) energy that brings about and sustains modern development; it does not see the identity of a people as a dynamic thing which they are free to create and recreate in order to sustain their dignity, survival and advancement; and, therefore, makes it difficult for the African to engage his/her received identity in a critical dialogue with a view to transforming the African's world for the better.

As a matter of fact, the traditionalists frequently fight against such critical dialogue with the authentic African past for fear of unearthing or exhibiting uncomplimentary facts which may reduce the accomplishments and therefore status of traditional thought in the sight of the foreigner; and, therefore, the equality of African philosophy and identity with other philosophies and identities. Consequently, the traditionalist approach fosters an uncritical and inexact approach, much of the result of which can pass as philosophy only when they are taken as species of the record of African philosophy/thought³. The traditionalist does not quite see that the problematic has changed from the questions posed by foreigners (which was used in part as justification for colonization the answering of which, therefore, is part of the de-colonization process) to questions about why independent African states should terrorize their citizens, misgovern them, steal and/or waste their resources, etc; questions about why Africans are underdeveloping Africa. These new problematic require thorough examination of the self, of the nation and her inheritance both indigenous and foreign; by discouraging, critical evaluation, traditionalists are discouraging African philosophers and intellectuals from discovering and addressing the true basis of Africa's underdevelopment, and to this extent are doing Africa a terrible disservice.

The ahistorical universalists rightly emphasize critical evaluation of received ideas from African tradition, but they erroneously hold that there are universal philosophical notions, ideas and concepts that are not the

products of any given culture at a given time; such ideas, notions and concepts according to them can be discovered and it is the task of philosophy to do so by the faithful application of its neutral scientific method. The ahistorical universalist, however, is hard put in pointing at any philosophical idea, notion or concept that cannot be shown to be the product of a given culture and epoch (including the laws, or principles of logic apart from the law of non-contradiction).

It does not seem that there are any historical universal philosophical ideas, notions and concepts apart from the capacity to reason and develop patterns or systems of logic based on the principle of non-contradiction⁴. Apart from this, there are associated problems for the universalist. The universal ideas, notions, etc these philosophers speak of are invariably from the West: so the question arises, if there are universal philosophical notions, ideas, etc. how is it that only Westerners have discovered them? How would these philosophers provide answers that will not play into the hands of the cultural imperialists and racists? To get out of this dilemma, ahistorical universalists have concentrated a great deal of their effort on showing that the universal ideas, notions, etc. that have floated in from the West also exist in Africa. Much of what they do, however, is forcing the facts to fit the theory; raising in some cases questions concerning, why Africans did not articulate these ideas fully or emphasize them prior to contact with the West⁵. The ahistorical universalists by accepting the notion of cultural universals they way they do (that is without the knowledge of how these ideas are generated,

verified and validated) condemn Africa to cultural dependence; of the type in which foreign cultural products may be uncritically accepted. This approach does not aid the development of African societies because it does not rely on the critique of African ideas based on the alternative choice of philosophical values that were foregone, and therefore does not make for the organic growth of the stock of philosophical values in Africa. In other words there has to be clear and adequate philosophical demonstrations based on truth or verisimilitude (not on mere appeal to the possibility of material advancement or aesthetics, etc) in favour of a given choice of philosophical values(s) in any area - ontology, epistemology, ethics, etc. This is the proper relationship between theory and practice, in which theory informs and guides practice and vice-verse.

The third alternative represented in this work rejects the relativism and parochialism of traditionalism as well as ahistorical universalism. The basis of the rejection of these two schools lies in the fact that we can have historical-cultural products - particularly systems of thought - that are universally valid or, rather, more universally valid than other competing systems. The relativist/traditionalist on the contrary holds that we can look at the internal consistency of a system and establish the coherence of such a system, thereafter we can do no more because every coherent system is of equal status with respect to truth. This, however, is not correct, because we can show that a system possesses more of the principle of consistency than another system. The principle of consistency is the basis of the coherence theory

of truth - truths obtained as valid inferences from premise(s) regardless of the existential status of such premise(s) - they therefore pertain to the logical order and provide us with logical truths. However they bear on existential truths, this is because whatever we are conscious of as existing - by way of our intelligence, reason, intuition, senses, etc - we are conscious of because such a thing remains consistent long enough (and this may be tiny fractions of a second) to register in our consciousness as being (of whatever order).

Consistency, therefore, is at the root of our consciousness of being; since this is the case, it follows that the converse is also the case: inconsistency is at the root of non-being. It follows from this that where there is inconsistency in thought reality cannot be as conceived. It also follows from this that the more the principle of consistency is exhibited in a system of thought, the more likely that such a system of thought approximates being; that is, the more likely that it is true, the more verisimilitude.

Given the above, a major task of philosophy is the exhibition of the occurrence of consistency, particularly the level of manifestation of the principle of consistency, in a system or sub-system of thought, a belief, etc. This task is an open ended one, more or less; philosophers have to keep striving to develop ways of apprehending the principle of consistency in a system of thought, belief, etc. The approach followed in this paper may be described as the method of analysis of consistency.

The third alternative in African Philosophy we are pursuing may be described as formal universalism. It is universalistic in the sense that there is an identifiable universal reality that can be known (or known approximately as best as possible), that links our thought and knowledge with existence. This reality is essentially formal. Its concrete embodiment takes place in historical settings (cultures) but the ontological compositions that make up this historical setting (that is the stuff of this embodiment) is not seen as a necessary part of the universal essence. In the sections below, I have tried to examine traditional and contemporary African societies with respect to politics, particularly the use and misuse of power. Before we go on, let us note that the use of power is more or less invariably stalked by the misuse (abuse) of power arising from the fact that humans have a tendency to seek for self-centred purposes and personal advantages; Kant states it thus:

“Man is an animal that, so long as he lives amongst others of his species, stands in need of a master. For he inevitably abuses his freedom in regard to his equals; and although as a reasonable creature he wishes for a law that may set bounds to the liberty of all, yet do his self-interested animal propensities seduce him into making an exception in his own favor whenever he dares⁶”.

There are basically two types of abuse of power, namely; the use of communal power for purposes it ought not to be used for. And, secondly, refraining from the deployment of communal power for purposes it ought to be deployed. An example of the first type is -

in a modern Western type society - the arrest and detention, without trial, of dissidents. An example of the second type is refraining from arrest and or prosecution of a person who embezzled state funds. It is the duty of every society (country) to ensure that the state expresses governance in a self-regulatory manner that will keep out (minimize as much as possible) the abuse of power; thus there is the need for the proper management of communal power to accomplish desired goals and objectives. Following from the above we can say that one can estimate the intelligence (purposive intelligence or reason) of a society by looking at, among other factors, a society's level of success (or failure) in managing its communal power.

A society expresses reason at two levels: the level of the rationality of its goals - this deals with the logical relations of the goals (the extent to which they are contradictory - or non-contradictory); the level of the rationality of the society - this deals with the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization and actions of society in accomplishing its accepted goals. We may regard this as the macro-rationality (reason) of a society; and this should be distinguished from the micro-rationality of a society. Whereas the macro-rationality of a society is the rationality of a society as such (that is a society as a single unit); micro-rationality is the rationality of the individuals and groups that make up society in respect of their individual and group goals; and their efficiency and effectiveness in accomplishing such goals. There is apparently the need for a harmonious balance between the macro-reason and micro-reason of society, otherwise

the one may undermine the other, as in when dissipated tendencies of individuals and groups makes it difficult for a society to effectively pursue its societal goals, such as security and justice for its members (here the expression of micro-reason stifles that of macro reason); or, as in when society is so totalitarian as to stifle individual creativity (here the expression of macro-reason is suffocating that of micro reason). The problem of the management of the communal power of a society, given the above, thus centres around the issue of the enhancement of the macro-reason of a society in an auspicious relationship with the micro-reason of society. Let us now look at African societies to see how they have fared in respect of the management of communal power.

2. The Management of Communal Power in African Societies

To understand the management (or rather mismanagement) of communal power in contemporary African societies, we have to look first at the management of communal power in traditional African Societies; in order to do this, however, we have to look at the sources of communal power and some of the ways by which they are controlled.

Usually, the government and the leaders of government are in control of the physical coercive power of a state (society). The State may be seen as an association that is meant to see to the security and welfare of its members, hence the need for it to control the physical coercive power of a society. Apart from the physical coercive power of a society, there is the moral coercive power of a society; this is expressed through ostracism and other forms of social rejection. The communal moral coercive power of a society may be expressed through the institutions of the state or through non-state associations such as religious organizations, or via a non-institutionalized manner, some of which may be spontaneous, for example, the spontaneous protest of a mob. Apart from expressing some communal moral coercive power, some non-state associations, particularly religious ones express spiritual (or metaphysical) power which may be very potent and very significant, if such a non-state association commands society wide membership or the membership of a sizeable part of a society; an example of this is the power of excommunication in the Catholic Church. From the above, one may say that there are three types of mutually influential communal power; physical, moral and metaphysical power. Let us note that the way each of these forms of power manifests (including the way one may influence the expression of other forms of communal power) depend in some circumstances, in some degree, on the nature of leading personalities.

2.1. The Management of Communal Power in Traditional African Societies

In traditional African Societies, the basis of the prevention of the abuse of the communal power vested in states and governments lay in the metaphysical power (mainly religiously based metaphysical power) that could be depended on by a society or a significant section of it (this, as we shall see, clearly latter, is in contrast with the more secular and moral basis of contemporary Western societies which serve as models in many ways for modern African Societies). In what follows below, I shall show why this is so with some illustrations.

In the traditional African society, political power/authority derived from the possession/control of the vital force of a given political unit (which may be the family, clan, tribe, or nation). The vital force of a community is the source of vitality of such a community as a corporate body as well as the ultimate source of vitality of its individual members. It may be taken as the *genus* (or *genii*, as the case may be, of a community); it is essentially a spiritual (non-physical) force, which can exert its influence on both physical and non-physical nature. The rules by which people determine that a given person or persons are legitimately in possession of the vital force of a political community differ. However, once a person(s) is deemed to be in proper possession of the vital force of a political unit, the basis of limiting this power from below (that is, by those it is supposed to govern) ceases to exist. This is because those below derive their vital force from above (that is, that controlled

the ruler controls) and, therefore, cannot limit it; in other words, they have no power (vitality) over and above that which the ruler controls, with which to control him/her. Mbiti's observation about the principles that underlie morality in traditional Africa generally applies to political morality and action; he points out that:

"The principle of hierarchy is most helpful here. As a rule, a person of a lower rank, status or age commits an offence against another person or being of a higher rank or age. One may also offend against a person of the same status. Never or rarely does a person of higher status do what constitutes an offence against a person of lower status? What is considered evil or offence are functions from a low level to a higher level... the king or ruler does not offend against his subjects, the elder in the village does not offend those who are younger or under him, and parents do not offend against their children."⁷

Given the above, it should be clear that power flows from the top downwards; hardly the other way round. The body that constitutes authority at a given level need not be composed of one person or a few persons; it may for example be an assembly of the adult male, as in the village or village-cluster democracies of the Igbo. Whatever the composition of the ruling body, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is authoritarian. Even in traditional democracies, such as the Igbo democracies, women and children cannot have their way, or indeed their say, in many situations. The male assembly demand total obedience from them and there is hardly any legitimate way by which women and children

as groups can overturn the decisions of the male assembly; the same is also the case at the sub-unit level where the male head of family rules. So, although there were various types and sizes of states in traditional Africa - for example, monarchies with hereditary aristocrats as in Benin; monarchies without hereditary aristocrats as in Onitsha; democracies, which in some cases, as with many Igbo communities, for example, were in effect a mixture of plutocracy, gerontocracy, and democracy - the authoritarian principle is more or less common⁸.

To check the abuse of power built around the authoritarian principle, Africans relied largely on gods, spirits (especially ancestral spirits) and other spiritual forces upon which the vital force of the political unit ultimately depended. Consequently, abuse of power was checked by the following:

- (1) Taboos that surrounded an office
- (2) Fear of incurring the wrath of a patron deity (deities) or spirit that protects and oversees the welfare of a group or an individual.

In this regard, Mbiti's observation about parents as persons in authority applies to the various offices in a state:

"If parents do something which hurts their children and which constitutes an offence against the children, it is not the children as such who experience it as offence: rather, it is the community, the clan, the nation or the departed relatives who are the real objects of the offence, since they are the ones in higher status than the parents. Consequently, it is not the children themselves

but the offended community or clan or living-dead, who punish the parents⁹".

From taboos and the wrath of gods and spirits, different types of control of the power of rulers were developed. For example, in some places, taboos made kings to live in near total seclusion (for example, the Obi of Onitsha and the Aku-uka of the Jukuns); compelling such rulers to rely a great deal on their deputies and representatives whose assessment of situations and counsels were all they could get (they could not go above these representatives to deal with the people directly). And, if a ruler seriously goes against a god(s) or spirit(s) in his/her community, it is expected that such a god(s) or spirit(s) will punish such a ruler; in this regard the people may act as representatives of the god(s) or spirit(s) in getting rid of such a ruler¹⁰.

The system of checking the abuse of power in traditional African societies, given the above, may be described as divinely-limited-authoritarianism. It is, therefore, wrong to think that abuse of power was checked in traditional African societies largely by the constitutional rights of the people or groups of persons¹¹. Let us deal with this error by looking at a particular case: the city - state of Onitsha¹².

Onitsha is a monarchy with a king (Obi) at the apex of political power. The Obi after going through the selection and installation rituals becomes divine. He becomes the personification of the sky-god Igwe (Igwe kaniogo: the sky-god who is more generous than the earth-goddess, Ani); hence his assumption of the title Igwe as a personal title. As Igwe he is above the ethical

standards required of all the other members of the community because these standards are injunctions from the earth goddess, Ani, whose suzerainty he is no longer directly under; R.N Henderson correctly records this:

“The King is freed of ordinary behavioral proscriptions, not only with regards to ordinary free men but particularly with regards to his own immediate agnates. It is said, “the king does not experience judgment or guilt”; because he is identified with spirit and cannot be accused of abominations or required to take ordinary oaths, he is free to attempt things, which others cannot essay¹³”.

And he also notes that: it is said that he is above accusations of violating land custom, for “the sky is higher than the land”¹⁴. Consequently, no one may condemn the decision or action of the Obi (disapproval of his actions may, however, be conveyed by way of courteous advice on how to conduct himself better); similarly, the king’s children(and by extension his close relations are rather above the law - the proverb, “ ikpe ama nwa eze (a king’s son is not found guilty in his father’s court)” expresses this; it shows that the rule of law is not held as an ideal in respect of the office of the king and by extension other offices of the state¹⁵.

A measure of the sort of power the Obi possesses could be seen in some of his titles or cognomens; apart from Igwe already mentioned, they include:

1. Agbogidi (voice of thunder)
2. Agu (Leopard)
3. Akenyikolua (“The hand of the elephant that is mightier than its hind-leg)

4. Ogbu Onye mbosi ndu ya nagu ya (He who kills a person on a day he desires life)

5. Okwue obe e (supreme Judge; final arbiter)

6. Onye okwu nana n’onua (He who has the final word on any matter)¹⁶.

In addition, the nature of the Obi’s powers can be seen in the fact that he is the repository of the vital force of the community as such and consequently the chi of the Onitsha people (the divinely appointed destiny of the people, which is itself a spirit)¹⁷. It is in this context that one can properly understand Ben Chukwudebe’s assertion that “when he (the Obi) is captured in battle the war ends”; the war ends because with the Obi in captivity the people can hardly find the spirit to continue the fight¹⁸. This explains the necessity of concentrating power in the person of the Obi. He has to be in control of the community in order to bear personal responsibility for the fate of the collective vital force (and hence destiny of the people).

Clearly, from the foregoing the Obi possesses despotic powers. But he does not act arbitrarily or despotically in practice. The reason for this, as I have already has been attributed to his being a constitutional monarch by Azikiwe, Nwala and others but this is erroneous¹⁹. Let us look at Azikiwe’s case to demonstrate this sets out the arguments that should show that the Obi is a constitutional monarch thus:

1.”It was customary that the Obi should consult the Ndichie [chiefs] who in turn, should, by previous exchange of views, reflect public opinion as expressed by the Agbala n’Iregwu [male and female commoners].

Having ascertained what is public opinion, it is mandatory that the Obi should act on advice”²⁰

2. “Secondly, the office of Onowu lyase (traditional prime-minister) was to be confined exclusively to the non-royal lineage of Ugwu na Obamkpa”²¹.

3. “Finally, in appointing Ndichie, the Obi was enjoined to have regard to the composition of each college so as to correlate as near as possible a reflection of the dichotomous nature of the Onitsha clan”²²

First, the Obi is not known in Onitsha tradition to be bound to take the advice of the Ndichie (the chiefs that he appoints to represent him and perform administrative, judicial and military functions on his behalf); their power is essentially advisory²³. If the Obi goes against the advice of the Ndichie and the will of the people, he was not committing any constitutional crime. If he persists in such acts it does not seem that it would inevitably lead to his deposition as Milne thought (provided, of course, he was not offending the gods by his acts)²⁴. The reason for this is that the Obi can only be deposed when the most dreaded of the incarnate dead (masks), the Muo-Afia or Muo-Ogonogo (tall ghost) enters the kings square after passing under the traditional archway that guard the entrance to the palace. And, the Muo-Ogonogo being agents of the collective incarnate dead can only embark on this mission (it should be obvious) if there is a grievous offence against the god(s) and ancestors. No Obi of Onitsha since the over three hundred years history of the city-state has ever been deposed; an indication that they know their duties in respect of the gods and ancestors.

Secondly, although the Onowu lyase title should, as tradition indicates, go to the Obamkpa clan, it has been held by people outside this group for far more times than members of the Obamkpa group since the time of Obi Eze Aroli who reigned around the later part of the 18th century (of the fourteen or so Onowu Iyaseles in this period only 4 are Obamkpa men). The acceptance of these irregularities show how much the king can have his way.

Thirdly, the need to evenly spread the Ndichie titles among the various units that make up Onitsha, is an administrative need that works to the advantage of the Obi. Indeed, he should desire to spread them evenly to enhance the effectiveness of his administration, such an act in no wise limits the power of the Obi.

Why then does the Obi consult his people extensively via the Ndichie as well as directly during public assemblies in the palace (an example of the later is cited as the key factor that shows that the Onitsha kingdom operated democratically with a limited monarchy in Elizabeth Isichei’s *Igbo Worlds*.²⁵)? Why does he act in a not so overtly arbitrary, tyrannical and oppressive manner (his agents, for example, could forcibly take – virtually seize – a woman; present her to the Obi; whereupon she will become one of his wives, living in a closely guarded seraglio; the Obi however, usually sends some gifts to the parents of such women in lieu of bride price²⁶)? It is because his power/authority is limited by divine sources. He has to consult with his people and obtain their consent so that if misfortune comes as a result of a decision (say, the acceptance of Christian mis-

sionaries, as in the case cited in Igbo Worlds), the gods, and spirits, that protect and oversee the fortunes of the people will not hold him entirely responsible for inflicting disaster on their wards, rendering him indefensible against their wrath. Similarly, he will send compensating gifts to parents whose daughter he has forcibly taken to appease their personal and family gods. There is what one may call a spiritual logic in the actions of the Obi in relation to his people, which is aimed at maintaining a favourable cosmic and spiritual balance - the check upon his power, thus rests clearly on metaphysical sources.

As it is with the Obi so it is with other levels of authority right down to the family unit. The Omu (Queen - she is not the Obi's mother or his wife; rather, she is a woman chieftain appointed by the Obi to look after the affairs of the womenfolk; including, especially trade and market affairs which was one of the special domains of women; actually she ran a synonymous structure of government with that the Obi, complete with a council of titled women: "Otu Ogene"); Ndichie; Nze n'Ozo titled men; Iregwu (untitled men); Agbala (Ikporo Onitsha - married or once married women). All these levels of power and authority were hedged by taboos and the need to ensure a favourable balance of cosmic and spiritual forces in the conduct of ones affairs.

The Ndichie and Nze na Ozo titled men (the latter title is "a precondition for taking the politically higher title of Ndichie), for example, observed elaborate taboos that governed their movement; eating habits; morality in terms of lying to, stealing from, or killing a

member of the lineage group to which one belongs as well as sexual relations with females belonging to this group either as wives or daughters. The Iregwu had to observe taboos which all men whether they were titled or not observed; some of such taboos ensured that the community was organized along gender lines in which women though subordinate to men ultimately, had their own sphere and dignity; and that children were treated with fairness and some dignity. Henderson captured elements of this in respect of the latter in his documentation of the relationship between a father and his eldest son (diokpala):

"The senior son serves as a model of appropriate father-child relationships, and his interaction with his father is constrained by numerous proscriptions of acts that are defined as forbidden (Nso). He must never overtly challenge his father, lest he be thought eager to replace him. Of all members of the parental household, he alone is forbidden to enter his father's private "treasure room" (Òlisiliókù) so long as the father is alive for it is believed that by doing so he might learn the extent of his father's wealth and wish to succeed him immediately, since the father and senior son interact in a context defined by the imperative of strict truth (Ofo) their relationship should concern matters of moral knowledge and responsibility, not possibilities of future economic gain... many behavioral prescriptions bind father and son (especially senior son), and most emphasize that a son should submerge his personal will and interest in the will and interests of his father...

However, certain beliefs limit this submergence of the senior son in collectivity with his father. First, it is said that a father must exercise extraordinary care in directing his senior son; should he chastise the son excessively the son may fall into a “prideful lament” (called *akwa alili* or *ifu alili*), and, it is thought, pine away and die. That would jeopardize the spiritual health of the household and deprive the father of his most reliable support for his old age... Third, the Onitsha father must respect the right of his son to accumulate his own personal property even though the son should voluntarily contribute the wealth obtained from such property primarily in the furthering of his father’s glorification.”²⁷

A crucial element of traditional African political thought, as could be seen from the above, is non-opposition to properly constituted authority on the part of subordinates. A major reason for this is that all authority is god-given (it is at least given by the *chi* of such a person) and consequently it is in some way a divine right; the various offices in the State and the power and authority that go with them, are thus indistinguishable from the persons that hold them; a ruler owes no obligation to his/her subordinates as persons *qua* persons for he/she is conceived in the manner of the lord or mistress, not the servant of, his/her people; he/she however owes the powers above his/her level, whether they are human or divine, some obligations; the duty of the subordinate is to align himself/herself to the will of the ruler as much as possible hoping for the best (that is, that the interests, inclinations and dispositions of the

ruler will be to one’s own interest and welfare; and the intervention of the god(s) and spirits in one’s favour).

We may summarize the principles and practices that underlie the nature and management of communal power in the traditional African society thus:

1. Occupation of a political office is ultimately explained in terms of selection (or allotment) by the god(s) or spirit(s), involving at least one’s personal god (*chi* among the Igbo; *ori* among the Yoruba) who controls the fortunes and destiny of a person. This personal god, however, operates in some accord with other spirits and gods; and it appears the higher the office the more involvement of other gods and spirits. Corollaries of this are that offices are highly personalized; and a person in power/authority is ultimately accountable to the god(s) and spirit(s).

2. Responsibility in essence is taking care of the interests of the powers above one’s office, including divine powers and interests, so that one will maintain a cosmic and spiritual balance that is favourable to one’s personal advancement. Responsibility thus flows from bottom upwards.

3. A person in authority/power is essentially a collector of obeisance; one of the outward signs of which is the payment of homage (*Ife nru*, among the Igbo) – a widely accepted practice, rendered, for example by a son to his father, by the head of a nuclear family to the head of the extended family; by the head of an extended family to the head of the patrilineage group; by a chief to his king.

4. 1-3 above fosters a culture of non-opposition to power/authority by subordinates irrespective of the manner by which power/authority is exercised. In addition, the cost of opposition could be very high, because it is readily conceived in a personalized manner and so it easily becomes a do or die affair. Consequently, opposition is not organized or institutionalized in a manner that can benefit society maximally.

5. The apparently authoritarian and despotic tendencies above are mitigated (controlled) by the requirement of those in authority to observe taboos set out by the god(s) and spirit(s) as well as avoid incurring the wrath of the divine beings; both of which are divine provisions to ensure the welfare of devotees and wards.

6. The divinely demanded limitations in 5 above is the ultimate basis for curbing abuse of power and ensuring some level of responsive and responsible governance. Thus there is heavy reliance on metaphysical sources in the management of communal power.

2.2. The Management of Communal Power in Contemporary African Societies

The management of power in contemporary African societies is most of the time the mismanagement of power. The basis of this mismanagement of communal power lies largely in the fact that contemporary African societies are societies that are based on what one may describe as mutually distorting parallel frameworks: the traditional African framework and the modern Western

framework. Each of these frameworks (composed of supreme beliefs, derivative beliefs, derivative values, institutions and practices) function in a way that prevent the abuse of communal power to a significant degree. The existence of these parallel frameworks can be traced back to the colonial period when the colonial system of administration (with its alien legal system and values) was superimposed on traditional institutions and values either with the aim of destroying and replacing the traditional system as with the French policy of assimilation or with the aim of rearranging the traditional system just enough to make it deliver cheap and efficient local administration to the colonial system as with the British policy of indirect rule, which was given some ideological backing in the notion of the dual mandate). We have already seen the nature of the traditional system let us now look at the modern Western system.

First, let us note that the colonial administration was imperialistic and authoritarian while it lasted, its legacy could still be seen in elements of the legal and security spheres. However, the colonial systems from the 1950's onward have been replaced by conscious adoption of the political institutions and practices of modern western societies. There are various types of institutions and practices borrowed from modern western societies. however, there are common features which show that they belong to a common framework. Let us now look at the features of this framework.

The basic features of modern Western system as it is today (we need not deal with the stages of its evolution here) may be summarized thus:

1. Occupation of a political office depends ultimately on election by citizens who have the right and the power to put people in office and remove them from office after a period. Thus, political power is ultimately bestowed by the citizens of a state; this replaces the notion of divine selection or allotment and any other conception of divine right. Corollaries of this are that offices are less personalized; and a person in power/authority is ultimately accountable to the citizens of a state (the electorate).

2. Responsibility in essence is taking care of the interests of the powers (the electorate) that put one in office. Responsibility, thus, flows from top downwards. There is some sort of contractual relationship (a sort of social contract) in which a person takes political office (authority/power) in return for serving the interest of the electorate.

3. A person in authority/power is essentially a service provider. One of the outward signs of this is that there is a more or less clear separation of personal interests and official interests (interests of the state) in a manner that makes it illegal for one to use one's office for personal gains over and above those stipulated by law.

4. 1-3 above fosters a culture of opposition to power/authority. Indeed, opposition is a necessary element of this system, because through it the leadership (the quality of services) provided by those in power is scrutinized to make sure that they conform to the terms of the contract. Opposition is organized and institutionalized in a manner that will make it effective without

generating disorder and chaos; and in a manner that can enable society benefit maximally.

5. Abuse of power, as could be seen from 1-4 above is checked by the constitutional powers and limitations of offices as well as rights of persons; and the active participation of citizens (civil society) in the exercise of such rights through opposition, lobbying, campaigns of various types, etc.

6. The ultimate basis for curbing abuse of power and ensuring a significant level of responsive and responsible governance lies in the moral force of the community by which it determines occasions for positive sanction (including rewarding some people with such things as political offices via the ballot) and negative sanctions (including denying some people political office via the ballot). This system of management of communal power thus relies heavily on the moral coercive power of a community.

The type of conscience and moral activism that is necessary for the successful operation of the modern Western system is not in Africa at the moment; in part, because Africa had not relied on moral coercive power in the past, but rather on metaphysical sources, for the management of communal power. In addition, the modern Western system came with a worldview (or perhaps worldviews) that are grounded in Christianity, humanism, naturalism, etc. all of which are opposed to the key elements of the supreme beliefs of the traditional African worldview; and have succeeded in eroding the foundation of the traditional system of managing power: the belief in commonly held gods and spirits

that actively Supervise human affairs at the communal and sub-unit levels.

The erosion of the beliefs that affects the policing activities of the gods and spirits followed the general abandonment of commonly held god (s) and spirits, such as the earth goddess (Ani, among the Igbo), but many people still privately hold on to personal gods and spiritual powers, which they believe will aid them in procuring power. The result is that many people still believe that power *is* to be acquired by the favour of some spirit(s) or god(s); this explains the widely believed use of “medicine”(magic) and fetish related sacrifices, that include human sacrifices at times: it also largely explains the widespread rigging and abuse of the electoral process – politicians do not really believe that the people’s will matter, rather it is the will of some spirit or god and this is often known after one has tried to gain power by hook or by crook. The notion of divine allotment thus remains and with it the upward flow of responsibility and the culture of non-opposition. In other words, the authoritarian and despotic elements remain but the divinely based limitation in the exercise of power is gone. This is the fundamental asymmetry of values and institutions in Africa.

The effects are gross abuse of power at all levels and governance that is highly nonresponsive and irresponsible. The institutional arrangements and practices that have delivered responsible governance in the West are not working here because the citizens whether they are operating as the led or as leaders are to a large degree unwilling to respect these institutional arrangements or

engage in the practices required by the modern Western system.

3. Concluding Remarks

Let us first note that the management of communal power is culture and history specific; and the object of the management of communal power is the curbing of the recurrent features and tendencies in the abuse and irresponsible exercise (or non-exercise) of power in a given historical and cultural context. From our analysis, it should be clear that the abuse of power in contemporary Africa runs very deep, arising from the inability of the traditional African system and the modern Western system to impose any check on the all out pursuit of narrowly defined self interest. We saw in the previous section why politicians in Africa are not checked by the traditional system of managing communal power nor by the Western system. This unfettered African politicians readily terrorize and underdevelop Africa.

In order to deal with this situation, there is a need to develop functional ways of managing communal power in modern African. In this regard, it seems that a return to the metaphysical basis of managing communal power is not feasible, because the gods and spirits have been abandoned at least at the communal level; and Christianity that replaced traditional religion in many places is hobbled with sectarian divisions (that make religious leaders and their doctrines to have little or no influence outside their followers).

Africans, therefore, have to kick-start the management of communal power based on moral coercive force. The constitutions of Western countries which many African states have borrowed cannot do this because African communities do not share in the historical and cultural contexts out of which they evolved. For example, these constitutions do not address the ingrained sense of non-opposition that makes it difficult to mobilize people in many places to deal with abuse of power via legitimate means – a case in point was the non payment of the salaries of civil servants for many months by the government of Anambra state of Nigeria during the tenure of Governor C. Mbadinuju 1999-2003; there were little or no major rallies, demonstrations, etc to oppose this. African societies need to develop constitutions that can raise, strengthen and direct constructive opposition as well as oppositional-tenacity. For example, if there was constitutional provision stating that a government that cannot pay its workers' salary for up to two months automatically forfeits its term of office, then opposition groups would have found a better basis to mobilize and get the Governor out.

Consequently, the constitutions of African states must be founded among other things on a charter of responsibility, which will set out a minimum standard of services, rights, conduct, etc. which a government must meet to avoid impeachment, recall or automatic termination of a term of office - some of the items that may be included in such a charter are non- payment of salaries of government workers over a given period of time; inefficiency in dealing with easily solvable health hazard

such as disposal of refuse and the filling in of potholes on highways; a code of conduct that reflects commitment and patriotism; punctuality (this is not a light matter at all, the lack of punctuality by high officers of the state reflect the general inefficiency of government); a given level of job creation; a given level of free flow of factual information about the activities of the state. These items are largely founded on the right to life - an individual's right to preserve his/her life. The respect of this right is the ultimate justification for the duty, on the part of an individual, to obey an authority in a political unit and this is because political power exercised by a person(s) on behalf of a political unit must necessarily include the preservation and promotion of the lives of the individuals that make it up; a political unit that neglects this, or actively works against this, is simply telling its members to seek alternative ways of preserving their lives or face death in some way; the individual has no reason to remain in such a political unit indeed he/she is obliged to seek an alternative arrangement.

Finally, let us conclude this examination of the management of communal power in Africa by saying that from the above examination, the formal structure of the proper management of communal power can be stated thus: the communal goals are deduced from the welfare and interest of the public; the purpose and pursuits of political leaders are derived from the communal goals; therefore, political leaders serve the welfare and interest of the public. This is more or less the universal formal structure of the proper use of communal power; it is therefore the formal universal every human political

unit sets its eyes on (or should set its eyes on). However, the way (institutions, practices, etc) by which this formal universal is made concrete depends on the history, culture and circumstances of a given society. Consequently, the fashioning of a viable constitution that can galvanize and move African Societies forward is a task for Africans themselves because it is an exercise that draws heavily on the perceptiveness of the people about their attitudes, values and motives for action.

Notes:

1 Olusegun Oladipo, *The Idea of African Philosophy*, (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 1998), pp.13-28

2 Ibid, pp 29 – 30.

3 Ibid, pp. 36 – 48.

4 Stephan Korner, *Metaphysics: Its Structure and Functions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). pp 53 –54.

5 See for example J.C Ekei's attempt to show that "the Igbo and Africa in general have an ethics, an ethic that is quite different from their religion... a rational ethics". J.C. Ekei, *Justice in Communalism*, (Lagos: Realm Communications Ltd, 2001) p. 2.

6 I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Stand Point" in Alburey Castell, *An Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, Third Edition (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc, 1976) p. 382.

7 J. S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy*, (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1969). p. 208

8 Azuka. A. Dike, *The Resilience of Igbo Culture* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985). p. 109

9 J.S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophies*, p. 208.

10 Ibid.

11 See for example in respect of the Igbo, T.U. Nwala, *Igbo Philosophy*, (Ikeja, Lagos: Literamed Publications, Nigeria Ltd, 1985). pp. 172; Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Onitsha Market Crisis* (Nsukka: Zik Enterprises Ltd, 1976). p. 4.

12 A similar examination of Yoruba and Benin communities can be made from, among other materials, Johnson, S. *History of the Yoruba*, CMS (Book Shops) 1960; Fadipe, N.A. *The Sociology of the Yoruba* (Ibadan, Ibadan University Press 1970); Biobaku, S.O. *Sources of Yoruba History* (Oxford University Press, 1973); Egharevba, Jacob *A Short History of Benin* (Ibadan University Press, 1960)

13 R.N. Henderson, *The King in Every Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). p. 274.

14 Ibid. p. 308.

15 S.I. Bosah, *Groundwork of the History and Culture of Onitsha* (No 1: Bosah Street, Onitsha: Self Published, Undated). See also Henderson. *The King in Every Man*, p. 285.

16 N. Azikiwe, *Onitsha Market Crisis*, pp. 4 - 5. I have followed Azikiwe's translation of titles 1, 3, and 5.

17 R.N. Henderson, *The King in Every Man*, p. 275.

18 Ben. N. Chukwudebe, *Onitsha Quo Vadis*, Second Edition (Self Published, 1986) p. 11

19 See T.U. Nwala, *Igbo Philosophy*; p 172; N Azikiwe *Onitsha Market Crisis*, p. 4. In disusing Umuezechima Kingdoms from whence Onitsha migrated some three and half centuries ago, LU. Ejiofor says that "the Ezechima Obi is neither absolute nor autocratic. He rules his people with a 'constitution' to guide him. The many constraints of customs and traditions combine with the established powers of lineage heads and cabinet chiefs to clip visible traits of absolutism and autocracy". *Igbo Kingdoms* (Onitsha: Africana Publisher Ltd, 1982). p. 256. It should be noted that the lineage heads and cabinet chiefs on their own cannot cheek the Obi; it is the customs and traditions that make it possible and these in turn are founded, ultimately, on metaphysical grounds.

20 N. Azikiwe, *Onitsha Market Crisis*. p. 5.

21 Ibid.

- 22 Ibid.
- 23 W.R.T. Milne. *Intelligence Report on Onitsba* (Enugu: Government Printer); reproduced in N. Azikiwe, *Onitsba Market Crisis*, p. 65.
- 24 Ibid, p. 64.

- 25 E. Isichei *Igbo Worlds*, (London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1977) pp. 256 – 259.
- 26 R.N. Henderson, *The King in Every Man*, p. 285.
- 27 Ibid. pp. 147 – 149.

Political Use of Conversion in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Context: Some Cases From Salonica

The purpose of this study is to shed light on a period of time in Ottoman history when conversion policies and practices, influenced by the changes of times and, resulted in unprecedented socio-political directions. In order to do that, some conversion cases from the Ottoman society in Salonica will be presented. Conversion to Islam is of central importance in explaining the rise of empire and its formation in many scholarly studies. It was usually presented as an official policy of Ottoman administration throughout the centuries. The devshirme system and Sufi preaching were considered to be the major instruments of mass conversion to Islam. On the contrary, I propose to look at the conversion issue in the nineteenth century context from a different angle.

As is the case in Islam every religion has naturally sought to attract people to "its own system of teachings and life style. For this purpose, Islamic faith set some rules to promote conversion to Islam. For instance, in the Koran prospective converts are included among the people who can receive the income of *zekat* (obligatory alms).¹ According to Islamic understanding, one's conversion to Islam is not the embracing of a new religion but the return to his original faith, because everybody is regarded to be born in a Muslim faith and without any sin. Therefore, the one who converted to Islam simply returns or reverts to his nature.² Another important point is that after the conversion all the previous sins of a convert are forgiven by God. The convert is regarded as innocent as a new-born baby. This understanding of

BÜLENT ÖZDEMİR

Assistant Professor,
History Department,
Balıkesir University,
Turkey
E-mail:
ozdemirb@balikesir.edu.tr

KEY WORDS:

Islam, Koran, conversion, Islamization, Jews, Christians, Muslims, Apostasy

Islam helps a lot for the promotion of Islam and attracts the people who committed crimes but wanted to repent.³ Since there is not such an institution as the clergy in the Islamic faith, all the believers in Islam are responsible to introduce Islam to non-Muslims.

No doubt, conversion was the basic process of the spread of any religion. Thus, the history of the phenomenon of conversion to Islam goes back to the early years of the expansion of Islam, when the peaceful convincing of individuals prevailed against the use of force. On this matter Koran says: “Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and godly exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner; surely your Lord best knows those who go astray from His path, and He knows best those who follow the right way.”⁴ The believers in Islam multiplied rapidly in a very short period of time not because of forced conversion but because of the tolerant and convincing nature and simplicity of Islamic teachings.

Like all great religions, Muslims wanted to convert everyone to the faith that they believe to be the only true one. According to Islam, the people of the book are those who still follow one of the older revelations given before Islam, that is Jews and Christians, each of whom have a book to show for their belief. They may keep all their customs and social arrangements, and are quite free with regard to their religion. From the time of the first conquests of Islamic state the tolerant treatment of the non-Muslims was set as a rule in which forced conversion or extermination of non-Muslims was prohibited. The prevailing policy was the attitude of

aloofness to the conquered people because the teachings of Koran commend it.⁵ Thus, this tradition was followed by almost all of the Muslim successor states. As in the case of Ottoman Empire, for instance, one can find so many Christian and Jewish contemporary and academic accounts which clearly pointed out the tolerant nature of treatment to the non-Muslims.⁶

After the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans continued the previous Islamic states’ general policy of granting and recognizing the non-Muslim communities’ extensive privileges respecting to their internal organization and communal affairs.⁷ Since Islam regards Christianity as a religion and respects the Christians as the “people of the book” and the Bible as a holy book and Jesus Christ as a prophet, the Orthodox church was recognized as an official body to supervise both the religious and civil affairs of the community in the Empire. According to Professor Ýnalçýk, protections of the rights of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were considered “a command of God and a duty of the State” by the Ottomans from the beginning.⁸ Moreover, the Orthodox Church was particularly recognized as the most respected religious community in the hierarchical structure of the Empire.⁹ Before the eighteenth century, traditionally the candidate for the Patriarchate was proposed to the Sultan by the holy synod of the Patriarchate, which was believed to be composed of Metropolitans who were mostly close to Istanbul, and thereafter an imperial *berat* (permit) was issued for the confirmation of appointment.¹⁰

Conversion as a Nineteenth-century phenomenon

Since social, political, cultural and economic conditions of the nineteenth century were changed radically not only in the Ottoman Empire but also all over the world, the phenomenon of conversion to Islam in the nineteenth century Ottoman context was also different from the earlier centuries.

Conversion was a common incident in a plural society such as Salonica, which was divided into several religious groups in the nineteenth century.¹¹ There is only one condition for conversion to Islam, which requires one to attest that “there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger.” However, it became a tradition to have two witnesses present during the attestation. The convert has to learn the basics of Islam in the first place. He/she does not need to change his name but for the male converts circumcision was advised.¹² Although there is no need to do this as a ceremony or before any religious institution or authority, in the nineteenth century Ottoman context, when a person wanted to convert to any other religion, he had to do it in front of the local authorities, including the *mufti*, heads of the Orthodox and Jewish communities and sometimes the foreign consuls.¹³

I have selected four registers of conversion dated in the early nineteenth century from Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in İstanbul (BOA) in order to analyze the structure and the process of conversion. Each document refers to persons from different religious groups,

Catholic, Jewish, Armenian and Greek Orthodox. The structural style of the documents is typical. All of them were registered for the purpose of requesting *kisve baba* (value of clothes). The depiction of the former religion of the converts was not severe. Most of the time, the terms: “*batıl dinden ibraç*” (exclusion from an unreasoned faith), “*bu ana kadar kefare hilalinde kalup*” (to this time remaining in the circle of infidels) were used in order to explain the former religion of the converts. There are not much information about the special position, age, marital status of the converts. It can be grasped from the documents that these persons had already converted to Islam at another time and place but wanted to register themselves as the new converts to qualify to get *kisve paha*. We know that the amount of *kisve baba* was 150 *guru*^o in the early nineteenth century. Two important ceremonial acts were performed during the process of registry: one was the declaration of conversion by saying the attestation before the judge and the scribes; another one was the circumcision.¹⁴

Conversion was predominantly an urban phenomenon in the nineteenth century context. Cultural interactions and acculturations were best realized in the cities. Both the mind and the interests of urban people compared to those of rural population were predominantly more assertive and well developed. Therefore, occurrences of conversion cases mostly among the urban population were very normal. On the contrary, the simplicity and conservativeness of rural population in its life style and belief in a way prevented them from becoming pragmatic-interest seekers.

In the nineteenth century context, conversion was an individual private act. If one wanted to convert to any other religion, one could do it in his limits of privacy. However, it was not that clear cut. Most of the time, change of social status, of marital status, the purpose of prevention from abuse, of getting rid of the debts were some of the several most common reasons that affected the process of conversion. When we talk about any purposeful act, we should see politics behind it. We cannot say that the converts were not sincere in their acts and always carried an agenda behind their thoughts and deeds. In fact, we have to give credit to the righteousness of Islam and what it offers to the needs of people. But, when we take the subject of conversion into account as a historical phenomenon, we have to deal with the causes and effects, which directly lead us to the political use of conversion in the nineteenth century Ottoman context.

Was Conversion Forced or Voluntary?

Apart from some nationalist historians of the Balkan states, scholars, after having done much research on the subject concluded that Ottoman state did not coerce the conversion and nor followed the policy of forced-conversion. Conversion to Islam was perceived as an individual's own decision by the state which also saw its role as legitimating and registering the conversion cases. As Eyal Ginio noted rightly at the conclusion of his article on conversion of minors to Islam that

external pressures with social and economic considerations always constituted some forms of coercion.¹⁵ When we look for common features of human motivations among converts in the nineteenth century context, political and practical ones prevailed against the emotional and intellectual ones. Although we cannot generalize the economic aspects as the sole causes of conversion, they played a significant role in the process of human motivations. The conversions made under the influence of economic causes were not rejected by the Islamic faith. While the Koran set the rule by allowing the prospective converts to receive the *zekat*, the Prophet Muhammed practiced this rule by providing financial support to some non-Muslims in order to attract their attention to Islam.¹⁶

This was not a process of forced conversion but that of institutionalized conversion says S. Vryonis.¹⁷ Exercise of social function with an efficacy by the Islamic institutions over the Christian and Jewish institutions provided prestige and propaganda for the prospective converts to Islam.¹⁸ The rise of *sufizm* and spread of the *derwish* orders in these appropriate conditions could be seen as an example of the institutionally well-organized conversion in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Nehemia Levtzion also points out that since the conditions following the conquests provided a kind of psychological superiority to the Muslims, conversion to Islam became a positive-cultural-phenomenon among the conquered people.¹⁹

Vryonis equates the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans with the so-called Islamization. According to

his point of view, the sole purpose of Ottoman conquests in the Balkans was to gain converts to Islam or in more general terms for the spread of Islam. Naturally, he sees “a picture of cultural change and of a single line movement of Christians and Jews into the fold of Islam.”²⁰ However, to assert that the ideology of Ottoman expansion in the Balkans was Islamization is to twist the historical facts. The centuries following the early conquests clearly reflected that the Ottomans did not use the state’s means and efforts to transform all the peoples of Balkans into Muslims. The movement of mass conversion was realized in certain areas where either there was not an institutionalized religious order or the people were under religious persecution. Another point which has been made in the studies is that most of the time conversions were realized for the worldly advantages or to escape from mostly religious persecution. (like in Cyprus and Crete).²¹ Religious alienation was another factor which induced some Christian sects to convert to Islam, like the Bogomils. For instance, some religious groups such as the Nestorians, the Monophysites and the Copts living on the borders of Byzantine Empire were under serious religious persecution during the spread of Islam.²² Most importantly, the Orthodox Church, which must have been seen as the biggest obstacle that stood in front of Islamization, was not destroyed but rather strengthened by the reviving of the ecclesiastical seats in the Balkans. The highest authority of the Orthodox Church, the Patriarchate of Ýstanbul was made an administrative body of the Otto-

man state. Therefore, the issue of conversion should be viewed as simply an individual and private act.

Generally speaking, the literary historical character of a Christian child who was converted to Islam is not a new symbol of the depiction of the Islamization process in the modern Balkan literature.²³ The popular mind in the most part of the Balkans with the help of actualist history textbooks has seen the issue of conversion as a process of official coercion imposed upon the people of the region by the Ottoman rule. According to Maria Todorova, the process of conversion to Islam during the five centuries of Ottoman rule has to be seen mainly as the result of the voluntary decisions made by individuals.²⁴ In the nineteenth century, conversion to Islam became more and more an individual experience and a personal choice. Most of the time issue of conversion remained a hidden phenomenon and completely individualistic private experience. Since Islam does not require one either to make official his/her conversion or to make it publicly known, converts chose to remain unknown unless they had some political agenda or economic interest. We learn of their existence from the summaries of lawsuits and brief registrations of converts’ names on the *‘er’iye sicils* (Ottoman judiciary court records). Since conversion changes one’s legal status almost completely, the ties of paternity, inheritance, marriage and the ownership of slaves are also abolished accordingly. In fact, these registers of conversion refer to the converted people who one way or the other needed to make official declaration of their conversion in the court. There are several reasons behind their intention

of registration. At this point, I argue that individualistic political implications occupied an important part of these reasons. Registering his/her conversion in the Ottoman Muslim court consolidated the convert's belief and involvement in the Muslim community. "The declaration in the court was probably made as a result of the wish to have documentary proof to hand, possibly to show to persistent poll-tax (*cizye*) collectors"²⁵ says Eyal Ginio about the conversions in the eighteenth century context. However, for the nineteenth century the reasons to register in the Muslim court were various. These were political sympathies, cultural similarities, admiration for Islamic morals, social advantages, political promotion, exemption from taxes, admiration for doctrinal clarity and social pressure.

Causes of Conversion

In a general sense, conversion requires a process of preparation in which environmental causes were very active. The personal motivation and the state of mind of the new converts in the changing political and socio-economic conditions of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire have to be taken into account. The prospective convert's social status, economic condition, intellectual capacity, religious indoctrination, worldly interests and marriage were the basic aspects of causes for conversion.²⁶ Richard Clogg cited the following ten reasons from a contemporary account, which induced the Christians voluntarily to embrace Islam:

"1) for the love of civil liberty, 2) in consequence of the fatigues of slavery and particular vexations, 3) to enjoy the luxurious privileges of polygamy, 4) to preserve their property from Muslim usurpation, 5) to enjoy freedom in their manner of dressing, 6) to get rid of a capital condemnation, 7) to free their children from slavery, 8) from want of religion, a sentiment of honour, 9) from a taste for arms, and often with a design to avenge himself on a Turk who has ill treated him, 10) from despair, or from a state of drunkenness".²⁷

We look first at the impact of money given to the converts as *kisve baba* (150 *guru*^o in the early 19th century). This should be considered as a gift of honor from the government rather than an instrument of appeal for conversion. *Kisve baba* which was awarded upon conversion given for buying clothes was not other than a sort of financial grant handed out to the new converts. The amount of sums normally awarded was varied according to the conditions of time (such as inflationary processes in the Empire) and the social status of the converts.²⁸ Nikolay Antov asserts that Ottoman government's treatment to the new converts differed and more money was allotted to converts "who had higher social status prior to their conversion and some who were of special importance to the Porte."²⁹ The amount of *kisve baba* in the early 19th century economic conditions of Ottoman Empire was a great amount of money for the converts, since the amount of *kisve baba* as 150 *guru*^o was exceeding the rate of poll-tax (for the middle category of *cizye* payers the rate was 24 *guru*^o) five or six times. It is generosity toward non-Muslims, care for the needy and

pretended holiness of life that especially promoted the conversion in the cities. Making the religious charity buildings (like *imarethanes*) even more active centers for relief and needs of the poor people regardless of their religious etiquette in the cities provided suitable space for the promotion of Islam.

As was the case in other parts of the Empire, conversion cases in Salonica were quite frequent particularly in the early nineteenth century, since the population of the city consisted of three different religious groups.³⁰ Converts (both Christians and Jews) to Islam were provided with financial and moral support in the form of either paying all the debts of the converts or providing great security and protection against all offences. This protection and practice of paying of debts were frequently exploited by the non-Muslim population, when they needed either to get rid of enormous debts or to get protection against their own community's rather strict rules. It was very easy for a Christian or a Jew in those cases to declare that he had converted to Islam, because when he said that he had become a Muslim, his former community had no authority over him.³¹

Consul Blunt reported the following incident relating to Christian apostasy from Salonica:

"A Greek *reaya* who presented himself to the Pasha saying that he wished to embrace the Mohammedan faith. His Excellency told him to go and reflect, and gave him a week to consider. The man who is a native of Ionina returned still resolved to abandon his faith, but the Pasha having in the meanwhile made inquiries respecting this individual, and finding that he wished to

become a Muslim purposely to escape the payment of some trifling debts. His Excellency rejected him".³²

In former years, all the debts of a prospective convert had generally been paid by the Muslims; after that the individual was accepted as a true convert to Islam.³³ The above apostasy case clearly defines the position of the Ottoman authorities towards the status of Christian people in Ottoman society. In other words, depiction of the Ottoman authorities' aggressive behavior towards the Christian *reaya* in which the former perceive the latter as potential candidates for Islamisation, as found in a number of accounts, need closer examination. Islam does not allow conversion of Christians to Islam by the sword or by persecution, but rather recognizes both Christians and Jewish people as the "people of the book" and allows them to continue to exercise their faith undisturbed as long as they acknowledge their submission to the authority of the state. On this issue, Kemal Karpat says:

"The government regarded itself as the protector of Christians and of their right to abide by their chosen faith, and infringements of the right by Muslim subjects was punished. If, indeed, the Ottoman government had wished to force non-Muslims to convert to Islam during its four hundred years of absolute rule over the Balkans, it had the means to do so. The intact survival of a great variety of non-Muslim groups in the Empire ... is the best proof of the freedom of religion and culture that existed during the Ottoman rule".³⁴

Another factor was the desire to avoid payment of taxes. It has been pointed out in some studies that espe-

cially the *cizye*³⁵ (poll-tax) was used as an instrument by the Ottoman state to force non-Muslims to convert to Islam. Since *cizye* tax required to be paid in cash, in some regions, it was difficult for the people to pay it. That is why, it has been said, mass conversion was realized in some poor districts in order to avoid this tax. Ottoman government's adoption of a new collection method which "the community leader of a particular region or town was appointed to collect the tax and deliver it to the treasury in lump-sum" was a proof that the Ottomans did not use the *cizye* tax as an instrument to force non-Muslims to convert to Islam.³⁶ Noblemen were the first to embrace Islam in the Balkans in order to retain their property and social status.³⁷ However, they had to pay 2.5 percent of their property as *zekat* to the state or poor people. Also, male converts had to take the obligatory military service into account when they embrace Islam. From the conquest of the Balkans in the 15th century to the end of the Empire, there was no policy of forced conversion. "Most of the great Balkan families and smaller *tymar* holders converted to Islam during the 16th century not as the result of Ottoman pressure, but in consequence of their realization that this was a necessary first step on the road to becoming full Ottomans" says Stanford Shaw on this issue.³⁸

When in the 19th century the Ottoman government decided to abolish *cizye* tax and to apply compulsory military service also upon the non-Muslim subjects according to the Tanzimat reforms, they protested against the new regulation saying that the *cizye* tax was prefer-

able to the military service.³⁹ The argument which asserts that the non-Muslims of the Empire choose to convert to Islam because of the heavy tax burden upon their shoulders is nonsensical. On the other hand, the fact that the amount of *cizye* tax in the nineteenth century was not a heavy burden on the non-Muslims was dealt with by several studies.

Indeed, the *cizye* tax continued to be exacted under the name of *bedel-i askerî*, the tax for the exemption of non-Muslims from military service, which was made mandatory to all citizens of the Empire after the Tanzimat. When voices were raised against the new measure of compulsory military service for non-Muslims by the leaders of Christian and Jewish communities, the old *cizye* tax was re-named as the *bedel-i askerî*. According to an Ottoman document dated 1835, the number of non-Muslims held responsible for the *cizye* tax in Salonica was as follows:⁴⁰

Table 1 The number of non-Muslims held responsible for the *cizye* tax in Salonica in 1835.

Non-Muslims	Alâ, (rich)	Evsat (medium rich)	Ednâ (lower)	Total
	48 guryûb	24 guryûb	12 guryûb	
Christians	250	1280	655	1185
Jewish	205	862	2840	3907
Total	455	2142	3495	6092

According to the document in the *sicils* of Salonica, Sicil, 229:110, 3^a envâl 1250.

Now, from the above numbers, we can draw some conclusions. In 1835, the number of rich Christian people who paid 48 *guru*^o was greater than the number of rich Jewish people. Most of the Jewish *cizye* tax payers were categorized lower level, while most of the Christians were in the medium rich category. If we compare the numbers with the overall numbers of the Christian and Jewish population of Salonica in 1839, 1,185 out of 13,000 Christians (9 percent) were held liable for *cizye* tax while the rate for the Jewish population was 3,907 out of 25,000 (15.6 percent). The above facts, which are based on contemporary sources, clearly show the fair division of the *cizye* tax collection in the Empire in the nineteenth century even before the Tanzimat changes. These figures also refute the overlapping assertions and generalizations about unjust measures in *cizye* tax collection system in the present literature.

Apostasy from Islam

Another important subject was the apostasy from Islam. Though this was a rare occurrence, in some special periods of the history of Ottoman Empire such as the Greek uprising and under extraordinary conditions, there occurred some Muslim apostasy cases particularly in Crete.⁴¹ The practice of allowing the literally converted Christians to repent under the condition of public manifestation of their repentance goes back to the early 14th century when the first wave of Islamic conquests occurred in Anatolia and the Balkans.⁴² In the

ordinary times, apostasy from Islam was unspeakable and even a crime which required the punishment of death penalty. According to the traditional Islamic law of apostasy, being an apostate requires one to deny Allah's divinity and attributes partners to Allah, deny that Muhammad is the Prophet and reject the holy book, the Koran.

In the case of an apostate being a woman, the punishment would be imprisonment until she repents to Islam. As is the case of conversion to Islam, apostasy from Islam was also a private individual act and does not need to be made public. However, its reflections and practices in the Ottoman society did not support this. Most of the time, apostates wanted to declare their intention of apostasy from Islam in public or before the certain authority or to the people under social, economic, political and moral pressures, even though they had already known that the consequences will be severe according to the Islamic law. The following case is very illustrative:

“A monk of the Oriental Church named Pappa Isaiah, presented himself before the Council at Serres, about two months since, and apostatized to the Muslim faith, and took the name of Isa Efendi. He repented shortly after and went to Mount Athos and from there to Greece. He returned a few days since to Serres, and presented himself to the Greek bishop of that place and told him of his determination of recanting before the whole Council. The Bishop advised him not to do this. The monk would not however follow the Bishops advice but presented himself before the Council, dressed

as a monk, and declared himself a Christian. Ömer Pasha and the Council were horror-struck and ordered that the monk should be immediately beheaded. The bishop reminded the Pasha of the Sultan's promise in favor of the Christians, and the Monk was imprisoned."⁴³

In this later case, two important facts can be discerned according to Consul Blunt: first, the monk accepted Islam in order to protect himself against the unjust persecution of the Greek Bishop of Serres, and secondly, many of the Bishops and clergy of the Greek Church were warm advocates of martyrdom.⁴⁴ Therefore, since the clergy wanted to expel him from the church when the monk converted to Islam, they had no influence over him. After he decided to return to his faith, the clergy purposely let him present himself as a convert from Islam before the Council, although they had already known what the decision of the Council would be.

One who converted to Islam had made himself subject to Muslim law. Thus, since his legal status was changed, it was illegal for him/her to return to his original faith. If this does happen, he becomes an apostate in the eyes of his adopted religion, and the Islamic law was enforced against him. In the case of a woman embracing Islam, it was also illegal to marry a non-Muslim man. If the conversion of a woman had happened after marriage, she had to persuade her husband to convert to Islam in order to legalize the marriage. If she failed to do, the contract of marriage would not be valid. However, the opposite arrangement was not illegal. A Mus-

lim man was free to marry with a Christian or Jewish woman without renouncing of her faith. The change of legal status after conversion to Islam according to the Islamic law provided opportunities for the non-Muslims to use conversion for political purposes. Most of the time, conversion to Islam was used by the non-Muslim woman who wanted to end the marriage contracts. By this way, a woman not only divorced from her husband easily, but also got a new legal protection for herself due to her inclusion to the Muslim community.

Conversion from Islam to the Christian or Jewish faith was prohibited; and if this would have happened, the punishment according to Islamic law was the death penalty. When a person who converted to Islam, decided to return to his previous faith and declared it in front of the authorities, the first act was to persuade him or her by giving meaningful and convincing answers to the questions raised by the person. If this effort failed and the person insisted on his apostasy from Islam, the punishment of the death penalty was carried out by the authorities.⁴⁵ In 1844, with the continuous efforts of British Ambassador to İstanbul Lord Canning, new effectual measures were taken by the Ottoman government to remove the punishment of the death penalty for apostasy cases, replacing it with imprisonment.⁴⁶

The misperception by Westerners of apostasy cases and of severe punishment for apostates results from Westerners' established background and perception of apostasy in their own religion, that is, in most cases, Christianity. In Christianity, apostasy was not an act

which calls for the death penalty, as it does in Islam. The perception was that in the Christian religion, one could convert from one sect to another very easily (for instance from Orthodoxy to Protestantism); this was called apostasy and in the nineteenth century did not merit a severe punishment. Maybe the apostate was excommunicated from his own community. Since the boundaries between the Christian sects (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant) had been drawn precisely, the conversion from one sect to another was a serious act but did not require the death penalty in the nineteenth century context.⁴⁷ However, in Islam, while conversion from one sect to another is not a serious matter mainly because Islam is not divided into several sects in terms of the fundamentals of faith and accepting or changing the sect is not regarded as apostasy. The term “apostasy” in the Islamic context is used only for the cases of conversion to any other religion; and the punishment of this action is death. Now, in this context, the accounts in Western literature about apostasy cases in Islam might most probably seem severe and the critiques of Islam and of Islamic rules might also be excessively severe. Generalizing from their own background and understanding of the issue, they might look at apostasy cases, say, in the Ottoman Empire, from a distance and might not comprehend the issue in its Islamic context. As a result, the punishment for apostasy in Islam continued to be regarded as a very cruel practice in the minds of the Westerners.

According to Islam, apostasy from Islam to any other religion is the most serious attempt and is consid-

ered as a total rejection of the truthfulness of the Islamic faith and consequently requires capital punishment. On the contrary, conversion from Christianity to any other religion and even within Christianity from one sect to another is very common and to some extent acceptable. This difference in perception and also the protective measures established by the Islamic state for converts from other religions might have been confusing for Lord Canning who tried too much to change the practice of Islam wholeheartedly.

Apart from being an individual action, conversion to and apostasy from Islam, especially in the 19th century, became an important political and diplomatic issue between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. British Ambassador to Ottoman Empire, Lord Stratford Canning, used the issue of apostasy from Islam as a political instrument to gain the sympathy of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. His intention was to induce the Ottoman government to abolish the law which required the death penalty for apostasy from Islam. At the end, “although Canning did not achieve the abolition of the law, he did obtain an agreement that it would not be used in future.”⁴⁸

Generalizations reached under the influence of current politics, observable in many Greek books regarding Ottoman practices need to be clarified in light of contemporary evidence. For example, the following case cited by Blunt was a very good indication of changes in the thinking of the people in Salonica:

“In a recent case of a Greek woman’s embracing Islam, prior to the ceremony, Vasif Mehmet Pasha called

the Molla and told him to speak with all due respect for the Greek bishop, who would be present, and that when asking the woman if she with free will left her religion, he must say the 'Christian religion' and not the religion of '*gâvur*'".⁴⁹

Conversion of Jews to Islam and Christianity was another problem that the Ottoman government became involved in. Though forced cases were not encouraged but prohibited by Islamic law and the Ottoman government, social and economic considerations paved the way in some cases of conversion to Islam.⁵⁰ In cases of forced conversion, the Ottoman policy was precise and further strengthened by the Tanzimat reforms. Local officials were ordered to prevent forced conversion and forced converts were liberated by government intervention.⁵¹ Similarly, there occurred, though very rarely, conversions from the Jewish faith to Christianity under the influence of growing Protestant missionary activities in the Empire.⁵² In such cases, the Jewish opposition to their renegades was apparent. Since the Jewish religious leaders had power and authority over all sorts of internal affairs in the community, their response was to counterbalance apostatic tendencies by persuasion, threat of excommunication, corporal punishment and detention. It is also clear that the Jewish authorities got the Ottoman government help for enforcement and intervention whenever they needed.⁵³

We should not disregard genuine spiritual transformation as one of the motives for conversion to the Muslim faith. The role of the impact of simplicity, moral and doctrinal clarity of Islam embodied by der-

vish orders have to be taken into account. However, it is hard to speculate about these motives by showing evidence from the conversion registers. The standard expressions like "I saw light" in the registers most probably referred to the common format of the document.⁵⁴ Another point was the Ottoman's policy of the acceptance of skilled or high status converts to the government's ranks regardless of the sincerity of conversions. In some cases, the social position of a non-Muslim was used by the Ottoman authorities to obtain the sympathy of the non-Muslims. The case of the conversion of Sabbatai Zevi best illustrates this. The apostasy of Sabbatai Zevi was a well-known story of conversion to Islam. An article⁵⁵ written by Geoffrey L. Lewis and Cecil Roth discusses the political aspects of the cause of Sabbatai Zevi's embracing Islam. I would like to mention it here because of the assertion's relevance to the subject of this paper. According to the authors, Ottoman government in some way induced him to accept Islam ostensibly of his own free will in order to have achieved a mass conversion of the great body of Ottoman Jewry, "a feat which had baffled even Muhammad." By presenting his conversion "as the result of his having suddenly seen the light", Ottomans wanted to show the correctness of the Islamic faith. On the other hand, this occasion provided an opportunity for Sabbatai Zevi to "present the conversion as a spontaneous action within a messianic setting, as a part of the necessary fulfillment before the ultimate glorious consummation." Thus, we can see in this seventeenth

century conversion story the collateral use of the conversion issue as a political instrument.

Conclusion

One thing which is clear in the accounts which deal with the conversion issue in the Ottoman Empire is that conversion to Islam neither followed a process of indoctrination nor did it utilize force. Ottomans also did not choose to employ force for the propagation of Islam. There is a clear need to distinguish the phenomenon of conversion in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries from the one in the nineteenth century. The process of conversion to Islam during the conquest of Anatolia and the Balkans can be viewed as “Islamization”, it involved a communal or group conversion with a vast territorial expansion. However, in the nineteenth century Ottoman context, conversion was a rather slow process, involving individuals and families in mostly urban settings. This was a process of interaction and acculturation in which the converts either consciously chose to undergo a meaningful change as “reorientation of the soul” or accepted Islam under the impact of mostly socio-economic and socio-political reasons.

Notes:

*Paper presented at the Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence & Montecatini Terme 19 – 23 March 2003, organised by the Mediterranean Programme of

the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute.

1 See the related works of eminent Turkish historians such as Ö. L. Barkan, I. H. Uzunçarşılı, M. T. Gökbilgin, H. İnalcık and K. Karpat who most of the time emphasized the role of state policies and Turkic colonization in the Balkans Koran, sura 9, verse 60.

2 Koran, sura 7, verse 172.

3 I would like to mention here a contemporary phenomenon which is the spread of Islam in the US prisons especially among the Afro-American inmates.

4 Koran, sura 16, verse 125.

5 Arnakis, “The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire”, *Journal of Modern History*, v. 24, n. 3, (September 1952), p. 238.

6 T. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination*, 2nd edition, (Hampshire G.B.: Variorum, 1992) pp. 1-26. Steven Runciman, *The Fall of Constantinople, 1453*, (Cambridge, 1965), C.A. Frazee, *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) pp. 1-8.

7 See H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilisation on Muslim Culture in the Near East*, vol. I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950). pp. 215-16. Philip Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, (New York, 1951) p. 716. There are several explanations of this issue in the literature: that Mehmet the Conqueror granted the privileges because of his policy over Europe which served to split Christianity into two camps or his financial considerations which served to collect more tax from the non-Muslims or that Constantinople was not captured by force but surrendered by capitulation. For the elaboration of the above arguments see T. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination*, 2nd edition, (Hampshire G.B.: Variorum, 1992) pp. 1-26. On this issue see also G. Georgiades Arnakis, “The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Em-

pire", *Journal of Modern History*, v. 24, n. 3, (September 1952), pp. 235-251, Steven Runciman, *The Fall of Constantinople, 1453*, (Cambridge, 1965), C.A. Frazee, *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) pp. 1-8. According to Inalcik "from the beginning Ottomans followed a policy of tolerance and protection of the Orthodox Church. This policy proved to be beneficial to both the Church and the new rulers." See, Halil Ýnalçýk, "The Turks and the Balkans", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, v. 1, (1993), p. 20.

8 Halil Ýnalçýk, "The Turks and the Balkans", p. 18.

9 Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Gayrimüslim Osmanlı*, p. 32. Timothy Ware, *Eustratios Argenti, A Study of the Greek Church under Turkish Rule*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) p. 2.

10 Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Gayrimüslim Osmanlı*, p. 29, T. Papadopoulos, *Studies and Documents*, p. 41.

11 For more details of the Salonican society in the early 19th century see, Bülent Özdemir, *Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Reflections from Salonica, 1830-1850*, unpublished PhD thesis, (The University of Birmingham, 2000)

12 "ibtida" in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 21, pp. 554-558.

13 Bülent Özdemir, *Ottoman Reforms*, p. 268. See also, Ýlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Aile*, (İstanbul: Pan Yayınları, 2000) p. 94.

14 BOA, Cevdet Adliye, No.1115, 2083/I, 2083/II, 1735.

15 Eyal Ginio, "Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion to Islam in the Ottoman State" in *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, n. 25, (2001) p. 115.

16 "ibtida" in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 21, pp. 554-558

17 Speros Vryonis Jr., "Religious Change and Continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the Fourteenth through the Sixteenth Century" in Speros Vryonis Jr. (Ed.) *Islam and Cultural Change in the Middle Ages*, (Wiesbaden, 1975), p. 135.

18 Saying that *dev'irme* system was another means of conversion appears to be a false assertion, especially for the Greeks because Greeks were not taken as *dev'irme* until the late 17th cen-

tury. As it was the case for the Jewish subjects. If the *dev'irme* system is considered to be the instrument of conversion, why did it target only the rural population and almost all Slavs and Albanians? See, P. Wittek, "Devshirme and Shari'a" in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, n. 17, (1955), pp. 271-278 and V. L. Menage, "Devshirme", EI, v. 2.

19 N. Levtzion, "Towards a Comparative Study of Islamization" in N. Levtzion (Ed.) *Conversion to Islam*, (London, 1979), pp. 1-9.

20 Speros Vryonis Jr., "Religious change", p. 138.

21 Stavro Skendi, "Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans", in *Slavic Review*, v. 26, (1967), p. 229.

22 Ali Köse, "İslamın İlk Devirlerinde Yayılma Bekleri" in *Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, n. 2, (1999), pp. 45-75.

23 Eyal Ginio, "Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion", p. 91.

24 Maria Todorova "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans", in L. Carl Brown, (Ed.) *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, (New York, 1996) p. 65. See also other articles in the same volume, Carl Brown (Ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, (New York, 1996)

25 Eyal Ginio, "Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion", p. 97.

26 Hüseyin Peker, *Din Değiştirilmedi Psiko-sosyolojik Etkiler*, unpublished PhD thesis, (Anakara Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, 1979) pp. 28-46.

27 Cited in Richard Clogg, "A Little-known Orthodox Neo-Martyr, Athanasios of Smyrna, 1819", *Eastern Churches Review*, v. 5, n. 1, (Spring, 1973) p. 30.

28 Nikolay Antov, *Aspects of Balkan Islamization in the Light of Petitions for Conversion, 1670-1750*, Unpublished MA thesis, (Bilkent University, 2000)

29 Ibid., p. 21.

30 It is interesting to note that according to a statistics made on Bursa, numerical density of conversion cases was in the highest level between 1800 and 1850. See, Osman Çetin, *Sicillere Göre*

Bursa'da Ýhtida Hareketleri ve Sosyal Sonuçları (1472-1909), (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1999) p. 34.

31 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 August 1845.

32 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 August 1845.

33 For the practices in the 17th and 18th centuries see, Nikolay Antov, *Aspects of Balkan Islamization*, p. 30.

34 Kemal Karpat, "The Situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire: Bulgaria's view", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, v. 4, n. 2, (1983), p. 261.

35 The *cizye* was a religious poll-tax introduced by the Ottomans upon conquest. *Cizye* was levied upon adult males. Children, women, poor people, crippled, blind and old men, clerics were exempted. See, H. Ýnalçýk, "Djizya", EI 2, II, p. 562.

36 Halil Ýnalçýk, "The Turks and the Balkans", p. 23.

37 Halil Ýnalçýk, "Stefan Duþan'dan Osmanlý Ýmparatorluðuna: XV. Asýrda Rumeli'de Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menþeleri", in *Osmanlý Ýmparatorluðu: Toplum ve Ekonomi*, (Ýstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1993) p. 93.

38 Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman View of the Balkans", in Charles and Barbara Jelavich, (Eds.), *The Balkans in Transition*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) p. 65.

39 See, Bülent Özdemir, *Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Reflections from Salonica, 1830-1850*, unpublished PhD thesis, (The University of Birmingham, 2000) p. 84.

40Salonica Sicils, 229:110, 3 *Pevval* 1250.

41 See, A. Nükhet Adýyeke and Nuri Adýyeke, "Yunan Ýsyanyý Sýrasýnda Girit'te Ýrtidat Olayları" paper was presented in XIVth Congress of Turkish Historical Association, 9-13 September 2002, Ankara.

42Stavro Skendi, "Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans", in *Slavic Review*, v. 26, (1967), p. 228

43 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 August 1845.

44 For the importance of the advocacy of neo-martyrdom by the local clergy in the nineteenth century, see, Richard Clogg, "A Little-known Orthodox Neo-Martyr, Athanasios of Smyrna, 1819", *Eastern Churches Review*, v. 5, n. 1, (Spring, 1973), pp. 28-36.

45 According to Kemal Karpat, if one willingly converts to Islam that makes one subject to Muslim law, which can naturally be enforced against one when one decides to return to one's previous faith. See Kemal Karpat, "The Situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire: Bulgaria's view", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, v. 4, n. 2, (1983), pp. 259-266.

46 FO 78 / 555, Canning to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844.

47 See Timothy Ware, *Eustratios Argenti, A Study of the Greek Church under Turkish Rule*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) pp. 16-33.

48 For the discussion of the issue see, Turgut Subaþý, *Anglo-Ottoman Relations and the Reform Question in the Early Tanzimat Period 1839-1852: With Special Reference to Reforms Concerning Ottoman non-Muslims*, unpublished PhD thesis, (The University of Birmingham, 1995).

49 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 3 May 1844.

50 It was clearly stated in a *ferman* dated 1836 that the forced conversion to Islam was strictly prohibited by the Ottoman government. See Sicil 232:21, 14 *Cemaziyellevvel* 1251.

51 There are several cases in Consul Blunt's reports regarding forced conversion and liberation according to the government regulations. For instance, "A boy of nine years of age, taken by some Turks and persuaded to apostatise. When he was brought before the Council he declared that he was a Christian and was liberated." See FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 21 August 1845.

52 Hayyim J. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East, 1860-1972*, (Jerusalem: Keter Press, 1973) p. 167.

53 Albert E. Kalderon, "Turkish Jews of Istanbul and Missionary Activities During the Reign of Mahmud II", *Turcica*, v. 14, (1991), pp. 91-109.

54 BOA, Cevdet Adliye, No: 1735, 2083/I, 2083/II, 1115.

55 Geoffrey L. Lewis and Cecil Roth, "New Light on the Apostasy of Sabbatai Zevi", *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, v. LII, n. 3, January 1963, pp. 219-225



Liliya Sazonova

The role of interfaith dialogue in the process of protection and implementation of Human Rights

The main thesis of this essay is that the inter-religious dialogue gives us some unique mechanisms for protecting and implementing human rights. This alternative way of implementation of the basic provisions of the international human rights law includes several practices. Among them there are organizing demonstrations, informational campaigns, lobby campaigns for the ratification of certain legal means, monitoring, educational programs, declarations etc. These activities define the inter-religious dialogue movement as a civil society phenomenon that acts both at the level of international and local NGOs on the one hand, and at the level of the high religious authorities on the other. In this regard, in order to illustrate the inter-religious potential for accomplishing the protection and the implementation of the international standards, the analysis encompasses the relations between different religious systems as well as between the religious bodies and the state itself.

LILIYA SAZONOVA

M.A. in Democracy and Human Rights in South-East Europe at Bologna University / Sarajevo University. Teacher in Philosophy of Law, part-time journalist, consultant on a help-line in Sofia, Bulgaria
E-mail: liliya_sazonova@yahoo.co.uk

Introduction

The contemporary process of globalisation and the accelerating process of international communications make the investigation of interfaith dialogue a critically important issue. Religions in other ages lived in separate territories. Their divisions resulted from their occurrence in different spaces. However, this lack of communication has changed radically in recent decades. Today religious offers cannot be made from a monopolistic standpoint and this fact explains the importance of the dialogue between them. Thus, the new social and economic conditions in the world mandate a change of the old scheme of interactions (or their absence) between religions.

In this regard, the main argument of the following essay is that interfaith dialogue¹ offers several unique

KEY WORDS:

Interfaith dialogue, religion, state-church, protection, human rights, international standards, non-governmental organizations

mechanisms of protecting and implementing human rights. This alternative for implementing the basic provisions of international human rights law includes several practices: organizing demonstrations, informational campaigns, lobbying for the ratification of certain legal instrument, monitoring, educational programs, declarations, etc. These kinds of activities define the interfaith dialogue movement as a phenomenon of the civil society that acts on the level of international and local NGOs.

We follow this line of reasoning to identify the unusual nature of interfaith dialogue and thus explore the topic by starting with the definitions of three key concepts in our essay. Therefore the first chapter analyzes three terms: “interfaith dialogue,” “protection” and “implementation.”

The second chapter elaborates on the two main levels on which interfaith dialogue accomplishes the protection and implementation of international standards. The one is on the level of religious rights while the other encompasses human rights as a whole.

The third and final chapter presents the role of interfaith dialogue as redefining the official attitude of certain religious systems towards human rights issues. In this regard, at least two main obstacles are addressed confronting the enforcement of international standards of human rights. Namely, they are the “problem with reservations” regarding women, and the freedom to choose or change one’s personal beliefs.

In order to achieve more objectivity we have used both legal instruments and the literature of interfaith

dialogue. Additionally, we have employed three types of approaches – analytical, polemical, and interpretative.

Finally, in accordance with the topic of the essay we highlight the protection and implementation of human rights. However, in order to create a clearer picture of the so-called “culture of human rights”, some aspects of their promotion, fulfillment, and enforcement are mentioned as well.

Definition of the key concepts used in the essay

A credible exploration of the role of the interfaith dialogue in the protection and implementation of human rights requires a clear definition of the three core concepts used in the exploration. These three key terms are “interfaith dialogue”, “protection” and “implementation.”

Since there is no agreed upon definition of “interfaith dialogue,” in what follows the concept will be used as an umbrella term covering various kinds of activities. These different types of inter-religious interaction (discussions, joint appeals, shared projects, etc.) take place at different levels, ranging from governmental to grassroots. Broadly defined, there are six forms of dialogue people engage in: parliamentary dialogue, institutional dialogue, theological dialogue, community dialogue, spiritual dialogue, and inner dialogue.² Although the last two types of communication channels underlie all other discussions, they do not bear significantly on the pur-

pose of the present essay. When it comes to the contribution of interfaith communication to the improvement of human rights status as a whole it is both the parliamentary dialogue and the community dialogue that should be particularly explored. Consequently, in the chapter on this issue the term “interfaith dialogue” expresses the above mentioned two types of religious interaction even when not overtly indicated.

The first type of dialogue - the parliamentary dialogue - refers to the large assemblies created for interfaith discussion such as those organized by the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) and World Council of Churches (WCC).³ These worldwide organizations do not focus on particular agendas, but rather tend to explore broader concerns, such as the possibility for better cooperation between religions, or global issues such as peace, poverty, the environment and human rights. Covering such complicated and fragile problems, the parliament dialogue is important since it takes place at the level of International NGOs. Thus it serves as a regulator of state decisions and government policies. We further investigate how and to what extent the discussion between high-ranking religious leaders can influence and shape the governmental policy towards human rights protection.

The second type dialogue – the community dialogue – concerns the less structured interaction between people of different religions. It also includes cooperative social projects organized by religious groups in response to local problems and practical matters. Its involvement in the course of civic or humanitarian projects is on a

more unofficial level than is true of the first type of dialogue. However, this kind of informal interaction between representatives of various beliefs assumes its own place and “responsibility” for the human rights situation. It encompasses numerous local and regional initiatives for the promotion of both conflict prevention and conflict resolution. In this sense, the peace-keeping and peace-building role of the “Clergy for peace” in the Middle East or the “Council of grace” in South India could be mentioned.⁴ Moreover, these unofficial streams within society often function as indicators of people’s awareness of human rights.

In addition, the valuable role that both institutional dialogue and theological dialogue have specifically in the process of implementation of religious freedom could be pointed out. The one is important for including the organized efforts of particular religious institutions that aim at initiating and facilitating various other dialogues. The other refers to the process of representatives of different religious communities discussing theological and philosophical issues in a structured format. These two types are also explored further on.

The second term to be elaborated is “protection.” As stated in “Understanding Human rights,” protecting certain human rights means that the state must “prevent violence and other human rights violations among people on its territory.”⁵ With regard to interfaith dialogue, protection refers to the important role to be played by inter-religious communications in conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict transformation and post-conflict peace-building. For instance, on

the one hand, this can be connected with the specific role of varied religions providing food security, health services, etc., which corresponds directly to economic, social, and cultural rights as ascertained by ICESCR. On the other hand, it encompasses the protection of civil and political rights. For example, in wartime Bosnia and Herzegovina when freedom of movement was limited, some local religious leaders were useful in acting as escorts to refugees returning as minorities in their communities. Apart from this, the interfaith dialogue dimension of the protection of human rights entails attempts both to articulate respect and to promote religious tolerance within society.

Finally, the third concept explored is “implementation.” Essentially this means that the state has a duty to protect, fulfill, and implement human rights. On the one hand, civil and political rights “implementation” means that the state and its authorities have to respect the rights accepted. Therefore, these so-called “negative” rights require less energetic state action. On the other hand, to implement economic, social, and cultural rights means that the government should initiate certain positive actions.⁶

Apart from the process of implementation as a whole, the implementation of religious freedom in particular is elaborated in the second chapter of this essay – “The role of the interfaith dialogue in the protection and implementation of religious rights.”

The role of the inter-religious dialogue in the protection and implementation of human rights

Inter-religious communication offers an alternative way of implementing human rights. The role of cross-religious cooperation in promoting and preventing human rights could be investigated from several different perspectives. The input is visible in the pivotal role played by religion in the moralization of society. Thus it influences in a positive way the perception of mankind towards the delicate human rights issue. There are various examples that could be pointed out. For instance, the moral support for the non-violence movement given by the church on the 17th of April 2003 could be mentioned. This date was promulgated as a day for prayer and fasting for peace throughout the world in order to raise social consciousness and indicate the violations of basic human rights caused by war crimes.

Nevertheless, the role of interfaith dialogue in promoting human rights within society is all the more essential. There are at least two main levels on which its contribution is noticeable. On the one hand, it can be achieved through mutual understanding and tolerance between various religious systems, involving more effective protection and implementation of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. From this point of view interfaith dialogue particularly assists the implementation of religious rights. On the other hand, its influence can be observed within a larger framework. Certain political and civil rights, as well as economic, social,

and cultural rights, are successfully encouraged and advocated by the NGOs dealing with interfaith dialogue.

There are several arguments that prove the fact that inter-religious co-operation is of specific importance concerning the promotion and protection of human rights. One of them is illustrated by the Bucharest Meeting in 2000 of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. It was aimed at addressing the needs for democratization and respect of human rights, human dignity and reconciliation.⁷ The official report states that the contribution to the objectives of the Stability Pact of inter-religious dialogue is bound with the exploration and preparation of the grounds for co-operation between the confessions and religions in the region. Such an interpretation of the connection between interfaith dialogue, on the one hand, and the protection of human rights, on the other, is based on the understanding of religious rights as guaranteed by international law.

The role of inter-religious dialogue in the protection and implementation of religious rights

The three basic legal instruments encompassing the issue of religious freedoms are Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The other legal document dealing especially with religious freedoms is The United Nation Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-

crimination Based on Religion or Belief. As stated in the ICCPR, under the term “religious freedoms” one should understand everyone’s “right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”⁸

However, the role of the relation between different religious factions in the process of implementation of religious freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination in particular provides the possibility for overcoming a problematic situation within the international standards. The obstacle is caused by the lack of a legally binding treaty protecting the realization of religious rights. In this regard, The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief should be mentioned again. Although it has some legal effect, especially under customary international law, it is still only a declaration bearing no officially authorized obligatory status.

The fact that there is no internationally enforceable instrument that would safeguard the free exercise of personal beliefs makes the inter-relations between various systems of beliefs especially important. As it does not promote a singular religious perspective but rather is based on the respect of one’s free choice of faith, it assists the state’s obligation to implement religious freedoms. Inter-religious dialogue offers a mutual self-controlling mechanism within the religious organism itself

through placing all religious systems on equal ground. Additionally, it could also serve as a monitoring body. Along with the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and other regional instruments dealing with the implementation of the freedom of religion on local level, interfaith dialogue provides a unique possibility to observe and regulate the implementation from within. Therefore, the more powerful the multi-lateral religious dialogue movement, the more reliable the safeguard for identifying the incidents and the avoidance of violence of religious rights.

A good example of the above-mentioned interdependence is the formal discussion “*Nurturing a Culture of Dialogue: A Journey from Violence to Cooperation*” held under the patronage of Boris Trajkovski, the President of Macedonia. By clarifying points of differences, the multi-lateral dialogue carried out by a group of religious leaders in the midst of the recent 2001 crisis in Macedonia facilitated the building up of trust and openness between religious groups. One outcome of the constructive discussion was that the two deans of the Orthodox and Islamic theological seminaries made a commitment to cooperation between the two schools. Additionally, a plan to rebuild mosques and churches that had been destroyed or vandalized during the conflict was accepted. In conclusion, they made a significant commitment to creating a Council on inter-religious cooperation appointed by religious leaders to replace the one previously directed by political parties. The concluding provision presents a significant step ahead towards religious independence from the ruling

elites and turns religion away from being a factor in interethnic conflicts.

However, the role of the interfaith dialogue movement is not only that of mediator between various religions. As summarized in “Understanding human rights,” international and local NGOs dealing with the interfaith dialogue issue, together with secular organizations, have “an equally clear role in pointing out violations by states and others, in defending the persecuted and promoting tolerance through information campaigns, awareness raising, educational programs and teaching.”⁹

Moreover, one of the key principles of interfaith dialogue as stated by Abbot Thomas Keating in “Guidelines for Inter-religious Understanding”¹⁰ is that a difference among belief systems should be presented as facts that distinguish them rather than as points of superiority.¹¹ This main postulate resolves the long-standing problem concerning the relationship between the state and religion. More precisely, the phenomenon of the “state-church” or “official belief” is often a source of violation of religious freedom. Although the international standards do not require the separation of church or religion from the state, such relationship repeatedly results in discrimination against those who do not belong to the recognized faith. Further on, abuses of the freedom of belief could affect breaches of the other rights as well. Among them are the rights to employment, accommodation, access to social services, etc.

In this regard Florian Bieber in his report on “Minority rights and the freedom of religion in Balkan

countries” enumerates several kinds of such violations of religious rights that reflect on economic, social, and cultural rights.¹² As a rule, they refer to the efforts of governments to establish the predominant religion as a formal or informal state-church, thus violating the rights of other faith communities. As a consequence of this discriminatory policy the dominant religion usually receives a privileged status in the state structure, while the smaller communities are viewed with suspicion by the authorities.

Related to the topic of this paper, the above mentioned problem has reference to the violation respectively of the right to cultural and religious identity. Moreover, the intervention of the “authoritarian” religious community in the political sphere manipulates government decisions.¹³ This reflects not only on cultural rights but also on the right to proper education and sometimes even on the right to work. For instance, in the educational system some minorities are exposed to stereotyping. When in schoolbooks Islam is characterised as a “religion of warriors” it affects the quality of education and hence its positive influence on the rising generation is questionable.

Furthermore, he points out that a lack of dialogue and constructive relations exists even among these injured religious groups. The outcome of this “hierarchy” is that many religious units are confronted with registration problems as religious communities. For example, in some cases new religious groups must be registered at the ministry of the interior instead of the ministry of religious affairs. This lack of legal personality for the new

religious entities further complicates the ownership of property, and contracts (i.e. employment) are made impossible. Therefore it seems that the existence of dialogue and more constructive relations among religious communities is important from a religious standpoint as well as for the realization of the key provisions of the international treaties.

The role of interfaith dialogue in protecting and implementing human rights as a whole

Although the role of the inter-religious dialogue in the protection of human rights as a whole is not as obvious and direct as the role of the state, it does have its own unique and specific position. The interfaith dialogue movement’s means are different from the traditionally used mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights – reports, recommendations, individual complaints, etc. As a factor within the civil society it acts through demonstrations, information campaigns, educational programs, appeals, calls, notes, urges, and encouragement. Thus the promotion of human rights can be accomplished through several strategies.

One of these strategies is cooperation between various religious systems. Their members urge political leaders to uphold the principles of democracy, good governance, and human rights. In this respect, interfaith dialogue succeeds in promoting and protecting human rights using the symbolic value of religion. Furthermore,

through guiding policy-making it can partake in the structure and make its presence felt in the content and implementation of human rights instruments and mechanisms. Additionally, campaigns can be organized to lobby the ratification of certain international instruments.

Therefore, at the level of religious leadership the international interfaith NGOs, as part of the non-governmental network, contribute to the visible development of civil society. As such they can influence both the formal governmental policy and public opinion. In this regard an evident example is the legal experts working group with multi-religious representatives, established in May 1999 within the Inter-Religious Council (hereafter IRC) in BiH. Since the representatives of all the major faith communities in BiH were dissatisfied with the legislation concerning religious freedom currently in force in BiH, the above-presented experts working group has been assigned to draft a new law on the freedom of religion and the legal status of the religious communities in BiH. As an outcome of its activity on October 10, 2002, the agreed on text for a Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Religious Communities and Churches in BiH was presented by the prominent lawyers from the four traditional religious communities and churches (the Islamic Community of BiH, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church and the Jewish Community).¹⁴ Thus the draft law presented stands a good chance of being adopted and implemented in the parliamentary procedure.

The role of interfaith dialogue in the protection of human rights as a whole is visible in wartime as well. In such cases as divided cities or conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building, the leaders of different religious communities having broad concerns about people beyond their own groups “can use their authority to lead the way to inter-ethnic co-operation ... and on a practical level they can play an extremely important role in civil society building.”¹⁵ Apart from the non-governmental initiatives that will be explored further on in this chapter, we could hardly ignore the role of religious leadership. In this respect, the role of joint efforts towards reconciliation undertaken by the religious leaders in BiH is even more important considering that the tradition of grassroots activism and strong civic engagement is usually lacking in the Balkan area. As Branka Peuraca points out, faith authorities can foster reconciliation not only through formal joint statements but also through personal example. For instance, she points out that such a simple act as an Orthodox priest and a Franciscan monk sharing coffee publicly in a café in Tuzla received attention as a demonstration of overcoming rifts between faith traditions and influenced some of the local people.¹⁶

In addition to the above-mentioned, Marc Gopin proposes a valuable analysis of the role of the cross-belief discussion as a specific form of inter-religious dialogue. According to him, both “official” dialogue at the level of religious leadership and interpersonal communication between believers from dissimilar systems of belief are a powerful means of reconciliation. As he puts

it, “to the degree that one can get enemies to use their words one will move closer to peace and away from confrontation.”¹⁷ The idea is that during the interfaith encounter, by articulating deep envy, the shame of the collective humiliation of one’s group, the desire to take revenge or to see the enemy suffer, one will move the intense emotions of hatred into a different mode of interaction.¹⁸

Furthermore, it is the grassroots interfaith dialogue initiative that has the important mission of preparing the grounds for reconciliation. Without this essential basis, international assistance could be insufficient. To prove this statement Peuraca indicates several cases where the early initiatives toward promoting interfaith reconciliation undertaken by international actors were misconceived and counterproductive. From among them we can mention the efforts to rebuild mosques in the predominantly Serbian cities of Banja Luka and Trebinje that led to an unfortunate death. Thus grassroots inter-religious initiatives can assist the work of international organizations so that their efforts are not perceived as an outside pressure to reconciliation.

The role of the inter-religious dialogue as redefining the official attitude of certain religions towards the issue of human rights

So far we have elaborated the functions of multilateral religious dialogue as a self-regulatory mechanism preventing both religious discrimination and the viola-

tions of religious freedoms. Moreover, interfaith dialogue was presented as independent from the state’s influence as a monitoring body. Apart from this, inter-religious dialogue has a crucial role as a redefining mechanism which transforms the official attitude of certain religions towards the issue of human rights.

This aspect of communication between religions is of particular significance for the present essay, since many breaches of human rights still stem from religious intolerance, ignorance, or one-sidedness. In this respect, the interfaith debate, based on the principle of mutual understanding among world religions, offers a great possibility to overcome certain negative approaches to human rights through discussion. As mentioned before, it is the theologian dialogue that can be perceived as an opportunity for redefinition. Furthermore, the 8th principle of the “Guidelines for Inter-religious Understanding” could be used as a reliable foundation for the efforts of re-thinking. This postulate states that: “In the light of the globalization of life and culture now in process, the personal and social ethical principles proposed by the world religions in the past need to be re-thought and re-expressed.”¹⁹ However, this attempt is grounded not only in the theoretical apparatus of interfaith dialogue but also in its practical activities. For instance, the relationship of religion to the family, to education, to the state, to women’s rights, etc., has been one of the topics of discussion encouraged by the WCC between Christians and Muslims in recent years.

Thus, interfaith dialogue offers a possibility for entering the dialogue with Muslims on the restrictions on

fundamental human rights that are imposed in many countries with Islamic majorities. However, it is important not to single out freedom of religion or belief, because other fundamental rights may also be threatened. One of the fundamental postulates of interfaith co-operation is not to criticize and neglect but to inspire new common perspectives on a given issue through mutual understanding and interaction. Using this basic principle for resolving the difficulty with the teachings of Islam it is essential not to characterize Islam as repressive. Thus, it would be possible to enter into a dialogue with Muslims about the application of international law in pluralist societies with Islamic majorities.

Religious NGOs can also help encourage both other believers and governments to enforce human rights standards with respect to the gender issue. Several basic rights recognized by the international standards are violated even to this day. For instance, Shariah²⁰ limits the rights of women to a fair trial since they do not have the right to access the court on an equal footing with men. In this regard, the Global Network of Religious Women's Organizations should be mentioned. Its goal is to develop internal guidelines for the purpose of mainstreaming gender concerns in all religions. The Network aims to bring together women of different faith traditions in order to promote understanding, the observance of human rights, and the political status of women among followers of different religions. One of the general problems of the human rights treaties – the “problem of reservations” – could be addressed through such activities. As a consequence, better conditions for

the implementation of the basic human rights of women in Islamic countries could be provided.

Along with women in Muslim states, another target group is the adherents of other religions. Thus apostasy – the freedom to choose or change one's faith, could be safeguard in future through common discussions. This step would be in accordance with international law, which states that every person has the right to choose and convert his or her beliefs freely and without any restrictions or oppressions. In the UDHR it is stated that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief.”²¹ At the same time, the current situation is that Islam questions the act of converting to another religion (apostasy). For instance, a person who exercises his/her freedom of apostasy in some countries where society is based on the Shariah laws is still severely punished.

Therefore, interfaith dialogue has the important task of defining a common canon of values acceptable to all. Facilitating the most problematic spheres of life within which human rights seem to be frequently disregarded, the inter-religious exchange of ideas assists the implementation of the international standards. However, the latter is frequently connected with redefining the perception of human rights of some religions, which perceptions are inherited from the past.

Conclusion

It is a fact that religious leaders have recently been too easily manipulated by nationalist politicians. Moreover, religious motives were used not only in the Bosnian violent conflict but even during the recent events that took place in New York and Washington on September 11th 2001. Thus different religious traditions were misused for secular goals. They were involved in an inhumane violation of basic human rights. For instance, in ex-Yugoslavia the power of established reverence for religious authorities existing for centuries was used first by the former communist regime and later by the political leaders during and even after the war. The role of religion, a powerful instrument used both in a positive and negative way, raises the question of how co-operation between different religious communities can protect and implement human rights.

In the light of the above-mentioned, the present essay had the objective to explore the role of interfaith dialogue in the process of protection and implementation of human rights. To this end, an attempt was made to elaborate their interdependence and the various alternative “mechanisms” for the protection and implementation that inter-religious communication offers to the traditional legal procedure.

In the course of elaboration, several ways of protection and implementation of human rights were demonstrated. They were thematically developed in the respective chapters.

In order to make the exploration clearer in the first chapter the three key concepts – “inter-religious dialogue,” “protection,” and “implementation” were defined. Since the concept of the interfaith dialogue can have different interpretations, we have insisted on specific definitions of these key terms. In the second chapter, the role of interfaith dialogue in the protection and implementation of human rights was presented from two perspectives. The one illustrated its impact especially for religious rights, while the other focused on human rights as a whole – their civil, political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Finally, in the last chapter the role of the interfaith dialogue as redefining the official attitude of certain religions towards human rights issue was explored.

Future research on this topic could lead to an examination of the role of interfaith dialogue in the process of reconciliation. Such an exploration is of interest since it covers a violation and, consequently, the possible protection of many rights. These rights include the right to life and personal security, the right to property, to free movement, and economic, social and cultural rights. This offers a unique perspective towards the role of interfaith dialogue in protecting and implementing human rights in the post-war context.

Notes:

1 In the following, inter-religious dialogue and interfaith dialogue are used as synonyms. This use of these terms is in accordance with widely accepted practice.

2 Eck, D. *What do we mean by 'Dialogue'?*, in: *Current Dialogue*, vol. 11, 1986, pp. 14-15.

3 Other similar international NGOs dealing with the Interfaith dialogue issue are The World Parliament of Religions, The Global Ethic Foundation, The World Fellowship of Inter-Religious Councils (WFIRC), etc.

4 See *World Council of Churches inter-religious relations & dialogue*, <http://wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/interreligious/index-e.html>

5 Benedek, Wolfgang and Nikolova, Minna. 2003, p. 24.

6 Ibid., p. 24.

7 Rondos, Alexandre. *Bucharest Meeting. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Working Table I*, [http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/home.nsf/Toate/pactstabil/\\$File/agenda26_en.htm](http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/home.nsf/Toate/pactstabil/$File/agenda26_en.htm)

8 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm>.

9 Benedek, Wolfgang and Nikolova, Minna. 2003, p. 165.

10 Keating, Thomas. *Speaking of Silence: Christian and Buddhists on the Contemplative Way*. Edited by Susan Walker. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987, pp. 56-57.

11 Abbot Thomas Keating and his organization, the Snowmass Conference, made up of fifteen religions, each represented by one person. The Snowmass Conference has been meeting for nearly ten years, and the fifteen spiritual leaders have arrived at a consensus on the principles of inter-religious dialogue.

12 Bieber, Florian. "Minority rights and the freedom of Religion in Balkan Countries", 1999, pp. 7-14, <http://www.immi.se/irf/invandraren/inva991/minority.htm>.

13 In this respect, one could mention the role that the Serbian Orthodox Church played in promoting nationalist tensions in Serbia.

14 For further details see: "Law of freedom of religion and the legal position of religious communities and churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina", in: "Building civil societies in South-east Europe," http://www.wcrpp.org/RforP/SOUTHEASTEUROPE_MAIN.html.

15 Bieber, Florian and Daskalovski, Zidas. *Religion in Kosovo – blessing or curse?* in: *Understanding the war in Kosovo*, London: Frank Cass, 2003, p. 275.

16 Peuraca, Branka. "Can Faith-based NGO Advance Interfaith Reconciliation?: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina," in: *United States Institute of Peace*, N. 103, 2003.

17 Gopin, Marc. "The use of the word and its limits: a critical evaluation of religious dialogue as peacemaking," in: Smock, David, ed., *Interfaith Dialogue*, Washington: USIP, 2002, pp. 155.

18 Ibid., p. 152.

19 Keating, Thomas. 1987, p. 57.

20 Shariah is the Islamic codification of law.

21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, <http://www.udhr.org/UDHR/default.htm>.

O radiografie necesara – Ortodoxie si Globalizare

The two works this paper focuses on (Anastasios Yannopoulos, *Orthodoxy and the Problems of Contemporary World* and Georgios Mantzaridis, *Globalization and Universality. Phantom and Truth*) represent a thorough analysis of contemporary history, in which globalization is the direction and purpose of the new vision in human relations and community. The loss of the individuality of these relations is considered to be a disease which has very strong religious and anthropological effects. The common feature is the reaffirmation of community in the perspective of Eastern anthropology.

În cartea sa, *La mondialisation*, aparuta în 1997 la Press Universitaire de France, Philippe Moreau Defarge afirma: “Mondializarea pare sa deschida umanitatii doua cai extreme. Da oamenilor impresia ca sunt închisi într-o închisoare, pământul... Sau naste constiinta unitatii umanitatii... Mondializarea nu este decât un produs al progresului tehnic. Desigur, nu e împlinator faptul ca mondializarea se realizeaza în clipa în care omul se afunda în doua infinituri: în infinitul mic al materiei si în infinitul mare al astrelor” (p. 124-125). Un sentiment înrudit, dar de sens opus celui de claustrofobie produs de mondializare, îl avea în secolul al XVII-lea Pascal care contempla spatiul infinit (problema

ION CORDONEANU

Assistant Lecturer, Ph.D.,
Department of Philosophy
and Theology, Faculty of
Letters, History and
Philosophy, University of
Galati, Romania
E-mail:
theosisro@yahoo.com

KEY WORDS:

Globalization, uniformization, depersonalization, religious and anthropological crisis, personal community

infinitatii lumii devine una de mare dezbatere în acest secol), imaginându-si acest bulgare de pamînt care-l poarta pe om fara directie si fara sens prin univers. Aceeasi gravitate ca atunci infinitatea lumii o are astazi discutia privitoare la fenomenul globalizarii, un fenomen pe cît de complex, pe atît de interpretat si evaluat, într-o dezbatere generalizata care este înca în plina desfasurare.

Spatiul rasaritean a intrat în algoritmul acestei analize din doua perspective, ca personaj si ca actor¹, ambele dînd la iveala doua viziuni care, indiscutabil, sunt, daca nu contradictorii, cel putin diferite. Din interiorul crestinismului rasaritean doi autori sunt cei care ne atrag atentia prin analizele pe care le întreprind asupra fenomenului globalizarii; este vorba despre profesorul Georgios Mantzaridis, a carui judecata deosebit de transanta catalogheaza, în *Globalizare si universalitate – himera si adevar* (Editura Bizantina, 2002), globalizarea drept “numai o înșelatoare fata a universalitatii”; si despre Anastasios Yannoulatos, Arhiepiscop al Tiranei si a toata Albania, al carui studiu, *Ortodoxia si problemele lumii contemporane* (Editura Bizantina, 2003) reprezinta o perspectiva clara si convingatoare asupra unor probleme majore precum comunitatea mondiala, Ortodoxia si drepturile omului, crestinismul si celelalte religii etc.

I

Profesorul de morala si sociologie a crestinismului de la Tesalonic, Georgios Mantzaridis, expune un punct de vedere foarte critic în analiza fenomenului globalizarii care, în opinia sa, nu este decît o ideologie politica promovata de noua ordine mondiala.

Alaturi de tendinta globalizanta în care este angrenata lumea contemporana si provocata de aceasta tendinta, își face simtite efectele miscarea de autolimitare promovata de nationalismele militante, ambele orientari luînd adesea dimensiuni amenintatoare. Autorul remarca o situatie paradoxala: apoteoza globalizarii a coincis cu disolutia comunismului. Trecînd prin comunism, popoarele respective se întorc la fondul lor etnic, în timp ce statele care nu au avut experienta internationalismului promoveaza globalizarea. Ambele miscari arata ca nu exista sinceritate pentru adevarata universalitate nici de o parte, nici de cealalta. Totusi, Mantzaridis opteaza pentru o atitudine critica la adresa globalizarii care “duce la transformarea popoarelor în mase de indivizi, la nivelarea culturilor, la amestecul religiilor, la omogenizarea înfatisarii si a comportamentului oamenilor, la americanizarea modului de viata”¹. Trebuie remarcat ca Georgios Mantzaridis simpatizeaza chiar din primele rînduri cu definitia data globalizarii de K. Melas într-o carte

publicata în 1999, *Globalizarea. O noua fază de internaționalizare a economiei. Mituri și realitate*, conform caruia globalizarea reprezintă “raspunsul american la încercările europenilor și japonezilor de a se găsi ca parteneri de dialog la aceeași masă cu SUA”, o definiție pe cât de tendentioasă, pe atât de reductionistă.

În radiografierea fenomenului, autorul manifestă preferința pentru individualizarea elementului economico-financiar, afirmând că “la nivelul economiei și mai ales la nivelul economiei financiare, globalizarea a prezentat o evoluție impetuoasă”².

Însă, adevăratul motivul pentru care globalizarea este tematizată, și de obicei lucrul acesta se face în sens negativ, este pentru că ea are, printre multitudinea consecințelor și pozitive, și negative, ca urmare gravă anihilarea omului ca persoană, atât la nivel religios, cât și la nivel antropologic. Urmare a acestei realități, religiile sunt promovate și înțelese ca “mijloace de reglare psihologică”, viziune aflată la antipodul abordării creștinismului drept cunoaștere a adevărului despre Dumnezeu ca Persoană și comuniunea Sa cu creația.

În viziunea lui Mantzaridis, globalizarea aduce cu sine o anumită imagine a lumii înțelese ca material omogenizant, nesocotind principiile, valorile și particularitățile sale și consfintind domnia banului³. Reclamând drept imperativă *redescoperirea adevărului persoanei*, teologul grec consideră opțiuni necugetate deopotrivă idolatrizarea trecutului și aderarea necritică la fenomenul globalizării. “Provocarea globalizării nu duce în mod fatal la omogenizarea oamenilor”⁴, afirmă Mantzaridis, în opinia căreia acest fenomen complex ar

putea chiar, dacă nu determina, atunci cel puțin înlesni renasterea comunității de persoane. El vede în globalizare o provocare din confruntarea cu care în Biserică ar putea renaste motivația pentru o conștiință critică în vederea experienței universalității eclesiologice⁵.

Parafrăzând cartesiană îndoiala metodică, Mantzaridis dovedește un optimism metodic exprimat în speranța că impasul contemporan nu trebuie considerat fără soluție⁶. Acest impas ar putea foarte bine să funcționeze ca motivație și punct de plecare pentru pregătirea unei renasteri fundamentale care să aibă în centru persoana umană, neîngrădită de sisteme și metode formale. Autorul opune globalizării universalitatea creștină care are ca premisă abandonarea egoismului. Ea se construiește în interiorul lumii, la nivelul persoanelor, “înlauntrul omului și al istoriei, prin stradanie și jertfa de sine”⁷. Prevăzând că, dacă persoana umană nu va lupta împotriva epidemiei globalizării, atunci acest sistem impersonal va distruge viața personală și comunitară, fiind astfel lichidată comunitatea omenească reală și concretă, Mantzaridis își afirmă credința că o societate mondială “nu se construiește pe omogenizarea oamenilor, ci prin înălțarea lor la demnitatea persoanei”⁸ și animate de un duh universal.

Aceste idei constituie premisele unei viziuni mai nuanțate și, de ce să nu o spunem, mai puțin alarmiste, care va fi dezvoltată în cartea Arhiepiscopului Tiranei și a toată Albania, Anastasios Yannoulatos, careia i-am acordat un spațiu mai larg din acest comentariu.

Principala exigenta care se poate desprinde dintru început în lectura lui Anastasios Yannoulatos este aceea ca globalizarea nu înseamna relativism, ea trebuie înțeleasa ca dialog. În privinta Ortodoxiei, aceasta trebuie sa depaseasca prejudecatile si crisperile contractate în confruntarea cu modernitatea, sa depaseasca logica vechi simfonii si sa paseasca în logica dialogului.

Dincolo de aceste prescriptii de ordin general, Anastasios Yannoulatos întreprinde o exigenta analiza a fenomenului globalizarii ca expresie a secularizarii care neglijeaza sau submineaza religia, ocupându-se de alte teme. Totusi, în ciuda conditiilor impuse de secularizare, se impune situarea “în aria acestor noi forte de unitate ale umanitatii, fara complexe superioritatii sau inferioritatii”², iar factorii “nereligiosi”, precum miscarea socialista sau miscari ale caror idealuri au fost initial religioase, dar ulterior s-au laicizat (egalitate, libertate individuala, dreptate), trebuie tratati drept parteneri pentru înfaptuirea idealurilor universale. Chiar si asa, în relatie de colaborare fiind, *religia nu-si va putea ignora rolul critic, necesitatea unei exprimari îndraznete si a unei viziuni profetice*³, precum si *identificarea pericolelor si degenerarilor culturii contemporane*⁴.

Imperativului unitatii, asa cum este ea înțeleasa de catre protagonistii contemporani reuniti în functie de interese sau organizare tehnocrata, deci ca realitate impusa din exterior dupa ratiuni economice si politice, îi

este opusa o viziune inteiorizata, bazata pe comuniunea personala care determina unitatea organica.

Pentru iesirea din criza si realizarea unei reale unitati, religiile sunt chemate sa ofere din inspiratiile si intuitiile lor spirituale, sarcina lor fiind dubla: 1. depasirea blocajului si a sterilitatii dialogului⁵; 2. descoperirea punctului vital, semnalarea pericolului iminent al crearii unui amestec social eteroclit si lipsit de forma deodata cu oferirea solutiilor pentru realizarea unitatii, deosebite calitativ de unitatea politica si economica, preconizata de organisme internationale, si într-o cu totul alta ordine, cea transcendentă.

Anastasios Yannoulatos crede ca, în conditiile tehnocratiei si a societatii informationale de azi în care se contureaza o veritabila criza de identitate a omului sau a comunitatii, religia crestina are o cotributie hotarâtoare care consta în „descoperirea persoanei si a nevoii de integrare a acestei într-o comuniune de iubire”⁶. Evaluarea crizei umanitatii la sfîrsitul mileniului al-II-lea si începutul mileniului al-III-lea este facuta din perspectiva principiilor crestine, însa autorul este constient ca „solutia nu poate fi aceea conform careia noi, ca individualitati, sa transcendem cercul la nivelul discursului propriului cerc religios închis pentru a-i întâlni pe ceilalti, ci toti sa deschidem usile si ferestrele sistemelor noastre religioase din interior, pentru a înlesni adevarata comuniune cu toti oamenii”⁷. În interpretarea teologului, fenomenul globalizarii nu poate fi despartit de o filosofie a comuniunii personale al carei fundament este, în opinia autorului, comuniunea cu creatia si comuniunea cu Dumnezeu. Cauza separatiei

dintre oameni o reprezinta ruperea relatiei dintre Dumnezeu si om.

Crestinism si comuniune universala

Anastasios Yannoulatos arata ca religia crestina are în sine disponibilitatea pentru dialog, afirmând necesitatea pastrării constiintei scindării si a concilierii universale. Credinciosului “nu îi este permis sa se izoleze în nici un fel de suficienta de sine, nici sa socoteasca izbavirea în Hristos drept mântuire exclusiva a infimului sau *ego*”⁸. Eliberata de orice sentiment sal *posesiunii* (a adevarului, a doctrinei etc.), Biserica este înțeleasa ca *semn al unitatii* umane care depaseste granitele sensibile ale comunitatilor eclesiale si ca *slujitoare a umanitatii*. Pentru Arhiepiscopul Anastasios, unitatea nu trebuie sa fie nivelatoare, ci organica; în aceasta unitate, persoana se dezvolta în armonie cu întregul, iar Biserica, în universalitatea ei, trebuie sa dovedeasca capacitatea de cuprindere, nu de excludere.

Afirmîn ca înțelegerea istoriei începe de la modelul comuniunii care este Sfînta Treime si se sfîrseste cu acest model, Anastasios sustine proiectul unei “democratii a responsabilitatii”, în care fiecare este responsabil de directia pe care o urmeaza istoria. Modelul argumentativ este pe cît de simplu, pe atît de revelator: persoana este celula, comunitatea – istoria este organismul de viata caruia celula nu doar se bucura, ci contribuie la împlinirea ei⁹. Afirmînd ca indiferenta crestinului pentru ecumenism nu este conforma cu

esenta credintei crestine, Anastasios sustine afirmarea responsabilitatii asupra întregului si a mobilizării tuturor fortelor individuale, fiind depasita astfel orice filosofie politica individualista sau a statului de tip asistential promovate în prezent în Occident.

Ortodoxia si drepturile omului. Local si universal

Împotriva unor puncte de vedere conform carora spiritul rasaritean ortodox ar fi incompatibil cu ideologia drepturilor omului, teologul grec pune în discutie aceasta tema, afirmînd ca istoria Bisericii si cugetarea teologica ortodoxa ofera material pretios în abordarea dintr-o cu totul alta perspectiva a temei drepturilor omului.

Convingerea ca ignorarea drepturilor omului constituie, din perspectiva crestina, “denaturarea firii umane, negarea principiului unitatii neamului omenesc, a izbavirii în Hristos a întregii firi umane”¹⁰, trebuie, în opinia autorului însoțita atentie în ceea ce priveste acceptarea fara discernamînt a uniformizării pe care o practica un tip de internationalism uniform si amorf la moda, care ignora mostenirea si specificul national. La fel de critic se dovedeste a fi cu încercările de integrare a crestinismului sub lozinci nationaliste (pentru ca, astfel, se neaga firea comuna a oamenilor) sau sub idealuri capitaliste (care neaga particularitatea persoanei si specificul fiecarui popor).

Viziunea ortodoxa asupra drepturilor omului este astfel integrata în discutia mai larga a echilibrului dintre

universal si local, importanta pentru armonizarea respectului pentru traditiile religioase locale cu descoperirea sensului universal pe care îl ascund specificul lor¹¹. Pornind de aici, religiile, fara a neglija diferentele, pot identifica sarcina comuna în încercarea de a oferi o dimensiune verticala alternativa la civilizatia tehnica *lipsita de profunzime si altitudine*, acest demers fiind cu atât mai important cu cât autorul sustine ideea ca rezolvarea problemei raului nu se poate limita doar la dimensiunea sociala.

În cadrul aceleiasi discutii referitoare la problematica drepturilor omului din perspectiva ortodoxa este si importanta distinctie dintre credinta si politica: orice tentativa de considerare a drepturilor omului din perspectiva ortodoxa este datoare sa mentina explicita constiinta perspectivelor diferite si a diferentei de planuri dintre cele doua¹². Ca rezultate ale politicii, toate declaratiile referitoare la drepturile omului urmaresc impunerea principiilor prin instrumente legislative constrângatoare, în timp ce crestinismul actioneaza în lume ca forta spirituala care elibereaza, transfigureaza si renaste omul la o noua viata duhovniceasca¹³.

Este recunoscut faptul ca principiul drepturilor omului se sprijina pe o antropologie indiferenta la coordonatele tainei persoanei, motiv pentru care secolul trecut a fost martorul atâtor tragedii si esecuri. În aceste conditii, optimismului simplificat al declaratiilor privitoare la drepturile omului (pe fondul actiunilor contradictorii ale celor care le sustin, al contradictiilor dintre cunoastere si vointa), îi este propusa ca alternativa antropologia ortodoxa, în viziunea careia

“exista o antinomie înnascuta în existenta umana”¹⁴, constînd în tensiunea dintre tragedia pacatului si posibilitatea transcenderii lui.

Drepturile omului si responsabilitate umana

Perspectiva unilaterala a *afirmarii drepturilor* trebuie astazi corelata cu *accentuarea îndatoririlor si responsabilitatilor*. Si pentru ca unilateralitatea drepturilor individuale conduce la individualism, nu trebuie pierduta din vedere armonizarea lor cu cele comunitare. Aceasta armonizare este exprimata în formula evanghelica *iubeste pe aproapele tau ca pe tine însuti*, fiind vorba aici despre “transcenderea *eu*-lui si a *tu*-ului, în vederea ridicarii la comuniunea persoanelor”¹⁵. Se impune, astfel, o *redefinire* a drepturilor fundamentale ale omului pornind de la fundamentele teologice ale antropologiei rasaritene, redefinire în care *demnitatea umana*, legata de constiinta maretiei umane si a limitelor sale, sa reprezinte certitudinea ca omul este creatia Dumnezeului personal, *libertatea* sa fie considerata în legatura cu responsabilitatea pentru faptele proprii, fiind limitata de poruncile dumnezeiesti, iar *egalitatea* sa fie circumscrisa conform declaratiei paulinice “nu mai este elin si iudeu, barbar, scit, rob ori liber, ci toate si întru toti Hristos” (*Col. 3, 11*)¹⁶. Peste acestea trei, Anastasios Yannoulatos aseaza, fundamental, *dreptul de a iubi si de a fi iubit*, la care nu face referire nici un document, nici o declaratie. În acest drept se împlinesc organic si dinamic, demnitatea, libertatea si egalitatea creștine.

Autorul pune în valoare adâncimea acestei concepții creștine despre drepturile fundamentale, remarcând cum, în epoca idolatrizării drepturilor omului, “gândirea creștină și trăirea creștină scot în evidență dreptul omului de a-și jertfi în mod liber, de dragul iubirii, chiar și propriile *drepturi*. Lucrul acesta nu este impus, ci este decis în mod liber. Iubirea rămâne o decizie dinamică ce își răspândește razele sale dincolo de cadrele înguste ale structurilor juridice, ce daruiește libertatea nu numai față de o lege ipocrită, ci și față de orice lege omenească”¹⁷.

Ultima consecință a antropologiei creștine răsăritene o constituie afirmarea supremului drept al fiecărui om, acela de a deveni *ceea ce a fost creat să fie, adică să împlinească ceea ce este mai profund în el și să devină fiu al lui Dumnezeu*.

Îngrijorarea Arhiepiscopului este aceea că declarațiile drepturilor omului să nu rămână texte juridice aride, iar, în privința aceasta, “conștiința ortodoxă creștină oferă posibilitatea unei aprofundări și mai mari a sensului drepturilor omului”¹⁸.

La nivelul dialogului interreligios, există acordul că problema drepturilor fundamentale, indiferent de o tradiție religioasă ori alta, este o problemă importantă pentru majoritatea religiilor lumii și, în special, ale marilor curente religioase (hinduism, budism, iudaism, ortodoxie, catolicism, protestantism, sintoism și islam) care acceptă sacralitatea ființei umane, demnitatea ei și înțeleg să colaboreze cu organisme internaționale specializate.

Fenomenul mondializării și religiile

Caracterizând-o ca ideologie politică a celor puternici economic și exprimându-și temerile cu privire la viteza cu care se desfășoară și acționează în schimbarea structurilor lumii, Anastasios Yannoulatos afirmă că mondializarea nu mai este un fenomen autonom, ci reprezintă un proces care produce schimbări radicale în viața oamenilor, atât pozitive, cât și negative.

“Mondializarea nu este doar un proces economic. Este vorba despre o directă sau indirectă impunere a unui sistem de gândire care ignoră sau distruge particularitățile fiecărui popor și om în parte și izgoneste sau dizolvă valori ca prietenia, onestitatea, cumpătarea, proiectând un prototip consumist cu o neîncetată urmărire a câștigului, sub influența căreia relațiile umane sunt adesea strivite”¹⁹.

Însă, fenomenul mondializării este specific oricăreia dintre marile religii care au avut viziunea comunității mondiale și au încercat să realizeze mondializarea spirituală și, implicit, culturală prin răspândirea credinței. Se pot identifica trei etape în evoluția religiei la nivel mondial: mai întâi, este vorba despre impunerea unei religii (etapa războaielor religioase), apoi de abolirea fenomenului religios (corespunzătoare instaurării ideologiei comuniste) și, în sfârșit, spre sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea se constată revigorarea religioasă. Acum suntem în plină desfășurare a celei de-a patra etape, când constatăm “invazia relativului” care tinde să se substituie absolutului religios²⁰.

Date fiind condițiile desfasurării procesului de mondializare, se impune observatia ca fenomenul religios are o importanta deosebita în configurarea acestui secol. Interesanta este analiza, chiar daca sumara, a tezelor pe care Samuel P. Huntington le lansa în *Ciocrnirea civilizațiilor*, unde cultura rasariteana este asimilata, dupa o schema *a priori*, Islamului, fiind ignorate, în fapt, fundamentele teologice si diferentele dintre cele doua religii. Aici Yannoulatos crede ca în spatele argumentarii lui Huntington se ascunde aroganta culturii americane “superioare” si instinctul autoconservarii. În opinia lui Yannoulatos, religia are propria ei dinamica nesusceptibila “planificatelor delimitari strategice ale celor mari”.

Mondializarea impune readaptarea relatiilor dintre religii, a caror existenta este provocata fie de nasterea unei noi religii (de tip *new age*), fie de o atitudine auto-conservatoare.

Este limpede ca discutia despre “religia mondiala” este mai prezenta ca oricând, data fiind similitudinile cu fenomenul mondializării. În atari conditii, trebuie recunoscuta importanta comunicarii si a dialogului religios, fie doar pentru înțelegerea reciproca, daca nu pentru respectarea libertatii celuilalt, a specificului alteritatii, a coexistentei pasnice si colaborării în problemele comune, precum dreptatea sociala, rezolvarea conflictelor²¹.

Înțelegerea mondializării se îndeparteaza tot mai mult astazi de imaginea în care un centru, o cultura se impun, în detrimentul celorlalte comunitati. În acest sens, comunitatile religioase se constituie în “centre de

rezistenta” si “fortarete ale identitatii”. Împotriva mondializării abuzive, Yannoulatos înțelege religiile ca singurele insule de siguranta unde oamenii se repliaza.

În acest fenomen destul de complex, Ortodoxia are contributia si responsabilitatea ei, dar legitimarea traditiei milenare ortodoxe este data numai de o traire autentica si pura care sa contribuie la oferta pozitiva a evolutiei mondiale.

Credinta ierarhului grec este ca, în raport cu mondializarea, ortodoxia nu se afla în impas²². Universalitatea (*ecumenicitatea*, în limbaj teologic) este componenta fundamentala a traditiei ortodoxe iar învățatura creștina are dimensiune universala si eshatologica. Cultural, viziunea holistica s-a articulat în procesul sintezei dintre cultura greaca si continutul revelat al credintei creștine. Aceasta viziune este prezenta si în reprezentările liturgicii ortodoxe care cultiva un orizont global, o viziune pancosmica: rugăciunile sunt “pentru pacea lumii”, iar Biserica este datoare sa orienteze “renasterea duhovniceasca a omului, mântuirea în Hristos, conferirea unui sens vietii”²³. În centrul preocupărilor ei Biserica aseaza omul (caracterizat de tenacitate si iubire nefatarnica, care sprijina dreptatea împotriva egocentrismului individual, national sau rasial) si vesteste, alaturi de exercitarea functiei profetice si critice la adresa oricaror forme de decadenta umana, *comuniunea mondiala de iubire*. “Biserica nu poate apartine clubului celor puternici si bogati. Puterea Ortodoxiei nu s-a identificat, nici nu s-a sprijinit pe exercitiul puterii lumesti”²⁴.

O viziune mondiala crestina, diferita de orice alta forma de mondializare, este circumscrisa în *Epistola a doua soborniceasca (ecumenica) a lui Petru*: “Dar noi asteptam, potrivit fagaduintelor Lui, ceruri noi si pamânt nou, în care locuieste dreptatea” (3, 13) (vezi despre sensul dreptatii, nota 16 *infra*). Aceasta viziune are în centrul ei relatia cu Dumnezeu cel Viu, relatie în care Biserica, în ecumenicitatea ei, difera de orice alt sistem religios. Revelatoare este lectia si credinta pe care Arhiepiscopul Anastasios le aseaza în încheierea cartii sale: “Ecumenicitatea este în sângele ortodocsilor, care este purificat neîncetat de sângele lui Hristos, Izbavitorul lumii. În locul unei mondializari care transforma popoare si oameni într-o masa utila doar scopurilor economice ale unor oligarhii anonime, trairea si viziunea ortodoxa propun si cheama la efotul pentru o comuniune de iubire”²⁵. Lectia aceasta marturiseste credinta în Ortodoxie, una a secolelor viitoare, deschisa evolutiei, si nicidecum la marginea istoriei, ci în avangarda ei, spre asigurarea *libertatii si unicitatii persoanei umane si a integritatii creatiei lui Dumnezeu*.

Note la partea I

1. *Globalizare si universalitate, himera si adevar*, Editura Bizantina, Bucuresti, 2002 (Tesalonic, 2001).
2. *op. cit.*, p. 10. Elementului economic îi corespunde procesul similar pe plan cultural si la nivel duhovnicesc.
3. *op. cit.*, p. 7.
4. *op. cit.*, p. 8.

5. Constiinta critica a Bisericii se afla si ea în deriva, deoarece *constiinta eclesiala, universală în esenta ei*, se confrunta cu un fenomen concurent ale carui aspiratii sunt *universaliste*.

6. Conform unui model de argumentare asemanator, în spatiul românesc H. R. Patapievici preconizeaza iesirea din impas a Ortodoxiei prin reconsiderarea din partea Bisericii a relatiei cu modernitatea.

7. *op. cit.*, p. 29.

8. *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Note la partea a II-a

1. Ca personaj, spatiul rasaritean (Crestinism ortodox, Islam, Orient îndepartat) este unul dintre factorii cu care civilizatia occidentala se confrunta, atât în ordinea politica si economica, cât, mai ales, în cea religioasa (conform Samuel Huntington, *Ciocrnirea civilizatiilor*). Ca actor, Rasaritul (aici este vorba despre Ortodoxie, în mod strict) vrea sa fie partener egal la configurarea noilor cadre ale geopoliticii euro-atlantice.

2. Anastasios Yanoulatos, *Ortodoxie si problemele lumii contemporane*, Editura Bizantina, 2003, p. 20.

3. Anastasios Yannoulatos nu pierde din vedere functia *metanoica* pe care si-o asuma teologia crestina în dialogul ei cu lumea. Aceasta functie este presupusa si îndeplinita de rolul critic al religiei, critica fiind înțeleasa în sensul etimologic al cuvântului grecesc: *krinein*=a *discerne*. Discernerea este urmata de optiune, fiind conditia necesara pentru a putea înțelege si alege binele.

4. Alaturi de sentimente contradictorii ca putere-neputinta, libertate-oprimare, este identificata si izolarea (sentimentul tragic al izolarii în multime).

5. Textul este redactat în anii 70 si prezentat ca referat în cadrul Conferintei Interreligioase Internationale din Colombo (Ceylon, 17-27 aprilie, 1974). La vremea aceea, cel puțin dialogul între romano-catolici si ortodocsi era la început. Astazi, chiar daca suntem încă în faza ceremonioasa a relatiilor, evolutia în comunicare este evidenta.

6. *op. cit.*, p. 25. Autorul constata, la nivelul tuturor structurilor societății, înmulțirea „mastilor” (ῥῆνιούδαῖσα) și dispariția „persoanelor” (ῥῆνιούδα), iar pierderea identității „personale” a unui individ este un proces în care, la nivelul existenței sociale individuale, o mască este înclocuită cu alta.

7. *op. cit.*, p. 27.

8. *op. cit.*, p. 33.

9. *op. cit.*, p. 36. Responsabilitatea creștinului acopera nu doar istoria prezenta, ci și pe cea trecută și viitoare, pentru că doar responsabilitatea asupra întregului constituie rațiunea pentru promovarea comunității mondiale. Principiul responsabilității asupra istoriei este considerat fundamental în literatura creștină răsăriteană.

10. *op. cit.*, p. 44.

11. În acest sens, trebuie amintită interpretarea pe care a dezvoltat-o Mircea Eliade asupra culturilor tradiționale arhaice, în care religiologul român a accentuat asupra semnificațiilor universale ale culturilor locale, susținând că suntem cu atât mai universali, cu cât coborâm pe filonul specific în identificarea semnificațiilor originare ale unui fenomen religios.

12. *op. cit.*, p. 62

13. Trebuie, însă, remarcată maniera mai puțin convingătoare de a căuta „radacinile” problematicei drepturilor omului în textele Evangheliei, cărora lumea apuseană, în opinia autorului, le-ar datora multe. Fermentul care a înlesnit dezvoltarea ideilor evanghelice l-ar fi constituit, în perioada Renasterii, gândirea greacă. Se pierde din vedere faptul că creștinismul și-a formulat propria viziune cu privire la locul și rolul omului în lume și relația lui cu statul, viziune atât de diferită de cea greacă, cât și de cea a Renasterii, aceasta o mișcare cu vadite accente de autonomizare a existenței umane în raport cu Dumnezeu (fără a mai discuta și amestecul substanțial de magie,

astrologie și alchimie care strabate toată această perioadă, până în zorii obscuri ai modernității). Modernitatea, la rîndul ei, va desăvîrși opera de autonomizare a Ratiunii, începută cu Descartes și încheiată cu Iluminismul și Revoluția franceză, curente și evenimente ale caror principii, după părerea mea, cu greu pot fi echivalate principiilor creștine. (v. p. 64 și nota 29 *infra*.)

14. *op. cit.*, p. 66.

15. *op. cit.*, p. 67.

16. Nerespectarea *acestei* egalități este numită în textele patristice *nedreptate*.

17. *op. cit.*, p. 84-85.

18. *op. cit.*, p. 89.

19. *op. cit.*, p. 221-222.

20. Teologul grec considera drept protagonist principal în impunerea realtivismului gândirea indiană a cărei concepție asupra pluralismului religios este caracterizată de ideea „absoluturilor alternative”.

21. În această ultimă chestiune, Biserica romano-catolică și-a format un bun obicei de a interveni sau, macar, de a-și face auzită vocea, atunci cînd comunitatea internațională este în impas la masa negocierilor sau unele conflicte tind să se agraveze.

22. Aceasta împotriva multor voci exaltate din spațiul ortodox care prevăd conspirații oculte, atacuri subterane, subminări de autoritate, comploturi etc., toate acestea pentru a discredita în fața comunității internaționale și pentru a o arunca în afara procesului integrării țărilor est-europene în structurile euro-atlantice.

23. *op. cit.*, p. 234.

24. *op. cit.*, p. 235. Cu ispita puterii lumesti s-a confruntat Apusul.

25. *op. cit.*, p. 237.



Marius Jucan

Secularizare/ desecularizare. Un rezumat de etapa

MARIUS JUCAN

Assoc. Prof., Ph.D.,
Faculty of European
Studies, BBU, Cluj, Roma-
nia

Author of the books:
Singuratatea salvata
(2001), The Complex
Innocence (2001),
Fascinatia fictiunii sau
despre retorica elipsei
(1999)

E-mail:
marjucan@yahoo.com

The author attempts to sketch a general survey on the issue of secularization and de-secularization, as it appears in various present-day interpretations of the meaning of cultures, as well as in the comprehension of modernity. Taking as guiding point the process of secularization in Western Europe, but also considering the rebirth of religious life in Eastern Europe, the author looks at the flexible ways in which the relations between secularization and de-secularization should be dealt with in a permanent global transition.

Textul de fata reprezinta pentru autor, dupa cum este înscris în titlu doar un „rezumat de etapa“, ceea ce înseamna doua lucruri, primul ca o etapa a fost parcursa în elucidarea unor chestiuni privind rolul secularizarii în înțelegerea modernitatii în general, al situarilor culturale prezente. Al doilea, ca schita de fata este un posibil punct de pornire pentru o analiza interdisciplinara a rolului secularizarii în diverse compartimente ale socialului, culturalului si politicului contemporan. Un anume eclecticism al abordarii este evident, dar pe de alta

KEY WORDS:

secularization, de-secularization, cultural studies, postmodernism, Theo-morphosis

parte, tendinta de a folosi o cercetare pentru a lansa o metoda, nu este în momentul de fata preocuparea autorului. Ceea ce nu însemna în vreun caz, desconsiderare fata de „taietura“ metodei. Acesta este probabil rostul etapei, cel de a nu declara decât un sfîrsit provizoriu al cercetarii.

Un prim pas pentru abordarea temei pe care o tratez aici într-o schita a unui proiect mai larg despre secularizare/ de-secularizare este cel în care încerc sa ma refer la secularizare/ desecularizare ca la un proces cultural în care este angrenata notiunea de cultura în sensul dat acesteia de Clifford Geertz,: „culture is best seen not as complexes behaviour patterns – customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters - as has by and large, been the case up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms, plans, recipes, rules, instructions, (what the computer engineers call „programs“). The second idea is that man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic outside-the skin control mechanisms, such cultural programs for order in his behavior” (*Interpretations of Cultures, Selected Essays, Basic Books, 1973, p.44-45*). Într-alta definitie asupra culturii, Pierre Bourdieu vorbește despre „conditiile asociate cu o clasa particulara de conditii de existenta“ care „produc habitusuri, sisteme de dispozitii durabile si transpozabile, structuri structurante predispuse sa functioneze ca structuri structurante, adica în calitate de principii generatoare si organizatoare de practici si reprezentari care pot fi adaptate obiectiv la scopul lor fara a presupune urmarirea constienta a unor scopuri si stapînirea expresa a operatiilor necesare pentru atingerea

lor, reglate si regulate în mod obiectiv, fara a fi cu nimic produsul supunerii fata de unele reguli, si fiind toate acestea, orchestrate în mod colectiv, fara a fi produsul actiunii organizatoare a unui dirigor” (*Simtul practic, Institutul European, 2000, p. 82-83*). Un al doilea pas este cel de a urmări o perspectiva culturala genealogica asupra ceea ce numim în general un proces de secularizare ca trasatura a modernitatii si instaurarii specifice, acesteia în Occident. Occidentul ofera o varianta explicativa a modernizarii prin modelul sau religios cultural, impactul stiintei si tehnologiei si organizarii ierarhiilor sociale. În acest loc, as mentiona de asemenea ca secularizarea apare ca proces reversibil, din nou în Occident, unde interesul pentru institutia clericala ca purtatoare de cuvînt a unei culturi a omului este recunoscut azi, mai degraba decât ieri. Pozitia religioasa dogmatica din trecutul Bisericii se transforma într-o „aparare” a omului. Secularizarea/ desecularizare occidentala trebuie constata într-o forma de opozitie inclusivă cu ceea ce se petrece în afara lumii occidentale, în culturi a caror modernitate a fost indusa ori provocata de modelul occidental, dar în care secularizarea nu a avut loc decât partial. Perspectiva genealogica culturala originea în perspectivismul nietzscheean, dezvoltînd o critica a organicismului romantic, vazut ca esentialism fals care obscurizeaza perceptia adevarului. Un al treilea pas urmareste ipostazierea adevarului în secularizare/ de-secularizare, ca proces de adeverire a unei forme istorice de cultura, de pilda cultura moderna/ postmoderna, ca forma de traire autentica care își masoara performantele într-un

stil adecvat recunoscut de societate. În acest sens o schematizare a evoluției unor tipologii umane și sociale este sugerată de diagramele de la sfârșitul articolului.

O perspectivă culturală genealogică se confruntă cu impasul survenit în economia reprezentărilor despre cultură, cu pluralitatea decupajelor despre reprezentare, și de asemenea cu tensiunea anti-representationalismului care caracterizează postmodernismul. Perspectiva culturală genealogică este o perspectivă a crizei, a dublei filiatii a crizei, venind pe de o parte dintr-un fragmentarism cultural pe care îl pune în dispoziție avangarda și proiectul ei de producere de nouitate continuă, iar pe de altă parte din figuralitatea incompletă a reprezentărilor culturale însași, care în momentul recunoașterii lor au depășit o bună parte din nouitatea lor. Un asemenea exemplu este dat de rapiditatea clasicizării avangardei. În alta ordine de idei, postmodernul nu mai recunoaște ierarhia unei centralități absolute, iar dacă o admite, o face doar în relație cu o marginalitate înzestrată cu un rol la fel de important cu cel al centralității. Astfel, mitul recunoașterii se desface în versiuni posibile ale recunoașterii circumstanțiate de contextul cultural, adică în versiuni ale unor recunoașteri.. Perspectiva culturală genealogică nu este chemată să dea seama despre un impas peratologic, despre escapisme milenariste, ori despre adevărurile modernității ca adevăruri naturale ale omului, ci să arate dincolo de programul ideologic al oricărei emancipări (cum a fost gândita programatic secularizarea) intuirea posibilului uman, reînnoirea definițiilor despre această viziune postmodernă asupra

omului ca *om posibil*, față de om universal. Pornind de la rasturnarea cronologică nietzscheană (*chronologische Umdrehung*), perspectiva culturală genealogică pe care o invoc aici urmărește să dea seama despre un sens al secularizării/ desecularizării în circumstanțele culturale actuale, care sunt însă inevitabil cricumstanțiate de o tradiție. (de pildă, relația dintre scripturalitate/ oralitate)

O asemenea perspectivă își pune întrebarea despre importanța adevărului despre secularizare/ desecularizare, cum spune Bernard Williams, genealogist britanic, vorbind despre efectul filosofiei nietzscheene asupra limpezirii calităților primare ale adevărului, cum ar fi exactitatea, autenticitatea, („Virtuțile adevărului“ în *Respectul. De la stima la deferenta : o problema de nuanță*“, coordonator, Catherine Audard, Editura Trei, 2003, pp.186-199), pe care le folosim atunci când ne ocupăm de secularizare/ de-secularizare. Privesc secularizarea/ de-secularizarea ca pe un produs eminent cultural, care nu poate fi abordat din unghiul unei singure surse, al cărui înțeles trebuie condus spre o comprehensiune a actualului, prin interpretări pluridisciplinare. Tentativa de a privi secularizarea/ desecularizarea doar prin prisma unei unice surse de iluminare, pentru a spune așa, nu creează doar un monopol nedorit al unei singure discipline asupra problemei, ci oferă un exemplu monologic al hermeneuticii despre secularizare/ desecularizare. Deși prin această afirmație nu neg importanța originării studiului secularizării desecularizării încă de la nivelul unor texte patristice, sunt mai înclinat în această șchiță să observ secularizarea/ de-secularizarea în ceea ce apare ca secularismul societății civile occidentale, ca

existentă reală politică, socială, nu în ultimul rând culturală, și mai apoi ca proiecție universală dusă spre implementare în procesul de globalitate culturală în care ne aflăm, proces condiționat nu în ultimul rând de contextualitatea globalizării economice și tehnostiințifice a lumii actuale. Privesc, cum am mai afirmat, secularizarea/ desecularizarea ca un aspect major al comunicării în lumea contemporană, a tranziției de la oralitatea premodernă la scripturalitatea modernă și modernistă, pentru că apoi în postmodernitate să se observe o renaștere a interesului pentru oralitate, dar și pentru figurarea completitudinii simțurilor în comunicarea mediatică.

Menționez acestea pentru că de fiecare dată un anumit stil al comunicării a adus ideea unui sfârșit al comunicării, așa cum s-a întâmplat cu oralitatea, și așa cum se aștepta să se petreacă acum cu scripturalitatea al cărei obiect al comunicării, cartea este considerată de unii a fi în „pragul” sfârșitului. În aceste „secvențe” ale sfârșitului, oferite de un stil de comunicare, fie cel oral ori cel scriptural observăm semnalarea procesului de secularizare/ desecularizare a chiar mijlocului de comunicare, care după cum știm nu este doar un simplu vehicul de comunicare, ci adaugă comunicării un sens al existenței comunicatorului. Perspectiva culturală genealogică da în vileag, că nemiavând nimic de ascuns, arhitectura modernității ca sistem de habitus-uri culturale apte să producă noi constrângeri culturale. Modernitatea celebrează în conștiința superiorității ei fața de „cei vechi” ori în „cearta” cu cei vechi, producerea de noi constrângeri culturale, care în

noutatea lor consumabilă de fapt, nu sunt decât însemne ale unei *supleante a sfârșitului*. Semnul ruperii de *antiquus*, producerea neîntreruptă, concurențială de noutate (culturală, în sens generic, în care includ și noutatea tehnostiințifică) duce la uitarea voită a vechiului, deci la o *voință* de nou, la percepția acesteia și la celebrarea libertății acestei voințe, care se desfășoară în intuiția posibilului, a cunoașterii acestuia. Rememorarea vechiului (a trecutului) văzută în postmodernitate ca fiind forma de noutate care ține de parodic ori de ironic este o demonstrație că producerea noutății este un discurs despre creație, mai precis, voința de creație, că semn al existenței, nu neapărat al puterii, dar desigur al puterii de a exista, al cărui autor *delegea reprezentarea unui sfârșit în reprezentarea noutății*. Altfel spus, creația noutății în modernitate în general se face dintr-un loc al auctorialității, al asumării acestei funcții auctoriale de fiecare individ care trăiește sub emblema cognitivă a cunoașterii de sine prin inter-acțiunea cu ceilalți.

Omul modern ca „autor” al propriei sale vieți supuse constrângerilor culturale se găsește mereu în compania, ori mai degrabă în umbra unui autor „vechi”, al cărui negativ este împrumutat pentru a fi distrus la fiecare gest cultural de crearea a noutății. Despre vizibilitatea funcției auctoriale a omului modern, invizibilitatea autorului „vechi” tin neapărat seama, de vreme ce creația culturală, (literară, muzicală, de pildă), îmi apar ca niste creații dialogice.

Tema majoră a secularizării este încapsulată de teza hegeliană. Între timp însă, *différance*-ul derridean ne arată că, deși produs, sensul cuprins în pliuri hermeneutice

întârzie să se arate, adică să se ierarhizeze într-o reprezentare, ceea ce demonstrează impasul voinței de a ieși în deschisul adevărului, al intenției de a găsi, exprimînd, adevărul. (*Intentio* – încordare, *intendo-ere*, *tendi, tentum*, a încorda, întinde coarda, a întinde deasupra, a acoperi, a pune, a mari, a spori, îndrepta, a tinde, a intenționa). Expresia adevărului în vorbire, apoi în scris este pusă la îndoială, ca formă de reprezentare recurentă care tradează ceea ce se petrece în lipsa de „interioritate” ori de „adînc”. De aici, sarcina oricărui discurs de a veghea asupra fixării limitelor, din ce în ce mai „moi”, și de a recunoaște în pluralitatea vocilor care se întretaie, relativizarea vocii însăși care exprimă adevărul ca reprezentare. Cred că între moartea religiei ca logos relevant și moartea logosului din logocentrism, există o rețea de legături ce surprinde critica voinței ca metafizică depășită. Drama voinței romantice devine în modernismul avangardist și utilitarist o legitimare a puterii, de unde delegitimarea acesteia prin analiză subterfugilor voinței, a *voinței de a spune adevărul/ de a spune adevărat*, în cele din urmă. Perspectiva genealogică repusă în termenii ei nietzscheeni trebuie să discearnă în creația unei noutăți impactul unei intenții (voințe) care se emancipează de voința de creație, de formele instrumentale ale creației, dacă urmărim creația noutății în analogia ei cu creația artistică. Voința de creație eliberată de datoria unei *imitatio Christi*, cunoaște în autonomia ei, să remarcăm niciodată anarhica ci mereu controlată de un canon, o de-solidarizare cu propriul produs, văzut doar în această ipostază, ca noutate. Numai de-solidarizîndu-se de produsul creat, voința

creatoare umană poate recunoaște noutatea operei (folosesc mai departe analogia cu opera artistică), o poate repeta, revenind mereu la momentul unei fracturi dintre o voință și obiectul născut din ea. În această repetare a unei rupturi, care imită despartirea lui Dumnezeu față de lume, remarc, tocmai datorită de-solidarizării de mai sus, *singurătatea și singularizarea* voinței, aura ei de putere semi-fictivă deci semi-reală, între o imaginarea a ei ca proiect, și actualizarea a ei, ca program pragmatic pentru producerea de nou și noutate.

Un exemplu la îndemîna pentru ideea de noutate pe care Europa creștină l-a pus în acțiune, ca efect al secularizării treptate este „secularizarea războinicilor” despre care scrie Norbert Elias. Suprimarea și sublimarea violenței în procesul de „curtenizare” arată constrîngerea violenței și rusticității vietii în forme culturale noi, desigur artificiale, pentru a crea un spațiu al rusinii publice și al apărării pudorii, văzute ca produse ale interiorității. Voința de noutate civilizatorie și de construcție a unei asemenea noutăți nu a încetat să folosească de fapt violența în diferite forme de constrîngeri culturale, în care expresia unei „libertăți” de voință este contracarată cu estetismul, formalismul acestei libertăți. Contează de la un moment dat frumusețea care înnobilează libertatea unei voințe. Constrîngerea culturală profundă care a modelat Europa este habitus-ul creștinismului, al voinței de fi creștin, de fapt după reprezentările care s-au succedat în istoria ereziilor dar și a reformei. Universalizarea rațiunii de a crede în Dumnezeu și raționalizarile succesive ale

credinței în Dumnezeu au constituit „vointe” de a reprezenta ceea ce rămânea de fapt imuabil în misterul credinței. În timp ce ratiunea de a crede în Dumnezeu se centrează în lege, misterul credinței este iubirea „nebun” de Dumnezeu, pentru a-l cita pe Evdokimov. Legea creștină este iubirea, dar nu orice fel de iubire poate sapa în inima credinciosului legământ „noutății” viții. Între ratiunea de a crede și iubirea de Dumnezeu remarc o legătură procesuală, care „înnoiește” trairea celui ce caută adevărul sub genericul *teomorfozei*.

Teomorfoza creștină a Europei ilustrează conflictul și/ sau unitatea dintre lege și iubire în iconofilie și iconoclastism, în așteptarea mântuirii care se transformă în voința de despartire de lume (Augustin), pentru a avea conștiința unei lumi de care omul să se poate desparti. Despartirea în comunități umane monastice și laice pune în valoare voința unei conștiințe ca voința de adevăr interior sadit prin actul creației. În acest mod al aderenței vointei umane la proiectul depășirii condiției umane, se întrevide reprimarea „libertății” de a voi, cât și salvarea existenței pentru om, aceea de a nu vrea „altfel”. Întrebarea care se poate formula de îndată ce investigăm imaginile noutății în procesul de teomorfoza, înfățișările diferite ale lui Dumnezeu în imaginarul creștin, este cea despre raportul dintre teomorfoza și secularizare. Să menționez înainte de a încerca să răspund, că teomorfoza are rădăcini europene străvechi, teogoniile, care ilustrează un proces teomorfotic regresiv, în căutarea și exprimarea unei origini. Imaginarea originarității lumii în actul creației ei poate fi urmărită și într-un sens al pro-gresiv, în utopiile care apar ca semn

limpede al secularizării. Dar probabil, mai întâi, merita să stim ce este secularizarea, ori mai degrabă, cum se va vedea mai jos, ce nu este ea.

Dupa Bruce Stevens (*God is Dead. Secularization in the West*, Blackwell Publishers, 2002) secularizarea nu este o încercare de a explica din punct de vedere istoric și geografic un set specific de schimbări. Secularizarea nu are un caracter inevitabil, nu este cum spune autorul, „teoria progresului travestită”. Secularizarea nu este un proces uniform și nici universal, iar sfârșitul secularizării nu este ateismul. Nu există o teorie a secularizării. Se știe că deceniul șase susținea că viitorul religiei este extincția ei. Constatarea principală venea din faptul că modernizarea a creat dificultățile religiei în mai toate domeniile ei simbolice și performative. Trecerea de la comunitate la societate a însemnat declinul instituțiilor religioase, creșterea ca prestigiu a autonomiei individului, a experimentului în masă culturală a indivizilor, triumful unei orientări raționale, instrumentale și apoi hedonistice, care a submina ultimele reprezentări ale unui stil de viață ascetic. Separarea dispozițiilor evaluative de cele emotive, a celor experiențiale cotidian vorbind, de cele cognitive a dus și mai rapid la raționalizarea culturii și reprezentărilor culturale, adică a noului și noutății, ca produs legitimator al unei lumi seculare. Industrialismul și industrializarea, pentru a vorbi de alți termeni ai constrângerii culturale, alții decât credința religioasă, au produs în undă de șoc cunoscută un alt tip de nivelare culturală, deși secularizarea nu trebuie confundată cu sensul modernizării, ceea ce ar însemna ca apogeul

modernității este, cum am mai aratat ateismul. Un autor ca Gellner vorbește despre importanța valorilor egalitarismului, desigur altele decât cele ale vieții comunitare creștine, fără de care industrialismul esuează, ori stagnează, ca în societățile care se conduc încă după tradiția patriarhală, înapte de ceea ce se cheama mobilitate socială. Am menționat aceste date ale secularizării cu preponderență occidentală, deoarece în acest leagan al secularizării care este Occidentul au apărut odată cu industrialismul și primele reconstrucții ale credinței religioase moderne.

A insista asupra acestor caracteristici ale secularizării, ofera, cred o înțelegere din perspectiva multiplicării noului și noutății dintr-o cu totul altă direcție decât cea preconizată de transformarea omului, și anume de *transformare a lumii și naturii* odată cu cea dintâi. Mai menționez tot în acest loc ideea că societălizarea (după Wilson) este privită ca acționând de sus în jos, prin politicile de modernizare care diseminează efectele secularizării, prin rolul distinct al factorului coercitiv de putere în structuri administrative și legale. Consecința directă a implantului societal în modernizare, ca de pildă în cazul modernizării, sovietizării, al re-europenizării pentru România de pildă, este că de fiecare dată cultura tradițională a trebuit să își restrângă arealul, ca paznic al credinței religioase. Se pretinde că societălizarea armonia socială deasupra aparării credinței religioase, care nu ar mai putea efectua acest deziderat. Berger și Luckmann au ilustrat remarcabil faptul că societălizarea și compartimentarea socială creează constrângerea de a trăi fragmentar și fragmentat, simultan, în mai multe lumi.

Amenințarea religiei nu a venit însă din partea unei compartimentări progresive a societății, și nici din partea științei cu care religia s-a deprins să conviețuiască, fără a dovedi antagonismul funciar de care erau siguri iluministii. După Berger și Kellner, dezvoltarea tehnologică ar produce o conștiință tehnologică, „un stil de gândi ireconciliabil cu sensul sacralului”. Conștiința tehnologică ar însemna de asemenea înlocuirea seturilor de practice religioase, și diseminarea atributelor conștiinței tehnologice, care ar fi componentialitatea, reproductibilitatea, așteptarea schimbărilor constante, insistența asupra inovației.

Secularizarea prezintă după Steve Bruce câteva contra-tendințe principale, care ar putea trece drept simptome ale de-secularizării produse chiar în interiorul procesului de secularizare. Se arată în acest fel, că reprimată pe terenul social, al structurilor de prestigiu social, religia își regăsește vechea semnificație culturală, în ceea ce s-ar numi o „apărare culturală” a omului și reinventare al unui patrimoniu al societății umane, chiar mai mult, al umanității văzute în pericol (exemplul clonării). Rolul Bisericii în apărarea unei naturalități a omului ca ființă „creată” nu se referă numai la argumentele ontologice ale creației, ci la dreptul tradiției creștine de a revendica o proprietate morală de neatinș asupra umanității omului, văzută ca loc al tradiției umanismului universal. Identificarea etnică susținută de instituția clericală din aceleași rațiuni defensive se rasfrânge și asupra comportamentului industrial al individului contemporan, considerat a fi de către Biserică „maximalizant”, fără a aduce foloase reale

umanitatii omului, de aceea consumativ si alienant. Aceasta identificare a religiosului cu domeniile de mare miza culturala dar si politica ale omului, precum educatia, cultura nationala, efectul mass-mediei, critica hedonismului, si in general critica lipsei de idealism a societatii consumeriste demonstreaza revenirea în actualitate a religiosului, fapt datorat în primul rând scaderii dramatice a idealismului social, ori utopismului cultural. Prin cele doua notiuni, cele ale idealismului social si utopismului cultural, înțeleg forme ale imaginatiei sociale care au antrenat schimbari profunde în comportamentul cultural al individului în trecerea, de pilda de la o cultura a oralitatii la una a scripturalitatii, de la comunitatea rurala la societatea industrială. Dar pe de alta parte industrializarea si urbanizarea au condus la aparitia unor miscari de renastere si reforma religioasa, exemplul metodismului si evangelicalismului britanic fiind urmat în secolul douazeci de alte tari din America Latina, Europa de Est etc. Astfel, daca admitem ca secularizarea nu este o ruptura definitiva de lumea „vrajita“ a religiei si a credintei religioase, mai de parte, chiar de un spirit al religiozitatii care se rasfrînge în alte domenii decît cel al religiosului, ca mai curînd se poate vorbi de *episoade* de secularizare, se ajunge la ideea ca secularizarea ca proces, trebuie revizuit.

În schita de fata, intentionez sa arat ca secularizarea se prezinta ca o supleanta variabila a procesului de teomorfoza, care are un sens îndreptat spre o dezvoltare maximala, exhaustiva, acompaniata de o tendinta de de-secularizare (revrajire), prin care înaintarea secularizarii este dependenta de un habitus. Ca supleanta a

teomorfozei, secularizarea retine formalismul unor simboluri teomorfotice pe care le goleste de sensul original, cu alte cuvinte le degradeaza, fara a le elimina în totalitate. Un exemplu al urmei teomorfotice prezente în comuniunea de sentimente, în primul rînd, apoi de credinte, si în cele din urma de interese, este constructia *încrederii sociale* ca liant al societatii civile. S-a remarcat trecerea de la credinta religioasa la încredere sociala, prin *în-credintarea* pe care individul o cîstiga în pregatirea si apoi înflorirea iluminismului, prin autonomizarea vointei. În antagonismul modern (occidental) între stat si societate, diminuarea importantei statalitatii fata de societatea civila, si accentul relevant al unei „religii civile”, urmeaza, cred, modelul teomorfic al unei credinte sovaitoare, al celui *fides fluitans*, care are nevoie de un suport volitiv intern, pentru a putea depasi vulnerabilitatea umana, vazuta ca îndoiala, facînd din credinta si nu din vointa un instrument al „noutatii” vietii sociale, prin care dupa preceptul crestin se instaureaza armonia sociala. De remarcat, rolul vointei în separarea moderna a credintei de „îndrazneala de a sti”, în emanciparea vazuta ca iesire din minoratul miturilor si credintelor, care conserva un mod degradat teomorfic. Nu doresc aici decît sa spun ca contractualismul care fundamenteaza încrederea sociala moderna disuadeaza în societatile civile occidentale „sovaiala sociala“, si dimpotriva aceasta ramîne complet neschimbata (în sens de pasivitate sociala) în societatile în care simbolurile teomorfotice degradate exista în religiozitatea fata de stat ori lider politic. Cazul societatilor asa-zis „ne-democratice”, cu mult mai

numeros decât al celor democratice, evidentiaza faptul ca grupurile societatii civile nu pot se realizeze o coerenta a expresiei unei *vointe politice*, reprezentare a unui exercitiu de idealism social si a unui utopism cultural.

Mi-am pus întrebarea de ce teomorfoza pe care am prezentat-o în schita de fata ca factor generativ al secularizarii/ de-secularizarii este supusa unui proces de supleanta. Raspunsul ar fi ca supleanta este generata de structura teomorfozei, mai precis de o contradictie tot mai activa de la un moment dat în *lege* si *inbire* ca traire a credintei religioase, a plenitudinii oferite de trairea individuala si comunitara teomorfa. Habitus-ul cultural, în sensul lui recent, reactualizat de Bourdieu dovedeste ca producerea noului si a noutatii lumii crestine a fost divizarea lumii de la Augustin încoace prin celebra formula a „celor doua spade” o prima si importanta diviziune între o viziune culturala sacra si una profana. Rolul demersul genealogic pe care l-am schitat la început este cel de a vedea discriminarea pe care genealogistii, daca mi-as permite sa spun asa, o fac între *adevar* si *veracitate*. Accentul care cade pe veracitate, pe acea „asemanare adevarata” cu un prim model, duce la ideea producerii de similaritati canonice strict controlabile ale unei traiiri adevarate care sa legitimeze întrutotul adevarul. Fidelitatea fata de reprezentarea

adevarului credintei este dominanta care produce mereu forme sociale noi de fidelitate, ajustând comportamentul individului pe masura acestora si gasind în acestea realizarea posibilitatii neconsumate de adevar al credintei. Meister Eckhart spune ca : „Nimic nu-ti va lipsi daca posezi o vointa adevarata si dreapta : nici iubirea, nici umilinta, nici oricare alta virtute. Dar, posezi ceea ce vrei cu putere si cu toata vointa si nici Dumnezeu, nici vreo creatura nu-ti poate lua acel lucru, daca vointa îti este în întregime si cu adevarat divina si folosita în prezent”. (Jeanne Ancelet-Hustache, *Meister Eckhart si mistica renana*, Univers enciclopedic, 1997). Cum poate exista însa adevarul credintei decât printr-o intuitie a vointei de a crede, o experiere a aptitudinii, de unde si producerea unei atitudini care sa înlesneasca acest procedeu, reluat continuu, de a sesiza ceea ce nu este conform acestuia, prin vointa ? Dar în acelasi timp, adevarul credintei nu poate fi confundat cu proba sa de veracitate, de unde un model al experierii continue si nesfîrsite, o „scara” a experientei practice nesfîrsite..

Închei aceasta schita, mentionînd ca secularizarea este constructie culturala care trebuie citita în laturile adiacente ale culturalului si politicului, si în care „revrajirea”, reinstaurarea fascinatiei, nu doar a religiei ci si a ideologiei se petrece, cum arata J.F. Lyotard sub semnul unei alte perceptii a timpului.

*Sensul desvrăjirii
Tendința de
revrăjire*




TEOMORFOZĂ
ierarhii tari,
omogenitate
teomorfică




EMANCIPĂRI
EVOLUTIVE ȘI
REVOLUȚIE
Mitul libertății ca
voință servilă

SECULARIZARE
A
CA SUPLEANȚĂ
TEOMORFICĂ
(1)

HEGEMONIZARE
IDEOLOGICĂ
Corectitudine politică
Discriminări pozitive
Ecologie socială,
politică, culturală



IDEO-SEMIOZĂ
Inginerii sociale, etnice,
naționaliste
Fundamentalism, feminism,
segregări ale diferenței




*Sensul revrăjirii
Tendința de
desvrăjire*

SECLARIZAREA CA SUPLEANTA TEOMORFICA (2)

Secularizarea ca

1. SUPLEANTA TEOMORFICA A LOGOSULUI




Logos teomorfic

Discurs stiintific, filosofic, artistic, critic


Flecarea la mediatie

Reversitate



Secularizarea ca

2. SUPLEANTA A COMPORTAMENTULUIUMAN



Omulca "imitatio Christi"

Sfintul


Curteanul

Gentleman-ul

Artistul


Managerul

Reversitate



Secularizarea ca

3. SUPLEANTA A FORMELOR DE STATALITATE




Teocratie

Monarhie/imperiu

Dictatura


Republica democratica

Reversitate




Secularizarea ca

1. SUPLEANTA IN VIATA COTIDIANA



Secularizarea ca

2. SUPLEANTA IN COMUNITATEA UMANA



C. G. Jung, Opere complete. Arhetipurile si inconstientul colectiv

Ed. Trei, Bucuresti, 2003

În *Seven theories of religion* D.L. Pals considera inoportuna introducerea lui Jung alaturi de nume celebre care au studiat fenomenul religios în complexitatea sa. Explicatia acestei ne-alegeri este una pur formală, de metoda, întrucât diversitatea analizelor jungiene asupra materialului oferit de fenomenul religios, din punct de vedere psihologic poate fi cu greu restrânsă la câteva considerati principale. Este vorba despre imposibilitatea cuantificării materialului oferit de Jung în câteva clase sau subclase edificatoare în raport cu ceea ce vrea sa ne spuna autorul. Dificultatea survine în momentul în care psihologia analitica aplicata se combina inexorabil, ca într-un fel de încrengatura combinatorica, cu multiplele figuri mitologice, eroi salvatori, tricksteri, fiinte supranaturale, mandale, demoni, îngeri etc., pusi, sa demonstreze existenta inconstientului colectiv si a elementului sau constitutiv, arhetipul.

Laudabila intentia Editurii Trei de a publica operele complete ale psihanalistului elvetian C. G. Jung, pentru a putea avea în fata primul volum din cele 18 (!) propuse cititorului român, si, astfel, pentru a spera într-o

recuperare completa a gândirii unuia dintre cei mai importanti oameni de cultura ai secolului trecut.

Arhetipurile si inconstientul colectiv sunt principalele descoperiri jungiene în psihologia analitica si trebuie înteles, din capul locului, ca baza analizelor sale este una pur fenomenologica, întrucât studiul de caz constituie preambulul întregii constructii epistemologice. Fiecare pas facut de Jung în marile sisteme mitologice ale culturii universale este dublat, imediat, de exemple clinice ale indivizilor reali pe care îi trata. Orice aluzie metafizica este înabusita de corespondente ale materialului empiric, digresiunea în speculativ este mereu reprimata, astfel încât totalitatea teoriilor propuse de Jung pot fi verificate cazuistic.

„Arhetipurile si inconstientul colectiv” analizeaza mai întâi conceptul de inconstient colectiv al carui corolar indispensabil este arhetipul. Definirea stricta a celor doua elemente se impune imperativ întrucât orice incursiune în opera marelui gânditor clacheaza fara o prealabila analiza metodologica. Se poate presupune antecedenta inconstientului colectiv, ca matrice universala specifica întregii umanitati, asupra arhetipului, numai ca elementul definitoriu ramîne tocmai acesta din urma. Fara arhetip nu exista inconstient colectiv si viceversa. Trebuie distins în interiorul arhetipului între arhetipul natura si reprezentarile arhetipale. Astfel, arhetipul (ceea ce putem numi reprezentari arhetipale) este ca realitate a psihismului colectiv *jumatatea* pe care o posed apriori (în masura în care aprioricul poate tine de experienta speciei scoasa din osmoza materie – spirit, în timpuri imemoriale printr-un rapt cosmogonic), iar

VASILE CATALIN BOBB

MA in Culture and Communication,
Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj,
Romania

arhetipul natura este dezvaluit de “viziunile onirice”, “imaginatia activa”, “fantasmele în stare de transa”, fiind *jumatatea* pe care o caut. Imposibilitatea cuantificării gnoseologice a “arhetipului în sine” îl situează în linia marilor concepte metafizice: prim motor, divinitate, fiinta. Numai ca marea diferentiere între aceste concepte și arhetip rămâne poziționarea spațială; dacă primul motor, divinitatea, fiinta comporta situări transcendente, arhetipul face drum invers situându-se înăuntrul individului. Totuși, avem în acest moment numai o ipoteză, întrucât arhetipul în sine “poate fi lasat” în transcendent fără a deraia de pe firul gândirii jungiene - Jung nu face nici o precizare clară asupra acestui aspect.

Această scurtă prezentare a arhetipului s-a impus ca fiind necesară întrucât cartea propune apoi o incursiune în lumea arhetipală a culturii, și putem lesne observa că peste tot, de la antichitatea greacă, indiană, egipteană la epoca medievală creștină regăsim diferite forme și întrupări ale arhetipului. De la arhetipul mamei la arhetipul *infans*, de la arhetipul *animei* reprezentat de zeita Kore, la psihologia figurii *trickster*-ului, toate acestea vin să sprijine construcția edificiului arhetipal.

Desigur, nu putem eluda în prezenta recenzie elementele de psihologie analitică care apar în capitolele X și XI, unde sunt explicitate pe larg conceptele de conștiință, inconștient, individuație. Inedit este capitolul V, „Despre renasteră” în care se pot regăsi diferite forme ale renasterii și diversele aspecte psihologice ale

acesteia. Cele cinci forme ale renasterii sunt: Metempsihoza, Reîncarnarea, Învierea, Renasterea, și Participarea la procesul transformării. Iar ca evenimente psihologice care stau la baza renasterii regăsim: experiența transcendentă a vieții și transformarea subiectivă. Individuarea, în teoriile jungiene ocupă un loc central întrucât apare ca proces psihologic de unire a contrariilor, sub standardul elementului central al psihismului individual anume Sinele. Este un fel de punere în ordine cu tine însuți, de explicitare a complexelor care inhibă descoperirea arhetipurilor, un mecanism de recunoaștere, printr-un travaliu continuu, a idiosincraziilor personale.

Unul dintre cele mai inedite capitole ale actualei ediții îl reprezintă ultimul capitol, „Despre simbolistica mandalei”, în care este prezentată o întreagă paletă de imagini edificatoare. Exemplificările și interpretările fiecărei imagini dau savoare cărții și în același timp lasă cale liberă interpretării personale – hermeneutică „încă” mai funcționează.

Întreaga teorie dezvoltată de Jung nu face altceva decât să descrie structura sufletului personal prin intermediul inconștientului colectiv care poate fi regăsit în cultura umanității, iar instrumentul de căutare este arhetipul. Este vorba despre un travaliu continuu, similar cu cel regăsit în procesul de individuație, care urmărește identificarea, în decursul istoriei, a elementului „transistoric” riguros, și în același timp divers, care formează structuri comune, anacronice, în culturi diferite.



Aurel Bumbas-Vorobiov

Stefan Iloaie, Nae Ionescu si ortodoxia romana

Editura Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2003

Unele figuri ale culturii române interbelice au devenit astăzi incomode, mai ales prin faptele celor care le-au recunoscut ca maestrii spirituali. Printre ele se numara si „Profesorul”, filosoful român Nae Ionescu (1890-1940). De aceea a scrie o carte despre o asemenea personalitate este un curaj, dar si un risc, mai ales atunci când te desprinzi din liniile deja consacrate. Cartea d-lui Stefan Iloaie, parinte arhidiacon, intitulata *Nae Ionescu si ortodoxia romana*, vine sa suplineasca o dubla lacuna în ceea ce priveste interpretarea operei si vietii lui Nae Ionescu, mentor al generatiei intelectuale interbelice din România, generatie a carei membrii au rodit în majoritate peste granitele, dupa ce în interiorul tarii s-a asezat totalitarismul comunist si tendintele prosovietice. Una din cele doua lacune este legata de absenta unei bibliografii consacrate a operei „Profesorul”-ului, iar cea de-a doua este legata de distanta care se deschide între criticarea orientarii nationaliste a filosofului, acreditarea sa ca ideolog al miscarii legionare, implicit al

extremismului nationalist si asumarea necritica a operei sale de catre tendintele nationalist-xenofobe de azi.

Studiul, care precede o bibliografie a scrierilor naeionesciene, încearca sa argumenteze în favoarea importantei caracteristici teologice a gândirii „Profesorului”, stabilind un sens al interpretarii dupa care „toata gândirea graviteaza în jurul problemei mântuirii, a necesitatii ei”(35). Acest fapt constituie o premisa care îl determina pe autor sa raspunda adversativ afirmatiilor lui Cioran, în conformitate cu care: „Esecul în experienta absolutului este izvorul pasiunii în imanenta”(Emil Cioran, *Nae Ionescu si drama luciditatii*) si sa sustina argumentat ca „posibilitatea întoarcerii lumescului spre cele sfinte, convertirea mundanului si regasirea lui în axiologia ceresului, lupta pentru indicarea caii spre Adevar l-au determinat pe Nae Ionescu sa guste „tentatia timpului”, sa participe intens la evenimentul cotidian din jurnalistica si din viata politica prin prezenta activa în disputele de idei contemporane lui”(31).

Fara exces de citari se construiesc treptat, prin cumul de argumente, concluzia dupa care „trairea existentei istorice si participarea afectiva si efectiva la definirea structurii etnice ramân trasaturi dominante ale nationalismului profesat de Nae Ionescu”(40), întregindu-se apoi cu viziunea unui caracter teologic al scrierilor „Profesorul”-ului. Se constituie astfel un context de interpretare care ne ajuta sa construim un punct de sprijin între parerile extreme deja afirmate în publicistica, referitoare la scrierile si viata filosofului.

AUREL BUMBAS-VOROBIOV

Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy, BBU, Cluj, Romania

E-mail: tindanboom@yahoo.com

Curgerea textului în direcția amintită înglobează treptat, ca argumente, elemente specifice vieții și operei lui Nae Ionescu, intrate deja în viziunea comuna asupra sa, cum ar fi: caracterul socratic al cursurilor sale, refuzul de a constitui un sistem prin carti, înclinatia către traire, considerarea iubirii ca cel mai înalt grad de cunoaștere, identificarea „nației” cu credința, influența avută asupra generației ’27, scandalurile financiare etc. Pornind deci de la un fond comun și asumându-și premisele amintite autorul reușește în acest scurt text să ne convingă că poate exista și o altfel de lectură pertinentă asupra scrierilor lui Nae Ionescu și a celor despre el, mizând în același timp și pe angajamentele în plan teologic ale filosofului.

În același timp tendința de a identifica spiritul național cu ortodoxia, întâlnită în opera lui Nae Ionescu, este specifică perioadei interbelice, după cum afirmă și Lucian Boia în *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* ea poate fi întâlnită la Blaga, Crainic, Vulcanescu, slujind ideii de unitate spirituală a românilor, care ar fi precedat orice unitate geopolitică. În articolele pe care Nae Ionescu le publică în *Cuvântul* la sfârșitul anului 1930, sub titlul *A fi „bun român”*, duce atât de departe consecințele identificării dintre națiune și credință încât afirmă că a fi „român pur și simplu, înseamnă a fi și ortodox”, iar „catolicism și ortodoxie nu sunt numai confesiuni reprezentând anumite deosebiri dogmatice și culturale, ci două valorificări fundamentale deosebite ale existenței în genere”. Pune chiar în coprezenta originară ortodoxia și faptul de a fi român prin

afirmația: „Suntem, ca atare, ortodocși pentru că suntem români și suntem români pentru că suntem ortodocși”. Ceea ce reușește cu prisosință nu știm dacă este demonstrarea corelativității dintre ortodoxie și faptul de a fi român sau circumscrierea unei identități românești autentice, ci mai degrabă comunicarea unei atitudini radicale și separatiste, care se sustrage unei puneri în comun cu cei de o altă „plamada sufletească”. Vine firesc întrebarea care este atunci caracterul teologic al scrierilor lui Nae Ionescu și în ce sens putem regăsi „lucrarea dragostei față de aproapele” când tendința este de a ne exhiba mai degrabă dorința de izolare față de cei cu o altă „plamada sufletească”? Ștefan Iloaie răspunde indirect și acestei întrebări, într-o formă specifică formației sale teologice, îndreptându-ne gândul de la o polemică cu arme logice, către o înțelegere situată în paradigma iertător-iubitoare a creștinătății, ne calauzește ca un preot intelectual dinaintea sortit ortodoxiei și faptului de a fi român.

Cu totul remarcabilă este bibliografia care strânge nominal, în aproape 1800 de articole, atât scrierile lui Nae Ionescu cât și parte din cele referitoare la viața și opera sa, structurându-le astfel: 1. Volume, 2. Articole în „Cuvântul”, 3. Articole în alte reviste și în volume, 4. Despre Nae Ionescu. Munca depusă pentru strângerea bibliografiei este de apreciat în mod deosebit, iar aceasta carte merita considerarea publicului și pentru bunul simț care razbate din înlăntuirea textului și pentru faptul că va face mai ușoară munca celor ce vor cerceta scrierile filosofului român.

Zygmunt Bauman, *Wasted Lives. Modernity and Its Outcasts*

Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004

Recenta carte a sociologului Zygmunt Bauman vorbește despre ceea ce, în termeni mai puțin delicati, se poate numi „productia de deseuri umane” sau, mai precis, de vieti irosite – un efect datorat actualelor conditii ale industriei modernitatii, ce vizeaza noi forme de progres economic si de ordonare constructiva a societatii. Functia manifesta a primei ramuri a acestei industrii este aceea de a produce si reproduce ordine sociala. Orice model de ordonare este selectiv si necesita decuparea, segregarea, separarea sau chiar excizarea materialului uman care este nepotrivit sau nefolositor noii ordini. În finalul procesului, aceste parti sunt etichetate ca deseuri umane, distincte de cele ce sunt prezentate ca fiind folositoare, în conditiile în care acestea din urma sunt „ produse” intentionate. Deseurile umane nu sunt considerate a fi productii dezirabile ale societatii si, din acest motiv, ele trebuie înlaturate cumva.

Zygmunt Bauman considera ca pe masura ce parti mari ale lumii au ramas în totalitate sau partial

neafectate de modernizare, au fost tratate de catre societatile modernizate ca zone capabile de a absorbi excesul de populatie din tarile dezvoltate; era vorba de a se gasi solutii globale la probleme locale, iar aceasta situatie a fost caracteristica pentru perioada colonizarilor din secolele trecute. Pe masura ce modernizarea a atins, prin acest proces, si cele mai îndepartate tinuturi ale planetei, populatia redundanta este produsa peste tot, si toate zonele se confrunta cu suita de consecinte ale triumfului global al modernitatii. Aceasta creeaza acuta nevoie de a cauta, de data aceasta, solutii locale la probleme produse în mod global.

Sociologul arata ca raspândirea globala a modernitatii a condus la productia unei cantitati în crestere de oameni lipsiti de mijloace de supravietuire, dar planeta se confrunta cu lipsa unor locuri în care acestia sa fie plasati. De aici pornind, noile anxietati legate de imigranti, de cei care cer azil si de rolul crescând jucat de difuzia de temeri legate de securitate, prezente în agenda politica contemporana.

Bauman afirma ca planeta noastra este „plina”, însa nu în termeni fizicalisti sau geografici, în conditiile în care zonele depopulate sau locuite temporar si etichetate ca fiind nelocuibile sau incapabile de a sustine viata umana, par sa se mareasca, nu sa scada.

Tehnologia, în progresul ei ne ofera (la costuri ridicate) noi sensuri ale supravietuirii în habitate care înainte erau catalogate ca fiind incapabile de a sustine asezari umane. Pe de alta parte, aceeasi tehnologie distruge posibilitatea multor habitate de a sustine populatii pe care anterior le acomodase si le hranise. În

RALUCA CIURCANU

Department of Philosophy,
BBU, Cluj, Romania
E-mail:
danaida21@personal.ro

KEY WORDS:

Wasted lives, modernization, Zygmunt Bauman, outcasts, sociology

noua constructia sociala exista o distinctie calitativa între doi termeni: *somaj* si *redundanta*; primul semnifica o stare de ne-angajat (în sensul pe care îl ofera termenul englez - unemployed), de anormalitate, de abatere de la norma (ca în cazul unui „nesanatos” - unhealthy), dar este o situatie reversibila, întrucât destinatia somerului este aceea de a fi rechemat si reîncadrat în munca. În cazul redundantei asa ceva este exclus; redundanta nu este o conditie temporara, ci exprima permanenta. A fi redundant înseamna a fi dat la o parte datorita faptului ca poti fi dat la o parte, ai aceasta disponibilitate - ca si o sticla pet de plastic, sau o seringa folosita o singura data. Redundanta își împarte spatiul semantic cu rejectarea, lenea, gunoiul, refuzul, cu *irosirea*.

Cea de a doua ramura a industriei modernitatii este, pentru Zygmunt Bauman, progresul economic care vizeaza, în principal, anihilarea unor moduri de conservare a formelor de productie si introducerea inovatiei, a cresterii continue a standardelor productivitatii si profitabilitatii. „Practicantii” vechilor forme de productie nu pot, de regula, sa se acomodeze în masa la noile forme de activitate, mult mai simplificate si mai bine gândite. Aceasta duce, inevitabil, la interzicerea accesului la aceste forme de productie si, simultan, la crearea de deseuri (umane) ale progresului economic.

Progresul economic este privit de autor ca, metaforic vorbind, o istorie a distrugerii creative. În acest întreg proces factorul uman este tratat în termeni

de cerere de piata, schimb, competitie, productivitate, eficienta, simple notiuni care nu au nici o legatura cu oamenii reali, posesori de nume si adrese. Pe de alta parte, acest factor uman este destinat dezasamblarii si reasamblarii, în functie de cererea pe piata productiei.

Un alt aspect pe care autorul îl surprinde în cartea sa este legat de implicatiile pe care statul le are în rîndul populatiei. Daca înainte statul reprezenta un garant si un protector al intereselor membrilor societatii, în fata dezechilibrelor economice datorate jocurilor competitionale pe piata libera, acum acest lucru nu mai constituie o practica, în conditiile în care piata libera este definita ca o afacere privata. Acest fapt a condus la o diminuare continua a încrederii populatiei în valorile si actiunile statului, la o apatie politica, o descalificare continua a legii, si la o mare retragere a populatiei în fata participarii la politica institutionalizata.

Prin urmare, statul trebuie sa intervina cu noi metode de a crea starea de vulnerabilitate si nesiguranta, iar una dintre acestea o reprezinta accentuarea ideii de nesiguranta la nivel personal, în fata activitatilor criminale, manifestarilor anti-sociale ale clasei de jos si, mai recent, terorismului global. Se pare ca un nou stat trebuie sa se nasca, pe fundatiile vulnerabilitatii personale si a sigurantei personale, în locul precaritatiei sociale sau protectiei sociale.

Vieti irosite este o carte care puncteaza, din perspectiva sociologica, actualele probleme globale, la nivel de populatie si de productie.



Ioan Chirila, Fragmentarium exegetic filonian II. Nomothetica. Repere exegetice la Decalog

Ed. Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2003

SANDU FRUNZA

Assoc. Prof., Ph.D., Dept. of Systematic Philosophy, BBU, Cluj, Romania. Author of the books: *O antropologie mistica* (1996), *Iubirea si transcendentia* (1999), *Experienta religioasa in gandirea lui Dumitru Staniloae* (2001), *Fundamentalismul religios si noul conflict al ideologiilor* (2003) E-mail: sfrunza@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

Am fost mereu rezervat în ceea ce privește încercările teologice de a citi printr-o grila exclusiv creștina opera unor filosofi sau gânditori aparținând unor curente sau tradiții religioase dintre cele mai diferite. Astfel de rezerve sînt în chip major diminuate atunci cînd acest tip de valorizare teologica este facut pe fondul unei înțelegeri profunde si prin utilizarea tacita a unui instrumentar intercultural circumscris unei tradiții comune. O astfel de interpretare e facilitata de aceasta data si de stereotipurile cultivate de exegetii evrei ai lui Filon, care considera ca cea mai mare parte a mostenirii filoniene lasate evreilor nu a fost valorificata secole de-a

rîndul, ea servind în schimb la modelarea unei parti semnificative a tipului de ideatie teologica creștina.

Asa cum se întîmpla si în cazul primului volum de exegeze filoniene, parintele Ioan Chirila devine cu usurinta convingator în analizele de profunzime propuse în micul tratat de „nomologie” pe care îl schiteaza acest al doilea volum de exegeze filoniene. Cartea de fata încearca, de fapt, sa scoata Decalogul din sfera unei simple interpretari juridice si sa înfatiseze prefigurarea legii si Legea prin permanenta raportare la maniera de interpretare filoniana, patristica si moderna.

Hermeneutica initiatica la care recurge distinsul teolog are drept referential înaltimea sperantei care îl învaluie în calitatea sa de slujitor al Legii. Astfel, nu e deloc întîmplator faptul ca putem citi în paginile acestui volum fraze precum: „Mergînd spre o zare care ne cheama cu stralucirea ei vom trai o vreme nadejdea ca vom ajunge cîndva si acolo, ca ne vom satura setea din ambrozia îngerilor care tin hlamida cea albastra a cerului, ca ne vom aprinde din strafurgerarea lor care arde si ne mistuie”. Exista o poarta care privilegiaza acest acces: puterea de a vedea „fiecare apropiere prin cuvînt de semenul nostru ca pe o încercare a noastra de a ne regasi întrînsul chipul si în urma acestei gasiri sa înceapa hora chipului în îmbratisarea Lui” (pp.6-7).

Ioan Chirila este convins ca o astfel de cautare de sine însusi în Dumnezeu a întreprins si Filon Iudeul. Este unul dintre motivele pentru care se apropie de Filon ca de unul care are intuitia perfecta a faptului ca “punctul maxim al întîlnirii omului cu Dumnezeu înainte de Hristos este dialogul-rugaciune” (p. 12).

Moise este situat de Filon în acest dialog și în felul acesta obiectivitatea poruncilor pe care le aduce în numele divinitații reverberează din unicitatea celui ce se constituie drept sursa a rostirii.

Îmbinând cu deosebit talent frazele poetico-liturgice cu învățătura plină de subtilitate și cu discursul academic, Ioan Chirila reușește o expunere exegetică de înaltă tinută și de intensă vibrație sufletească. În felul acesta, părintele carturar este el însuși un fel de personaj filonian. Având deopotrivă apetenta pentru discursul filosofic, cel teologic și pentru cel cultural, Ioan Chirila porneste pe urmele lui Filon, despre care ne spune că “Din aceasta familie spirituală face parte și Filon din Alexandria, formația lui spirituală înscriindu-se pe linia lui Socrate, Platon și a altor înțelepți, numai că el depășește acest tip de interpretare deoarece se plasează în sînul dinamicii revelației și a înțelegerii acesteia în spiritul iudaic” (p. 18). Cu toate riscurile ce pot surveni de aici, ne permitem să afirmăm că într-o asemenea dinamică își înscrie Ioan Chirila scrierile sale, doar că perspectiva sa este cea a unui spirit iudaic care este integrat de spiritul totalizator creștin. În felul acesta cred că putem înțelege mai bine gândirea autorului și modalitățile prin care lecturează în perspectiva creștină interpretările la Decalog și opera lui Filon în general.

Cu toate acestea, teologul nu risca nici un moment să steargă diferențele între tradiții. Este destul să sesizăm că cel puțin într-un punct esențial – perspectiva dialogului – Ioan Chirila trasează clar distincțiile. Una dintre acestea releva diferența fundamentală dintre modul în care Iudaismul și Creștinismul înțeleg

structura revelatională “Lege-Cuvînt”. Pentru evrei “cuvîntul cel mai important nu este cel care vesteste, ci cel care îndrumă, sub forma legii ... legea este în mod absolut cuvînt al lui Dumnezeu” adresat evreilor, ceea ce are drept consecință faptul că “Vechiul Testament nu cunoaște un concept general sau global al revelației” (pp. 57-58). Pentru creștini, cuvîntul legii este înglobat în Noul Testament și dezvoltat în teologia creștină care porneste în principal de la premisa că “este revelație ceea ce Dumnezeu a revelat”.

În aparență, drumul propus este deja unul batătorit. Însă, pentru a înțelege semnificația legii și a legii celei noi în perspectiva pe care o deschid sfinții părinți, Ioan Chirila propune o nouă direcție de interpretare a Legii: “Dorim să propunem o lectură care să plece strict din planul dialogal. Poruncile sînt exprimate la singular, deci Dumnezeu vorbește cu fiecare dintre noi. Dar mai propunem o schimbare a sensului de lectură. Vrem să sugerăm citirea Legii începînd cu porunca a zecea și apoi, progresiv în descrescere valoric numerică, să ajungem la prima. Aceasta din dorința de a realiza și a constientiza drumul restaurării proprii” (p. 68).

Lecturînd cartea, putem observa cu ușurință că exegeza propusă de Ioan Chirila este una interesată. Ea caută să servească disciplinei academice pe care teologul clujean o predă. Totodată, este o manieră de interpretare pusă în slujba îndemnului de cautare a drumului ce a dus la desăvîrsirea legii. Lectura interesată a lui Ioan Chirila e făcută însă deschis, și este întreprinsă spre a fi oferită îndeosebi tipului uman pe care părintele îl cuprinde sub metafora “hotului de suflete”. “Hotul de



suflete, ne spune Ioan Chirila, este cel care s-a pierdut pe sine în mrejele individualizante ale celui care seamana exagerata parere de sine, adica pizmasul cel rau, care furând s-a furat pe sine însusi de la tot ceea ce este în veci Dumnezeu”(p. 131).

Dincolo de poetizarile care fac lectura mai apetisanta, volumul propus de Ioan Chirila este o lucrare academica ce reprezinta o apropiere crestina adecvata fata de opera lui Filon Iudeul. Fara îndoiala, este o repunere în discutie a gândirii acestuia menita sa dea tonul unor noi studii teologice, care sa stea sub semnul interculturalitatii.

Otilia Herman

Bryan Wilson, Religia din perspectiva sociologica

Editura Trei, Bucuresti, 2000

Religia a constituit un subiect central în teoria sociologica clasica, si se mentine inca si astazi în miezul tematic al sociologiei. Valoarea lucrarii de fata consta atât în noutatea problemelor tratate, cât si în modul cvasi-exhaustiv de tratare a problemelor analizate.

În primul capitol al lucrarii autorul trateaza problematica sociologiei religiei ca stiinta.

Religia nu este numai o formulare intelectuala a cerintelor de baza ale ordinii sociale. Ea si-a indeplinit functiile sociale prin mobilizarea unor dispozitii evaluative si afective si prin raspandirea de motivatii adecvate, ingloband un spectru foarte larg de experiente umane. A avut afinitati cu arta si cu poezia, de fapt cu tot ceea ce, în om, tine de imaginatie si de creatie. Religia a starnit simpatie, altruism si dragoste, însuflând sau sugerând deziderate de amanunt si deseori subtile care au modelat comportamentul uman. Sociologul este în mod necesar preocupat de subiecte precum ar fi controlul social, consensul social, relatiile inter-umane si pastrarea unui echilibru adecvat în exprimarea emotiilor umane.

Otilia Herman

Faculty of Sociology,
Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania
E-mail:
Otilia.Herman@personal.ro

Autorul considera ca sociologia religiei este inca intr-o oarecare masura prizoniera conceptelor sale, concepte de provenienta crestina. Orice critic din exterior insa trebuie sa recunoasca doua lucruri: ca acesta este un prizonierat si nu un angajament voluntar si ca cel putin unii dintre sociologi sunt constienti de el.

B. Wilson sustine si faptul ca, in ochii publicului, sociologul profesionist al religiei reprezinta o curiozitate. Oamenii il percep ca pe o persoana profund interesata de religie si care s-ar parea ca detine informatii deosebite in acest domeniu. Si cu toate acestea, el nu este, pentru ca nu vrea sa fie, un ins religios, sau cel putin nu atunci cand isi exercita meseria de sociolog. În contemporaneitate, cerinta neutralitatii axiologice a cercetatorului si-a pus amprenta si asupra sociologiei religiei.

Capitolul secund trateaza problematica functiilor religiei in societatea contemporana. B. Wilson considera ca “functia explicita si manifesta a religiei consta in a oferi oamenilor speranta mantuirii si a le da indrumarile necesare pentru a se mantui” (p. 38). Insa intelesul mantuirii difera de la o cultura la alta si de la o religie la alta. In decursul istoriei mantuirea a fost perceputa ca triumf asupra mortii, migrare a sufletului intr-un taram de existenta superior, sau invierea miraculoasa a trupului candva, in viitor. Acestea sunt elemente pe care crestinismul le-a luat de la predecesorii ebraici. In alte culturi aspiratia la mantuire se materializeaza in incercarea de a scapa de raul care predomina in viata pamanteasca. Masura in care mantuirea este conceptualizata ca avand un caracter particular si indi-

vidual, comunitar si local sau national si societal variaza de asemenea de la o cultura la alta, iar uneori in interiorul aceleiasi culturi.

Autorul sustine faptul ca in toate religiile importante se considera ca mantuirea se obtine prin actiune etica ce este de asa natura incat raportul dintre efort si rasplata nu este calculat cu precizie. Numai credintele cvasimagice functioneaza dupa reguli care desemneaza un castig calculat. Desi religiile majore au tentatia de a ingloba intreaga omenire in categoria aspirantilor la mantuire, acest universalism nu trebuie sa faca uitat faptul ca mantuirea vizeaza indivizii. Aceste religii pun accentul pe raspunderea proprie a individului de a-si cauta mantuirea, iar in traditia iudeo-crestina-musulmana fagaduinta mantuirii se adreseaza direct individului. Astfel, mantuirea este o vocatie universala, dar fiecare individ trebuie sa depuna un efort personal sau sa faca o alegere personala. Wilson subliniaza ca modul personal de a concepe mantuirea este influentat de experienta sociala individuala privitoare la conditiile necesare bunastarii. Ideea pe care o detine o persoana despre bunastare este conditionata social la randul ei. In continuare se precizeaza si alte functii ale religiei printre care regasim: organizarea societatii, mentinerea coeziunii sociale, oferirea unei identitati unor indivizi, factor de exprimare si reglare al emotiilor.

In continuare, autorul propune o paralela Occident-Orient in privinta culturii si religiei. “La natiunile avansate, atat din partea estica, cat si din cea vestica a globului, cultura generala a vietii cotidiene nu are un caracter pronuntat religios” (p. 67). Tarile occidentale se

gasesc in cadrul unui proces de secularizare. In trecut, religia a exercitat o influenta determinanta asupra profilului general al acestor culturi. Interesul diminuat al oamenilor pentru supranatural si redusa importanta a acestuia in organizarea societatii contemporane arata ca atat conceptiile despre o ordine transcendentala, cat si preocuparea pentru valorile ultime sunt din ce in ce mai putin relevante pentru viata moderna.

Progresul stiintei si dezvoltarea societatilor statale sunt doua dintre cele mai importante procese care au dus la instrainarea culturii occidentale de trecutul sau religios.

Wilson considera ca, spre deosebire de religiile orientale caracterizate de politeism si implicit printr-un grad de toleranta ridicat, religiile occidentale, iudaismul, crestinismul, islamismul s-au considerat fiecare ca fiind religie adevarata. Exclusivismul si cerinta ca dogmele religioase sa fie expuse intr-o forma logica, fara contradictii, a determinat, in cazul crestinismului aparitia si dezvoltarea unui sistem teologic cu o riguroasa tinuta intelectuala. Se poate afirma ca acest demers intelectual a pus o punte distincta si unificatoare pe cultura occidentala.

In cazul religiilor orientale, mentioneaza B. Wilson, formularea unui ansamblu de propozitii launtric constient si sistematic ordonat nu a constituit o preocupare majora nici pentru carturari nici pentru clerici sau laici. Surse de intelegere extrem de variate au fost acceptate de catre numeroase culturi orientale.

Un capitol aparte al acestei lucrari il reprezinta "sociologia sectelor". Autorul prezinta caracteristicile

acestora: caracterul exclusivist (nu admit dualitatea afilierii religioase), pretentia detinerii monopolului asupra adevarului religios in totalitatea sa; faptul de a fi organizatii seculare; respingerea diviziunii muncii pe criterii religioase (obligatiile religioase sunt aceleasi pentru toti); voluntarismul (un individ decide personal sa devina sectant); preocuparea fata de mentinerea unor norme morale ridicate in randul membrilor lor (este un fapt obisnuit ca sectele sa aplice sanctiuni celor care au un comportament inadecvat sau refractar, sanctiuni ce pot merge pana la expulzare). In general sectele se caracterizeaza prin faptul ca pretind membrilor lor un devotament total. In viata cotidiana un membru al oricareia dintre bisericile conventionale din tarile occidentale poate sa nu para mult diferit de oamenii fara convingeri religioase. Insa faptul ca o persoana este membra al unui anumit grup sectant, constituie cea mai importanta trasatura a sa.

In continuare, lucrarea trateaza problematica declinului religiei in societatea moderna, aparitia unor noi miscari religioase, gradul ridicat de atractivitate al acestora. Autorul remarca faptul ca asupra acestora nu se pot emite teorii unitare, capabile sa explice printr-un set de propozitii teoretice toate aceste fenomene actuale. "Nu se poate ajunge la o astfel de concluzie decat ignorand importanta dovezilor empirice si divesitatea istorica a societatilor si a culturilor acestora si subsumand continuturile faptice diferite unor propozitii condensate, foarte abstracte, care, desi arunca oarecare lumina asupra realitatii sociale, nu izbutesc sa o dezvaluie in mod adecvat, tocmai din

pricina gradului lor de abstractizare. Noile religii din întreaga lume au, indiscutabil, unele caracteristici și funcții comune, însă există între ele și multiple diferențe, este de așteptat ca rolurile pe care ele le îndeplinesc în diferitele societăți să fie la fel de diferite între ele ca și societățile respective, concluzionează autorul.

Ultimul capitol al acestei lucrări este dedicat secularizării. Termenul secularizare trimite la un set de propoziții enunțate adesea în termeni vagi și formând aproape un ansamblu teoretic, privitor la anumite procese de schimbare socială care au loc de-a lungul unei perioade nespecificate din istoria omenirii. Secularizarea nu este numai o modificare petrecută în societate ci și o transformare a societății în organizarea ei de bază.

Autorul consideră că unele schimbări secularizatoare au fost deliberate și conștiente, cum ar fi, de exemplu, desprinderea de putere a factorilor și organismelor religioase sau laicizarea proprietăților bisericești, pentru desemnarea cărora acest termen a fost inițial utilizat. “Secularizarea se referă la diminuarea importanței religiei pe plan social. Ea acoperă o multitudine de fenomene printre care: sechestrarea de către puterile politice a pamanturilor și a altor bunuri deținute de autoritățile religioase de către detinatorii puterii politice; trecerea de sub controlul religios sub cel secular a numeroase activități și funcții îndeplinite de religie; diminuarea cantității de timp, efort și resurse pe care oamenii le dedică preocupărilor supraempirice; declinul instituțiilor religioase; în privința chestiunilor legate de conduită, înlocuirea preceptelor religioase cu

cerințe adaptate criteriilor strict tehnice și înlocuirea treptată a unei conștiințe specific religioase (mergând de la credința în farmece, ritualuri, vraji sau rugăciuni) cu o orientare empirică, rațională, instrumentală; abandonarea interpretărilor mitice, poetice și artistice ale naturii și ale societății în favoarea unei descrieri sobre și prozaice.”

B. Wilson alături de aceste caracteristici ale secularizării și următoarea definiție: “prin termenul de secularizare înțeleg procesul prin care instituțiile, acțiunile și conștiința religioasă își pierd din importanța socială” (p. 173).

Importanța socială a religiei în viața omului era odinioară mult mai mare decât acum. Culturile și societățile din trecut, așa cum ni le dezvăluie ramăsitele lor arheologice, par a fi fost profund preocupate de supranatural. Este de remarcat faptul că și în societățile tradiționale clădirile cele mai impunătoare erau cele dedicate activităților religioase. Definiția dată de Wilson apare într-un sens mult mai larg decât la alți autori care au studiat creștinismul și care, explicit sau implicit au pus semnul egalității între secularizare și decrestinizare. Religia, prin care autorul înțelege invocarea supranaturalului, era ideologia comunității. Religia le dădea oamenilor siguranța în privința puterii pe care o dețineau, le pune la adăpost statutul ideal, le justifică averea sau îi consola pentru sărăcia lor. Autorul consideră că toate aceste funcții de odinioară ale religiei și-au pierdut din importanță pe măsura ce implicarea umană a încetat să mai fie în primul rând una la nivel local, iar asocierile umane au încetat să mai fie

comunitare. Societatea industrială în care mijloacele de subzistență nu sunt locale, nu mai are nevoie de zei sau sfinti locali, de rețete sau leacuri tamaduitoare locale.

În sistemul societal actual, supranaturalul nu joacă nici un rol în ordinea percepută, trăită și instituită. Astfel, în Occident și în alte țări puternic modernizate religia tradițională a cedat în fața transformărilor produse în organizarea socială. Noile mișcări religioase încearcă să revigoreze viața religioasă în care personalitatea și anonimatul să fie depășite, iar comunitatea de simțire să renască, fie și efemer.

Cartea se încheie într-o manieră destul de sceptică. Autorul subliniază că: "aceste tentative sunt, deocamdată, cel puțin în Occident, doar niște marturii

neoriginale ale neliniștilor noastre și firave speranțe de a le alina. Nu se vede vreo posibilitate ca oamenii să reclădească lumea pe care au pierdut-o.(...)Pana acum, tentativa de recuperare a dimensiunii religioase nu a avut succes decât la marginile și în intersecțiile societății și în principal în sfera vieții private, permitându-le unora să-și depășească cel puțin nemulțumirile prezente, și dând naștere, prin răspândirea înclinațiilor spre bunăvoință și solidaritate umană, la acea < < sare a pamantului > > de care ordinea socială are atata nevoie."

Perspectiva sociologului Bryan Wilson este una incitantă deoarece vizează tocmai problemele care au determinat cele mai vii dispute și care, cu certitudine, vor genera și în viitor numeroase frământări.



Constantin Radulescu-Motru, Scrieri Politice

Editura Nemira, Bucuresti, 1998

Volumul ofera cititorilor o selectie de texte ale lui Constantin Radulescu-Motru publicate între anii 1904 si 1942: *Cultura româna si politicianismul* (1904), *Nationalismul* (1909), *Sufletul neamului nostru* (1910), *În zilele noastre de anarhie* (1910), *Psihologia ciocoismului* (1911), *Psihologia industriasului* (1911), *Din psihologia revolutionarului* (1919), *Conceptia conservatoare si progresul* (1924), *Taranismul, un suflet si o politica* (1924), *Demagogia scolara* (1927), *Ideologia statului român* (1934), *Românismul* (1939), *Etnicul românesc* (1942). Astfel, el cuprinde practic cele mai importante contributii ale autorului, din toate sferile sale de activitate stiintifica (filosofie, politologie, sociologie, psihologie) si parcurgând întreaga perioada de creatie. Volumul se remarca, pe lînga realizarea incontestabila a republicarii în sine a textelor lui C. Radulescu-Motru într-un volum atît de cuprinzator, si printr-un studiu amplu dedicat întregii creatii a autorului (*Un totalitarism pe potrivă sufletului românesc*, de Cristian Preda). Studiul vine în sprijinul cititorului care, parcurgând doar textele lui Radulescu-Motru, se afla în pericolul unei lecturi influentate de receptarea ideologizata a acestor lucrari

pe parcursul schimbarilor cultural-politice dramatice din ultimii 150 de ani din România. Selectia de texte din prezentul volum surprinde într-un mod exceptional chiar aceste schimbari, vazute prin prisma unui autor care nu s-a rezumat la o simpla observare si consemnare a evenimentelor epocii sale, ci a încercat sa ofere explicatii si solutii la problemele timpului.

În prezentarea de fata m-am oprit asupra unui singur text, *Cultura româna si politicianismul*, primul din aceasta selectie, dintr-un considerent care tine atît de aspecte cronologice, cît si de continut: textul, fiind editat înaintea celorlalte, prezinta în forma mai mult sau mai putin incipienta toate aspectele pe care C. Radulescu-Motru le dezvolta pe parcursul întregii sale activitati. În plus, el sustine foarte bine ideea pe care doresc sa o redau în continuare, si anume cea a actualitatii scrierilor politice ale lui C. Radulescu-Motru.

„Reformele savîrsite în România de catre politicieni sunt, unele, spre folosul aparent al generatiunilor de astazi, si toate spre paguba reala a generatiunilor de mîine.”¹

Cu aceste cuvinte îsi începea Constantin Radulescu-Motru lucrarea *Cultura româna si politicianismul*, publicata pentru prima oara acum o suta de ani, în 1904. Un întreg secol ne desparte de aceasta data, un secol care a produs mult mai multe evenimente – multe dintre ele dezastruoase – decît putea sa prevada atunci marele filosof si psiholog român. Întreaga sa viata pare ca sta sub semnul trecerii secolelor: nascut în anul 1868, cu o suta de ani înaintea miscarilor studentesti care au zguduit Europa (printre altele si prin atitudinea lor

CHRISTIAN SCHUSTER

PhD. candidate, Department of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania
E-mail: schuster@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

KEY WORDS:

philosophy, Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, politics, nationalism, Romanian culture, politicianism

politica explicit anticonservatoare) si decedat în 1957, la o sută de ani după preluarea puterii în Prusia de către Wilhelm (regent care, sub influența soției sale, renunța la concepțiile puternic conservatoare în favoarea liberalismului), Radulescu-Motru și-a dedicat activitatea politica reabilitării concepției conservatorismului din România acelor vremuri. Concepția sa filosofică își are rădăcinile în filosofia lui Kant, dar contactele permanente cu viața spirituală, filosofică, psihologică, sociologică și artistică deopotrivă, din Germania și Franța timpurilor sale i-au facilitat autorului elaborarea unor idei proprii, cu aplicabilitate la realitățile românești.

Profesor la Universitatea din București și membru al Academiei Române (din 4 iunie 1923), vicepreședinte (31 mai 1935-3 iunie 1938; 31 mai 1941-2 iunie 1944) și președinte (3 iunie 1938-31 mai 1941) al prestigioasei instituții, repus în drepturile sale de membru titular (la 3 iulie 1990) după ce calitatea de membru îi fusese retrasă de către conducerea comunistă, Constantin Radulescu-Motru este, cum bine remarcă Cristian Preda, coordonatorul reeditării textelor sale în volumul *Scrisori politice* din 1998, „un autor neîndreptățit”². Printre autorii de lucrări filosofice ai perioadei sale de activitate, și îi numim aici pe Nae Ionescu, Conta, Blaga, mai târziu Mircea Eliade, Noica, Cioran, Vulcanescu și mulți alții, Radulescu-Motru nu s-a bucurat de aceeași apreciere, nici în epoca și nici mai târziu. Nu pot să-i dau dreptate aici lui Gabriel Stanescu, care în 2001 scria în *Cotidianul* că „dacă ar fi scris într-o limbă de circulație universală, un Lucian Blaga, un Noica, un Petre Tutea sau un Mircea Vulcanescu, opera lor s-ar fi bucurat de

recunoaștere europeană.”³ Nu limba i-a împiedicat pe acești oameni de cultură să intre în „circuitul european”, ci mai degrabă un lucru pe care Radulescu-Motru îl sesiza, trăgând în acest sens un semnal de alarmă, în lucrarea din 1904 *Cultura română și politicianismul*: este vorba în primul rând, spune autorul, de urmarile nefaste ale mimetismului social și cultural din a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea. Atât de mult s-au lasat copleșiți tinerii care au studiat prin țările „culte” ale Europei de diferențele față de condițiile din propria lor patrie, încât, întorși acasă, nu au fost în stare să creeze – lipsiti fiind de mediul favorabil din Apus – valori care să se impună cu adevărat. Critica sa se îndreaptă totuși către trecut, pastrând încă, printre ironiile fine și atacurile severe la adresa susținătorilor îndârjiți ai idealului pasoptist, o urmă de speranță pentru viitor: „Secolul al XX-lea găsește mimetismul nostru social într-o vătărită descrescere. Pe de o parte, cauza care-l provocase, *acele ce va zice Europa*, pierduse mult din misterul de altădată: Europa, când i-a fost dat să vorbească, a vorbit ca orice negustor capitalist, fără înconjur și fără farmec; pe de altă parte, și elita noastră socială nu mai era aceea care a fost în trecut.”⁴

Ideea principală care se desprinde din lucrarea lui Radulescu-Motru este exprimată chiar de către acesta prin cuvintele lui Nicolae Iorga: „O nouă epocă de cultură trebuie să înceapă pentru noi. Trebuie, sau altfel vom muri!”⁵ Importanța acordată culturii, ca și condiție indispensabilă pentru evoluția socială a unui stat, își face simțită prezența în fiecare capitol al lucrării, însoțită fiind pe tot parcursul de critica îndreptată împotriva

elitei politice. „Cultura este o condiție indispensabilă pentru dezvoltarea popoarelor ieșite din starea de barbarie.” – Aceasta fiind starea în care Radulescu-Motru considera că se aflase pînă nu demult (e vorba, bineînțeles, de timpul în care traia...) cultura română – „În cultura se oglindește finalitatea conștiinței sociale; prin ea, faptele dobîndesc un înțeles mai înalt, devin istorice.”⁶ Dar ce îl deranja atît de mult, la modul concret, pe Radulescu-Motru la cultura prezentului sau, încît să o disece prin toate mijloacele care îi stăteau la dispoziție: prin mijloacele psihologiei, ale filosofiei, ale sociologiei și politologiei, și nu în ultimul rînd prin talentul sau de literat? Răspunsul ni-l da chiar el, în mod repetat: *politicianismul*.

Radulescu-Motru definește conceptul de „politicianism” drept „un gen de activitate politică – sau, mai bine zis, o practică mesugită a drepturilor politice – prin care cîtiva dintre cetățenii unui Stat, tind și uneori reușesc să transforme instituțiile și serviciile publice, din mijloace pentru realizarea binelui public, cum ele ar trebui să fie, în mijloace pentru realizarea intereselor personale.”⁷ Două sunt originile pe care le poate avea politicianismul, în accepțiunea lui C. Radulescu-Motru: odată, printr-o degenerare a adevăratei politici, sau dintr-o nepotrivire între mecanismul vieții politice și fondul sufletesc al poporului chemat să-l practice. Primul lucru implică preexistența unei practici politice funcționale, pe cînd cea de-a doua se aplică vieții politice ale unor state tinere, aceasta din urmă fiind și situația la care se referă autorul cînd vorbește despre politicianismul din

România timpurilor sale. Și tot acest lucru este cel care îi conferă textului citat o actualitate cu care puține lucrări se pot lauda, după trecerea unui întreg secol de la publicare.

La fel ca multe alte „-isme”, politicianismul, ca și noțiune teoretică, ține de domeniul ideologic. Pentru Radulescu-Motru însă, el are o conotație practică cît se poate de reală, practicantii fiind cei pe care îi ataca, uneori cu dispreț, alteori cu aversiune: politicienii din România. Această critică dură la adresa clasei politice de dinaintea primului Război Mondial vine să certifice convingerea pe care o avea autorul în legătură cu rolul decisiv pe care personalitățile individuale, și în special elitele culturale ori politice, îl joacă în viața unui stat. Ca un real susținător al individualismului, Radulescu-Motru știe că „individul, luat în sine, ar fi o arătare fără de înțeles, dacă în viața socială nu i-ar fi dat lui să se asocieze și să contribuie la existența bunurilor sufletești, la cultura poporului din care face parte”.⁸ Aceasta este adevărata natură a individului, care nu poate trăi în afara societății – este, putem spune acum de la distanță pe care ne-o oferă secolul trecut între timp și prin evoluția științei de pînă în zilele noastre, un început de gîndire de genul teoriei generale a sistemelor. Actualitatea lui Radulescu-Motru trece de dimensiunea ideologico-istorică în cea a științelor sociale. Cum spuneam însă și la începutul lucrării, el a fost un autor neîndreptățit, fiind remarcat mai ales pentru realizările sale din domeniul psihologiei și mult prea puțin pentru concepțiile sale politologice sau sociologice, care, întrecînd capacitatea de comprehensiune a

contemporaneității sale, au fost trecute cu vederea în epoca și privite ca învechite la momentul redescoperirii sale.

Un alt aspect care vine să confirme această afirmație îl găsim tot în *Cultura română și politicianismul*, unde Radulescu-Motru face (deja la începutul secolului al XX-lea) o diferențiere pe care mulți sociologi nu au reușit să o facă decât foarte târziu, și anume cea dintre conceptele de „cultură” și de „civilizație”: „negresit, e mai ușor a dobândi o civilizație, decât o cultură. Și multe popoare, cu toate că rasa lor este aptă de cultură, totuși, din cauza condițiilor istorice, sunt condamnate la spoiala civilizației. Căci civilizația se împrumută prin imitație și se răspândește cu o iuteală uimitoare, cum se și pierde de altminteri tot așa de repede.”⁹ Această „spoială de civilizație” pe care o observă Radulescu-Motru la clasa politică de după 1848 se manifestă prin „împrumutarea” sistemelor de legi, de organizare instituțională, ba chiar a modei, din țările Europei occidentale în detrimentul culturii indigene, condamnată la o moarte lentă prin absorbția tot mai numeroaselor elemente culturale străine. Astfel, el îl citează amplu pe I. C. Brătianu, pe care îl acuză că „avusesse bunavoința să-i ofere [pa români], încă de la 1853, Franței. «Constituirea Statului român, zicea el [I. C. Brătianu] într-un *memoriu*, ar fi cea mai frumoasă cucerire ce a făcut vreodată Franța afara de teritoriul său. Armata Statului român ar fi armata Franței în orient, porturile sale de la Marea Neagră și de pe Dunare ar fi întreprinderile comerțului francez, și din cauza abundenței lemnului nostru de construcție, aceste

porturi ar fi tot deodată magazinele de construcție (*chantiers*) ale marinei franceze; produsele brute a acestor avute țări ar alimenta cu avantaju fabricile Franței, care ar găsi în schimb un mare debit în aceleși țări. În fine, Franța va avea toate avantajele unei colonii, fără a avea cheltuielile ce aceasta ocaziona. Compararea nu este exagerată. În lipsa de o metropolă, am adoptat de mult Franța de a doua noastră patrie; ea a devenit sursă de viață din care tragem viața noastră morală și intelectuală»¹⁰.” Cu privire la această atitudine a politicienilor români, în general a gânditorilor de la 1848, Radulescu-Motru are de spus doar atât, evident cu ironie: „Dăți-le cetățenilor români libertatea și drepturile politice, și cu aceasta i-ați fericit pentru totdeauna! Pretensiunile lor la o cultură autonomă și originală sunt minime de tot. Dacă drepturile politice sunt asigurate, dacă politicianul își are idealul sau realizat, sufletește Românii s-ar vinde oricui.”¹¹ Chiar și în zilele noastre, discuția privind departajarea conceptelor de *cultură* și de *civilizație* este departe de a se fi încheiat.¹² „Deosebirea între cultură și civilizație ne face să înțelegem (...) faptul că Statele cele puternice ale Europei sunt neobosite în ceea ce privește răspândirea civilizației, și indiferente în ceea ce privește cultura. (...) Opera civilizatoare primează pretutindeni.”¹³ Efectele sociale ale politicii de colonizare și ale economiei capitaliste sunt criticate de Radulescu-Motru, fără ca acest lucru să facă din el un adept al ideologiei marxiste (din contra, se exprimă foarte vehement împotriva socialistilor) sau naționaliste. El analizează doar, critic, „schimbările de decor venite după 1848”, schimbări care au adus, pe de

o parte, beneficiile unei civilizații apusene superioare, periclitând însă, pe de altă parte, evoluția naturală a unei culturi române unitare, dar totdeauna în cunoștința de cauză că aceste schimbări erau, pentru mulți dintre contemporanii săi, „o îndrumare spre ideal, dacă nu chiar idealul”.¹⁴

Prin urmare, aceasta este marea problemă care se pune în *Cultura română și politicianismul*, marea întrebare la care C. Radulescu-Motru încearcă să răspundă: „oare aceste schimbări de decor, începute la 1848 și continuate în tot cursul jumătății a doua a secolului trecut, pătruns-au ele în firea poporului român, pentru a constitui cu aceasta o unitate sufletească, din care să izvorască motivele unei activități viitoare? Asimilat-a oare poporul nostru în firea sa obiceiurile, instituțiile, cultura Apusului, pe care în aparență le imitam atât de docil? Desteptat-au formele civilizației apusene, în mijlocul cărora noi ne învățăm, și fondul sufletească care le susține aievea? Sau, sub aceste forme de împrumut, trăiește mai departe fondul nostru propriu moștenit din veacuri?”¹⁵

Analizând în maniera neokantiană diverse aspecte ce tin de cultura socială, politică, religioasă a poporului român și folosind metoda comparatismului prin prezentarea aspectelor echivalente din Apusul Europei, C. Radulescu-Motru ajunge la concluzia oarecum paradoxală că în România totul – justiția, instituțiile publice, până și lumea artistică – funcționează doar prin intermediul unui individ abstract, „omnipotentul *cineva*”.¹⁶ Paradoxul acestei concluzii izvorăște din convingerile individualismului și, uneori, elitismului, pe

care autorul le susține cu consecvență în mai toate lucrările sale, ajungând până la a fi exclus din Academie din pricina acestor convingeri.¹⁷ Acest „*cineva*” este motorul politicianismului, iar cei care apelează la el sunt cei care-l întrețin. „Prin ce mijloace au izbutit politicienii noștri să robească într-un timp atât de scurt sufletului poporului român? Prin ce farmec au știut ei să momască atâtea capete, care s-au alipit lor și ne-au adus astfel în starea de pseudo-cultură în care ne găsim astăzi?”, se întreaba Radulescu-Motru. Și tot el ne luminează: „Răspunsul la asemenea întrebări mi se pare a fi numai unul; acela care, în teza generală, s-a adeverit a fi o lege urmata în dezvoltarea tuturor popoarelor care s-au aflat în condițiile în care ne-am aflat și noi. Adevărul anume: că orice popor (...) se robește cu ușurința unui gen nou de viață, de câte ori în acest gen nou de viață se exalta viciile sau relele sale deprinderi din trecut. Virtutile sau deprinderile bune sunt ca zidurile de apărare ale individualității unui popor; ele sunt greu de dăruit și în toate cazurile greu de reconstruit; viciile sau deprinderile rele însă sunt totdeauna ca niște porți, deschise oricărei inovații venite din afară. (...) Noul mod de viață pe care tu-l aduci este un simplu decor, care vine să poleiască sau să rafineze o veche slabiciune. Așa se explică și izbânda politicianismului nostru.”¹⁸

„A împrumuta tiparul extern al vieții Statelor constituționale, fără a împrumuta și sufletul acestor state; a avea pe hârtie alegeri libere pentru parlament și în fapt a fura urnele chiar prin mijlocirea jandarmilor care trebuiau să le păzească; a înființa mii de slujbasi și

apoi a constata ca exactitatea acestora la serviciu este dependenta de culesul viilor si de lasarea secului; a vota legile cele mai liberale din lume în care sunt înscrise toate drepturile pentru cetateni, si în fapt sa se tolereze absoluta iresponsabilitate a puterii executive, acestea toate nu constituie un progres, ci o falsificare a progresului.”¹⁹

Politicianismul din România nu este, dupa cum am vazut prin intermediul lui Radulescu-Motru, o aparitie a epocii postcomuniste. Se poate chiar spune ca avem o lunga si bogata traditie în ceea ce priveste aceasta forma devianta de manifestare a actului politic, pe care Radulescu-Motru o denumeste fara inhibitie o boala a societatii. În rolul sau de parazit („parazitii nu pot sa prospere decât în corpurile intrate în descompunere”²⁰) îl întâlnim pe politician pretutindenii: în România si în celelalte state balcanice, în America de Sud sau noile state africane, în Extremul Orient sau în fostele republici sovietice – „El este o aparitie necesara în politica lumii întregi.”²¹ Descrierile pe care Constantin Radulescu-Motru le face multora dintre aceste regiuni par sa arate ca din acest punct de vedere nimic nu s-a schimbat în acest secol ce a trecut. Rolul „civilizator” al marilor puteri economice a ramas acelasi, la fel ca si mecanismul politicianismului în tinerele democratii. Unde ramâne progresul acestui ultim secol, unde sunt salturile culturale si de civilizatie pe care omenirea considera ca le-a efectuat în acest timp? Radulescu-Motru își încheie discursul din *Cultura româna si politicianismul* pe un ton optimist, dupa ce pe sute de

pagini a înșirat sute de motive ce îndeamna la pesimism, dând prin aceasta un sfat care transcede barierele timpului: „Sa avem încredere.”

Note:

1 Citatul se regaseste aici: Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Cultura româna si politicianismul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti 1998, pag. 177.

2 Cristian Preda: *Un totalitarism pe potrivă sufletului românesc*, studiu introductiv în: C. Radulescu-Motru: *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti 1998.

3 Gabriel Stanescu: *Nae Ionescu fata-n fata cu reactiunea*, în *Cotidianul*, martie 2001.

4 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Cultura româna si politicianismul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti 1998, pag. 83.

5 *Semanatorul*, No. 20 (1903), citat dupa *Scrieri politice*, pag. 84.

6 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Cultura româna si politicianismul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti 1998, pag. 72.

7 Ibidem, pag. 65.

8 Ibidem, pag. 73.

9 H.S. Chamberlain: *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, pag. 809, citat dupa *Scrieri politice*, pag. 111.

10 I. C. Bratianu: *Memoriu asupra Românilor dat Împăratului Napoleon III* (publicat în *Romanul*, 6 Decembrie 1861), citat dupa *Scrieri politice*, pag. 81-82.

11 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Cultura româna si politicianismul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti 1998, pag. 81.

12 Buna oara, *culture* din engleza corespunde în oarecare masura conceptului de *Zivilisation* din germana, si invers, *civilisation* este mai degraba apropiat de *Kultur*. Nici limba franceza, nici alta limba nu ofera o echivalare perfecta a

conceptelor. Încercarea de a face totuși o distincție clară între cele două noțiuni este, pentru momentul respectiv, un act de mare importanță științifică pentru științele sociale. Ce păcat totuși că receptivitatea acestui fapt s-a lăsat atât de mult așteptată. Asemenea dificultăți apar mai ales în momentul încercării de a traduce scrieri științifice importante, erorile de traducere ducând deseori la înțelegerea diferită a autorilor în limbile diferitelor popoare. Exemplul pe care-l consider foarte elocvent în acest sens este traducerea cărții lui Samuel P. Huntington *Clash of Civilisations* în diferite limbi.

13 Constantin Radulescu-Motru, departe de a fi un ignorant în ceea ce privește valoarea reală a civilizației și culturii europene, exprimă în *Cultura română și politicianismul* o poziție similară cu cea a „euroscepticilor” sau a mișcării anti-globalizare ale începutului de secol XXI.

14 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Cultura română și politicianismul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, București 1998, pag. 121.

15 Ibidem, pag. 122.

16 Ibidem, pag. 153.

17 Bineînțeles, nu acesta a fost unicul motiv al excluderii sale. Mult mai greu în balanță a cântărit probabil argumentul susținerii de către el a Germaniei fasciste. Pentru aceasta, vezi Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Conceptia conservatoare și progresul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, București 1998, pag. 331-336.

18 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Cultura română și politicianismul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, București 1998, pag. 161.

19 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Conceptia conservatoare și progresul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, București 1998, pag. 329.

20 Constantin Radulescu-Motru: *Cultura română și politicianismul*, în volumul *Scrieri politice*, Ed. Nemira, București 1998, pag. 181.

21 Ibidem, pag. 67.

Leonard Swidler, Dupa absolut. Viitorul dialogic al reflectiei religioase

Ed. Limes, Cluj, 2003

Leonard Swidler is one of the most significant thinkers and promoters of the dialogue in the context of a perpetual redefining of contemporary religious identities. He is a Professor at Temple University, Philadelphia, co-president of the *Global Dialogue Institute* and co-editor of the *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*. He is also the author and coordinator of over 60 books among which we can mention: *Dialogue for Reunion* (1962), *Women in Judaism* (1976), *Kung in Conflict* (1981), *Yeshua: A Model for Moderns* (1993), *Theoria ? Praxis. How Jews, Christians, Muslims Can Together Move From Theory to Practice* (1998), *The Study of Religion in an Age of Global Dialogue* (2000) and many others.

The first Romanian translation of the well-known American Catholic theologian, *After the Absolute. The dialogical future of religious reflection* was published by the notable Limes Publishing House from Cluj -Napoca .The translation made by Codruta Cuceu, a conversant with Leonard Swidler's work, is to be remarked due to the harmonic literalism of the text and to the accuracy of

expression. The total deciphering of the English phrase embedded in the dialogical reflection of the book was obtained by Codruta Cuceu after a thorough work and very long discussions with some of the most important scholars in the field.

One of the most original perspectives framed in *After the Absolute*, is that a religious reflection on religion's dialogical future has to go beyond the strict level of inter-confessional and inter-religious dialogue. The cultural and religious context of modern world requires the extension of the discussions of the worldviews that try to comprehend the meaning of life and to circumscribe a way of living according to the new dialogical standards.

Assuming as a standpoint a broad dialogical perspective, Leonard Swidler considers that the task of our times is to discover the necessary openness to engage in the dialog between religions and ideologies at the general level of contemporary mentality but also at the particular level of some communities' customs. In order to make possible such a dialogue, the Catholic theologian holds that the two terms –religion and ideology –have to be connected to a broader category drawn by the theological paradigm. Theology is defined by the author as a systematic religious and ideological reflection. If we accept that theology – considered as the search for the meaning of live and for the means to live accordingly – is a “worldview and way”, we find ourselves confronted with a system in which the two basic categories - religion and ideology – coexist.

SANDU FRUNZA

Assoc. Prof., Ph.D., Dept.
of Systematic Philosophy,
BBU, Cluj, Romania.

Author of the books: *O antropologie mistica* (1996), *Iubirea si transcendentia* (1999), *Experienta religioasa in gindirea lui Dumitru Staniloae* (2001), *Fundamentalismul religios si noul conflict al ideologiilor* (2003)

E-mail:
sfrunza@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

KEY WORDS:

Leonard Swidler, interreligious dialogue, absolute, ideology, religion

Such a “worldview and way” always includes the “four Cs”: the creed as a system of beliefs, the code as an ethical system, the cult as a celebratory system, and the community as a social system.

The author distinguishes between two species of theology in accordance with the place taken by transcendence. A conception based on an entity which transcends humanity and world as such, belongs to the category of *religion*. On the other hand, an explanation based only on a reality intrinsic to our world, an explanation that excludes the idea of transcendence, belongs to the category of *ideology*.


This paradigm shift assumed by the theological approach of the perspectives upon life is needed by the Catholic theologian in order to circumscribe the frameworks for advancing a dialogue not only between different confessions or Christian Churches, but also between the religious groups and those groups that take as an “explanation of the meaning of life and how to live accordingly” a perspective more or less religious or laicized and engage themselves in an inter-religious or inter-ideological dialogue.

For a traditional theological perspective it is clear that it would be difficult to accept that such an inclusion under the same category of religion and ideology is possible. The experience of ideology as a secularized religion helps us to make a clear distinction between religion and ideology and to consider theology not as a more comprehensive category, but as the most elaborate form of reflection from the standpoint of the constituted religions. It is true that ideologies, considered as

the models of a reality globally constituted, presuppose constructs based on the experience of the world and on the efficient action, while theologies – themselves imaginative creations – are always the result of an assembly of structures of the sacra which belong equally to the transcendent and to the transcendental. In other words, religion, altogether with its more refined expression, theology, is the creation of an icon/incarnate which itself and its consequences surmised by the theological model of the world cannot be understood outside the biblical testimony. It is an icon which, as an original meeting constantly actualized, is strengthened by the power of an Archetype which circumscribes it to a structural figuring in an interpersonal dynamic underpinned by the immanence-transcendence unity.

But besides all prejudices concerning the nuances of the term ideology, it is clear that the option for a secularized existence reduplicated by the need of a religious renewal, which cannot be ignored by the traditional ecclesiastic institutions, are part of our experience of this century. In his effort, the remarkable American thinker manages to find an original and very efficacious compromise that is necessary for a Christian resetting of the significances and the possibilities of cohabitation in this century. Such an intellectual game has some special consequences at the level of a practical meeting between confessions, religions, and religions and ideologies. The empirical field, the cognitive field, and the spiritual one can thus find the way of a common approach.

In a systematic and very creative reflection, Leonard Swidler proposes a broad discussion of some theoretical



AUREL CODOBAN

Prof., Ph.D., Department of Systematic Philosophy, BBU, Cluj, Romania. Author of the books: *Repere si prefigurari* (1982), *Structura semiologica a structuralismului* (1984), *Introducere in filosofie* (1995), *Sacru si ontofanie* (1998), *Teoria semnelor si interpretarii* (2001), *Amurgul iubirii. De la iubirea pasiune la comunicarea corporala* (2004). E-mail: codoban@hiphi.ubbcluj.ro

subject-matters for dialogue that appear in the Christian context, but also of the dialogue with Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism or of the dialogue with Marxism. The ideal goal of the author's approach is to translate the religious reflection in an *Ecumenical Esperanto* that gives us the means needed for a real inter-religious and inter-ideological dialogue, starting with the basic of dialogue generally accepted.

Leonard Swidler's book is one of the most important appearances in Romanian culture after 1989. I believe that this book cannot be left aside, being a must both for theologians dealing with inter-religious dialogue or ecumenism, and also for scholars in political sciences, communication, philosophers and sociologists.

In times when the religious element is reaffirmed as a force within the context of globalization, the scholars from all fields of scientific and cultural research find themselves in need of searching a dialogical paradigm that avoids the conflicts bearing a religious dimension.

Aurel Codoban

Gal Laszlo, Societate si Logicitate

Ed. Cartimpex, Cluj, 2004

Aceasta carte are o tema de mare actualitate, sau cel putin mie mi se pare foarte actuala din cauza câtorva motive importante¹. Ma marginesc aici si acum la aceasta carte desi cunosc si teza de doctorat din care a rezultat o excelenta carte care pune în conjunctie limba si logicitatea. În ambele carti m-a interesat foarte mult continutul de idei si în numele acelui continut, am îndraznit sa ma avînt în prezentarea acestei carti, ceea ce, trebuie sa recunosc, e o dificultate pentru mine pentru ca a trecut multa vreme de cînd mi-am încercat capacitatile logice, ca student, în contextul cursurilor si examenelor si m-am temut ca lectura va fi un test de logica într-adevar solicitant. Partea de logica formala, prezenta în aceasta carte, este însa strict limitata la ceea ce este necesar, nu este în exces si este foarte clar prezentata, asa cum trebuie sa fie într-o carte, pe care oricine din publicul larg o poate citi.

Sa va explic de ce cred ca este foarte importanta si tema si cartea: În contextul logicii se întîmpla acest lucru cred, este o miscare pulsabila, adica o miscare care

KEY WORDS:

applied logic, Gal
Laszlo, communication,
interpretation, society

oscileaza între formalizare excesiva si tendinta de a aborda ceea ce este de abordat logic concret, tendinta de aplicare. În cele ce urmeaza, am sa încerc sa explic sensul în care, autorul gîndeste, relatia dintre societate si logicitate si sensul în care gîndeste logica, ca disciplina aplicativa. Ma marginesc sa parcurg ideile acestei carti, idei care mi se par si importante si interesante din perspectiva aceasta a unei logici care doreste sa se aplice, a unei logici care merge într-o tendinta pulsabila contrara formalismului în care logica a excelat. Logica pe care noi o cunosteam, era logica care tindea tot mai mult sa se formalizeze. Logica pe care domnul profesor Gal ne-o propune, este o logica care vrea sa revina la viata, vrea sa devina cumva aplicativa. Acuma lucrurile sunt un pic mai complete si mai complexe. E un text din care as dori sa citez pe urmele lui Kurt Goedel, care gîndeste cît de paradoxala poate deveni formalizarea si care ne îngaduie sa spunem ca: “Nici un sistem nu va putea cuprinde în sine toate adevarurile”. Directia aceasta aplicativa pe care, domnul profesor Gal o initiaza cu aceasta carte mi se pare foarte importanta, pentru ca merge împotriva formalismelor.

Dati-mi voie sa examinez cîteva dintre ideile prezente în carte. Mai întîi de toate titlul: *Societate si Logicitate*, trebuie sa ne imaginam din perspectiva paradoxului pe care l-am citat, societatea seamana cu un fel de biscuite si logicitatea seamana cu ceaiul si societate si logicitate nu înseamna de fapt ca toata societatea devine logica. Înseamna ca ea poate fi infuzata cu logicitatea, acesta este sensul aplicativitatii logicii, ca diferite domenii, diferite aspecte ale vietii

noastre pot fi infuzate cu logicitate. Biscuitele ramîne biscuite, dar este patruns de ceaiul tare al logicii. Cartea mi se pare suplimentar interesanta pentru ca atunci cînd scrii o carte precum este teza de doctorat, atunci orientarea este omogena, efortul si intentia ta sunt oarecum unitare si coerente. E foarte greu sa-ti dai seama cum gîndeste un om daca îi citesti doar o singura carte, putem folosi si în acest sens formula ca: “ma tem de omul unei singure carti”, e foarte greu de descoperit cum este. În schimb aceasta carte, care este un fel de culegere de texte, publicate, prezentate cu diferite ocazii de domnul profesor Gal, ne ofera ocazii diferite în care aceeasi atitudine logica se manifesta, contextele sunt diferite, deci aici exista o contextualizare si atunci cu atît este mai relevant felul în care el îsi prezinta ideile sau care este tendinta lui adevarata în directia aplicativitatii. Îmi place foarte mult sa descopar ca are un obiect predilect de analiza, acesta a fost unul dintre motivele interesului; am si dat ca bibliografie cartea domnului profesor din acest motiv, interesul lui pentru proverbe. Mi se pare pentru un logician, extrem de interesant si ilustrativ în ceea ce priveste logica aplicata, acest interes pentru proverbe si ele nu apar doar într-un loc sau altul. Chiar atunci cînd vrea sa foloseasca exemple didactice pentru a-si ilustra ideile, adesea domnul profesor recurge la astfel de proverbe care sunt instrumente de comunicare si interpretare. Exista înca o linie pe care as vrea sa o desprindem si pe care vreau sa o folosesc la “crosetat”, aceasta linie rezulta dintr-un citat pe care tot asa l-am ales, el suna asa: “proverbele ofera solutii si poate, resemnare, si nu eficienta”.

Un alt obiect predilect de analiza, pe lînga proverbe, sunt si modurile de gîndire. Îmi place aceasta formula a modurilor de gîndire si regasesc aici o preocupare comuna care priveste diversitatea moderna. Exista un pasaj foarte bun care spune ca, aceasta diversitate moderna, aceasta pluralizare a diversitatilor moderne, este cea care conduce la comunicare si în cele din urma la inventia sau invocatia alteritatii. Modurile de gîndire reprezinta din nou o maniera concreta în care logica se cere aplicata în aceasta infuzie între logica si societate pe care o descriam înainte.

Exista în aceasta carte si asta este ceea ce suplimentar o face interesanta, exista o anumita formula de înțelepciune. Cu filozofia se întîmpla ceea ce s-a întîmplat si cu logica - a devenit metafizica, i-a placut sa se retraga într-un “turn de fildes”, sa devina hiperabstracta în limbaj si foarte departe de ceea ce este realitatea temîndu-se de un fel de murdarie. Or, adevarul este ca si filozofia si logica prima ca forme efective ale înțelepciunii erau legate de viata cetateanului grec din cetatea greaca. Aceasta carte este de asemenea legata de viata noastra, de viata noastra din acest oras chiar si în formula în care se petrece ea, cu toate detaliile ei concrete. Ca sa revin, sa fac un fel de miscare dubla, voi trece imediat la Goedel cu o alta formula care mi se pare foarte înțeleapta si care deriva efectiv din acest paradox goedel-ian si care as pune-o alaturi de celelalte citate, înainte fata de proverbe, sa vedeti ce deductie scoate aplicînd paradoxul goedelian domnul profesor Gal Laszlo, el spune: ”nici o societate nu poate realiza binele tuturor”, aceasta este o fraza efectiv filozofica scoasa

dintr-un paradox logic si e unul dintre acele semne pe care le indicam ale înțelepciunii. Asta este ceea ce îmi place sa regasesc în aceasta carte, este foarte interesant sa vezi la un logician, pîna unde merge cu aplicarea paradoxului goedelian, admitînd si aici interesul nostru pentru proverbe ar trebui sa fie similar, al meu din partea hermeneuticii sau semnificatiei, a dînsului din partea logicii, merge pîna acolo încît observa ca exista o pretentie de universalitate a acestor proverbe si ca aceasta pretentie de universalitate a proverbelor implica caracterul lor contradictoriu. Ceea ce este realitatea proverbelor, la fel ca si societatea care nu poate realiza binele tuturor, nici proverbele nu pot realiza un sistem logic strict coerent pe contradictoriu.

Am trecut cu mult interes, dar pot vorbi mai putin de schitele de istorie a logicii. Îmi era cunoscut Apacai Csere Ianos, m-a interesat foarte mult studiul despre Bohm Karoly, care îmi era mai putin cunoscut si va marturisesc ca ar trebui mai multa lume dintre noi sa-l citeasca, pentru o buna cunoastere reciproca. E o foarte subtila si buna prezentare si convine foarte mult unui dialog cultural autentic realizat aici în contextul transilvan. Mai este aici un set de idei în care ma simt foarte aproape de domnul profesor Gal Laszlo; este ideea pluralitatii logicii contemporane. Problema este daca exista mai multe logici sau exista o logica unitara care, desigur, atît pe orizontala cît si pe verticala cunoaste o dispersie. Înclin sa cred, asa cum într-un alt articol am vazut ca si domnul profesor Gal înclina sa creada ca exista mai degraba o pluralitate a logicilor contemporane.

Ajungem în sfîrșit la partea care mie mi se pare cea mai interesantă și anume la logica dialogului rațional și la logica argumentării juridice. Aceste părți sunt efectiv părți de logică aplicată și părți care leagă logica de ceea ce este teoretizarea dialogului și comunicării în clipa de față. Într-adevăr, aceste texte dau măsură stilului de gîndire: logica aplicată pe care domnul Gal Laszlo vrea să o promoveze și mi se pare de nivelul efectiv al ultimelor realizări occidentale, este la punct și este admirabil că se poate înscrie pe o astfel de traiectorie de realizări de vîrf în ceea ce privește partea aplicată a logicii.

Ultimul dintre textele acestei cărți mi se pare foarte interesant și dacă am început cu aspectul acesta teoretic, problematic și de formalizare, așa vrea închei cu acest text care se numește “Gratuitate, alternanță și viitor”, pentru că pune în discuție una dintre ideile născute în școala filozofică clujeană, aceea legată de problema gratuității și felul în care o tratează, e felul înțelept în care revede, reia pur și simplu ideea aplicativității, atît a logicii cît și a filozofiei. Observația la adresa filozofiei cu care sunt de acord este că: în întregul ei filozofia nu se poate aplica, ea poate crea doar un mediu de dialog civic, politic și social și că aplicabile sunt teoriile luate bucată de bucată, în acest sens vorbim de o aplicativitate chiar și în logică. Domnul profesor Gal Laszlo se întîlnește cu cele mai interesante și noi teorii care susțin

că ceea ce este cultura este implicat în schimburile de piață. Am putea vorbi într-un sens foarte larg despre economia bunurilor simbolice. Ceea ce susține domnul profesor Gal este aceasta: că trebuie să gîndim produsele noastre culturale de aici înainte, fie că suntem logicieni sau filozofi, în maniera în care piața ne propune să le gîndim. Adică gratuitatea nu mai are circulația pe care o propunea profesorul D.D. Rosca alta dată și noi trebuie să ne înscriem în această formă a comunicării care este structura pietei. În ceea ce îl privește pe autor, așa vrea să-l felicit, să subliniez la el ceea ce găsesc că este adevăratul stil logic.

E o carte de mare transparență, care are claritatea de cristal a logicii, dar fără să aibă îndepărtarea rece, cum au cristalele logice, de gheață. E o carte în care există multă viață, într-adevăr, și multă aplicabilitate, dar există o structură logică impecabilă foarte clară și asta este îndeosebi de apreciat; întreaga carte este nu numai o carte de logică, dar și o carte de filozofie care face de fapt că ceea ce este stilul emfatic al metafizicii să nu mai aibă circulație.

Note:

1 Textul reprezintă prezentarea de la lansarea cărții la Polul Cultural Clujean.